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A b s t r a c t
The aim of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the concept of critical 
junctures in political science. In this regard the dissertation examines the approach’s 
evolution to this point. It is argued here that the critical junctures approach, as it had 
developed up to now, has lacked rigour. Consequently, the approach is remoulded in 
ways that add to its rigour and applicability. Improving upon the approach will involve 
specifying clearly defined standards that enable the identification of levels of change in 
order to see if that change constitutes a critical juncture. This systemisation of 
standards will improve the usefulness of the critical junctures approach in identifying 
change both within and across countries over time.
The remoulded critical junctures approach is employed in examining changes in 
the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in a series of case 
studies in Ireland, Britain, the United States of America, and Sweden spanning the 
period 1945-2000. This is in order to see if these changes in the trade unions’ influence 
over public policy constituted critical junctures. This research is based on the extensive 
assessment of trade union documentation, the media, government and political party 
publications, and other policy papers, along with the extensive use of secondary source 
material from these countries.
This dissertation argues that the remoulded critical junctures approach, as set out 
here, possesses a clarity that was lacking in the literature up until now. The clear 
criteria concerning the levels of change permits the identification of critical junctures. 
Thus, uncertainty surrounding the concept of critical junctures is diminished. What is 
more, the approach as set out here is designed to be readily applicable to any research 
project concerned with the issue of change.
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I n t r o d u c t io n
This dissertation seeks to improve upon our understanding of the concept of critical 
junctures. In this regard the dissertation takes the concept as it has evolved to this point 
and remoulds it. It is argued here that the approach, as it has developed, lacks a certain 
rigour. Specifics and standards relating to levels of change have been absent from the 
approach, and this absence has weakened the approach. Consequently, the remoulded 
approach will be rigorous, applicable, operationalizable, and falsifiable.
With the study of institutions assuming an important place in comparative 
politics in recent years the various institutional approaches have come to the fore. The 
new institutionalist approach is not one all encompassing methodology, but instead is 
made up of a variety of approaches ranging from rational choice institutionalism to 
historical institutionalism. However, these approaches have difficulty dealing with the 
all-important issue of change. Historical institutionalism, for example, tends to treat 
institutions as static variables, this being immiscible to the whole idea of change. This 
in itself then leads on to the concept of institutional determinism, a concept anathema to 
change. But, employing the critical junctures approach provides a means of identifying 
change within an institutional context. Collier and Collier (1991) have argued that the 
critical junctures framework is particularly appropriate in the study of trade unions, 
politics, and the economy. Nevertheless, their approach possesses vagueness, and this 
vagueness weakens it as an explanatory instrument. Here we will take the critical 
junctures approach, remould it in certain ways that add to its rigour and applicability, 
and then test this remoulded approach with a series of case studies that will focus on 
change in trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in four different 
countries. This is in order to see if these changes in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy constitute critical junctures, and if the approach stands up to empirical
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scrutiny. As Visser (1996, p. 1) argues ‘comparisons across countries is an essential 
tool, because only thus can we create the ‘quasi-experimentaP conditions needed for 
testing our theories.’
This dissertation is divided into seven separate chapters. The first chapter is the 
literature review. This chapter begins with a general discussion on the evolution of the 
political science discipline over the course of the twentieth century. This involves a 
brief analysis of the literature relating to old institutionalism, behaviouralism and 
rational choice approaches, before concentrating upon new institutionalism, and in 
particular historical institutionalism. The chapter concludes with an in depth 
examination of the critical junctures literature. This section then examines what the 
critical junctures approach has to offer for correcting historical institutionalism’s 
weaknesses, especially weaknesses relating to the issue of change. The chapter then 
sets out, in detail, the remoulded critical junctures approach.
The second chapter is devoted entirely to the methodology employed within the 
dissertation. The section explains in detail why the trade unions are focused upon, why 
a case studies approach was chosen, and the logic utilised in choosing which countries 
to concentrate upon, and the time frame to set all this within. The chapter then 
discusses the analytical narrative approach that is employed in the case study Chapters 
IV through VII. The methodology section lays out in minute detail the hypotheses and 
observable implications that will be used to test the remoulded critical junctures 
approach’s ability to identify change. The argument set out here is that there is a critical 
juncture only if there is a generative cleavage or crisis, and a period of change that is 
significant, swift, and enduring in nature.
Chapter III sets out the prima facie evidence of changes in the trade union peak 
organisations’ influence over public policy that, in each of the countries, possibly
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constituted critical junctures. In performing this duty the chapter allows the main body 
of the dissertation bypass providing a prolonged historical narrative tracing the political, 
economic, and industrial relation evolution of the countries under examination. 
Consequently, the chapter is succinct in its structure and objectives. The approach 
adopted permits the subsequent chapters to examine, in detail, a manageable number of 
instances of change in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy 
in order to see if they do in fact constitute critical junctures. In all, there are 15 
instances where the trade unions’ influence over public policy was prima facie 
identified as having changed to the extent of constituting possible critical junctures.
The main chapters of the dissertation, Chapters IV-VII, concentrating on Ireland, 
Britain, the United States of America, and Sweden, respectively, apply the analytic 
narrative methodology to the countries’ political, economic, and industrial relations 
evolutions. The objective of these chapters is to investigate, using the observable 
implications criteria derived from the hypotheses, whether those hypotheses relating to 
change in trade union influence over public policy can identify critical junctures. The 
essence o f this examination is the search for significant, swift and enduring change in 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy at the time o f a generative cleavage, this 
in the form of a macroeconomic crisis.
Since much of the material used in this dissertation was archival in origin, a 
necessity was to integrate it within the wider framework o f industrial relations, political, 
and economic history. As a consequence, much secondary material, focused on the 
period under discussion, is employed to augment the primary sources. However, 
despite the fact that the period under examination was relatively recent, there was great 
variation in the extent to which the studied countries maintained comprehensive records 
on the data under examination. Consequently, there are degrees of inconsistency in
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relation to the detail o f certain of the material utilised here. The state-by-state 
structuring was also adopted in favour o f a thematic approach as it permits comparison 
between states, and yet still provides sufficient leeway to allow for the incompleteness 
of certain of the material under examination in relation to certain of the countries. 
Nevertheless, a consistent analytic narrative methodology will be employed throughout 
the dissertation, thus blending the hypotheses, their observable implications, and the 
findings within chapters rich with ‘thick historical descriptions of empirical cases’ 
(Campbell and Pedersen, 2001, p. 13).
Due to the constraints placed upon the size of this dissertation the amount of 
material included was to an extent limited. There were vast amounts of other materials 
that were relevant in the sense that they placed certain of the incidents studied within 
their wider context, and elaborated on this wider context in time and place. But in the 
interests of brevity this material could not be included. Only the most significant 
materials, after having been carefully considered on the merits of their contribution to 
the arguments set out, have been included. Certain other materials, these relating to 
economic statistics, and trade union growth and density figures, have been provided in 
the appendices at the back of the dissertation.
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C h a p t e r  I
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w
The objective of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the concept of critical 
junctures. It is argued here that the concept, as it has developed to this point, lacks a 
certain rigour. The critical junctures approach is vague. Consequently, the central 
question is how to improve upon the critical junctures approach? That process shall 
involve the remoulding and fleshing out the concept as it has developed, essentially 
endowing it with specifics where previously it had none, and in so doing adding to our 
understanding of critical junctures, and their usefulness in identifying change both 
within and across countries over time. This process is to be conducted without 
discarding any of the central arguments of the definition of a critical juncture as 
developed by Collier and Collier (1991). Nevertheless, clearly defined standards are 
developed, and laid down, that will enable the identification of levels of change in order 
to see if that change in fact constitutes a critical juncture, or not, as the case may be. 
This will enable the identification of what does, and what does not, constitute a critical 
juncture. In essence, the thesis is taking a concept that has certain nebulous qualities to 
it, and defining it more clearly. Put simply, the aim is to set out a systematic approach 
for assessing potential critical junctures in a logical and methodical fashion. In so doing 
the approach developed here is readily applicable to any research project focusing on 
the issue o f change, as the standards developed here are universal in nature.
This chapter, the literature review, will discuss the evolution o f the political 
science discipline over the twentieth century, with brief discussions on old 
institutionalism, behaviouralism, and new institutionalism, before moving on to 
consider historical institutionalism. Institutions have, of late, taken centre stage in 
comparative politics, after falling from grace during the middle of the twentieth century. 
The chapter discusses, in detail, the literature relating to the evolution of historical 
institutionalism, and critical junctures specifically. From the late 1980s onwards,
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historical institutionalism came to the forefront of new institutionalism to present a set 
of theoretical and methodological challenges to the more established political science 
traditions. This focus on historical institutionalism will examine what the literature has 
to say on that approach’s strengths, as well as its weaknesses, and what the critical 
junctures approach has to offer for correcting those particular weaknesses, especially 
weaknesses relating the issues of change in historical institutionalism.
1. From Old Institutionalism to New Institutionalism
The roots of political science are to be found in the analysis and design of institutions. 
For Plato and Aristotle -  as well as for Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes and 
others in that tradition -  one of the major problems was to ascertain which political 
institutions produce the best type of society and individual (Rothstein, 1996, p. 136). 
As the discipline began to emerge in the latter part of the nineteenth century, its 
principal questions remained institutional and normative. Political science was about 
the formal aspects o f government, including the law, and its attention was squarely on 
the machinery o f the governing system. Many of its aims were normative, and it was 
concerned with discovering which institutions would function most efficiently within a 
particular political system. The traditional approach to the state emphasised that what 
was special about the state is not the fact that it is composed of institutions, but that 
state institutions are very particular (Lane and Ersson, 1991, p. 361). Political science 
was very much in the service of the state. However, after World War II new approaches 
were adopted that sought to make political science more scientific. The study of 
political science switched over from an inductive to a deductive approach. The study of 
political institutions was supplanted by the study of attitudes and political behaviours. 
However, this approach, with its grand theorising, was found wanting in the field of
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cross-national research during the 1970s. Behaviouralism was in turn then supplanted 
by a return to the study of institutions during the early 1980s.
Old Institutionalism
The study o f institutions dominated the field of political science. Indeed, in its early 
years political science meant the study of political institutions (Wilson 1891). The early 
theories of political scientists, such as J. W. Burgess, economists such as Thorstein 
Veblen, and sociologists such as Max Weber, all laid particular emphasises on the 
importance o f institutions. It is from this well of knowledge that the new institutionalist 
writers have all drawn inspiration. The work of this school of old institutionalists 
constituted the basis of political science for much of the late nineteenth and the first half 
o f the twentieth centuries. ‘[It] characterised political science until at least the early 
1950s, and to some extent never really died out among many student of politics’ (Peters, 
1996, p. 205). The old institutionalists concentration was mainly, though not 
exclusively, on configurative studies of different administrative, legal, and political 
structures. For them institutions were complex and reoccurring patterns of behaviour 
and interaction that had acquired a degree of legitimacy (Huntington, 1965, p. 394). 
The little comparative analysis then conducted did not encourage the development of 
concepts that would have permitted a comparative research that would have advanced 
explanatory theory (Eckstein and Apter, 1963, p. 6). Comparative politics, in particular, 
consisted mostly of detailed configurative studies of different legal, administrative and 
political structures. Nevertheless, old institutionalism did make some definite 
contributions to the comprehension of governance. ‘One contribution came from the 
attention given to the details of structures which is, to some degree, returning to 
academic fashion - particularly in historical institutionalism’ (Peters, 1996, p. 206).
For all the insight and descriptive richness of the older institutionalist literature, 
with some important exceptions (cf. Herring 1940; Key 1947), it does not appear to 
contemporary eyes to have the theoretical aspirations and motivations we have come to 
associate with social sciences. Early political science was often more descriptive than 
analytical. The old institutionalists usually employed the methodology o f the intelligent 
observer attempting to describe and understand the political world around them in 
simple terms (Carter and Herz, 1962). Nevertheless, James Bryce, Herman Finer, and 
Carl Friedrich, all theorists active in the field of old institutionalism, produced a number 
o f works that still bear reading today. However, they were utilising different techniques 
for different purposes than are most contemporary social scientists (Apter, 1991). 
‘Despite their being characterised, or even stereotyped, as being atheoretical and 
descriptive, it is still important to note that there were theories lurking in this research’ 
(Peters, 1999, p. 6).
Even if  not explicitly theoretical, the old institutionalist scholars’ efforts laid the 
groundwork for contemporary institutionalist analyses. However, new institutionalism 
developed not to reassert certain of the virtues of the older form of analysis, but as a 
statement on failings in the conventional wisdom within political science. 
Consequently, to understand new institutionalism requires not only an understanding of 
old institutionalism, but also a comprehension of the schools of thought that emerged 
between the two,
Behaviouralism and the Rational Choice Approach
In the immediate post-war years a new generation of political scientists attempted to 
make the study of politics more scientific. For many, this effectively meant that 
political science ought to model itself on the hard sciences that they believed was
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fundamentally a deductive process. Thus rather than studying the details of political life 
and inductively uncover the patterns of behaviour and action, political science should be 
a deductive science that seeks to discover the general laws and fundamental forces that 
lay behind political action. Focusing on particular institutions, proponents of this 
intellectual agenda implied, was atheoretical.
Concomitant with the push for more abstract laws, political scientists were 
disillusioned by the failure of parliamentary institutions in Weimar Germany (and later 
in post-colonial Africa) to prevent these polities from devolving into authoritarianism 
(Steinmo, 2001). Many argued that there were bigger, more important, indeed more 
fundamental, forces at work in politics and development than political institutions. 
These forces, they argued, should be the focus of political science. Thus, behavioralist, 
functionalist, and Marxist perspectives took leading roles in political science theory 
building though most of the 1960s and 1970s.
As a consequence, institutional analysis diminished in prominence, particularly 
in comparative politics. For Functionalists, political institutions were simply seen as 
organizations created to fulfil the systemic needs o f society. As such, political 
institutions were neither important nor interesting. For Behavioralists and Marxists, 
political institutions were simply arenas in which political battles were fought out. 
While Marxists saw the relevant groups as classes and Pluralists saw them as more 
narrowly defined, neither theoretical perspective played particular attention to the 
structure or character of the institutions themselves.
Behaviouralism was a rejection of the old institutionalism. ‘[It] grew out of 
what were known as behaviourist studies in psychology’ (Rush, 1992, p. 5). The 
behaviouralist argument was that analysts should concentrate on attitudes, and political 
behaviour (Lane and Ersson, 1994, p. 103). The behavioural revolution of the 1950s
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and 1960s transformed the discipline of political science. ‘Behaviouralists viewed 
institutions as epiphenomenal, merely the sum of individual properties’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991, p. 2). This revolution was to precede a more fundamental shift in the 
discipline in the form of the rational choice approach. Following the publication of 
Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951 there was an explosion 
of rational choice scholarship in political science (Green and Shapiro, 1994, p. 7). 
Although different from one another in some respects the behavioural and rational 
choice approaches shared a concern for theory and methodology, insisted that political 
science invest heavily in methodology, saw the individual as the unit of analysis, and 
emphasised the gathering of evidence. The behavioural and rational choice approaches 
also shared an anti-normative bias.
It was not the case, however, that all political scientists had abandoned the study 
of explicitly institutional emphasis (cf. Schattschneider 1960; Greenstein 1963; Fenno 
1966; Polsby, Gallagher et al. 1969). In comparative politics, as well, several political 
scientists continued to examine political institutions and their effects on political 
outcomes (Ekstein 1960; Bendix and Brand 1968; Huntington 1968), even while they 
sometimes had to defend their inductive approach from the challenge that it was not 
scientific (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Bill and Hardgrave 1973). For these scholars it 
was self-evident that if one wanted to understand what government does, one needs to 
specifically study the institutions through which it acts.
As behaviourist theories focused on attitudes and behaviours to explain political 
developments they often did not answer questions concerning cross-national variations 
in these variables. Interest group theories could not account for why groups with 
similar characteristics and preferences had not the same influence over policy across 
countries. In this view the institutions of government became the black box converting
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inputs into outputs, as if by magic according to critics o f the approach (Kriek, 1995, p. 
30). The grand theorising that dominated comparativist politics in the 1950s and 1960s 
obscured the intermediate institutions that structured politics in different countries. 
However, the variety o f policy responses elicited from the industrial democracies by the 
economic shocks o f the 1970s gave the convergence theories of the 1960s a distinctly 
hollow ring. National level institutions were to be a primary focus in the search for 
answers to these outcomes. Among the first group of scholars to move in this direction 
was Katzenstein and his colleagues who sought to explain why several advanced 
capitalist states responded so differently to the oil shock o f the 1970s. The answer, they 
concluded, was found in the differing institutional structures in these polities and the 
consequent patterns of economic policy pursued in each nation (Katzenstein 1976). 
Similarly, Theda Skocpol’s study of social revolutions also concluded that one could 
not explain the course o f a country’s revolution without examining the nature and 
structure of the state against which these revolutions were aimed (Skocpol 1979, pp. 
292-293).
New Institutionalism
In recent years the study of institutions has again taken centre stage in comparative 
politics. The appeal o f the approach is that it offers an angle through which to better 
understand policy continuities within countries and policy variations across countries. 
Institutional analysis has proven effective in explaining a particular range of 
phenomena, especially those found in the black box of government, largely ignored by 
theories developed during the 1960s and 1970s (Peters, 1996, p. 217).
Although institutional variables were pushed to the side by the dominant 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s, institutions had not disappeared completely from the
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agenda. Nevertheless, by the late 1970s traditional political institutions, legislatures, 
legal systems, and the state had receded in importance from the position they had held 
in the earlier theories of political scientists such as J. W. Burgess or W. W. Willoughby 
(March and Olsen, 1984, p. 734). Despite this, institutional explanations had remained 
somewhat popular in policy and governance studies. It was in this period, against the 
behavioural and rational choice background, that key elements of what was to become 
new institutionalism were formulated. This development was a reaction against the 
behavioural revolution’s interpretation of collective political behaviour as the aggregate 
consequence of individual choice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 2). The new 
institutionalism implied a rejection of the actor-centred approach for the explanation of 
organisational phenomena (Lane and Ersson, 1991, p. 361).
In 1984 March and Olsen (1984, p. 734) observed that ‘in recent years a new 
institutionalism has appeared in political science.’ They believed that the focus of 
political science had shifted in a wrong direction. While not demanding a return to the 
old institutionalism, they argued that some of the features of that approach were of 
value. March and Olsen (1984, p. 738) describe the new institutionalism as blending 
elements o f old institutionalism into the non-institutionalist styles of recent theories of 
politics. Their approach did not emphasise the dependence of the polity on society in 
favour o f interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political 
institutions.
New institutionalism brought a fresh insight in that it treated political institutions 
as important independent variables in explaining political behaviour and change 
(Douglas, 1987, p. 46). As against social and economic structures, political institutions 
are entities that might once have been deliberately created by rational, goal-orientated, 
political agents (Levi, 1990). While political institutions may be understood as setting
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limits on, as well as enabling, agents in pursuit of their objectives (Giddens, 1979, p. 
106), they can also be looked upon, because of their general stickiness, as political and 
administrative structures (Shepsle, 1989, p. 136). The new institutionalism specifically 
examines the ways in which the institutions structure social and political behaviour 
(North 1990). In this approach state actors, and their preferences, like the societal 
actors with whom they interact, explicitly exist within an institutional framework. This 
is the context in which they interpret their self-interests, and there from derive their 
policy preferences. This burgeoning body of literature argues that policy, politics, and 
behaviour can only be understood in the context o f the institutions in which they take 
place. Ideas and interests are important for understanding policy variations across 
countries. However, the central argument is that, if abstracted from the institutional 
context in which they are defined neither of these variables will have substantive 
meaning.
Ellen Immergut argues that variations in National Health Insurance (NHI) 
systems is best explained by variations in national political institutions (Immergut 
1992a, p. 57). Similarly, Bo Rothstein shows that Sweden’s high union density is best 
explained by the Ghent unemployment insurance system that gives workers powerful 
incentives to join Swedish unions (Rothstein, 1992, p. 51). Even more broadly, 
Douglas North suggests that the very success of western political economic model is 
rooted in the peculiar institutions developed in these societies (North 1990). The central 
tenet of this new institutionalism is that institutions are not neutral to policy outcomes. 
As Peter Hall has suggested, on the one hand, the organization of policy-making affects 
the degree of power that any one set of actors has over policy outcomes. On the other 
hand, organizational position also influences an actor’s definition of his own interests. 
In this way, organizational factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring
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to bear on policy and the likely direction of that pressure (Hall, 1986, p. 12). In sum, 
institutions define the rules of the political game, and as such they define who can play 
and how they play. Consequently, they ultimately can shape who wins and who loses. 
If politics is the study o f who gets what, when, and why, then, institutionalists argue, 
institutions should be at the heart of that study.
New Institutionalism differs from its intellectual precursor in ways that reflect 
its development after the behavioural revolution in political science. The movement is 
characterised by an explicit concern with theory development. It always looks at actual 
behaviour rather than only at the formal, structural aspects o f institutions. The new 
approaches to institutional analysis focuses on outcomes in the form of public policies 
or other decisions.
Rather than analysing policy-making in terms o f correlation between 
policy inputs and policy outputs the strength o f institutional analysis is to 
show why policy inputs and policy outputs may be linked in different 
ways in different political systems (Immergut, 1992b, p. 57).
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New institutionalism is not a single approach, but an agglomeration with a number of 
approaches contained within it. These approaches to institutionalism should be seen as 
complimentary (Ostrom, 1990, p. 22). Currently there are at least six versions of new 
institutionalism in use. However, the one concentrated upon here has been self­
described as ‘historical institutionalism” (Peters, 1999, p. 63). Historical 
institutionalists are primarily interested in understanding and explaining specific real 
world political outcomes. The historical institutional approach, building upon the work 
of institutionalist scholars such as Katzenstein, Hall, and Ikenberry, was put forward in 
an effort to bridge the gap between preferences and interests on the one hand, and policy 
choices on the other. Here we will discuss the approach itself, along with its strength 
and weaknesses, focusing in particular on its inability to deal with the all-important 
issue of change.
Historical Institutionalism
The historical institutional scholars have engaged in a variety of studies of specific 
historical events in widely different places and across large spans o f time. In this they 
discovered that they could not explain variations without specifically examining the 
ways in which the political institutions had shaped or structured the political processes 
and ultimately the political outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen et al. 1992). The historical 
institutionalists came about their institutional arguments inductively after testing a 
variety o f alternative theories such as Marxism, Structural Functionalism, Culturalism 
and Rationalism against the outcomes they observed. In other words, historical 
institutionalists are first interested in explaining an outcome. They then proceed to 
explore alternative explanations for the outcomes they observe. Because theirs is not a
2. A n  E xa m in a tio n  o f  H is to r ic a l In s titu tio n a lism
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theory in search o f evidence, historical institutionalists do not argue that institutions are 
the only important variables for understanding political outcomes. Quite the contrary, 
these scholars generally see institutions as intervening variables (or structuring 
variables) through which battles over interest, ideas, and power are fought.
Nevertheless, institutions are important both because they are the focal points of 
much political activity and because they provide incentives and constraints for political 
actors and thus structure that activity. Rather than being neutral boxes in which 
political fights take place, institutions actually structure the political struggle itself 
(Steinmo, 2001). The historical institutionalist argument provides a better 
understanding of the linkage between individual preference formation and broader 
political issues. But this approach also goes further, attempting to situate the logic of 
the new institutionalist school into a historical understanding of the ways in which 
political institutions interact with the historical and economic context in which they 
operate. The appeal of the institutionalist approach is that it offers an angle through 
which to better understand policy continuities within countries and policy variations 
across countries.
The literature on historical institutionalism is diverse. Contemporary political 
scientists are familiar with leading examples of historical institutionalist research 
without necessarily realizing that they exemplify a coherent genre (Pierson and Skocpol, 
2001, p. 2).' Hall (1986) was one of the first researchers to allude to the importance of 
institutions in shaping policies over time. He is explicit concerning the influence of 
different histories and institutions on the economic policies, and subsequent economic 
performance, o f Britain and France. He chooses these countries due to the initial 
dichotomy, and subsequent similarity, of the solutions sought to their economic
lhttp://www.google.com/search?q=cache:4cRIC2s9BCMJ:www.people.fas. harvard.edu/~pierson/Discipli 
ne.pdf+historical+institutionalism+critical+juncture&hl=en
problems in the 1980s. Skowronek’s (1997) The Politics Presidents Make reveals 
recurrent cycles in the nature and success of presidential leadership throughout U.S. 
history. Painting on even grander canvases, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical 
Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America by Ruth 
Berins Collier’s and David Collier (1991) and Birth o f the Leviathan: Building States 
and Regimes in Early Modern Europe by Thomas Ertman (1997) explain regime 
dynamics and the varied formation of modern national states. The following are only a 
few of the possible citations, from recent historical institutionalist studies, that have 
cumulated to provide wide ranging, as well as causally precise, understandings of such 
important matters as transitions to democracy Baloyra (1987) and Bratton and Van de 
Walle (1997), the emergence and demise of authoritarian regimes Doyle (1986) and 
Mahoney (2001); the intersection of domestic and international politics Friedberg 
(2000) and Ikenberry (2001); the origins and development of welfare states Esping- 
Andersen (1990) and Flora and Heidenheimer (1981); social identities in politics 
Hattam (1993) and Kryder (2000); the roots and development of economic regimes Karl 
(1997) and Thelen (1993, 1994); and the causes and consequences of social movements 
and revolutions Goldstone (1991) and Goodwin (2001).
It is clear that studies employing the historical institutional approach vary in 
many different ways. Certain studies are comparative, and others analyse trends in the 
context of one single issue. ‘Some offer suggestive interpretations (e.g., Hart 1994) 
while others offer explicit models framed in general terms (e.g., Hansen 1991)’ (Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2001, p. 3). Certain studies draw extensively from primary sources (e.g., 
Gamm, 1999), while others synthesize findings from secondary publications (e.g., 
Skocpol 1979, Downing 1992). Some deploy arguments about strategic choice and the 
impact o f ‘rules o f the game’ (e.g., Immergut 1992a, Pierson 1994), while others adopt
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culturalist modes of explanation (e.g., Hattam 1993). As Pierson and Skocpol (2001, p. 
3) argue, a vibrant research tradition will encompass variety, and flourishes, through 
internal debates— and in this regard historical institutionalism is no exception.
It was Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992) who were responsible for making 
a coherent statement of historical institutionalism, and for supporting its broader 
application in political science (Peters, 1999, p. 63). At its broadest, historical 
institutionalism represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles ‘are mediated 
by the institutional setting in which they take place’ (Ikenberry, 1988, pp. 222-223). 
Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate the various 
theories of politics: class structure in Marxism, group dynamics in pluralism. Instead, 
they point to the ways that institutions structure these battles and in so doing, influence 
their outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 3). As an alternative to broad and 
abstract Marxist, functionalist, and systems theory approaches, historical 
institutionalism provides an approach to the study of politics, and public policy, that is 
sensitive to persistent cross-national differences. Those who approach the world from 
the standpoint of historical institutionalism accord prominence to the role of institutions 
in political life. However, historical institutionalists are not concerned with institutions 
alone. Rather, their analyses explore the role of several variables -  often encapsulated 
as institutions, interests, and ideas -  in the determination of political outcomes (Weir, 
1989).
Three important features characterize historical institutional scholarship in 
contemporary political science. Historical institutionalists address big, substantive 
questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. 
The focus is on explaining variations in important or surprising patterns, events, or 
arrangements -  rather than on accounting for human behaviour without regard to
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context or modelling very general processes presumed to apply at all times and places. 
To develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puzzles, historical 
institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality. To understand an interesting outcome 
or set of arrangements usually means to analyse processes over a substantial stretch of 
years, maybe even many decades or centuries. Scholars working in this tradition have 
developed compelling methodological and theoretical justifications for historically- 
grounded investigations -  by which they mean not just looking at the past, but looking 
at processes over time. Extending the time frame of social inquiry widens the range of 
experience available for examination. This simultaneously makes more data available 
and generates greater variation in outcomes. Such widening of the empirical terrain is 
especially important for political scientists because many phenomena of great interest -  
especially macro ones such as revolutions, state-building, democratization, the 
construction of welfare states, occur relatively infrequently, or only partially -  in any 
particular slice of time. Historical institutionalists likewise analyse macro contexts and 
hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than 
examining just one institution or process at a time. Taken together, these three features
-  substantive agendas; temporal arguments; and attention to contexts and configurations
-  add up to a recognizable historical institutional approach that makes powerful 
contributions to the discipline’s understandings of government, politics, and public 
policies.
Much research in historical institutionalism adopts a meso-level focus, 
concentrating, for example, on policy developments in a particular issue area (e.g. 
Hacker, 1998; Immergut, 1992a; Weir 1992) or changes in organizational fields (e.g., 
Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson, 2000). Historical institutionalists may also tackle the most
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macro-level developments, such as modernizing intellectual transformations (Wuthnow 
1989) or state formation (e.g. Anderson 1986, Doyle 1986, Tilly 1975, Downing 1992; 
Ertman, 1997; Skowronek, 1982). In either case, analyses tend to highlight and explore 
causes operating at the inter-organizational or inter-institutional level. Certainly, 
historical institutionalists accept the principle that causes should ultimately be 
consistent with plausible accounts of individual motivation and behaviour (Little, 1991, 
p. 73). But they also believe that the patterns of resources and relationships in which 
individuals find themselves have powerful channelling and delimiting effects. So 
historical institutionalists aim to make those patterns visible and trace their causal 
impacts. Historical institutionalists typically analyse how sets o f organizations and 
institutions relate to each other and, in turn, shape the processes or outcomes of interest. 
There is a strong tendency to doubt the power of many claims about institutional effects 
that rest solely on an analysis of that institution in isolation. Instead, historical 
institutionalists generally expect to see powerful effects stemming from interactions 
among institutions, or between institutions and organizations. Research on American 
policy development, for instance, typically focuses on the interplay among multiple 
organizational actors in multiple institutional settings (Skocpol, 1992).
Historical institutionalism provides an avenue for looking at policy across time, 
an aspect lacking in many of the other approaches. The explicit purpose of historical 
institutionalists is to deal with the demands of comparative political analysis. These 
theorists see their approach as capable of explaining differences across national political 
systems.
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Institutions in Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is characterized by the second part of its label as well as the 
first, but what does institutionalism mean for this family of scholars? In political 
science today many scholars analyse how institutions influence political behaviour and 
shape processes ranging from legislative decision making to social movements (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). As Thelen (1999, p. 371) has ably elaborated, both rational choice 
institutionalists and historical institutionalists presume that organizationally embodied 
routines play a crucial role in allocating resources and structuring the incentives, 
options, and constraints faced. Historical institutionalists probe the origins, impact, and 
stability or instability of entire institutional configurations -  sometimes to explain the 
institutional arrangements themselves, at other times to use variables referring to 
institutional configurations to explain other outcomes of interest.
In historical institutionalism the definition of an institution is rather vague, 
including as it does both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that 
structure conduct (Lane and Ersson, 1994, p. 116). For Thelen and Steinmo (1992, pp. 
2-4) institutions range from government structures, through legal institutions, to social 
institutions. They state that they are interested in institutions of an intermediate nature, 
those existing between the entities of states and individuals. Hall’s (1986) definition of 
institutions provides an impression of institutions as rules and procedures. For 
Ikenberry (1988, p. 223) institutions extend from features o f government to the structure 
of the state, to a nation’s social order. These definitions all define institutions by way of 
examples rather than precise characteristics.
The state in historical institutionalism is not discussed as a single entity, but 
rather as an aggregation of organisations and institutions, each with its own interests. 
Policies can then be explained by the ideas and interests o f those institutional actors
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within a differentiated public sector rather than merely a response to external pressures 
(Hall, 1986). What also stands out in historical institutionalist literature is the role 
played by ideas in defining institutions. Immergut’s (1990) analysis of health care 
policies in Sweden, France, and Switzerland, is clear on the impact ideas of best 
practice have on the public programmes taken up. She chooses these countries firstly 
because politicians in all three proposed national health insurance schemes at much the 
same time after the end of the Second World War. The second reason is that the results 
of these proposals came to exemplify the extremes o f the European health care systems. 
Sweden has the most socialised health care system in Europe, the Swiss the most 
privatised, and the French a conflict-riddled compromise between the two. For 
Immergut ideas are the dominant factors in determining policies and institutional 
structures.
Historical institutionalists focus on common sense concepts of formal 
institutions, legislatures or bureaucracies. However, they also rely on the vague concept 
of ideas to define the existence of institutions. The concept of ideas as central 
components in defining institutions is a limited solution to the problems raised by 
historical institutionalism. The emphasis of historical institutionalism is much more on 
the persistence o f organisations after they are formed, than it is on the facts of their 
initial creation. However, here what may be more important is the definition of when 
institutional creation occurs. The choice of date from which to mark future 
developments is crucial for making the case that those initial patterns will persist and 
shape subsequent policies in the policy area.
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For historical institutionalism the focus is the choices made early in the history of a 
polity. The central tenet of this version of new institutionalism is that choices made 
when an institution is being formed, or policy initiated, will have a persistent influence 
over that policy far into the future (Peters, 1999, p. 210). When a government’s 
initiative starts down a particular path there is an inertial tendency for the initial policy 
choices to persist. This is the issue of path dependency as discussed by Krasner (1984, 
p. 240-241). Path dependency means that history matters (North, 1994). We cannot 
understand today’s choices without tracing their evolution through time. The initial 
policy choices and the commitments that grow from them are argued to determine 
subsequent decisions. ‘Choices made at a time T influence choices made at a time T+l ’ 
(Berman, 1998, p. 380). Policies are path dependent, and once initiated they continue 
along until a sufficiently strong force deflects them (Krasner 1984, p. 240).
Historical institutionalists also demonstrate the ways in which institutions are 
remade over time (Thelen 1999, 2000). Because of strong path dependent effects, 
institutions are not easily altered when conditions change. Instead, institutions will 
often have a highly “layered” quality (Schickler 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998). New 
initiatives are introduced to address contemporary demands, but they add to, rather than 
replace pre-existing institutional forms. Alternatively, old institutions may persist but 
be turned to different uses by newly ascendant groups. In either case, the original 
choices are likely to figure heavily in the current functioning of the institution. Thus 
institutions will rarely look like optimal solutions to present collective action problems.
Clearly, attentiveness to history and the analysis of meso- or m acro-1 evel 
institutional configurations are highly complementary strategies o f analysis. Tracing 
politics through time is very helpful for identifying the boundary conditions for
Path Dependency
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particular theoretical claims. Even more significant, the emphasis historical 
institutionalists place on conjunctures and sequencing draws attention to the temporal 
connections among social processes, and highlights the importance of meso- or macro­
level analysis of institutional configurations.
“Path dependence” can be a faddish term, lacking clear meaning, but in the best 
historical institutionalist scholarship it refers to the dynamics of self-reinforcing or 
positive feedback processes in a political system -  what economists call sunk costs. A 
clear logic is involved in strictly defined path dependent processes: outcomes at a 
formative moment, or critical juncture, trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the 
recurrence of a particular pattern into the future. Path dependent processes have very 
interesting characteristics. Actors can be highly influenced by relatively modest 
perturbations at early stages. Once the actors have ventured far down a particular path, 
however, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course. Political alternatives 
that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost. Thus, events or processes 
occurring during, and immediately following, critical junctures emerge as crucial.
Not unlike the concept of sedimentation in sociological institutional theory 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1996), institutional rules and structures can generate attempts to 
solve the problems that they themselves have caused. This adaptive recognition gives 
historical institutionalism a dynamic conception of policy. If  the initial choices in the 
formulation of a policy or institution are inadequate, the institutions must correct these 
or be rendered defunct (Genschel, 1997). Historical institutionalism implies a course of 
evolution. However, the range of this evolution will be constrained by the ‘path’ laid 
down during the institution’s formative period. This is the fundamental paradox of 
institutions, they are formed by human agents yet constrain the behaviour of those same 
actors (Grafstein, 1992, p. 90).
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Historical institutionalism is a central part o f the new institutionalist thinking about 
political life. Despite this centrality, the approach does have particular problems that 
limit its own capacity to explain and predict. Historical institutionalism’s focus on how 
institutional structure shapes politics has yielded compelling accounts of policy 
continuities within countries over time and differences in policy outcomes across 
countries. But the drawback of institutionalism’s power in explaining policy 
trajectories across countries has been that it gives the impression that political outcomes 
can simply be read off the institutional configuration (Dunlavy, 1992, p. 115). A more 
explicit theorising on the reciprocal influence of institutional constraints and political 
strategies has been missing. Also absent has been a broader theorising on the 
interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions.
There are several versions of historical institutionalism in use in the discipline. 
However, while they all appear extremely effective at explaining what happens, and in 
weaving a narrative that captures a good deal of the reality of history, these 
characterisations o f history at times come close to being functionalist accounts. Things 
happened the way they did because they had to, given the historical and institutional 
forces at work at the time. The problem is that there are cases in which institutions do 
change in unexpected ways, and this approach appears at something of a loss to explain 
those changes. Further, the functionalist explanations are often not convincing, given 
that often there is no clear explanation for why things had to happen the way they 
actually did.
It is ironic then that historical institutionalists are typically suspicious of 
functional explanations, in which institutional outcomes are explained by their 
consequences. In such functional accounts, institutions develop because of their
Historical Institutionalism’s Limitations
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capacity to solve certain collective problems. The implicit or explicit claim is that 
rational actors produced these outcomes in order to solve these problems. As suggested 
above, concern with issues of institutional development within historical 
institutionalism is strongly linked to theorizing about the causal relevance or origins, 
sequences, and temporal processes. Functional accounts of institutions seem most 
plausible when investigations take a one-time snapshot, because long-term effects and 
inconsistent “layers” of institutional development are not so readily noticed in such 
studies. By examining issues of institutional origins and change over an extended time 
frame, historical institutionalists have been able to highlight a number of potential 
problems for functional accounts (see Thelen 1993, 1994, 1999; Pierson 2000d for 
relevant findings and arguments). Functional interpretations of politics are often 
suspect because o f the sizable temporal gap between actors’ actions and the long-term 
consequences of those actions. Political actors, facing the pressures of the immediate, 
or skeptical about their capacity to engineer long-term effects, may pay limited attention 
to the long-term. Thus the long-term effects o f institutional choices, which are 
frequently the most profound and interesting ones, should often be seen as the by­
products of social processes rather than the realization (“congealed preferences” as 
Riker put it) of actors’ goals.
Cross-national studies in the new institutionalism explain different policy 
outcomes in different countries with reference to their institutional configurations. 
However, a problem that has been identified in the historical institutionalist approach is 
that of treating institutions as static variables. Although the approach provides 
explanations for cross-national differences it is not suited to dealing with change. ‘This 
is the weakest and most difficult point in institutionalist analysis,’ according to Bo 
Rothstein (1996, p. 153). ‘Historical institutionalism is not a fertile source of
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explanations for change in organisations and institutions’ (Peters, 1999, p. 70). While 
change is not ignored by the approach it is not central to it either. Indeed, this is the 
area where historical institutionalism has encountered particular difficulties. The 
analytical framework appears premised upon the enduring effects o f institutional and 
policy choices made at the initiation of a structure. This leads to a kind o f institutional 
determinism that ultimately gives the impression that political outcomes can simply be 
read off the institutional configuration (Dunlavy, 1992, p. 117). Analytical frameworks 
based upon institutional determinism are not well suited to handling the issue of change 
(Ikenberry, 1988, p. 225). Essentially, the approach appears incapable o f doing other 
than postdicting changes in institutions. Further, the analytical power of historical 
institutionalism is lessened by its failure to demarcate the causes of institutional inertia 
and its influence on outcomes (Garrett and Lange, 1995, p. 628). However, considering 
that the model can be regarded as more descriptive than either explanatory or predictive 
this deficiency is not fatal. Yet, this does limit the overall scientific utility of this 
account of institutional theory. Knowing how a particular policy developed over time, 
it may be difficult to imagine any other sequence of development. Consequently, 
refutation of the institutionalist approach may be difficult. In simplified terms, the 
argument appears to be that here was a set of institutions, there was a policy outcome, 
and the two must be linked (Rothstein, 1996, p. 154).
Exploring Change in Historical Institutionalism
There are within historical institutionalism some promising avenues for exploring 
change. Historical institutionalism has treated change through the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium (Krasner, 1984, p. 242). This concept is borrowed from Steven 
Gould’s neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory in biology. Institutions will exist in an
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equilibrium state for most of their existence, the decisions made at their initiation 
governing their subsequent functioning. However, those policy equilbria are not 
permanent, and institutions are considered capable of change. The model argues that 
long periods of institutional stability are periodically punctuated by crises which brings 
with them change. In other words, change in any system is a product of external shocks 
to the system (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Thereafter institutional stability returns. 
Here, the external environment is the source of changes that bring about these 
institutional crises. The crises cause the breakdown of the old institutions, and this 
leads to political battles over the design of new institutions. The model emphasises the 
stickiness of historically evolved institutional arrangements. To continue with the 
analogy to evolutionary biology, the scientist in this view is engaged in a process of 
understanding how and why certain organisms (institutions) have evolved, why some 
flourish in some contexts and/or why some die out in other contexts. The answers to 
these questions (in both biology and political science) are discovered through careful 
historical analysis that examines the ways in which a number of factors have intersected 
and affected one another over time.
Historical institutional scholars do not deny that dramatic shocks to the system 
can invoke massive changes. However, institutionalists, much like most evolutionary 
biologists, are skeptical o f the punctuated equilibrium model if offered up as the sole 
explanation for change. ‘The problem with this model is that institutions explain 
everything until they explain nothing’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 15). During stable 
periods institutions are independent variables that can be used to explain political 
outcomes. However, during periods o f breakdown following crises the status of 
institutions is inverted. They become dependent variables, their design at the mercy of 
political conflicts consequent of the break down. The model is ambiguous on the
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dynamic interaction of political strategies and institutional constraints. What is required 
is a model that can capture the interplay of these two variables over time. Punctuated 
equilibrium can provide a sufficiently clear explanation for change, but only after the 
fact. An a priori criteria for identifying when there is sufficient pressure to cause 
change is needed. The idea of critical junctures provides another way of looking at the 
process of change in historical institutionalism, and it is to this that we turn next.
3. Critical Junctures
Institutionalist scholars from a variety of perspectives are currently focusing on one of 
the most interesting and vexing issues left hanging in the institutionalist literature -  
explaining institutional change. Institutional stability (or equilibrium) is far easier to 
explain than change. Institutional change means increased uncertainty. As any 
particular set o f institutions are embedded in a variety of other institutions, it is difficult 
to accurately predict the long-run consequences of even small rule changes. Once 
again, every institution favours some interests and ideas over others, and therefore the 
advantaged are generally loath to change the status quo. Indeed, even current losers 
may decide that the status quo is preferable to some uncertain future in which they 
could be even further disadvantaged. O f course, institutions do change, and sometimes 
they can change quite dramatically. Still, we as yet have no clear theory of how and 
why they change (with the exception of the punctuated equilibrium model derived from 
evolutionary theory). But clearly this single model o f change, as discussed above, is 
inadequate. It amounts to little more than suggesting that “change happens.” While it 
may be true that “change happens,” we need to have a better understanding of why even 
exogenous shocks get refracted in particular ways. Additionally, we need a better 
understanding of the role of endogenous variables in the change process. A variety of
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scholars have begun to explore the dilemma o f  institutional change by building more 
explicitly on evolutionary models suggested in the life sciences (Arthur 1994; Jervis 
1997). Indeed, perhaps one o f  the most interesting outgrowths o f  the institutionalist 
turn in political science in recent years is that political science may begin to move away 
from its fascination w ith physics and its emphasis on absolute laws that hold across time 
and space. An institutionalist political science may instead look more like the life 
sciences -  w ith their emphasis on contingency, context, and environment. In this event, 
the goal w ill be more to explain past (evolutionary) outcomes and less to predict future 
ones. It  is in this context that we w ill now turn to the issue o f  critical junctures.
Crises can bring on abrupt institutional change, because they present 
leaders w ith an opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas by 
embedding them in the institutions they establish. History is thus divided 
into ‘normal periods’ and ‘critical junctures’ , during which major 
institutional change is possible (Gorges, 2001, p. 156).
The concept o f critical junctures has been used to explain change in Latin American 
governments during the twentieth century (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 27). A  critical 
juncture constitutes a period o f significant change that takes place in distinct ways in 
different countries and that is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies (Collier and 
Collier, 1991, p. 29). For Collier and Collier (1991) the duration o f a critical juncture 
may be relatively brief, or could constitute an extended period o f reorientation. The 
argument is that where there is a great deal o f inertia change would not occur unless 
there was a conjuncture o f a variety o f political forces that individually were not capable 
o f generating significant change. This approach is applicable to cross-national
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comparisons, and to long-term patterns o f change within individual countries. The 
agenda-setting literature has discussed some o f the same phenomena in the guise o f 
critical institutional events (Bohte, 1997).
Watersheds in politics open and close opportunities in a way that shapes 
political life for years thereafter, these are the critical junctures (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967, p. 37). W hile not maintaining that critical junctures are necessarily the only 
source o f change or innovation, critical junctures can nevertheless discredit existing 
institutions and policies, triggering change (Cortel and Peterson, 1999, p. 184). The 
character o f critical junctures, and the perspective from which they are analysed, vary 
greatly. Some critical junctures may involve considerable discretion, whereas with 
others their coming about appears deeply embedded in antecedent conditions. The 
duration o f a critical juncture may involve a relatively b rie f period in which one 
direction or another is taken, or can constitute an extended period o f reorientation. This 
analysis can focus on the underlying societal cleavages or crises that precipitate a 
critical juncture, or can concentrate primarily on the critical juncture itself. Central to 
this approach is an understanding that change is a cornerstone o f comparative historical 
research and development. This suggests a path dependent pattern o f change in which 
outcomes during a crucial transition establish distinct trajectories within which one 
incident follows another (David, 1985, p. 332). But even ‘grand reforms’ are path 
dependent, and m odify existing institutions without replacing them. Path dependency is 
due not only to the interests o f existing institutions, and the risks o f major reform, but 
also to the stabilising persistence o f shared norms (Zucker 1991; D iM aggio and Powell 
1991; Krasner 1988) and to the political and institutional contexts that shaped these 
rules and organisations (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Schmidt 1996).
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There are certain basic issues that arise in the analysis o f  critical junctures. The 
importance o f establishing analytical equivalence, a problem common in comparative 
historical research, is present in this type o f analysis. This is because it is important to 
the critical junctures concept that they take place in different ways in different cases. 
Differences in how critical junctures occur have to be substantial enough to produce 
interesting variances, yet these variances must not undermine the idea that it really 
involves the same critical juncture (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The duration o f 
critical junctures can vary from brief transitions (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. 14), to, 
as C ollier and Collier (1991, p. 32) argue, periods o f many years duration. Variations in 
duration depend in part on the causal mechanisms involved. These mechanisms may 
produce a type o f change that crystallizes rapidly or gradually.
A n  important part o f the literature on critical junctures views them from the 
perspective o f cleavages or crises, thereby placing particular emphasis on the tensions 
that lead up to the critical juncture. Since these cleavages or crises are seen as 
producing or generating the critical juncture Valenzeula and Valenzuela (1981, p. 15) 
refer to them as generative cleavages. It  is only through the examination o f its historical 
legacy that the importance, or lack thereof, o f  a critical juncture can be established in 
general. However, a critical juncture’s legacy w ill not last forever. As a consequence it 
is necessary to have specific criteria in order to ascertain when it ends, but also to be 
open to ambiguities concerning the end points (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 33). In 
addition to carefully identifying the legacy, it is essential to compare it explicitly with  
the antecedent system.
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The analysis o f  critical junctures has been widely influential in the field o f  comparative 
politics. Critical junctures have been used to help us understand the different 
trajectories o f  national development in Latin America. In their classic work, S hap ing  
the  P o li t ic a l  A re n a , Ruth and David Collier (1991, p. 29) assert that ‘critical junctures 
... played a central role in shaping the national political arena in the following decades.’ 
Their argument was that the emergence o f the labour movement in Latin America, along 
with the changing pattern o f state-union relations at these times o f initial incorporation, 
impacted significantly on the subsequent evolution o f  national politics. They pointed to 
organized labour’s being a pivotal actor in different countries at different times, and the 
positioning o f other actors in relation to organized labour having had a crucial impact 
on national politics (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 40). The incorporation periods 
constituted a critical juncture.
In their examination o f the preconditions for institutional reform in democracies 
in general, and Switzerland in particular, Armingeon and Beyeler (2001, p. 6)2 refer to 
critical junctures as open windows o f opportunity for policy makers. In their 
examination o f how and why extant institutions mediate in the relationship between 
internationally induced changes in the policy preferences o f domestic actors, on the one 
hand, and political outcomes on the other, Garrett and Lange (1995, p. 628) argue that 
electoral landslides may create critical junctures by producing an overwhelming 
mandate for policy and/or structural change. Garrett (1993, p. 523) writes o f this in 
relation to the emergence o f ‘two o f the most successful instances o f structural change 
in the twentieth century: the building o f social democracy in Sweden after the Great





Depression, and the construction o f neoliberalism in Thatcher’s Britain.’ Casper and 
Taylor (1996) argue that critical junctures can be used in analysing periods when 
authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to liberalisation. They suggest that critical 
junctures can present opportunities for reform-minded actors intent on reforming the 
authoritarian regimes. Agress and Butler (2002, p. I ) ,3 in studying démocratisation, 
focus on how non-democratic regime members come to the decision to liberalise. 
Using a game-theoretic non-cooperative bargaining model they focus on the interactions 
between regime members, and examine how bargaining between these members can 
lead to critical junctures.
The critical junctures approach has also been utilised in relation to national 
specific incidents and crises. In examining the watershed in American trade policy that 
was the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act o f 1934 Haggard (1988, p. 91) argues that 
unanticipated events (critical junctures), in this case an economic depression, can bring 
into question existing institutions, and this can result in dramatic change. Vargas (2004) 
has used critical junctures to examine the political dynamic o f the conflict in Chiapas 
Mexico. He presents an analysis o f the conflict from the perspective o f the choices 
made by the actors involved at moments that increased or decreased their range o f  
strategic opportunities. Gal and Bargal (2002) analyse the emergence o f occupational 
welfare in the Israeli welfare state using the critical junctures approach. The article 
focuses on the crucial role the labour movement played in the formation o f the 
occupational welfare system during a critical juncture in the evolution o f Israel. 
Referring to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska’s Prince W illiam  Sound as a 
focusing event, or critical juncture, Birkland (1998) argues that disasters, in this case 




are not completely unpredictable, are often harmful, and they open windows o f  
opportunity for increasing our capacity to manage environmental problems. They are 
powerful because they are rare, sudden, harmful, and because they directly, or 
indirectly, affect many people. The impact o f critical junctures can be sufficient to see 
drastic changes in the policy-making process, as happened with the passing o f the Oil 
Pollution A ct o f  1990 in America, thus alleviating a successful stall by the lobbying oil 
industry that lasted for fourteen years (W illson, 1998).
W hat should also be underlined is the extent to which the analysis o f critical 
junctures is w idely employed in a diverse spectrum o f research not particularly 
concerned w ith revolutionary change. This perspective is central to research on crises, 
sequence, and timing o f development (Binder, 1971). It is also important to studies o f 
continuity and change in international and domestic political economy (Katzenstein, 
1985), to older w ork on institutionalisation (Huntington, 1968), and to more recent work 
on the new institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1984). Although this perspective’s 
importance is evident in cross-national studies, it is also useful in research on long-term 
patterns o f change within individual countries (Brady, 1988).
Arguments about critical junctures have played an important role in research on 
labour politics. Kerr (1960, p. 235) emphasises the long-term stability o f the industrial 
relations system that was crystallised by the leading elite at a relatively early stage. In 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) analysis, and to an even greater degree in the subsequent 
work o f Waisman (1982), the resolution o f the working-class cleavage has a profound 
effect in shaping national politics. Other studies have focused on critical junctures 
within the labour movement. Valenzuela (1979) shows how the filling o f organisational 
space during crucial phases o f labour movement development freeze organisational 
alternatives within the labour sector. Lipset (1983, p. 1) analyses how the historic
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conditions under which the proletariat entered the political arena shaped the subsequent 
emergence o f reformist, as opposed to revolutionary, labour movements.
The distinctive contribution o f the critical juncture’s framework is its approach 
to explanation. I t  concentrates on historical causes (Stinchcombe, 1968, pp. 101-29). 
Here a set o f causal factors brings about an outcome or legacy at a particular point or 
period, and the pattern that is instituted subsequently reproduces itself without 
recurrence o f  the original cause. Central to the process o f reproduction is that 
institutions create vested interests, and power holders therein seek to perpetuate their 
own position (Verba, 1971, p. 308). The traditional understanding o f trade union 
politics, and state-union relations, suggests it is an area where a given constellation o f 
political relationships, once institutionalised, has a strong tendency to persist. Such 
elements suggest that a critical juncture framework is appropriate in the analysis o f 
trade union politics (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 37). However, it must be noted that 
with critical junctures the core hypothesis is that they occur in distinct ways in different 
contexts and that this produces distinct legacies.
The Weaknesses o f the Approach
Despite all o f the above Collier and Collier (1991) do not set out any systematic 
approach for assessing the examination o f critical junctures. In their approach there is a 
distinct absence o f  clearly defined rigorous standards by which to assess proposed 
critical junctures in order to discover i f  they really are critical junctures, or just a case o f 
change that has taken place incrementally. A  question that comes up under these 
circumstances is how does one possibly distinguish between a critical juncture and 
incremental change that is in itself relatively swift? This is the decisive weakness at the
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heart o f  the critical junctures approach that spawned this thesis and its objective o f 
remoulding the approach.
Other writers in the field, such as Cortell and Peterson (1999), although 
incorporating the notion o f critical junctures into their research, appear more interested 
in studying the whole process o f structural change. Focusing on various stages in the 
change process, they only discuss critical junctures briefly as environmental trigger 
events. They do not study the critical junctures in detail, as it is o f little interest to them 
whether that change was in fact due to a critical juncture. Kingdon (1984, ch. 8) argues 
that every environmental trigger -  whether crisis or non-crisis -  creates the opportunity 
for structural change i f  it raises questions about the adequacy o f  the current policy 
making process. Keeler (1993) refined Kingdon’s concept by suggesting that there 
were different sized windows o f opportunity. Non-crisis events opened ‘micro- 
windows,’ while ‘macro-windows,’ opened in response to events with widespread 
implications for many facets o f society. However, there is no classification as to what is 
a m icro-window and what is a macro-window, and what gradation lies between these 
two extremes. Gorges (2001, p. 156) argues that Skowronek (1982, p. 10) explains the 
development o f certain kinds o f institutions at certain times as a response to the 
existence o f certain conditions: ‘domestic or international crises, class conflicts, and the 
evolving complexity o f routines social interaction.’ None o f these writers set out a 
systematic approach w ith which to examine critical junctures in themselves, but instead 
appear to utilise a general understanding o f the concept in furtherance o f their own 
arguments on various topics o f interest to them.
Some o f the problems in the study o f critical junctures are relatively standard 
issues in the field o f comparative historical analysis. One o f these concerns the issue o f 
assessing partial explanations. Compared to scholars who engage in multivariate
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analysis based on quantitative data, researchers who do multivariate analysis based on 
the systematic yet qualitative comparison o f historical events face an interesting 
problem in assessing partial explanations and in making the assessment convincing 
(C ollier and Collier, 1991, p. 38). The problems o f dealing with partial explanations in 
comparative-historical analysis also arise in addressing rival explanations. An example 
o f particular importance concerns the role o f suppresser variables that conceal the 
relationship that one is assessing (Rosenberg, 1968).
The Approach Remoulded
Collier and C o llier’s (1991, p. 29) definition o f a critical juncture consists o f three 
distinct components. The assertion that significant change occurred; the claim that this 
change happened in distinct ways in different cases; and the explanatory hypothesis 
concerning the result o f  this change. Although Collier and Collier (1991) do set out a 
generalised framework for analysing critical junctures, a big step forward at the time 
given the lack o f  attention to the problems that arise in assessing arguments about 
critical junctures and their legacies, this approach nevertheless possessed a vagueness 
that inhibited its ready application to any research project. In  order to improve upon the 
critical junctures approach it is necessary to essentially remould that approach. Without 
discarding any o f  the central precepts that constitute the definition o f a critical juncture 
as set out by Collier and Collier (1991) the version o f the critical junctures approach 
developed for this dissertation possesses a rigour that is lacking in theirs.
Firstly it is necessary to identify the generative cleavage or crisis. This w ill 
involve an examination o f  the tensions that lead up to the critical juncture. As a 
consequence o f the generative cleavage or crisis being a central concern o f the analysis, 
a careful examination o f this cleavage or crisis is essential. Therefore, before a
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proposed critical juncture has been examined for change o f a significant, swift and 
enduring nature, it is necessary to identify the generative cleavage or crisis that sets the 
process in motion.
Importantly, the approach employed here keeps the concept o f significance in 
change. But instead o f arguing that change must be significant, and saying no more on 
this most important o f  matters, in this dissertation we lay down standards for identifying 
the level o f significance o f that change (see Chapter I I) .  Change o f below a certain 
level is not even classified as significant, while above a certain level the significance o f 
the change is considered to increase through various levels.
Because we are dealing with critical junctures, periods o f significant change, we 
assume that this change is not a long drawn out process that takes years to come about 
as is allowed for by Collier and Collier (1991, p. 32). W e must reject the notion o f 
incremental change entirely i f  we are dealing w ith radical change at a point in time. As 
a consequence o f this assumption we add the notion o f swiftness to our understanding 
o f a critical juncture. The significant change must take place quickly come what may. 
In this case we consider a swift change to be one that takes place within a twelve-month 
period. I f  the change takes longer than the allotted twelve-month period then there 
might not have been a critical juncture at all, but an incremental change.
W e also keep the concept o f a legacy resulting from a critical juncture. Collier 
and Collier (1991, p. 33) do not provide any set o f criteria for minimum legacy 
duration. However, instead o f leaving it at that, just a vague notion that a critical 
juncture must have an ill-defined but enduring after-effect or effects, we assumed that in 
order for a change to be a critical juncture its after-effects should last for a minimum of 
at least one standard government’s term o f office. W hile not setting a specific end point 
for the duration o f a critical juncture’s legacy, at least setting a minimum standard for
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the duration o f a legacy w ill make it easier to identify a critical juncture when 
examining change. Should the explanatory hypothesis prove false -  the critical juncture 
had no legacy -  then it was not a critical juncture.
To  sum up, the argument in relation to identifying critical junctures is that there 
must be a generative cleavage or crisis, along w ith a period o f  change that is significant, 
swift, and enduring in nature. In accordance w ith the rigour that is being brought to this 
approach, each o f these conditions has been defined, w ith specific standards being laid 
down. Should any one o f these conditions fail to be fu lfilled by the proposed critical 
juncture being examined, then it is not a critical juncture at all, but something else in 
fact. W hile not purporting to have drawn up a panacea to the problem o f identifying 
when is a period o f  change a critical juncture, as opposed to not being a critical juncture, 
but something else, this framework has gone some ways towards answering that 
question in a way that is applicable across disciplines. A  common framework for 
analysing critical junctures is o f vital importance here, as without it the validity o f the 
findings set out are questionable at best. The objective in setting these various criteria 
for assessment is to rigorously systemise the critical junctures approach. The use o f this 
approach w ill enable the identification o f what is, and what is not, a critical juncture. 
This addresses the uncertainties regarding critical junctures not answered by earlier 
approaches.
Conclusion
The literature on institutionalism is diverse. The most successful aspect o f this body o f  
work is the understanding it has provided o f policy continuities within countries and o f  
policy variations across countries. A t mid-range theory institutionalists have 
constructed important analytical bridges between state and society-centred analysis
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(Katzenstein, 1978). They have also built analytical bridges between grand theories that 
focus on cross-national comparisons and narrower accounts o f nation-particular cases 
(H all, 1986). Institutionalist analysis examines actors as both agents and objects o f 
history. Consequently, historical institutionalism goes a long way to addressing another 
o f the critiques o f  political science offered by M arch and Olsen (1984, p. 735) -  the 
ahistoricism that had become characteristic o f much o f the discipline. Historical 
institutionalism provides the theoretical bridge between those who make history and the 
circumstances under which they do so (Rothstein, 1992, p. 35). The main inadequacy 
o f institutional analysis to be avoided is providing static accounts that fail to capture the 
essence o f change, or become tied up in institutional determinism. The historical 
institutionalism explores the political conditions under which particular institutions have 
specific consequences. This approach tends to treat institutions as static variables. 
W hile providing explanations for cross-national differences, historical institutionalism 
is not suited to dealing w ith change within countries over time.
The central focus o f this thesis, the critical junctures approach, provides a means 
o f looking at the process o f change. Critical junctures can be looked upon as 
watersheds, or windows o f opportunity in political life that open and close possibilities 
for years afterwards. Their impact can result in drastic changes in the policy-making 
process. The approach has been utilised in the field o f  comparative politics, notably so 
by Collier and Collier (1991). W ithout discarding the central precepts o f their 
definition o f a critical juncture, as the concepts are good but incomplete, the approach is 
essentially remoulded here. W e have taken their definition and altered it, while at the 
same time adding clearly defined standards to the specific criteria that go into making 
up the critical juncture. Firstly the generative cleavage or crisis has to be identified, and 
then change o f  a significant, swift, and enduring nature. The absence o f a certain rigour
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with which to assess proposed critical junctures is essentially corrected for here. With 
the systemisation o f  the standards, and the presentation o f  the findings 
diagrammatically, it w ill be easy to see what is, and what is not, a critical juncture, 
reducing uncertainty surrounding the whole concept. This enhances the approach’s 
applicability to any research project across a host o f  various disciplines. Essentially, the 
approach is both operationalized and rendered falsifiable all at once. Critical junctures 
are looked upon here as transforming situations in which the outcomes produced vary 
over time. It is to the matter o f critical junctures in particular that we will turn in the 
next chapter when constructing our methodology.
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C h a p t e r  I I
Methodology
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The objective o f  this thesis is to improve our understanding o f the concept o f critical 
junctures. The argument here is that a critical juncture occurs when there is a generative 
cleavage or crisis, and a period o f change that is significant, swift, and enduring. Clear 
standards are set out for each o f these criteria that w ill enable the identification o f levels 
o f change in order to see i f  that change in fact constitutes a critical juncture, or not, as 
the case may be. This argument w ill be tested by means o f  case studies that concentrate 
upon trade union peak organisation influence over public policy.
This chapter w ill set out the methodology to be employed within the thesis. It 
justifies the choice o f trade union peak organisations as the focus for the case studies. 
The comparative approach is then set out and justified, explaining in detail the reasons 
why certain specific countries, and their trade union peak organisations, were chosen as 
suitable candidates for the case studies and why certain other countries were not. This 
w ill encompass issues relating to time frames and narrative approaches. The chapter 
w ill then focus upon the descriptive inference approach to be employed in the 
examination o f the altered critical junctures approach throughout the thesis. Finally, the 
chapter w ill discuss, in detail, the hypotheses and observable implications that are to be 
tested against the case study information. The thesis takes the view  that the critical 
junctures approach, as developed here, provides a better means o f looking at the process 
o f change than did the earlier versions o f  the approach, and in this context the variations 
in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy shall be employed as 
a testing ground for this remoulded critical junctures approach.
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This section w ill deal w ith the question o f why trade union peak organisation were 
chosen as the case studies for the remoulded critical junctures approach set out here. 
For Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992, p. 2) institutions range from formal 
government structures (legislatures), through legal institutions (electoral law), through 
more amorphous social institutions. In  general, historical institutionalists work with a 
definition o f institutions that includes both formal organizations and informal rules and 
procedures that structure conduct. ‘Just where to draw the line on what counts as an 
institution is a matter o f  some controversy in the literature’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 
p. 2). However, in general, institutionalists are interested in a whole range o f state and 
societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests, and that 
structure their relations o f power to other groups. Included in the definition of 
institutions are such features o f the institutional context as the structure and organisation 
o f economic actors like trade unions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2).
The contribution o f the remoulded critical juncture framework is its approach to 
identification. This approach, like its earlier version, focuses on what may be called 
historical causes (Stinchcombe, 1968). In  this case, a given set o f causes shapes a 
particular outcome or legacy at one point or period, and subsequently the pattern that is 
established reproduces itself without recurrence o f the original cause. The mechanisms 
o f reproduction involve in part the fact that, once founded, a given set o f institutions 
creates vested interests, and power holders within these institutions seek to perpetuate 
their own positions (Verba, 1971, p. 293). ‘The great importance o f such elements 
suggests that a critical juncture framework is particularly appropriate in the analysis o f 
trade-union politics’ (C ollier and Collier, 1991, p. 37). Consequently, trade union peak 
organisations are ideal candidates for examination.
1. W h y  T ra de  U n ions
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Trade union peak organisations, like trade unions themselves, are interest groups 
active within the polity. The state actors and societal actors w ith whom the trade union 
peak organisations interact all operate inside the national institutional framework. For 
Steinmo (1989, pp. 503-504) these frameworks are the context in which groups and 
individuals interpret their self-interest and thereby define their policy preferences. In 
this approach the trade union centres behave like any other rational political actor, 
defining their policy preference and strategic objectives within the framework o f the 
country’s decision-making institutions.
The influence o f  trade union peak organisations over public policy in polities 
provides an appropriate arena in which to examine broad comparative questions. The 
power o f trade unions is a central tenet in the ideological debate between left and right 
in various countries. Trade unions are usually the largest sectional interest groups in 
western societies. The level o f influence they are able to w ield within a polity can 
affect the formulation o f  economic and social policies, the distribution o f wealth across 
the whole o f society, industrial relations policy, and the use and misuse o f human 
resources. It  is impossible to categorise trade unionism by a single dimension. In 
assessing the dynamic o f national industrial relations Bridgford and Stirling (1994, p. 
94) suggest that an analysis o f  national trade union movements requires membership 
patterns to be linked to two dimensions: the degree o f  centralisation o f collective 
bargaining and links to the political system.
47
Case studies are o f central importance to this project. The case study approach is 
adopted here, as this project is descriptive in nature. As K ing et al., (1994, p. 44) point 
out ‘case studies are essential for description.’ The approach w ill be comparative in so 
far as it w ill compare the remoulded critical juncture’s approach’s determination o f  
whether changes in trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy, in a 
small number o f states, are a critical juncture or not. In  practice, comparison o f even a 
small number o f  countries enhances understanding. As Blondel argues (1995, p. 3) only 
by studying politics on a comparative basis is it possible to discover trends and achieve 
a satisfactory understanding o f the broad characteristics underlying politics. This 
approach permits the study o f the similarities and difference in the macropolitical 
institutions o f countries, and attempts to account for the patterns o f country variation 
(Eckstein and Apter, 1963). Im plic itly  or explicitly, comparative politics discusses 
questions about the institutional structure o f the state as it effects stability and 
performance (Lane and Ersson, 1994, p. 39). The value o f the comparative method is in 
the broad perspective that it offers, and in its goal o f building a body o f increasingly 
complete explanatory theory (M ayer et al., 1993; Mahler, 1995). Central to this 
approach is an understanding that change is a cornerstone o f comparative historical 
research and development.
For Lijphart (1971) the comparative method is the analysis o f  a small number o f  
cases, ranging from two to twenty observations. This approach offers a basis for 
evaluating hypotheses. However, in studying relatively few cases there is the problem 
o f more variables to analyse than cases to observe, or "many variables, small-A^" 
(Collier, 1991, p. 7). As a solution Lijphart proposed the number o f cases can be 
increased, enlarging the scope o f  comparison used to assess hypotheses (Lijphart,
2. C o m p a ra tive  A p proa ch
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1971). As for the variables “comparable cases” can be focused upon, and their number 
reduced either by combining variables, or through theoretical parsimony.
The case studies w ill be structured on a state-by state basis. The reason for 
adopting this approach is that it allows for the greatest degree o f comparison between 
the states being studied. A  state-by-state approach w ill also generate a more in depth 
knowledge o f how the altered critical junctures approach determines whether change in 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy, w ithin individual states, is a critical 
juncture or not. However, it is in the comparisons between these states that we w ill gain 
a comprehensive understanding o f  the remoulded critical junctures approach’s ability to 
identify where change in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public 
policy is a critical juncture or not. As the number o f hypotheses, observable 
implications, and states, in this study w ill be fixed, whether the case-studies are 
organised on a state-by-state basis or by theme is in many respects a matter o f  
presentation.
The case studies w ill be based upon primary documentation where available, 
and secondary sources. In terms o f testing the data gathered, both qualitative and 
quantitative methods w ill be employed (see below).
The States Chosen
In order to get a good spread o f different but comparable states a most similar, and then 
most different, basis w ill be used for state selection. This approach has been adopted 
from Collier and Collier (1991). This ensures that like is compared w ith like, and that 
‘the context o f  analysis are analytically equivalent, at least to a significant degree’ 
(Collier, 1997, p. 40). A t the same time the ‘most different’ criteria ‘places parallel 
processes o f change in sharp re lie f because they are operating in settings that are very
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d iffe ren t in  m any respects’ (C o llie r, 1997, p. 40). In other words, the diverse 
circum stances shou ld enable the researcher to m ore ea s ily  iden tify  the appropriate 
exp lanatory factors.
The crite ria  fo r ‘m ost s im ila r ’ states are that:
1. They  m ust be dem ocracies, so as to ensure that we are com paring  like  w ith  like.
2. They  m ust a lso  be ‘ long-stand ing ’ dem ocracies so as to generate a long enough 
track  record to p rov ide  a proper understanding o f  the ac tiv it ie s  o f  the ir trade union 
peak organ isations.
3. B y  ‘ long  stand ing ’ is im p lied: states in  w h ich  stable dem ocracy (un iversa l suffrage), 
was estab lished p r io r to W o rld  W a r II, and rem ained un interrupted by that con flic t.
4. In th is  tim e fram e trade un ions in these states must have been free to organise, and 
not have been subject to state suppression.
U s in g  these crite ria , the lis t o f  potentia l subject states is narrowed substantia lly.
L ijp h a r t ’ s (1999, p. 2) categories o f  m ajoritarian  and consensual democracies 
w i l l  be used as the ‘m ost d iffe ren t’ basis in  the state se lection  process. H e  defines 
m ajo rita rian  dem ocracy  as governm ent b y  s im p le  m ajo rity , w h ile  ‘ consensua l’ 
dem ocracy  seeks to m ax im ise  the dec is ion -m ak ing  m ajo rity . ‘ The  m ajoritarian  model 
o f  dem ocracy  is exc lu s ive , com petitive , and adversaria l, whereas the consensus m odel is 
characterised by in c lus iveness, barga in ing  and com prom ise ’ (L ijphart, 1999, p. 2). 
L ijp h a r t iden tifies  ten d iffe rences between m ajoritarian  and consensual democracies, 
and d iv id e s  these d iffe rences into tw o groups. The firs t f iv e  are grouped under a 
heading o f  ‘ execu tives-partie s ’ , w h ile  the second f iv e  are grouped under a heading o f  
‘ fede ra l-un ita ry .’ L ijp h a r t (1999, p. 2) plots the positions o f  36 dem ocracies using these
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tw o sets o f  fiv e  va riab le s g iv in g  a tw o d im ens iona l representation o f  each coun try ’ s 
po s it ion ing  between m ajoritarian  and consensual dem ocracy. The average o f  each 
states ‘ executives-parties ’ va lues is p lotted on the horizon ta l axis, and the average o f  
the ir ‘ fede ra l-un ita ry ’ va lues is on the ve rtica l axis. E a ch  un it on the graph measures 
one standard dev iation . The states are positioned as fo llow s:
Figure 2.1: Lijphart’s two dimensional conceptual map of democracy









(Source: L ijpha rt, 1999, p. 248)
G iv en  that h igh  va lues ind icate m ajo rita rian ism  and lo w  va lues consensus, a state’ s 
pos it ion ing  w ith in  the fou r quadrants ind icates whether it is:
• m ajoritarian  ‘ executives-parties ’ and consensual ‘ federa l-un ita ry ’ (bottom  right):
• m ajo rita rian  ‘ executives-parties ’ and m ajoritarian  ‘ federa l-un ita ry ’ (top right);
• consensua l ‘ executives-parties ’ and consensual ‘ federa l-un ita ry ’ (bottom  left);
• consensua l ‘ executives-parties ’ and m ajoritarian  ‘ federa l-un ita ry ’ (top left).
F rom  the top le ft quadrant (consensual and m ajoritarian) Sweden is chosen as it 
is  the on ly  country to rem ain  a continuous dem ocracy in  the tim e fram e set out above.
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A s  two other longstand ing N o rd ic  dem ocracies were a lso in th is quadrant, choosing  a 
N o rd ic  state w ou ld  be m ore representative. Sweden is a lso possessed o f  one o f  the 
highest leve ls  o f  trade union density in the w orld .
The  states in  the top right quadrant (m ajoritarian and m ajoritarian) are those that 
are nearest to be ing  m ajorita rian  dem ocracies. A s  three o f  these countries are m odelled 
on the ‘ W estm in is te r system ' o f  governm ent, one o f  these states w ou ld  be more 
representative o f  th is  group ing. F rom  am ongst these the U K  is chosen. The Un ited  
K in g d om  is the o ldest o f  these ‘ m ajoritarian  dem ocracy ,’ and as the w o r ld ’ s first 
industria lised  country a lso possessed its firs t trade unions.
F rom  the bottom  right quadrant (m ajoritarian  and consensual) the Un ited  States 
o f  A m e r ic a  is chosen. The other countries in  th is quadrant have either ‘ W estm in ister 
system s’ o f  parliam entary government, or are constitu tiona l m onarch ies, both o f  w h ich  
have a lready been inc luded  as case studies; or have had m uch shorter dem ocratic 
h isto ries than the U n ited  States o f  Am erica . A m e r ic a  has the largest econom y in the 
w orld , and the largest num ber trade un ion  m em bers o f  any country.
There is no country in the bottom  left quadrant (consensual and consensual) that 
meets the c r ite ria  fo r a long-stand ing dem ocracy as set out above. M o s t either became 
dem ocracies after W o r ld  W a r II, or i f  dem ocracies before the w ar experienced its 
suppression due to the rise o f  dictators or invasion. Sw itze rland , a lthough a dem ocracy 
from  before the war, and not subject to invasion  du ring  either W o rld  W ar, is excluded 
on account that un ive rsa l suffrage was not introduced there un til 1971. T h is  means that 
Sweden is  the o n ly  country in  the tw o le ft quadrants that satisfies the above criteria. 
The la ck  o f  a second country from  th is side is reso lved by  choosing  the nearest country 
from  a righ t s ide quadrant that satisfies the criteria: Ireland. Ireland has been a
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parliam entary dem ocracy  since 1922, how ever trade un ions were active  in the country 
since at least the ea rly  19th century.
In sum m ation, the countries chosen fo r the case studies consist o f  two 
constitu tiona l m onarch ies, one parliam entary repub lic , and one presidentia l federal 
repub lic . T hey  have a ll been stable dem ocracies possessing  un ive rsa l suffrage since at 
least the first quarter o f  the twentieth century, and a ll have long  trad itions o f  trade union 
recogn ition . F rom  the ir d iffe rent pos ition ing  on L ijp h a r t ’ s tw o-d im ensiona l graph o f  
dem ocracy, the fou r states selected p rov ide  a good cross section o f  states under a 
num ber o f  headings. G overnm ent in the Un ited  States o f  Am erica , and the Un ited 
K in gdom  is s ing le -party  based, w h ile  in  Ireland and Sw eden it has alternated between 
being m u lti-pa rty  and sing le-party based. The U n ited  K in g d o m  and the Sweden have 
M onarchs, w h ile  Ire land and the Un ited  States o f  A m e r ic a  have Presidents as heads o f  
state. Ire land and Sweden are both sm all parliam entary dem ocracies, em ploy variations 
on neo-corporatist state strategies in  industria l re lations, and possess h igh  trade union 
densities. The  U n ited  States and the Un ited  K in g d om  are large dem ocracies, em p loy a 
p lu ra lis t approach to p o lic y  m aking, possess neo -libe ra l state strategies in industria l 
re lations, and have low  trade un ion densities. In term s o f  the interest group system in 
each state, em p lo y in g  L ijp h a r t ’ s categorisation, Sweden scores at the corporatist end o f  
the scale w h ile  the U n ited  States and the Un ited  K in g d o m  are at the opposite end where 
there is m ore o f  an interest group free-for-a ll. A t  va riou s tim es throughout the twentieth 
century the U S A ,  B r ita in , and Sweden, have em bodied the extremes o f  either neo­
libe ra l or neo -corpo ratist state industria l re lations approaches (Schm idt, 1982, p. 253). 
Ireland is pos itioned  m idw ay  between these extremes, a lthough since 1987 it has 
becom e m ore co rporatist w ith  the instigation o f  nationa l pay agreements.
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The next item  to be dealt w ith  concerns the issue o f  the tim e fram e w ith in  w h ich  to 
bracket the case studies. T w o  p rin c ip les  were app lied  in determ in ing  the timeframe. 
F irs tly , the tim efram e should be as long  as poss ib le  so as to a llow  the greatest 
opportun ity  to investigate the trade un ion peak o rgan isa tions ’ in fluence over pub lic  
p o lic y  in each o f  the countries chosen. Second ly, to ensure that lik e  is compared w ith  
like , the tim e fram e m ust be the same across a ll fou r states. G iv en  these crite ria  it is 
possib le  to go as far back  as the when the last o f  the four states became dem ocratic, or 
when the m ost recent d isrup tion  to dem ocratic ru le  in  these states came to an end. In 
th is case the fu n ction ing  o f  norm al dem ocracy w as m ost recently  disrupted, i f  not 
interrupted, in  the U n ite d  K in g d o m  during  W o r ld  W a r II w ith  the suspension o f  
e lections du ring  the war. The firs t post w ar B r it is h  e lection  took  p lace w ith in  eight 
w eeks o f  the end ing o f  the w ar in Europe in  M a y  1945. So as to ensure a com parable 
situation across each o f  the four states, the trade un ion  peak organ isa tions’ in fluence 
over pub lic  p o lic y  sha ll be exam ined in each country from  1945 to 2000.
A n a ly t ic  N a rra tive
E x p lic it  attention to theory strengthens explanation. A n  e x p lic it  appeal to the narrative 
is required fo r the com p le tion  o f  that exp lanation  (Bates et al., 1998, p. 15). In th is 
approach the em p ir ica l content o f  the narrative is as im portant as the log ica l structure o f  
the m odel. A  d is t in c tiv e  feature o f  th is d issertation sha ll be its use o f  the analytic 
narrative m ethodo logy  to  b lend the hypotheses and observab le  im p lica tion s  crite ria  and 
narration into the study o f  the rem oulded c r it ic a l junctu res approach as set out above. 
The approach is narrative in  that it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. 
It is ana ly tic  in  that it extracts e xp lic it  and form al lines o f  reasoning, w h ich  fac ilita te
The Time Frame
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both exposition  and explanation. The chapters o f  the d issertation constitute in-depth 
investigations o f  events, the behav iou r o f  particu la r actors, they describe structures, and 
exp lo re patterns o f  in teraction that transp ired in particu la r periods and settings. In 
exp lo ring  the in terp lay  between p o lit ic s  and econom ics the d issertation considers a 
fundam ental theme o f  m odern po lit ica l econom y.
The d issertation is devoted to both the e laboration o f  theory, and the exp loration 
o f  cases. It contributes ‘ to the h is to rica l turn in  the soc ia l sc iences,’ w h ich  is based on 
‘ a com m itm ent to p roduc ing  understanding v ia  richness, texture, and de ta il’ 
(M cD on a ld , 1996, p. 10). In add ition  to prob ing the narrative record, the chapters seek 
‘ parsim ony, refinem ent, and elegance (Bates et al., 1998, p. 11). In th is research the 
d issertation seeks to p rov ide  an understanding o f  the actors invo lved , the ir perceptions, 
preference, and expectations, as w e ll as the strategies they adopt and constraints they 
encounter. T h is  he lps in  p iec ing  together the story that accounts fo r the outcome o f  
interest. A s  Bates et al., (1998, p. 12) argue in re la tion  to ana ly tic  narratives, the 
d issertation seeks to cut deep ly  into the spec ifics  o f  a tim e and place, and to locate and 
trace the processes that generate the outcomes o f  interest. The d issertation consequently 
b u ild s  narratives that are ana ly tica l in  nature.
B y  exam in ing  the processes that produced the outcom es the chapters seek to 
capture the essence o f  the story be ing to ld. The use o f  the rem ou lded cr itica l junctures 
approach, in con junction  w ith  hypotheses and the ir observab le im p lica tions, transforms 
the narratives into ana ly t ic  narratives. In essence, the chapters seek to provide ana lytic 
h is to r ica l accounts that are couched in theo re tica lly  re levant language (George and 
Bennett, 1998, p. 14). In the phrasing o f  Geertz (1973, pp. 6-7) the d issertation seeks to 
p rov ide  th ick  descrip tion . T o  id en tify  w hy  one outcom e occurred rather than another,
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the d issertation m ust ground its exp lanations in em p ir ica l m ateria ls, seeking the forces 
that shaped the se lection o f  a particu la r equ ilib rium .
3. A Descriptive Inference Approach
A s im p le  descrip tion  o f  the p o lit ic a l in fluence o f  the trade un ion  peak organisations in 
d iffe ren t countries at various tim es is in  its e lf  u n lik e ly  to do anyth ing  o f  real value fo r 
the research questions as set out above. It w i l l  te ll us litt le  that is o f  use re lating to the 
exp lana tory  pow ers o f  the rem ou lded  c r it ic a l junctures approach. H o w  are we to know  
i f  the descrip tion  is correct? ‘D e scrip tion  is far from  m echan ica l or unprob lem atic since 
it in vo lve s  se lection  from  the in fin ite  num ber o f  facts that cou ld  be recorded ’ (K in g  et 
al., 1994, p. 34). In order to answer th is question it is necessary to go beyond 
descrip tion  and use inference. Inference is ‘ the process o f  u sing  the facts we know  to 
learn about facts we do not k n o w ’ (K in g  et al., 1994, p. 46). There are two types o f  
in ference -  d escrip tive  in ference and causal inference. The  fo rm er is defined as ‘ the 
process o f  understanding an unobserved phenom enon on the basis o f  a set o f  
observations ’ (K in g  et al., 1994, p. 55), w h ile  the latter seeks to exp la in  a phenomenon 
on the basis o f  a set o f  observations. It is the d iffe rence between in fe rr ing  the ‘w hat’ o f  
a phenom enon and the ‘ h ow .’ In th is case descrip tive  in ference w il l  be used to 
understand i f  the rem ou lded c r it ica l junctures approach can id en tify  s ign ifican t, sw ift, 
and enduring  change in  the trade un ion  peak o rgan isa tions ’ in fluence over pub lic  po licy . 
The f irs t task in  th is regard m ust be to show  that the trade un ion  peak organ isations’ 
in fluence  on p u b lic  p o lic y  varies over time. I f  th is can be proven, then one can 
leg it im a te ly  ask the question what accounts fo r th is variation .
The sp ec if ic  too ls that w il l  be used to go from  observed phenomena to 
unobserved phenom ena are hypotheses and observable im p lica tions. W e do not know  i f
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the rem oulded c r it ic a l junctures approach can iden tify  change in  the trade union peak 
o rgan isa tions ’ in fluence over pu b lic  p o licy . T o  answer th is  question w i l l  require the 
deve lopm ent o f  a hypothesis setting out the k ind  o f  change in the trade un ions ’ 
in fluence  over p u b lic  p o lic y  w e should expect to see i f  there is a c r it ica l juncture, and a 
hypothesis assum ing that th is  change takes p lace at the tim e o f  some generative 
c leavage or other. F rom  this can be derived a num ber o f  im p lica tion s  w h ich  it should 
be poss ib le  to observe. A  search is then conducted fo r these observab le im p lications. I f  
they cannot be found then the hypothesis must be ca lled  into question. On the other 
hand, i f  the observab le im p lica tion s  do actua lly  occur, the lik e lih o od  o f  the orig ina l 
unobserved phenom ena ex ist ing  increases. W hat th is approach seeks to do is ‘ b ring as 
m uch in fo rm ation  to bear on our hypothesis as poss ib le  [to] increase the confidence that 
the theory is co rre ct’ (K in g  et al., 1994, pp. 48-49). The m ore observable im p lica tions 
found to o ccu r the greater is the like lih o od  that the hypotheses and the underly ing 
theory are correct. The  v a lid ity  o f  the hypotheses and the underly ing  theory can be 
inferred from  the fact that the observable im p lica tions exist.
4. Hypotheses and Observable Implications
In the context o f  em p loy ing  trade un ion  peak organ isations as the case studies, it is now 
necessary to determ ine what hypotheses can be draw n up that w i l l  test the rem oulded 
c r it ic a l junctu res approach. Iden tify ing  the states, and the trade un ion  peak organisation 
therein, that w i l l  be studied in  advance o f  dete rm in ing  the hypotheses and their 
observab le im p lica tion s, ensures that the observable im p lica t io n s  can actua lly  be tested. 
F o r exam ple, hav ing  both parliam entary and pres iden tia l systems o f  government 
represented am ong the fou r states selected means that the observab le im p lica tions must 
be as f le x ib le  as poss ib le  so as to cover both such systems. In some cases this w i l l  not
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be possib le. H ow ever, as long as m ost cases a llow  fo r com parison  across a ll four states, 
then the observab le im p lica tion s  are w orkab le .
The assum ptions that fo r a c r it ic a l junctu re to occu r there m ust be a period o f  
change that is s ign ifican t, sw ift and enduring in nature, and that th is period o f  change 
takes p lace at the tim e o f  a generative cleavage or cr is is , are used to derive the 
hypotheses and observab le im p lica tion s that are testable against the em p ir ica l evidence. 
The  hypotheses, w ith  the ir focus on the case studies, are structured so that each 
corresponds w ith  the fram ew ork deve loped for the exam ina tion  o f  c r it ic a l junctures as 
set out above. The  firs t hypothesis deals w ith  the issue o f  change in  trade un ion peak 
organ isa tion  in fluence over p u b lic  p o licy . T h is  encom passes the cr ite ria  o f  significant, 
sw ift, and enduring  change. The second hypothesis exam ines w hether th is change came 
about at the tim e o f  a generative cleavage. In th is case the generative cleavage being 
sought shall be a m acroeconom ic cris is . M ac roe cono m ic  crises were chosen as the 
p roxy  fo r the generative cleavages as it is argued here they im pact s ign if ican tly  upon 
both trade un ions and the ir peak organisations. A s  C o ll ie r  and C o ll ie r  (1991, p. 93) 
po in t out, labou r m ovem ents and national econom ies are c lo se ly  lin ked  to one another, 
the ir roots, and evo lu tions, be ing  intertw ined. ‘M o s t scho lars agree that severe 
recessions m ake s ig n if ican t structural changes poss ib le  because they render po lit ics  
h ig h ly  f lu id ’ (Garrett, 1993, p. 522). The trade unions are open ly  exposed to the impact 
o f  econom ic  flu ctuations as the ir m em bership makes up the w o rk fo rce  o f  an economy, 
and they them selves are interest groups active w ith in  that p o lit ic a l economy. Th is 
p laces a particu la r em phasis on the im portance o f  the econom ic situation that leads up to 
a c r it ic a l juncture. H ow ever, th is a lso leaves us w ith  a degree o f  sub jectiv ity  as to what 
exactly  constitutes a m acroeconom ic cr is is  in each particu la r country being exam ined
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here. The observab le im p lica tion s  derived  from  each o f  these hypotheses w il l be 
grouped into subsets based on the nature o f  the data.
H ow ever, it shou ld  be noted here that there is the p o s s ib ility  that a generative 
c leavage other than a m acroeconom ic c r is is  cou ld  co in c id e  w ith  s ign ifican t, sw ift, and 
enduring  change in  the trade un ion s ’ in fluence over pu b lic  p o licy . A lthough  em ployed 
here, m acroeconom ic crises are on ly  one o f  any num ber o f  other p rox ies that cou ld be 
u tilise d  fo r generative cleavages, p rov ided  adequate ju s t if ic a t io n  is set out. 
‘T rad it io n a lly , students o f  in stitu tiona l change focused on the im portance o f  crisis, 
s ituations o f  large-sca le pub lic  d issatisfaction  or even fear stem m ing from  an unusual 
degree o f  so c ia l unrest and/or threats to nationa l secu rity ’ (C o rte ll and Peterson, 1999, 
p. 184). W ars, revo lutions, coup d ’ état, chang ing balance o f  power, e lectora l landslides, 
dem ograph ic changes, and soc ia l m ovem ents m ay produce an overw he lm ing  mandate 
fo r p o lic y  and or/structural change. Such unantic ipated events d iscred it ex isting 
in stitu tions and po lic ie s , consequently triggering  change (T illy ,  1975). However, 
m acroeconom ic  crises were chosen as the p roxy  fo r generative cleavage as they are 
pa rt icu la r ly  sa lien t to trade un ion  change.
It m ust be recogn ised that w hen dea ling  w ith  m u ltiva ria te  analyses based upon 
the qua lita tive  exam ination  o f  h is to rica l events w e com e up against the issue o f  
assessing partia l exp lanations. There are bound to be cases in  w h ich  the independent 
variab les u tilised  in  the observable im p lica tion s  o f  the hypotheses satisfy  the sought- 
after c r ite ria  to va ry ing  extents. T h is  rea lisation  perm its us to approach the search for, 
and u tilisa t io n  of, em p ir ica l data w ith  a rea lis tic  understand ing that the em p irica l- 
theoretica l f it  w i l l  va ry  between each observable im p lica tion , and on a larger scale 
between each o f  the hypotheses. In order to iden tify  the extent o f  th is varia tion  it is 
necessary to c la ss ify  the em p irica l-theore tica l f it  accord ing  to a scale runn ing from
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none, through low and medium, to high. The findings will be set out in tables in order 
to see if proposed critical junctures in fact constituted critical junctures.
The hypotheses to be evaluated are:
HI. If there is a critical juncture, then change in trade union peak organisation 
influence over public policy will be significant, swift, and enduring.
To test this hypothesis an analysis will search for changes in trade union policy 
preferences, influence, and relative power over public policy in each of the four 
countries under examination. This approach is not measuring the trade unions’ 
influence per se, but is looking for different indicators of change in the relationship 
between the trade union peak organisations and the governments. The observable 
implications, sub-divided amongst the headings of structures, trade union membership 
and government policies, government policies and trade union policies, third party 
assessments of government -  trade union relations, and ministerial attitudes, are clearly 
focused, and comprehensive. This configured arrangement sequentially encompasses 
the main aspects of identifiable change in trade union influence over public policy. The 
independent variables utilised here were chosen specifically in order to identify change 
of a significant, swift, and enduring nature in the relationship between the trade union 
peak organisations and the governments.
In classifying the empirical-theoretical fit according to a scale running from 
none, through low and medium, to high, the specific criteria shall be whether each of the 
observable implications underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature. 
As set out above, swift refers to change taking place within months of the proposed 
critical juncture, while enduring requires that the critical juncture’s after effects last for 
longer than a standard administration’s term of office. However, in accordance with the
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definition of a critical juncture, significance shall be the most important factor being 
searched for, as without significant change there is little to indicate a critical juncture in 
the first place. The criteria for significance, being particular to each observable 
implication, will be set out individually below. Should none of these criteria be found 
then the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable implication will be none. Should 
only one of these three criteria be found then the empirical-theoretical fit for that 
observable implication will be low. Should two of the three criteria be found to occur 
then the empirical-theoretical fit will be medium. Should all three of the criteria be 
found to occur then the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable implication will be 
classified as high.
In the context of testing the remoulded critical junctures approach a change in 
the trade unions’ influence can be examined using the following proxies:
Structures
1. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the trade unions’ access to the prime 
minister or president, as measured by the number of meetings per year, underwent 
change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature, then the trade unions’ influence 
over public policy may have changed to the extent of constituting a critical juncture.
Change of below 10 per cent will be classified as of no significance, between 11 and 25 
per cent low, between 26 and 50 per cent medium, and above 50 per cent high.
2. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, trade union representation on 
government committees, within government departments, or on government policy 
making bodies, underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature, then 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have changed to the extent of 
constituting a critical juncture.
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Change of below 10 per cent will be classified as of no significance, between 11 and 25 
per cent low, between 26 and 50 per cent medium, and above 50 per cent high.
3. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak organisation, and/or the government, 
as measured by economic partnership agreements, underwent change of a 
significant, swift, and enduring nature then the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy may have changed to the extent of constituting a critical juncture.
No change in the relationship shall be classified as of no significance. The 
institution/dissolution of an informal agreement between two parties shall be of low 
significance, the institution/dissolution of an informal agreement between three parties 
shall be medium, and the institution/dissolution of a formal agreement between two or 
three parties shall be considered high.
4. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the trade unions’ relationship with a 
political party, as measured by the institution or dissolution of a formal/informal 
agreement or arrangement between them, underwent change of a significant, swift, 
and enduring nature then the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have 
changed to the extent of constituting a critical juncture.
No change in the relationship shall be classified as of zero significance. The 
institution/dissolution of an informal agreement between the trade unions and a political 
party shall be classified as of low to medium significance depending upon its 
particulars. The institution/dissolution of a formal agreement between the trade unions 
and a political party shall be considered as of high significance.
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The Level of Trade Union Membership and Government Policies
5. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the level of trade union membership in 
the economy, as measured in trade union documentation, research publications, and 
official state publications, underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring 
nature then the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have changed to the 
extent of constituting a critical juncture.
Change of below 1 per cent will be classified as of no significance, between 1 and 2 per 
cent shall be of low significance, between 2 to 3 per cent medium, and above 3 per cent 
high.
Government Policies and Trade Union Policies
6. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the government’s policies towards 
organised labour, as measured by its pre-election public statements, election 
manifestos, coalition agreement, policy documents and budgetary statements 
underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature then the trade unions’ 
influence over public policy may have changed to the extent of constituting a critical 
juncture.
The identification of significance shall be more subjective, focusing on the qualitative 
aspect of government policies toward the unions as opposed to any quantitative aspect.
7. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the level of trade union policies that 
were incorporated into the government’s policies towards organised labour, as 
measured by the comparison of trade union policy documents with subsequent 
government policy documents, underwent change of a significant, swift, and
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enduring nature then the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have 
changed to the extent of constituting a critical juncture.
The identification of significance shall be subjective in this case, depending upon the
judgement of the trade unions themselves.
Third Party Assessments of Government -  Trade Union Relations
8. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the government’s economic policies, as 
identified by organisations monitoring economic performance, underwent change of 
a significant, swift, and enduring nature then the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy may have changed to the extent of constituting a critical juncture.
The identification of significance in this case shall depend upon the judgement of the
organisations monitoring economic performance.
9. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy, as identified by national economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators, underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature then 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have changed to the extent of 
constituting a critical juncture.
The identification of significance in this case shall depend upon the judgement of the
commentators.
Ministerial Attitudes
10. If, at the time of a proposed critical juncture, ministerial attitudes towards the role of 
trade unions in the polity, as measured by statements made in parliament or in the 
national media, underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature then
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the trade unions’ influence over public policy may have changed to the extent of 
constituting a critical juncture.
The identification of significance in this case shall depend on the nature of the 
statements made by the ministers.
If the change in influence is to accord to the criteria set out above for critical junctures 
this change must be significant, swift, and enduring.
H2. If there is a critical juncture, then the change in trade union peak organisation 
influence over public policy will coincide with a macroeconomic crisis.
As note above, we are looking for a macroeconomic crisis as an example of a generative
cleavage. But, how do we identify a macroeconomic crisis? We can take it that a
macroeconomic crisis must constitute a severe economic low point. Yet, there will still
be a degree of subjectivity about what constitutes a macroeconomic crisis, insofar as
what is a major issue for one country might not be so for another. Each supposed
macroeconomic crisis that coincides with a proposed critical juncture must be examined
to see if it is in fact a macroeconomic crisis. That a macroeconomic crisis may coincide
with a significant, swift, and enduring change in a trade union peak organisation’s
influence over public policy can be examined using the proxies set out below.
However, in classifying the empirical-theoretical fit according to a scale running
from none, through low and medium, to high, the criteria here shall be the extent to
which each of the observables points to a macroeconomic crisis. Apart from the first
observable implication that is directly quantifiable to an extent, the identification of the
empirical-theoretical fit for the remainder of the observables will be reliant upon the
clarity of the results provided by the independent variables utilised. If these point to an
economic crisis then there is a high empirical-theoretical fit. However, should the
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independent variables not point to a macroeconomic crisis, then the empirical- 
theoretical fit will be lower, how much lower being depend upon the state of the 
economy as indicated by the independent variables.
Primary Economic Data
1. If the country’s main economic indicators, when compared with the antecedent data, 
have reached decade-long lows at the time of the proposed critical juncture, then the 
economy may have been in crisis at the time of the critical juncture.
If none, or only one economic indicator is at a decade-long low then there is no 
empirical-theoretical fit, if two economic indicators are at decade-long lows then there 
is low empirical-theoretical fit, if three indicators are at decade-long lows then there is 
medium empirical-theoretical fit, and if four of the indicators are at decade-long lows 
then there is high fit.
Public Opinion and the Media
2. If public opinion polls and election surveys found that the populace regarded the 
economic state of the country as in crisis at the time of the proposed critical 
juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis at the time of the critical 
juncture.
If less than 20 per cent of the public regarded the economy as in crisis then there is no 
empirical-theoretical fit, if 20 to 30 per cent regarded the economy as in crisis there is 
low empirical-theoretical fit, if 30 to 40 per cent regarded the economy as in crisis then 
there is medium empirical-theoretical fit, should above 40 per cent of the public have 
regarded the economy as in crisis then there is high empirical-theoretical fit.
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3. If the opinions expressed by the national media (as represented by two of a 
country’s main newspapers) regard the economic state of the country as in crisis at 
the time of the proposed critical juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis 
at the time of the critical juncture.
If the media states that the economy is in crisis then there is high empirical-theoretical 
fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower is dependent on 
the media’s assessment of the situation.
Specialist Opinion and Analyses
4. If a country’s national economic and political commentators alike regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis at the time of the proposed critical 
juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis at the time of the critical 
juncture.
If national economic and political commentators state that the economy is in crisis then 
there is high empirical-theoretical fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be 
lower, how much lower is dependent on the commentators’ assessment of the situation.
5. If the central bank regards the economic state of the country as in crisis at the time 
of the proposed critical juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis at the 
time of the critical juncture.
If the central bank states that the economy is in crisis, then there is high empirical- 
theoretical fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower is 
dependent on the bank’s assessment of the situation.
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6. If both domestic and international organisations (OECD) monitoring economic 
performance regard the economic state of the country as in crisis at the time of the 
proposed critical juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis at the time of 
the critical juncture.
If the domestic and international organisations state that the economy is in crisis then 
there is high empirical-theoretical fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be 
lower, how much lower is dependent on the organisations’ assessment of the situation
Political Opinion and Government Responses
7. If the opinions of elected representatives, both government and opposition deputies, 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis at the time of the proposed 
critical juncture, then the economy may have been in crisis at the time of the critical 
juncture.
If elected representatives state that the economy is in crisis then there is high empirical- 
theoretical fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower is 
dependent on the representatives’ assessment of the situation.
8. If government pronouncement on, and responses to, the state of the economy at the 
time of the proposed critical juncture are consistent with a crisis management 
approach, such as the introduction of supplementary budgets, then the economy may 
have been in crisis at the time of the critical juncture.
If the government regards economy as in crisis then there is a high empirical-theoretical 
fit, anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower is dependent on 
the government’s assessment of the situation.
68
If drastic, swift, and enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy 
was recorded at the time of a macroeconomic crisis then a critical juncture has been 
identified. However, as was previously stated, there will be variations in the extent to 
which each of the hypotheses’ observable implications point to a critical juncture. The 
empirical-theoretical fit will vary across the observables. This brings us to the question 
of how many observable implications are required to indicate a critical juncture in the 
trade unions’ influence over public policy. This is a subjective decision. Here, a rule of 
60 per cent is adopted. That is, at least 60 per cent of all observable implications, for 
which there are findings, should point to an empirical-theoretical fit that is exclusively 
high. By doing this we are ignoring the significance of findings that are of both a 
medium and low empirical-theoretical fit. If 60 per cent, or above, of the observables 
are found to be of a high empirical-theoretical fit, for each of the hypotheses, then a 
critical juncture has been uncovered.
The fact that the evidence gathered shall be a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data is one of the dissertation’s strengths. If the gathering of either 
quantitative or qualitative data was conducted to the exclusion of the other it would 
create an imbalance in the information presented for final analysis. However, sets of 
raw statistics on the trade unions and the economy, backed up by contemporary analysis 
and opinions, are the end result of this approach. This mix of both types of data ensures 
that a more fully rounded picture can be drawn, and argument put forward, concerning 
the trade unions and the economy. The outlined hypotheses and observable 
implications will be put to the test in the Chapters IV through VII.
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The central question posed is how to improve upon the critical junctures approach? The 
argument here is that for a critical juncture there must be a generative cleavage and a 
change that is significant, swift, and enduring in nature. The altered critical junctures 
approach, as laid out in this chapter, provides a promising avenue for the exploration of 
change within institutions and institutional contexts. The details on the altered approach 
were provided in order to improve our understanding of that approach, and its enhanced 
applicability and rigour. Essentially, the critical juncture framework, set out originally 
by Collier and Collier (1991), has been remoulded here in order to make it more 
rigorous. Vague concepts have been tightened up and defined. The ideas of 
significance, swiftness, and duration have been endowed with clearly defined values, 
making the framework readily applicable to individual countries, but also across 
countries, and over time. This enhances the approach’s usefulness to the field of 
political science. To test the altered critical junctures approach’s capability of 
identifying change it will be employed in the examination of possible critical junctures 
in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in four countries 
over a 55-year period. This required the development of the two hypotheses set out 
above. The first hypothesis assumes that for there to be a critical j uncture change in a 
trade union peak organisation’s influence over public policy must be significant, swift, 
and enduring. The second hypothesis assumes that this change takes place at times of 
macroeconomic crises (generative cleavages). As both quantitative and qualitative data 
will be utilised here, the findings are not reliant on any one indicator, or set of 
indicators, for that matter. This is one of the dissertation’s strengths, as its findings are 
uncovered through the combination of statistics and description. The hypotheses’ 
observable implications set rigorous standards by which to assess proposed critical
Conclusion
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junctures. The setting of standards for assessing the resultant empirical-theoretical fit, 
and the displaying of these results in tables, will highlight the extent to which the theory 
captures the reality of the situation. In all, the methodology section has set out a 
systematic approach for assessing the remoulded critical junctures approach.
The essence of this chapter has been the adoption of a rigorous approach to the 
construction of the remoulded critical juncture’s framework, the selection of countries 
whose trade union peak organisations will make up the case studies, and the 
development of the all-important hypotheses and their observable implications. This 
orderliness in approach is designed to ultimately reduce uncertainty regarding what is, 
and what is not, a critical juncture. However, before discussing specific case studies 
from the selected states, the following chapter will identify prima facie evidence of 
where the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy may have 
changed to the extent of constituting possible critical junctures. This shall provide us 
with our subsequent case studies.
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_______Chapter I I I ______
Proposed Critical Junctures
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The aim of the case studies is to determine whether the remoulded critical junctures 
approach can identify changes in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over 
public policy, within countries, that constitute critical junctures. The primary objective 
of this chapter is to avoid providing an overlong historical narrative tracing the political, 
economic, and industrial relations evolution of all four countries throughout the latter 
half of the twentieth century. An approach of that nature, while still encompassing and 
including the sought-after critical junctures, would be consumed mainly by the 
recounting of incidents ancillary, or superfluous, to the material central to this 
dissertation. Such an approach, very large in terms of both its scope and scale, would 
result in the dissertation exceeding all limits set for a project such as this. That said, this 
chapter will provide, in brief, certain relevant background information on the trade 
union peak organisations and the political contexts in which they exist. The secondary 
objective of the chapter is to identify prima facie evidence of critical junctures in the 
trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in each of the countries 
under examination.
The chapter will point out, in brief, various instances of where changes in the 
trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in each of the four 
countries have, prima facie, been identified as potential critical junctures. This 
preliminary identification is achieved through the examination of germane events that 
occurred in each country during the second half of the twentieth century. This 
examination shall seek generative cleavages, in this case macroeconomic crises, that 
occurred at the same time as significant, swift, and enduring changes in the trade 
unions’ influence over public policy. Consequently, the initial identification of the 
potential critical junctures, as set out here, is based upon circumstantial evidence, and 
that alone. In the following chapters these potential critical junctures shall undergo a far
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more detailed examination in order to see if they in fact constitute genuine critical 
junctures.
The following subsections, divided on a national basis, will set out the changes 
in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy, in the years between 
1945 and 2000, that an initial examination identifies as constituting possible critical 
junctures.
Ire la n d
This section encompasses the period from 1945 to 2000 in Ireland. Set out within this 
time frame will be various instances of where the trade union peak organisation’s 
influence over public policy has, prima facie, been identified as having changed to the 
extent of constituting possible critical junctures. In 1959, in the midst of a recession, 
economic strategy became outward-orientated. The move constituted a major departure 
in Irish economic policy, and ultimately provided the ICTU with more avenues through 
which to influence public policy. The Irish State’s attempt to govern through the trade 
union and employer associations during the 1970s, its genesis to be found in the moves 
towards the liberalisation of trade and economic planning from the late 1950s, 
constituted a phenomenon described as tripartism (O’Halpin, 1993, p, 198). This 
approach to policy making constituted a distinct break with the auxiliary state approach 
employed up to that time (Roche, 1994a, p. 158). However, the tripartite approach was 
abandoned by the Irish State in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, after 1987 tripartite 
agreements were again concluded between the social partners.
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The years following the ending of the Second World War had been difficult for the Irish 
economy. The 1950s were a dismal decade for Ireland (O’Grada and O’Rourke, 1993, 
p. 16). Between 1951 and 1958 GDP rose by less than 1 per cent per year, employment 
fell by 12 per cent, and half a million people emigrated (Haughton, 1995, p. 34). 
However, the late 1950s saw economic policy, as influenced by T K Whitaker’s report 
E c o n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t , shift away from protectionism and embrace export led 
industrialisation (O’Connell and Rottman, 1994, p. 234). This event was to overshadow 
the contours of economic and social life in Ireland thereafter (Tansey, 1998, p. 12). It 
constituted an admission of the failure of the economic philosophy that underlay 
protectionism.
In 1959 the new Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, brought an entrepreneurial economic 
leadership to government. Lemass ‘was prepared to offer the trade union movement an 
integral part in the development of much of the new thinking that lay behind the 
government’s economic and social programme’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32). The move 
towards economic openness, in a climate of crisis, saw the establishment in the early 
1960s of a number of primarily consultative bodies to which the unions appointed 
representatives. This constituted recognition by government of the import of the trade 
unions to Irish economic management, and provided the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU) with more avenues through which to influence public policy. The change in the 
ICTU’s influence over public policy, this resulting from the altered economic strategy 
initiated at a time of macroeconomic necrosis, may have constituted a critical juncture, 
as its contribution to national public policy making was dramatically enhanced for the 
rest of the 1960s by this development.
Proposed Critical Junctures
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Throughout the 1960s real production increased rapidly. Economists attribute 
this success to the export led growth that stood upon the pillars of trade liberalisation 
and the attraction of direct foreign investment. The government’s attitude towards 
collective bargaining was influenced by its increasing political and economic 
significance from the late 1950s onwards (Roche, 1994a). As more of the workforce 
became unionised, bargaining arrangements came to exert a major influence on 
macroeconomic policies and outcomes. Industrial development’s pride of place in 
national policy and politics also influenced the government’s stance towards centralised 
collective bargaining. Sean Lemass had urged a corporatist strategy towards industrial 
relations in circumstances marked by economic readjustment. However, both the 
employers’ and unions’ commitment to the status quo prevented corporatism taking 
hold at that time.
The consequence of the pay round system of the 1960s further impelled attempts 
to control and centralise collective bargaining. Industrial relations deteriorated in the 
late 1960s, and the daily news was dominated by major industrial confrontations 
(Arnold, 1984, p. 100). By 1970 the rate of inflation was running at about 8.5 per cent, 
while statistics for industrial output, employment, volume of imports, and retail sales 
indicated economic stagnation (ESRI, 1970). Economic crisis resulting from a rising 
level of industrial conflict, and forceful trade union wage pressure, impelled the 
government to adopt a more interventionist approach (McCarthy, 1973, p. 181). The 
government pressured the unions into accepting the first national agreement for six 
years in December 1970. This proved a watershed as it precipitated the dismantling of 
the boundary separating politics and industrial relations (Roche, 1989, p. 121). With 
active state involvement in industrial relations came direct trade union involvement in 
public policy making. By the mid-1970s the new collective bargaining approach was
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marked by quid pro quo arrangements on taxation issues between unions and the state. 
Macroeconomic difficulties, brought about by the actions of the trade unions 
themselves, provided the catalyst for the move towards neo-corporatism in Ireland, and 
saw the ICTU’s influence over public policy changing to the extent of constituting a 
possible critical juncture.
Through the centralised agreements the trade unions were able to combine 
continuation of wage pressures on employers with negotiation on a broader range of 
issues with government. The agreements provided scope for a continuation of the 
upward trend of pay pressures and for continued relatively high levels of industrial 
action. The centralised agreement gave the trade unions direct, and increasing, access to 
the government, and an unprecedented input into public policy. The 1975 National 
Wage Agreement (NWA), although concluded in a climate of economic crisis, and 
without establishing the principle of a trade-off between pay and public policy 
commitments, created a degree of expectation that the NWAs and budgets to follow 
might be linked. 1977 was to see the first budget-linked NWA.
The accommodating stance of government was the result of features of the 
political system, exacerbated by weak ideological differentiation of the party system. 
The policy mix of the 1970s was a product of contingent economic and political 
circumstances. Policy-making was marked by a tendency to respond to short-term 
political needs. The relative stability in collective bargaining possessed an attraction for 
government. Governments were constrained on alternatives to an accommodating 
approach, this due to electoral pressures. The range of electoral support that 
governments sought provided an incentive to avoid unpopular measures for as long as 
fiscal policy made possible.
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The fiscal instability of the late 1970s, exacerbated by the oil crisis of 1979, led 
to disillusionment amongst the social partners. Nevertheless, by the close of the 1970s 
the centralised agreements had acquired a macroeconomic significance as they had 
become wide-ranging policy agreements. However, a shift in the power balance 
between the corporate groupings was evident. In 1980 the main decisions concerning 
the second National Understanding (NU) were taken by the government and Congress, 
and then communicated to the employers (Weinz, 1986, p. 99).
By 1981 the national debt had reached £10.195 billion (Leddin and Walsh, 1998, 
p. 155). The current budget deficit was running at 7.3 per cent of GNP, and the public 
sector borrowing requirement had peaked at 20.1 per cent of GNP, both unsustainable 
levels of borrowing (Leddin and O’Leary, 1995, p. 167). The fact that, as Maye (1993, 
p. 203) states, ‘finance provided for the year would be nearly all spent by the end of the 
half-year’ precipitated Haughey’s decision to call an election for June 1981. The Fine 
Gael and Labour Party coalition government elected in 1981 placed the need for the 
correct management of the public finances, and curbs in public spending, at the top of 
the political agenda (Coakley, 1982, p. 91). The government permitted national pay 
bargaining end in 1981 as the terms that had characterised the NUs were not compatible 
with these objectives (Cox, 1983). The economic difficulties ushered in a period of 
political instability not previously experienced in Ireland (Beamish, 1982, p. 271). In 
all, three general elections were contested between June 1981 and November 1982, each 
of which brought with it a change of government. However, by 1982 all of the political 
parties were committed to curbing public spending. The seeds of collapse, the 
agreements’ failure to correct the national economic problems, and to close the gap 
between their objectives and achievements, had been sown over a number of years. At 
the time of a macroeconomic crisis the ICTU’s influence over public policy was to be
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drastically reduced. The build up of economic problems, along with what looks like a 
significant, swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy, may 
have constituted a critical juncture.
In retrospect the social partnership of the 1970s can be regarded as a weak form 
of neo-corporatism. The approach failed to re-orientate union and employer behaviour 
decisively away from the postures associated with decentralised collective bargaining. 
Instead of setting in motion a virtuous circle wherein pay restraint contributes to 
positive economic outcomes, which furthers support for tripartite bargaining, a vicious 
circle was set in train. By the start of the 1980s disposable pay and unemployment 
worsened, employers in many sectors faced intensifying competitive pressure, while the 
state found itself forced to raise taxes on employees and borrow to fund spending 
commitments.
Historical decomposition of GDP growth suggests that supply side shocks were 
the predominant cause of the recession of the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s 
(Cosgrove and Roche, 1994, p. 28). ‘Having increasingly become part of the global 
economy, Ireland [was] buffeted by some of the worst effects of the international 
recession’ (Grimes, 1992, p. 125). The 1980s saw the economy stagnate, the public 
finances deteriorate, and unemployment reached unprecedented levels. The absence of 
centralised agreements limited the influence of the trade union movement at a time 
when the economic situation of employees was worsening (NESC, 1990).
What had been considered an economic crisis in 1981 had continued to deepen 
throughout the mid-1980s. By 1987 the Irish economy had reached its nadir 
(O’Donnell, 1998, p. 6). The national debt rose to over £23 billion, 48 per cent of 
which was sourced abroad (Jacobsen, 1994, p. 160). This debt was three times larger 
than it had been in 1980, and represented 130 per cent of annual GNP (McCarthy, 1999,
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p. 5). The Fine Gael and Labour coalition government, struggling with chronic fiscal 
problems, eventually fell in 1987 over a disagreement on expenditure cuts proposed for 
the budget (Mjoset, 1992, p. 382). ‘Labour had withdrawn [from government] because 
it could not accept the public spending cuts that Fine Gael was insisting upon’ 
(Gallagher and Marsh, 2002, p. 31). There was a need for an alternative economic 
approach as continuation of the policies that had brought about this impasse were no 
longer an option (NESC, 1986, p. 303). The spiral of stagnation, rising taxes, escalating 
expenditure on current consumption, and skyrocketing debt had impressed themselves 
sufficiently on the main political parties to allow for a consensus (Brunt, 1988, p. 35). 
1987 saw the re-emergence of politicised industrial relations at national level. The new 
Fianna Fail government, pursuing the advantages of industrial peace and trade union 
commitment to severe spending cuts, initiated negotiations on a new centralised pay 
agreement with the social partners. Congress’s decision to participate in the national 
programme was born of strategic necessity. Thereafter ‘union leaders secured access to 
government they had never previously enjoyed’ (MacSharry and White, 2001, p. 130). 
The ICTU’s initial objectives in participating in the Programme for National Recovery 
(PNR) were refined and modified in the subsequent national agreements as a 
consequence of the changing economic environment and its changing priorities. The 
recognition by the Irish political establishment of the crisis state of the economy in 1987 
precipitated a new approach to economic management. After years of exclusion from 
the corridors of power, severe macroeconomic difficulties, combined with a significant, 
swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy, are proposed to 
have constituted a critical juncture.
‘Beyond the issues of pay and tax, the partnership programmes have contained 
agreement on an ever-increasing range of economic and social policies’ (O’Donnell,
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and O’Reardon, 2000, p. 237). While the partnership began by addressing the critical 
central issue of looming insolvency and economic collapse, it has since focused on a 
range of complex supply-side matters. The programmes have come to involve a dense 
web of working groups, committees, and task forces, which involve the social partners 
in the design, implementation, and monitoring of public policy.
‘In the decade after 1987, when the PNR was launched, interest group activity in 
Ireland attained centre stage, with the tripartite agreements of the 1990s cementing 
social partnership’ (Murphy, 1999, p. 291). Unlike the 1970s, the agreements of the late 
1980s and 1990s were based on a shared understanding of the problems facing the Irish 
economy and society, and the main lines of policy required to address them (NESC,
1996, p. 20). These agreements were not confined to wages alone, but encompassed a 
wide range of economic and social policies (O’Donnell and Thomas, 1998, p. 119). 
The making and implementing of these agreements shows how closely the trade unions 
became involved in public policy making and its administration. Arguably, the Irish 
variant of social partnership, which entails an exchange of wage moderation and 
economic peace, for tax cuts and a role in macroeconomic policy making, provided the 
institutional framework to achieve the combination of policies which transformed a 
falling economy into one of the fastest growing economies in Europe over the course of 
a decade (O’Connell, 1999, p. 6).
In conclusion, there are proposed to have been four simultaneously occurring 
macroeconomic crises and potentially significant, swift, and enduring changes in the 
trade union peak organisation’s influence over public policy, in Ireland, in the period 
between 1945 and 2000. These periods of change in the ICTU’s influence over public 
policy are proposed to have constituted critical junctures. However, this initial 
examination was possessed of a degree of subjectivity in so far as what constitutes a
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standard for macroeconomic crisis, and significant, swift, and enduring change in trade 
union influence over public policy, that is applicable across all countries.
The U nited K ingdom
This section, encompassing the period from 1945 to 2000 in the United Kingdom, will 
set out instances of change in the trade union peak organisation’s influence over public 
policy that constitute possible critical junctures. In the midst of the post war economic 
and social chaos of 1945 an election was held in Britain that saw the trade unions’ 
influence over public policy changed for the following quarter of a century. By the start 
of the 1970s economic developments contributed to political moves to reform the trade 
union movement and its influence on the government. However, by 1974 an economic 
crisis was to see the trade unions’ influence over public policy rejuvenate. Yet, five 
years later the trade unions’ links with the British government were to be drastically 
reduced for the remaining years of the twentieth century. A complex web of social, 
political, and economic factors conspired to create the conditions that made the political 
construct that was the British welfare state possible after 1945. However, a similarly 
complex web of factors was later to see the welfare state reduced in scope.
Proposed Critical Junctures
By the end of the Second World War the British economy was in disarray. During the 
six years of conflict Britain had lost approximately one quarter of its national wealth, 
and the economy had been distorted from top to bottom. The national debt had tripled, 
while the country’s standard of living had fallen (Sked and Cook, 1979, pp. 27-28). At 
this time the Trades Union Congress’s (TUC) influence over public policy underwent 
change. The war years had witnessed a major expansion of union representation on
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government policy-making bodies. Ernest Bevin, probably the most powerful British 
trade union leader in the first half of the twentieth century, had been appointed minister 
of labour and national service in 1940 (Bullock, 1960, p. 1). The trade unions’ 
contribution to the war effort allowed them to seek post war consultation with the 
government on policies of concern to them (Farnham and Pimlott, 1986, p. 28). During 
the war the view gained ground that economic and social conditions should be improved 
and that the State could, and indeed had a duty to, do something about them. To this 
end all political parties had committed themselves to the construction of a post-war 
welfare state.
The election of the Labour Party in July 1945, armed with a comprehensive 
programme for the development of post-war Britain (Childs, 2002, p. 79), provided the 
TUC with a receptive audience in government for its proposals. The Attlee 
administration brought the unions into formal contact with government in a continuing 
relationship. Legislation favourable to the unions was passed, and the number of bodies 
on which unions had representation expanded. The imprint of the unions ‘lay on many 
key features of the post-war settlement’ (Minkin, 1991, p. 72). However, ‘it would be 
quite wrong to suggest that the Attlee government was a mere transmission belt for the 
implementation of TUC policy’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 40). Although Labour was to lose 
power in 1951 the Conservative governments that followed maintained the post-war 
consensus. The significant change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, facilitated 
by the election of a labour government at a time of difficult macroeconomic 
circumstances arising from the war, is proposed to have constituted a critical juncture as 
it resulted in the TUC being drawn into the existing political establishment that was 
now controlled by the political party it had helped to found. The decades thereafter saw
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the unions become increasingly involved in the formulation and implementation of 
government social and economic policy (Edwards et al., 1992, p. 31).
The heyday of consensus in the late 1940s and early 1950s existed 
simultaneously with the growth of forces that were eventually to undermine it. A 
primary force was the relatively decline of the British economy. For most of second 
half of the twentieth century economic growth in Britain lagged behind that of its main 
competitors (Atkinson, 1987, p. 15). This placed an ever-increasing strain on the 
welfare state as national income failed to keep pace with government commitments 
(Edwards et al., 1992, p. 7). Economic policy from the 1950s to the 1970s was 
characterized by a series of stop-go cycles, that is economic expansion, producing 
inflation and a balance of payments crisis, which in turn led to a sharp recession 
(Edwards et al., 1992). The British labour market also underwent restructuring during 
the 1960s and 1970s as the number of white-collar workers and their unions grew in 
relation to their blue-collar counterparts, changing the balance between blue and white- 
collar unions in the TUC (Willman, 1990, p. 324).
From the late 1940s onwards a number of macroeconomic developments had 
consequences for the trade unions’ influence over public policy. Certain of these 
developments saw trade unions’ influence diminished, while other had the reverse 
effect. In 1957 the protection of the rate of exchange was prioritised over the pursuit of 
growth and the maintenance of full employment. This drove the TUC to break off 
contact with a government body, consequently reducing the avenues through which to 
influence public policy. Four years later economic problems led the government to 
establish a number of tripartite bodies to which the unions appointed representatives. 
These provided the TUC with more avenues through which to influence public policy. 
The following year saw the establishment of a national planing body, the National
84
Economic Development Council (NEDC). This was to be a forum in which the 
government, and both sides of industry, discussed plans to improve Britain’s industrial 
efficiency and international competitiveness (Edwards et al., 1992, p. 8). However, 
during the years of consensus the impact of these developments never resulted in a 
significant change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy.
The 1970s were to see dramatic macroeconomic developments, and changes in 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy. By this time the post-war consensus was 
coming under severe strain. The acceleration of Britain’s relative economic decline 
brought into question the utility of Keynesian demand management. As such, 
governments, notably the Labour governments of 1964-1970, turned to supply side 
management and neo-corporatist solutions. With the easing, and later abandonment, of 
the tight control on pay in the late 1960s, due to TUC opposition, there followed a pay 
and price explosion (Mitchell, 1993, p. 844). The build up of economic problems, along 
with concerns over the TUC’s domination of the Labour government, contributed to the 
election in 1970 of a Conservative administration on a ticket to right the economy and 
reform the trade union movement. For the first time, at least since the war, industrial 
relations figured as a prominent general-election issue.
Although the TUC’s relations with the Labour government had deteriorated 
during the late 1960s, the unions had still possessed a strong influence over Labour’s 
policies. However, now, at a time of economic difficulties, the political goal posts had 
shifted. The TUC had no such influence over the new Conservative government and its 
policies. The new government implemented policies such as standing firm against 
public-sector pay claims, and preparing a detailed Industrial Relations Bill. They also 
cut off many of the accustomed channels of communication between government and 
the unions. The TUC, having repeated its 1951 offer of co-operation to the
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Conservative government, was aggrieved at this curtailment of its accustomed role. The 
change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, resulting from the election of a 
hostile Conservative government at a time of macroeconomic difficulties, is proposed to 
have constituted a critical juncture as their ability to contribute to national public policy 
making had been dramatically diminished.
Towards the end of 1972 the British economy was in difficulty, with inflation 
rising rapidly, worsening industrial relations, a floating sterling, and an enormous 
balance-of-payments deficit. The Conservative government was driven to reverse many 
of the policies it had instituted after 1970. In late 1972 the government -  spurred by the 
miners victory in their strike and economic circumstances generally -  launched tripartite 
talks with the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the TUC in an effort to 
secure acceptable overall economic policies (Goodman, 1981, p. 611). The government 
was reversing its objective of depoliticizing industrial relations. Economic crisis had 
transformed the TUC’s position from one of outcast to insider on policy formulation. 
This move was indicative of a shift in thinking: wage inflation was no longer to be 
fought by introducing greater market discipline into wage negotiations, and by curbing 
the power of the unions. Instead, wage inflation was to be combated by introducing a 
compact with the trade union movement (Moran, 1977). Amongst the policies 
abandoned by the government was the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, legislation that 
had constituted an all out assault on union privileges. The Heath government, in the 
famous ‘U-turn’ of November 1972, introduced a statutory prices and incomes policy to 
combat inflation, a move contrary to the Conservatives’ own election manifesto.
Although the Conservative Government had wanted to limit trade union power, 
and depoliticise industrial relations, economic circumstances at the end of 1972 had 
forced them to reverse this policy. The dire economic consequence of the 1973 oil
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crisis saw the Labour Party returned to power the following year. The TUC’s influence 
on public policy, a social contract already agreed with the Labour Party, was 
dramatically enhanced by this development (Gallagher et al., 2001, p. 248). During the 
period of the Heath administration it became apparent that there had been a fundamental 
shift of power towards the unions. The irony was that it had been Heath’s attempt to 
shackle this power that finally confirmed it beyond doubt (Holmes, 1982, p. 119). 
However, the main issue in the election campaign of February 1974 was not the 
ongoing miners’ strike as argued by Crouch (1979, pp. 86-87), but inflation. ‘Middle 
income voters had already signalled their dissatisfaction with the Government’s 
handling of this issue by deserting to the Liberals in large numbers in by-elections long 
before the miners’ dispute had started’ (Grant and Nath, 1984, p. 24). With the 
Conservative’s electoral defeat Labour returned to power, its links to the TUC re­
established after their differences of the late 1960s. This provided the unions with the 
assurance that their goals would be at the forefront of the government’s policies. The 
change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, resulting from the election of a new 
Labour government at a time of macroeconomic difficulties, may have constituted a 
critical juncture as its contribution to national public policy making was dramatically 
enhanced.
Yet, the long lasting effects of the oil crisis -  high inflation, slow growth, high 
unemployment, huge balance-of-payments deficits, and the social contracts inability to 
correct these -  forced the Labour government to institute monetarist measures. 
However, it had already been moving away from a corporatist strategy since late 1975. 
Labour’s plans for both industrial reorganisation, and social reform, had been rendered 
ineffective by spending cuts. As with its predecessor, crisis management, rather than 
social reform, became the government’s preoccupation. As such, the TUC’s role faded,
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with the decline of union influence on public policy clearly dating from 1975 (Marsh, 
1975).
The heroic assertions concerning the overwhelming power unions enjoyed prior 
to 1979, and particularly in the period between 1974 and 1979, are clearly misguided. 
Union power was limited even at its height (Dorfman, 1983, p. 49). In retrospect, 
British corporatism can be seen to have been a very partial and ramshackle affair 
(Regini, 1984, p. 132). Its practices emerged out of attempts to manage economic 
crises, and not out of any deeper commitment to long-standing structural change 
(Cameron, 1984, p. 150).
The crisis in the British economy in 1979 was to coincide with a dramatic 
alteration in the TUC’s influence over public policy. The labour government’s 
monetarist measures, while at first accepted by the unions, ultimately lead to a serious 
confrontation in late 1978 and early 1979, in what became know as the ‘winter of 
discontent.’ The episode destroyed the country’s confidence in the Labour Party’s 
ability to work with the unions (Healey, 1989). It was as a consequence of the 
economic problems resulting from the ‘winter of discontent,’ and its impact on the 
Labour Party electorally, that a Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher 
came to power in the general election of 1979. The view that trade union power was a 
problem proved to be a vote winning issue for the Conservatives (Marsh, 1992b, p. 65). 
They came to office pledging to reform the unions. The 1979 general election marked a 
turning point in British industrial relations. What influence the TUC’s had still 
possessed over public policy while under the estranged minority Labour administration 
ceased to exist. Thatcher’s government, determined to remove trade union influence 
over public policy, oversaw the banishing of the TUC from the corridors of power 
(Auerbach, 1990, pp. 70-71). The TUC was reduced from a virtual partner in
government under Labour to a pressure group on the periphery of power under the 
Conservatives. The change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, resulting from 
the election of a new Conservative government at a time of macroeconomic difficulties, 
is proposed to have constituted a critical juncture as its influence over national public 
policy was significantly reduced by this development.
After 1979 the economic strategy of maintaining high levels of employment 
through Keynesian demand management was abandoned on the grounds that it was 
incurably inflationary, and resulted in an intolerable burden of taxation and actually 
created unemployment. As a consequence of the economic developments that 
facilitated the growth of white-collar trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
economic crises that afflicted the blue-collar workplaces, less than half of the trade 
union members who voted in the 1983 general election supported the Labour Party. 
This turn of events ensured that the Labour Party remained in opposition, and that the 
TUC remained consigned to the political wilderness. By the early 1990s the Labour 
Party was distancing itself from the trade unions. The economic slump of the late 
1980s, and the TUC’s exclusion from power, had reduced the number of trade unionists, 
and further diminished their influence. In 1993 the Labour Party reduced the size of the 
trade unions’ vote at the Labour Congresses, and in Party leadership elections. The 
economic downturn’s impact on the trade unions permitted the Labour Party to do this. 
Two years later, under Tony Blair’s leadership, the Labour Party replaced the old 
Clause IV of its constitution with a new modified version.
In this section four potential critical junctures in the TUC’s influence over 
public policy were identified in the years between 1945 and 2000 in Britain. These 
possible critical junctures will be examined in detail in Chapter V.
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This section will set out variations in the American trade union peak organisation’s 
influence over public policy between 1945 and 2000. In 1946, amidst a climate of 
economic malaise, the mid-term Congressional elections had major consequences for 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy. In 1960 the trade unions’ loss of 
influence 14 years earlier was reversed to a certain degree at a time of economic 
difficulties. However, an economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s witnessed a 
drastic reduction in the trade unions’ influence over public policy. By the early 1990s, 
with America in the middle of a prolonged depression, the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy changed once more. The US trade unions exist within a political process 
that is characterised as one in which power is fragmented and authority dispersed. It is 
notable that this fragmentation of the political authority gives highly specialised interest 
groups more leverage than they would possess in Ireland, Sweden, or Britain.
Proposed Critical Junctures
The Great Depression significantly altered the then stagnating organised labour’s 
influence over public policy by bringing the Democratic Party both the Presidency and 
Congress in the 1932 elections. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policies changed the 
relationship between the Democratic Party and organised labour. His victory provided 
the trade unions with a receptive audience in government. Subsequent years saw the 
size of the American trade union movement increase dramatically, rising from under 3 
million in 1932 to over 15 million by 1946.
The impact of economic developments in the period following the ending of 
World War II, as well as labour unrest, and unemployment which rose from only 1.2 per 
cent in 1944 to 3.9 per cent two years later, was to coincide with change in the
The United States o f America
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American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organisation’s 
(CIO) influence over public policy (Mitchell, 1983, p. 163). The building economic 
difficulties, with inflation outpacing wage increases, and industrial disputes erupting, 
saw the Democratic Party lose control of both houses of Congress in the 1946 mid-term 
elections to anti-labour Republicans (Welch et al., 2001). The 80th Congress was to 
prove extremely conservative. The anti-labour Republicans regarded their victory as a 
popular mandated to take drastic measures against organised labour. By 1947 many 
Southern States, along with a few in the North, had instituted restrictive right to work 
laws (Nelson, 1995). The same year saw the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act designed 
to protect employers from their employees (Wilson, 1979, p. 7). The change in the 
trade union peak organisations’ (AFL and CIO) influence over public policy, resulting 
from the Democrats’ loss of control in both the House and Senate at a time of economic 
difficulties, is proposed to have constituted a critical juncture as their contribution to 
national public policy making had been diminished. Six years later the Democrats lost 
control of the White House for the first time since 1928
The consequence of economic problems in the late 1950s, high unemployment, 
and a large deficit, saw the Republicans routed in the 1958 mid term elections, and the 
Democratic Party emerge victorious in the Presidential and congressional elections of
1960 (Boiler, 1996). The election of John F. Kennedy, who had received strong AFL- 
CIO support, presaged renewed growth and influence for the labour movement. With 
the appointment of the architect of the AFL-CIO merger, Arthur Goldberg, as Secretary 
of Labour in the Kennedy administration, it was clear that there was more sympathy in 
Washington for the unions’ cause and less pro-employer bias (Divine et al., 1995, p. 
510). The Democratic administration offered the unions an opportunity to reverse the 
declines in membership and influence that had characterized the Eisenhower years. The
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Republican executive’s failure to correct the economy precipitated the Democratic 
successes in the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1960, and the subsequent 
increase in the influence of the AFL-CIO, a major Democratic Party ally, over national 
public policy. A potential macroeconomic crisis and possibly significant, swift, and 
enduring change in the AFL-CIO’s level of influence over national public policy 
constituted a possible critical juncture.
By the mid-1960s organised labour’s influence over public policy was further 
enhanced. The threat of inflation drove the administration to seek AFL-CIO support in 
ensuring that economic conditions permitted a continuation of its policies. This 
constituted a recognition by the government of the trade unions importance to the 
economy. However, after a lengthy strike in 1966 the administration’s anti-inflationary 
strategy disintegrated. Ultimately, the failure to bring inflation under control, and cut 
domestic and military spending, for which the union bore significant responsibility, was 
to result in their loss of influence over public policy during the Nixon Presidency.
Economic problems, building since the late 1960s, and for which the unions 
were partly responsible, diminished their influence over public policy. The problems 
with the economy forced the Nixon administration to reappraise its economic policies. 
By 1970, industrial output and the stock market were in decline, while the cost of living 
had risen significantly. President Nixon’s efforts to curb inflation, and cure the 
recession, did not halt the economy’s decline. By implementing wage and price 
controls the president reduced organized labour’s scope of influence over public policy.
Inflation continued to be a problem during Nixon’s second term, and thereafter 
during that of his successor Gerald Ford. By 1976 the Republican executive’s inability 
to deal with the conjunction of a number of economic problems, budget deficits, 
international competition, unemployment, and the long lasting effects of the 1973 oil
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crisis, resulted in the Democrat’s retaking the presidency while maintaining their hold 
over Congress. The AFL-CIO’s influence over public policy consequently improved 
over what it had been under a Republican regime.
By the late 1970s employment had fallen significantly in the unionised heavy 
industries, and grown substantially in the non-unionised service industries. The 
restructuring of the labour market from the 1950s onwards had been marked by the 
relentless expansion of the service sector. The industry and population shift from the 
Northeast to the Southwest also meant expanding employment in parts of the United 
States long seen as stony ground for union organisers. These developments resulted in 
the reduction of the AFL-CIO’s relative size in the economy.
During the 1970s inflation emerged as a problem that seemed to threaten the 
stability of the social order (Hirsch and Goldthorpe, 1978). The Carter administration’s 
economic policy dilemmas were made all the more difficult by the increased diffusion 
of power in Washington (Dark, 1999, p. 114). Even when President Carter wished to 
deliver on his promises on the economy, or to organised labour, he had little capacity to 
do so. At first Carter pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to reduce 
unemployment, but a surge of inflation halted this. Carter was forced to choose a 
recessionary solution that ensured the enmity of union leadership. For a time there was 
a profound rupture in relations between the AFL-CIO and the government. However, in 
1979 a National Accord was agreed between the administration and the AFL-CIO. The 
AFL-CIO was granted information under the National Accord on the proposed budget 
for 1980. A supplement to this saw the establishment of a 15 member tripartite Pay 
Advisory Board. This would assist in formulating voluntary wage guidelines. 
Consequently, the problem with inflation had impelled the administration to seek a 
solution that included organised labour in the equation (Dark, 1999, p. 119). However,
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the problems with inflation persisted, and pressure from both Congress and Wall Street 
forced the government to alter its budget proposals to the detriment of the unions.
The United States entered the 1980s plagued by a conjunction of double-digit 
inflation, declining industrial productivity, and the highest level of unemployment since 
the Great Depression (Divine et al., 1995, p. 569). This was all compounded by the 
second oil crisis that occurred in 1979. The crisis conditions in the American economy 
by 1980, far worse than in 1976, were to witness a significant reduction in the trade 
unions’ influence over public policy (Blum et al., 1993). The election of Ronald 
Reagan as president marked the beginning of a 12-year Republican domination of the 
executive. Reagan, and to a lesser extent his successor George H. W. Bush, displayed 
an anti-union bias the like of which had not been seen in Washington since before the 
Great Depression. Under Reagan the unions experienced a reduction in their status in 
society and influence in politics. Organised labour now faced an administration that felt 
little need to consult or appease it. Reagan terminated the National Accord, and the 
tripartite Pay Advisory Board scheme, soon after coming to office. The change in the 
AFL-CIO’s influence over public policy, resulting from the election of a new 
Republican administration at a time of economic difficulties, is proposed to have 
constituted a critical juncture as the trade unions’ contribution to national public policy 
making was dramatically diminished.
In this hostile environment organised labour dropped its commitment to broad 
social reform programmes, pursuing instead a self-interested agenda. However, this 
turn of events resulted in organised labour’s re-examination of its relations with the 
Democrats. Out of this came an increased union influence over the Democratic Party’s 
process of selecting its presidential candidates. Consequently, the proposed critical 
juncture, while reducing AFL-CIO’s influence over government policy, resulted in it
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acquiring an increased influence over the Democratic Party in the longer term. The 
AFL-CIO’s relationship with the Congressional Democrats grew closer throughout the 
1980s, in contrast to the tensions that existed during the Carter Administration.
The economic downturn of the early 1990s became America’s longest recession 
since the Great Depression. Soaring expenditures on defence and social programmes 
saw the annual deficit at $450 billion in 1991. That same year the gross federal debt 
reached $2.7 trillion. During the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations America 
had gone from the world’s largest creditor to debtor state (Blum et al., 1993). By early 
1992 over 2 million jobs had been lost. To compound matters economic growth was 
stagnant. The problems afflicting the American economy in 1992 had their origins in 
the economic policies of the Reagan presidency. However, the Bush administration 
proved incapable of correcting the situation. The public saw certain of its corrective 
measures as a betrayal on pledges given during the 1988 election campaign. Trends 
revealed a middle class losing ground economically, and greater poverty in the more 
vulnerable sectors of the population (Mishel and Bernstein, 1993). The economic 
problems were to precipitate the election of the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, 
whose campaign had benefited from substantial labour support, and a new approach to 
economic management (Upham, 1993, p. G-109). Although there were difference 
between the AFL-CIO and the Clinton administration, particularly over the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Democratic president acted to promote 
the interest of the trade unions, and advance legislation favourable to them. For the first 
time in over a decade the AFL-CIO had a genuine ally in the White House. The 
inability of the Republican administration to remedy the problems with the economy 
precipitated its loss of the power. After years of exclusion and hostility a potential 
macroeconomic crisis, combined with a dramatic increase in the AFL-CIO’s influence
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over public policy, is proposed to have constituted a critical juncture. The Clinton 
presidency was to be marked by a close relationship with organised labour, and signs of 
trade union revival after years of decline.
The fear that union leaders might sit on their hands during an election makes it 
likely that Democratic presidential candidates will attend to their basic policy demands. 
Indeed, all Democratic presidential candidates from John F. Kennedy to Bill Clinton 
have endorsed the bulk of the AFL-CIO’s demands, including guaranteed union access 
to the executive branch. Once in office, Democratic presidents have deployed 
considerable resources to help the labour movement pursue its objectives. When 
executive action alone was sufficient, Democratic presidents have rarely hesitated to act 
in labour’s favour.
In conclusion, this section has identified four possible critical junctures in the 
trade union peak organisation’s influence over public policy in the United States of 
America in the fifty-five years between 1945 and 2000. Chapter VI shall see these 
potential critical junctures examined in detail.
Sw eden
This section concentrates on the changing influence of the Swedish trade union’s over 
public policy between 1945 and 2000. From the beginning of the 1930s the Swedish 
Model was regarded as successful and progressive. ‘People saw in Sweden a 
continuing social reform, the building up of a welfare state, and experimentation with 
stabilisation policy, while preserving the conditions of an expansive free-market 
capitalist economy’ (Lundberg, 1985, p. 1). The watchword of the period was harmony, 
harmony between social democratic governments and the business community, and 
between the trade unions and employer organisations. The model was at its zenith
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during the 1950s and 1960s. However, in 1976 an election held in the midst of 
economic stagnation impacted upon the Swedish trade unions’ influence on politics. 
Six years later the impact of this election on the trade unions was reversed to a certain 
degree. However, in 1991, at a time of severe economic difficulties, there was to be a 
drastic change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy.
Proposed Critical Junctures
The severe economic crisis gripping Sweden in the early 1930s, this born of the Great 
Depression, drastically changed the then growing Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation’s, Lcindsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), influence over public policy. 
The election of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarepartiet (SAP), in 1932, on a ticket to fight the mass unemployment, provided 
the LO with a receptive audience in government for its proposals. The SAP was to 
remain in power for the following 44 years. The party’s election in 1932 proved to be 
one of the most important factors behind the Saltsjobaden Agreement of 1938 
(Forseback, 1976).
What became known as the Swedish Model evolved out of the co-operative 
spirit encapsulated within the Saltsjobaden Agreement. The central interests behind this 
agreement, and the development of the model, were the powerful and inclusive workers’ 
and employers’ organisations. In Saltsjobaden in 1938 the LO and the Swedish 
Employers’ Federation, Svenska Arbetsgivarforening (SAF), agreed to conduct their 
relationship such that the government would have no call to intervene. In this 
agreement the LO acknowledged management’s right to manage free from union 
interference. In return the SAF recognised the principle of collective representation of
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workers through their chosen union organisations. Up to this time the employers and 
unions had often clashed over these basic principles (Korpi, 1978).
At the start of the 1950s the LO’s newly established research department, led by 
Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, develop a highly original approach to economic 
management, the solidarity wage policy. This rejected efforts to check inflationary 
pressures by freezing wages. The solidarity wage policy, known also as the Rehn- 
Meidner model, came into effect in the early 1950s. It was consistent with the objective 
of the Swedish labour movement: full employment, free collective bargaining, and an 
equal wage for equal work (Swenson, 1989). The policy combined two independent 
elements: egalitarian notions of a wages structure freed from the necessity of market 
forces, and the necessity to conduct a responsible wage policy adapted to the general 
policy of stabilisation.
The approach had a strong influence on the actions of both the LO and the SAP 
governments, for a couple of decades. Between 1950 and 1974 the policy was 
associated with outcomes positively evaluated in terms of economic growth, inflation, 
employment growth, competitiveness, living standards and welfare state achievements 
(Lundberg, 1985). These were the years associated with the growth of major Swedish 
manufacturers such as Volvo, Saab-Scania, Electrolux, and Ericson. In the 1960s and 
1970s the gap between high and low wage workers consistently narrowed (Hibbs, 
1991). Incidents of industrial conflict were extremely low in Sweden between the mid- 
1930s and the mid-1970s (Shalev, 1992).
The heyday of the Swedish model in the 1950s and 1960s saw the growth of the 
forces that were to eventually undermine it. A primary force was the restructuring of 
the labour market itself. The service sector of the economy was expanding relentlessly. 
Between 1950 and 1970 the percentage of workers in the service sector rose from 40 to
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50 per cent. This led to the rise in prominence of public-sector and white-collar unions. 
Their growth changed the internal power structure within the confederations. By the 
1970s the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees, Tjanstemannens 
Centralorganisation (TCO), emerged as a powerful force in the labour scene. Suddenly 
the whole structure of bargaining was exposed as much more complicated than the 
simple system dominated by the private sector and negotiations between LO and SAF.
Labour’s acceptance of private control of investment was founded on the 
premise that the sectors benefiting from solidaristic wage bargaining would create 
employment at the same rates as the sectors squeezed by the policy would shed labour. 
However, by the mid-1960s this premise became increasingly shaky. Expansion of the 
public sector provided the only means of maintaining full employment.
The strike wave that swept Sweden in the early 1970s led the unions to conclude 
that national collective bargaining was inadequate, and that legally supported 
managerial prerogatives, as enshrined in the SAF constitution, had excluded them for 
too long from plant decision making (Gospel, 1983). In 1971 the LO endorsed an 
ambitious legislative programme to democratise working life. Prior to this the Swedish 
trade union movement had been set against government involvement in the process of 
collective wage bargaining.
The early 1970s were marked by the unions, at the peak of their strength, urging 
government to limit the power of employers at workplaces. Discounting the possibility 
that negotiations with the employers would result in sufficient change the unions sought 
legislation to expand employees’ rights. The government abandoned its role of 
supporting and sanctioning concerted policies between the LO and SAF. This eroded 
support among the employers for corporatism. The SAP government, under pressure
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from the LO, passed laws on job security, absence from work, and employee 
participation in decision-making.
It was the repercussions from the oil crisis of 1973, and a weakening 
international competitiveness overall, that saw off the era of rapid economic growth for 
Sweden. The years leading up to the 1976 general election were marked by both 
recession and stagflation. This deepening recession was to significantly alter the 
Swedish trade union movement’s influence over public policy when it contributed to the 
defeat of the SAP, and its loss of power for the first time in 44 years. Firstly, the LO no 
longer had a direct influence over the parties forming the new government. Secondly, 
following its first election defeat since 1928, the SAP formed its own research 
department. To this point the primary source of ideas for the Swedish left had been the 
LO’s own research unit. Thirdly, the SAP’s reappraisal of its position within the 
Swedish political spectrum saw it move to the right in the years after 1976. The long 
lasting results of the 1973 oil crisis had proved the undoing of the LO. The building 
economic problems contributed to the SAP’s historic defeat, the creation of its own 
research unit, its reappraisal of its position within the Swedish political spectrum, and 
the diminished influence of the LO over both it and national public policy. The change 
in the trade union peak organisation’s influence over public policy, with the election of 
a new government at a time of macroeconomic difficulties, is proposed to have 
constituted a critical juncture as the LO’s influence over national public policy making 
appears to have been dramatically diminished in the years thereafter.
By the time of the 1982 general election Swedes were ready for a change of 
government. The non-socialist governments elected in 1976 and 1979 had not proved 
successful. The right wing interregnum was characterised by rather problematical 
coalitions. By the early 1980s the economy was in its worst state since the 1930s, with
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rising unemployment reaching a post war high (Mitchell, 1993, p. 165). The economic 
difficulties precipitated the SAP’s return to government in 1982, and with the Social 
Democrats return the LO’s influence over national public policy changed again. This 
was to become evident the following year. In spite of strong opposition from the SAF 
to the wage-eamer funds issue -  a LO endorsed idea for gradually changing the 
ownership structure of the economy through collective profit sharing (Pontusson, 1994, 
p. 29) -  the Riksdag approved its implementation in late 1983. However, the final 
version had been heavily modified from the original proposal set out by Rudolf Meidner 
in 1976 (Gould, 1993, p. 240). It had transformed ‘from an overtly socialist union 
proposal to a number of toothless share holding funds of a rather conventional type’ 
(Meidner, 1993, p. 223). Nevertheless, this was seen simply as a move by the SAP to 
ensure the support of the LO for its changing economic policies of the time. The trade 
unions’ influence over public policy had changed again at a time of macroeconomic 
difficulties. This change constitutes another possible critical juncture, as this time the 
LO’s influence over public policy had been increased.
The macro-economic difficulties that saw the return of the SAP to government, 
and LO influence over public policy increase, also precipitated a new economic policy 
from the Social Democrats. The SAP’s economic strategy for the 1980s was to take 
both the party and the country in a new direction, down what it referred to as the Third 
Road. The premise behind this approach was that renewed growth required a 
redistribution of income from labour to capital. This policy constituted a major shift in 
SAP economic planning. It was to have dire consequence for the LO’s level of 
influence over national public policy by the early 1990s. Behind this new course lay the 
influence of the SAP’s own research unit, which since 1976 had achieved ascendancy 
over the LO’s research department within the counsels of the labour movement
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(Meidner, 1989). The decade of the 1980s was to mark a dilution of the SAP’s left- 
wing policy commitments.
During the early 1980s inflationary pressures that had been building in the 
Swedish economy since the 1970s brought about the first cracks in the country’s highly 
centralised pay agreements. The primary cause of this inflationary pressure had been 
the expansion of the white-collar unions, this resulting from the expansion of the white- 
collar sector of the economy. The white-collar trade unions perceived their interests as 
different from those of their blue-collar counterparts. Initially this led to the 
fragmentation of political solidarity in the trade union movement, and then an end to the 
dominance of the LO-SAF axis. An economically induced shift in balance of power in 
the trade union movement increased inter-union rivalry, which was to undermine wage 
restraint. With this development, and the already disintegrating solidarity amongst the 
trade unions, there came the gradually fragmentation of the central wage agreements, 
and diminished LO influence within the economy and over economic policies.
By the early 1990s economic problems, their origins in the policies of the Third 
Road economic approach of the SAP from the early 1980s, were afflicting Sweden. 
There was general fiscal instability, and the current budget deficit, public sector 
borrowing requirement, and national debt were all rising rapidly. Sweden’s attempt in 
the 1980s to maintain industrial competitiveness, finance an enormous public sector, 
and enjoy full employment, all at the same time, had resulted in spiralling inflation by 
1989. The failure to sustain non-inflationary growth had been brought about by a 
sluggish productivity growth. The economic crisis in 1991 was to witness the 
unequivocal ending of national pay bargaining as it had existed since the 1950s.
The general election of 1991 proved a devastating defeat for the incumbent SAP 
government. The new non-socialist administration, led by Moderate Party Chairman
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Carl Bildt, adopted a new approach to economic management. This was to result in a 
drastic reduction in the trade unions’ influence over public policy for the rest of the 
1990s. Soon after coming to power the government set about dismantling the employee 
investment funds (Hadenius, 1997, p. 151). Fiscal instability, its roots buried deep 
within the Third Road economic policies of the 1980s, had precipitated the election of 
the non-socialist government, a new approach to economic management, and the ending 
of national pay bargaining. The resulting drastic reduction in the trade unions’ 
influence over public policy for the rest of the 1990s, occurring at a time of 
macroeconomic difficulties, may have constituted a critical juncture.
During the 1990s the electoral successes of the SAP became increasingly 
contingent on the vagaries of the business cycle. The deregulation of the financial 
markets at the end of the 1980s starkly revealed the narrowing confines of national 
economic policy. The internationalisation of capital had undermined the government’s 
control of the economy, and the restructuring of domestic industry eroded the 
solidaristic unionism that was once integral to Social Democratic success.
In conclusion, three potentially significant, swift, and enduring changes in the 
trade union peak organisation’s influence over public policy, these occurring at times of 
macroeconomic crisis, were identified in Sweden in the years between 1945 and 2000. 
These periods of change in the LO’s influence over public policy are proposed to have 
constituted critical junctures. In Chapter VII these potential critical junctures shall be 
examined in greater detail in order to see if they in fact constitute actual critical 
junctures.
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The essence of this thesis is the search for significant, swift, and enduring changes in 
the trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy, these occurring at 
times of generative cleavages in the form of macroeconomic crises. By this is implied a 
drastic alteration of the trade unions’ influence over public policy that takes place 
quickly at the time of a macroeconomic crisis, and has long last implications -  
specifically a legacy.
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify possible critical junctures in the 
trade union peak organisations’ influence over public policy in Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, and Sweden between 1945 and 2000. The 
number of proposed critical junctures identified in Ireland, Britain, and the United 
States of America was four each, while in Sweden there were three within the specified 
time frame. These 15 changes in the trade union peak organisations’ influence over 
public policy constitute the critical juncture candidates.
In the following chapters the potential critical junctures shall be tested against 
the hypotheses and observable implications drawn up earlier. This is in order to see if it 
the proposed critical junctures constitute actual critical junctures as per the definition set 





Within the context of a loose historical narrative tracing the political, economic, and 
industrial relations evolution of Ireland, this chapter will examine variations in the trade 
union peak organisation’s influence over public policy. It will focus upon the four 
instances, 1959, 1970, 1981, and 1987, where the ICTU’s influence over public policy 
was, prima facie, identified as having changed to the extent of constituting a possible 
critical juncture. The essence of this examination is the search for significant, swift and 
enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy at the time of a 
generative cleavage, this in the form of a macroeconomic crisis. This shall be identified 
by testing the potential critical junctures in the trade union peak organisations’ influence 
over public policy against the hypotheses and observable implications set out in Chapter
Potential Critical Juncture 1: 1959- Lemass, Institutions, and Trade Unions 
The trade union movement expanded with industrialisation in the 1930s (Boyd, 1985, p. 
108). However, this was a period marked by inter-union rivalry. In 1936 the Minister 
for Industry and Commerce, Sean Lemass, warned the Irish Trades Union Congress 
(ITUC) of government intervention unless there was a reduction in inter-union conflict 
(McCarthy, 1973, p. 42). During the 1940s, against a background clouded with rising 
industrial conflict and inter-union disputes, Lemass set about encouraging trade union 
rationalisation. However, the Trade Union Act of 1941 failed to reduce the multiplicity 
of unions within the State as part of the legislation was found to be unconstitutional, and 
was consequently struck down.
Government efforts to rationalise the trade union movement not only failed, but 
created such tension as to result in the Assuring of the movement’s structure. In April 
1945 a group of 15 Irish-based unions withdrew from the ITUC and established the
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Congress of Irish Unions (CIU) (Nevin, 1994, p. 94). The existence of two rival 
Congresses created great difficulties for the trade unions, weakening their efforts, 
dissipating their resources, and rendering a common front against the employer 
organisations impossible. In the event, most of the post-war period was marked by slow 
and unbalanced growth (OECD, 1962, p. 3).
However, by 1956 there were neither ideological nor organisational differences 
between the two Congresses. A Provisional United Trade Union Organisation was set 
up to co-ordinate the activities of both. That year Ireland opened up to foreign 
investment for the first time under Minister for Industry and Commerce William Norton 
(Tansey, 1998, p. 12). This was an admission of the failure of the economic philosophy 
that underlay the whole protection policy. The following year Eamon de Valera formed 
his final Fianna Fail administration. The year ‘1957 is conventionally thought of as the 
end of an era, as making the final exhaustion of the ideas of the first generation of 
political leaders’ (Garvin, 1982, p. 37). Two years later de Valera was succeeded as 
Taoiseach by Sean Lemass. The new Taoiseach was seen by the media as an economics 
man pure and simple.1 Lemass was to stand for a clean break with the economic and 
nationalist policies of the past. In addition to forging new links with Northern Ireland, 
he was to oversee the opening up of the country’s economy to the outside world. His 
tenure as Taoiseach was to be marked by a focus on social and economic issues.
The Economy. Reform, and the Trade Unions
International organisations, the media, and national commentators regarded the 
economy as in crisis in the early 1950s. Both the Central Bank of Ireland2 and the 
OECD (1961, p. 5) remarked that the 1950s were a decade of economic stagnation for
1 The Irish Times, 24 June, 1959, p. 5.
2 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report, 1961, p. 5.
107
Ireland. The OECD’s (1961, p. 8) economic analysis of the country’s performance in 
the 1950s showed that agricultural production was abnormally low, while industrial 
output had faltered. The Central Bank pointed out that by the mid-1950s Ireland had a 
large external trade deficit.3 The OECD (1962, p. 6) went on to state that per capita 
GNP grew at a rate of 2.4 per cent throughout the 1950s, but only because of ‘the 
exceptional demographic experience during this period when net migration averaged 
forty-one thousand persons a year.’ This per capita growth rate was among the lowest 
found in the OECD (OECD, 1962, p. 6). ‘Despite relatively little growth and increased 
emigration, inflationary forces and a worsening of the underlying deficit on the balance 
of payments forced severe deflationary action in 1956-7’ (OECD, 1971, p. 20). The 
Irish Times observed that employment in the economy was in decline, unemployment 
had increased, hundreds of thousands of people had emigrated, and the cost of living 
had gone sky high (Appendix D).4 The Economist also concluded that prior to 1959 
most indicators of economic performance were poor for Ireland (EIU, 1992, p. 5). This 
was despite, according to the Central Bank, the favourable influences on production and 
employment of the intensive development of sheltered industries catering for the home 
market, a high level of social investment, and large scale external disinvestments and 
external borrowing.5 In fact, the Central Bank argued that a greater proportion of 
expenditure than could be afforded at the existing stage of economic development had 
been devoted to social purposes, while too little had been set aside for the future in the 
shape of protective investment.6 The Economist argued that ‘righting the economy 
would be the paramount task facing the new Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass.’7
3 ibid, 1957, p. 27.
4 The Irish Times, 24 June , 1959, p. 6.
5 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report, 1959, p. 24.
6 ibid, 1958, p. 30.
7 The Economist, 4 July, 1959, p. 15.
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O’Grada and O’Rourke (1995, p. 214) argue that ‘in the 1950s, Ireland’s relative 
[economic] performance was disastrous, poorer than that of the UK as well as the 
European average.’ The quick benefits from protection had been reaped by the 
industrial expansion of the 1930s. The post-war economic boom had petered out by the 
end of the 1940s (O’Grada, 1997, p. 23). However, by the 1950s Irish industry was 
supplying as much of the domestic market as it could. In 1957 manufacturing output 
was no higher than it had been in 1953. Building activity in the economy was also 
declining. The OECD (1958, p. 15) stated that the rate of activity and of development 
in the industrial sector, in spite of some changes, depended on the small and static home 
market.
The late 1950s were to see a dramatic change in the government’s economic 
policies. The second coalition government was defeated in the 1957 general election by 
Fianna Fail due to the general economic collapse, and a lack of will to tackle the 
problems at its heart.8 ‘On his return to office in 1957 [Lemass] began the gradual 
process of opening up the state to new foreign investment’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 125). 
Despite fears over protected Irish industry, the pressure for change increased after 
1957.9 The poor economic performance prompted a fundamental reappraisal of the 
policy package pursued since the 1930s. Into this pessimistic economic environment 
was introduced T K Whitaker’s report Economic Development in 1958. Whitaker, 
Secretary of the Department of Finance since 1956, and the country’s premier civil 
servant, was committed to a policy of export-led economic growth. He advanced a 
three-pronged strategy within Finance, more planning, fewer tariff barriers, and a 
greater emphasis on productive investment. ‘Thus it was in the atmosphere of a new
8 The Sunday Press, 25 January, 1987, p. 12.
9 Budget, 1958, p. 8.
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government and a more active and interventionist Department of Finance, that 
Economic Development was born’ (Murphy, 2003, p. 61).
This document is regarded as ‘a watershed in the modern economic history of 
the country’ (Lyons, 1973, p. 628). It proposed the opening of the economy with the 
gradual transition to free trade, stimulation of private investment, the reorientation of 
government investment towards more productive uses, the introduction of grants and 
tax concessions to encourage export orientated manufacturing, and the inducement of 
direct investment by foreign export oriented manufacturers.10 The document effectively 
advocated the abandonment of the protectionist programme Fianna Fail had pioneered 
since the 1930s.’1 These measures were incorporated into the First Programme for 
Economic Expansion that appeared in November 1958. This White Paper, based on 
Whitaker’s document, ‘was drawn up by Charles Murray of the Department of Finance, 
supervised by a four-member Government subcommittee headed by Lemass’ (Horgan, 
1997, p. 177). The Central Bank argued that the First Programme for Economic 
Expansion was an event of ‘outstanding interest and importance.’12 Where Whitaker 
argued for intensive cattle production as the foundation for agricultural prosperity, the 
White Paper preferred not to abandon completely Fianna Fail’s traditional predilection 
for tillage.
While there were some significant differences between Economic 
Development and the [First ] Programme for Economic Expansion, which 
arose out of their different parentage, such differences were for the most
10 Economic Development, 1958.
11 ibid.
12 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report, 1959, p. 24.
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part cosmetic as the main thrust of both documents was the same 
(Murphy, 2003, p. 72).
Although the documents were vague about both policy instruments and targets, they 
presaged a new consensus on the need for a more outward-looking economic policy.
‘In February 1959 the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) was formally 
inaugurated’ (Nevin, 1994, p. 96). Congress reunification came as the country sat on 
the brink of the great economic and social changes that were to be such a feature of the 
1960s. Trade union unity gave Taoiseach Sean Lemass an opportunity to embark on 
national bargaining on wages policy, as there now existed a chance that the unions and 
employers could be brought together in a new framework that could achieve industrial 
progress without industrial disputes (Horgan, 1997, p. 190).
Both government ministers and opposition deputies came to recognize the 
economic crisis facing the country in the late 1950s. Lemass had stated, on becoming 
Taoiseach, that the task for the generation of the 1950s was to consolidate the economic 
foundations of Ireland’s political independence, and that 1959 was a crucial year in the 
government’s struggle for economic security.13 However, Tanaiste MacEntee went 
further when he argued that Ireland would have to face up to the economic struggles of 
the future if it was to maintain its status as a sovereign state.14 Members of the other 
political parties were also coming to recognize the grave situation the economy found 
itself in. During the Dail debate on Lemass’s nomination for Taoiseach, opposition 
deputies accused the government of neglecting agriculture while sponsoring an 
ineffective policy of industrial expansion.15 Daniel Desmond of the Labour Party
13 The Irish Times, 25 June, 1959.
14 ibid, 29 June, 1959.
15 The Times, 24, June, 1959, p. 7.
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argued that it was high time for the political establishment to realise that solving the 
problems with the economy superseded their own struggles for political power.16 
General Mulcahy, the leader of Fine Gael, remarked that the magnitude of the economic 
problem confronting the country was far too serious to be capable of being put right by 
half measures, and that a tremendous effort would be required by all sections of the 
community.17
The trade unions’ access to the Taoiseach changed at this time. ‘Shortly after 
Lemass became Taoiseach, he invited Congress to meet him to discuss the question of 
development and how co-operation might be generated between the various economic 
interests’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 125). The number of meetings between the Taoiseach and 
the trade unions increased significantly after Lemass assumed office. Whereas the
i o
1CTU had only one meeting with Taoiseach de Valera in 1958, it met with Lemass 
three times in 1959, and again in 1960 (Appendix A).19 The years thereafter were to see 
more such meetings conducted on issues ranging from the economy to the European 
Economic Community (EEC). This was in line with the call for more joint consultation 
between State, union, and employers contained in the First Programme for Economic 
Expansion.
For the OECD (1961, p. 12) the Fianna Fail government’s 1958 and 1959 
budgets reflected a distinct change in its fiscal policy. Lemass’s speeches in 1959 often 
paralleled the positions adopted in the previous years by Congress (Girvin, 1994, p. 
125). These included the need for state involvement in development, and the expansion 
of the state sector.20 The Congress had argued that government policy would not bring
16 The Irish Independent, 24 June, 1959.
17 Ddil Eireann, Vol. 171, 2 December, 1958.
18 A[nnual] R[eport], I[rish] C[ongress] of T[rade] U[nions], 1959.
,9AR, ICTU, 1960.
20 Dail Eireann, Vol. 176, 21 July, 1959.
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quick results in terms of employment or exports. It argued that the government should 
pump-prime the economy for growth.21 Capital investment should not be pursued to the 
detriment of social spending. In the subsequent capital budgets, emphasis on 
investments that made no direct contribution to productive equipment was reduced. As 
regards the current budget, consumer subsidies were discontinued, and efforts were 
made to relieve the economy of the burden arising from guaranteed agricultural prices. 
In fact, within a year of Lemass becoming Taoiseach budgets began to expand22 with 
increased investment in areas identified by Congress in policy documents and its private 
research.23 By 1961 the reshaping of public capital expenditure to give increased 
emphasis to directly productive investment, something the trade unions had argued 
strongly for, had stimulated economic growth. The OECD (1961, p. 10) found that 
encouragement to industry through a policy of grants and tax exemptions attracted a 
notable volume of foreign capital to Ireland. The government also pursued an 
increasingly liberal trade policy (OECD, 1962, p. 12). After 1959 the government’s 
economic policies had changed.
The Unions and Policy Development
Up to the late 1950s the trade unions’ influence in Ireland was at best indirect (Allen,
1997, p. 181). However, at this time the government’s policies towards organised 
labour began to reflect the policies advocated by the unions themselves. In 1958 the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce implemented amendments to the Apprenticeship 
Bill recommended by the unions.24 The ICTU Executive Council made representations
21 ibid.
22 Budget, 1960, 1961, 1962.
23 N[ational] A[rchives] Department] of the T[aoiseach]: ICTU Archive, Box 42 Economic Policy, 4002, 
‘Meeting with the Taoiseach 1959.’
24 Dail Eireann, Vol. 171,5 November, 1958.
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to this Minister in 1959 on legislation concerning annual leave with full pay, and other 
improvements covering minimum conditions of employment relating to holidays, 
overtime, and hours of work.25 The unions’ views on company accounts also had an 
impact on the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1959. The recommendations of 
the Company Law Reform Committee, upon which the ICTU was represented, resulted
Oftin amendments to company law.
In early 1960 the ICTU contacted the Minister for Finance prior to the budget, 
requesting provisions for an increase in the old age pensions, and other social welfare 
benefit, to maintain the relationship between these allowances and workers’ wages.27 
The subsequent budget increased social assistance benefits from 1 August I960.28 In
1961 the ICTU and the Federated Union of Employers (FUE) reached agreement on the 
formation of the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC) that the government subsequently 
facilitated.29 This body, formally established in 1962, was to become central to 
corporate control (Lalor, 1982, p. 80). The budget of 1961 saw increases in social 
welfare payments in line with the recommendations of the ICTU’s Social Welfare 
Committee.31
There was a change in the government’s policies toward the trade unions. 
Lemass’s perspective on economic development was close to that of Congress. In June 
1959 Lemass remarked on the need for change in Irish industrial development policy.32 
He realised that government policy towards organised labour would have to change. 
‘The government began to look hopefully to the united Congress for support in its




29 AR, ICTU, 1961.
30 Budget, 1961.
31 AR, ICTU, 1961.
32 Dail Eireann, Vol. 175, 3 June, 1959.
114
programme of national development’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32). The task of adjusting 
Irish industries to competition led public policy into the realms of labour practices, 
industrial relations, and pay bargaining. Lemass was prepared to offer the union 
movement an integral part in the development of the government’s economic and social 
programme (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32). This gave to unions a new perception of the 
strength they now possessed.
He [Lemass] clearly understood that the government would have to play 
a more active, even hegemonic, role in the Irish economy, but he also 
realised that the success of government strategy assumed a new 
partnership with different interest groups, which would (in time) become 
players in the policy game (Murphy, 1997, p. 58).
There was change in the trade unions’ representation on government committees. 
Lemass argued that social progress would follow from, but was contingent upon, 
economic development (Bew et al., 1989, p. 83). With the move towards the 
liberalisation of trade, and economic planning, Lemass was instrumental in the creation 
of consultative bodies involving the unions and employers (Lee, 1989, p. 401). This 
was recognition by government of the import of the trade unions to Irish economic 
management, and provided the ICTU with more avenues through which to influence 
public policy. Joint consultation was seen as of extreme importance for steady 
economic development (NIEC, 1966). After 1959 the number of committees on which 
the ICTU was represented expanded significantly (Appendix B). Of the new bodies the 
Irish National Productivity Committee (INPC) was a joint consultative body charged
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with improving productivity throughout Irish industry.33 The Committee on Industrial 
Organisation (CIO) was set up in 1961 to examine the ability of Irish industry to 
compete within the EEC (Murphy, 1997, p. 62). The National Industrial and Economic 
Council (NIEC) was established by Lemass in 1963 as the main consultative body in 
economic planning.34 The INPC, CIO, and NIEC were set up on the initiative of 
Lemass in the belief that a new era was dawning for Irish industrial relations. These 
bodies, ‘[paralleling] the state’s commitment to economic planning as contained in the 
first two programmes for economic expansion’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127) permitted the 
unions to co-operate with the state on a range of problems posed by economic 
expansion. ‘A new pattern of participation by Congress in government institutions 
emerged between 1959 and 1965’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127). Consultative bodies, and joint 
consultation, was represented as of extreme importance for steady economic 
development (NIEC, 1966). This gave the unions a new perception of the strength they 
possessed.
The trade unions’ participation in a number of national bodies concerned with 
planning was in line with the call for more joint consultation between State, union, and 
employers contained in the First Programme for Economic Expansion,35 ‘The 
institutional setting soon became largely tripartite, with the representatives of business, 
of labour and of government discussing the issues of employment, output, prices and 
trade’ (Pratschke, 1979, p. 43). From this it can be seen that the government’s policies 
towards organised labour underwent drastic change after 1959.
A declining trade union membership was arrested in 1959. In the years 
immediately leading up to 1959 Irish trade union membership had been stagnant at best
33 AR, ICTU, 1963.
34 AR, ICTU, 1964.
35 Budget, 1962.
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(Appendix C). Between 1955 and 1958 trade union membership had decreased by 
9,600, falling to 306,800 in 1958. However, in 1959 trade union membership increased 
by 6,900, or 2.2 per cent, to 313,700. In 1960 trade union membership increased again, 
this time by 3.8 per cent. Within five years of the proposed critical juncture there were 
upwards of 50,000 new members in Irish trade unions, an increase of 16 per cent 
overall. In fact, 1959 marked a turning of the tide for trade union membership in 
Ireland, as it was to be followed by 21 years of uninterrupted trade union growth.
The Government. Economy, and the Unions into the 1960s
When Sean Lemass became Taoiseach he brought to government a vigorous, 
entrepreneurial economic leadership that the country had never before experienced 
(McCarthy, 1973, p. 22). An outward-orientated economic strategy was adopted in a 
climate of severe balance of payments difficulty, recession, and emigration (O’Donnell,
1998, p. 4). The move constituted a major departure in Irish economic policy. 
However, throughout the decade of the 1960s real product was to increase at a rate of 
4.4 per cent per annum, economic openess grew by 23 per cent, while the 
unemployment rate averaged 5.05 per cent in contrast to 8.2 per cent in the 1950s 
(Appendix D). Economists attribute this success to the export-led growth that stood 
upon the pillars of trade liberalisation and the attraction of direct foreign investment.
The attitude of Congress to EEC entry was initially cautious, but by 1962 it was 
willing to support Lemass’s economic intentions. Congress, recognising that free trade 
was inevitable, decided to embrace it from a position of influence with the government 
through membership of the CIO and the NIEC (Murphy, 1997, p. 65). ‘The dialogue 
between state and major socio-economic groups quickly acquired a regular and 
institutional character’ (Peillon, 1995, p. 370). However, the limited effectiveness of
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relying on a web of collaborative bodies to oversee economic adjustment, while 
collective bargaining remained unregulated, became clear (Roche, 1994a, p. 155). The 
1963 Government White Paper Closing the Gap, which called for wage restraint, 
suggested that the ELC become a vehicle of incomes policy. The ICTU reaction, 
withdrawal from the ELC, and a threat to pull out of the other collaborative institutions, 
showed that they regarded free and collective bargaining as sacrosanct. This event 
signalled the end for the ELC in its first incarnation.
The government’s attitude towards collective bargaining was influenced by its 
increasing political and economic significance from the late 1950s onwards (Roche, 
1994a, p. 199). As a growing number of the workforce became unionised, bargaining 
arrangements came to exert a major influence on macroeconomic policies and 
outcomes. Industrial development’s pride of place in national policy and politics also 
influenced the government’s stance towards centralised collective bargaining. Seân 
Lemass had urged a corporatist strategy towards industrial relations in circumstances 
marked by economic readjustment following the Second World War. However, both 
the employers’ and the unions’ commitment to the status quo prevented corporatism 
taking hold at that time. ‘The eventual move towards some form of neo-corporatist 
accommodation with unions and employers was influenced initially by the policy of 
industrialisation in the context of an open economy’ (Roche, 1994a, p. 220).
The consequence of the pay-round system of the 1960s further impelled attempts 
to control and centralise collective bargaining. The growing trade union organisation 
and power, a rising level of industrial conflict, and forceful trade union wage pressure, 
impelled Irish governments to adopt a more interventionist stance. McCarthy (1973) 
encapsulates all that was the 1960s in Ireland in one word, “upheaval.” Economic crisis 
resulting from industrial unrest and an unprecedented pay-round increase in 1969 were
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the catalyst for the move towards neo-corporatism in Ireland. This resulted in the trade 
union movement’s influence over public policy increasing substantially. In the
following decade pay determination was to become increasingly politicised.
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Table 4.1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1959
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: D o  domestic an d  international organisations 
regard the e c onomic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




As Table 4.1 shows there are variations in the extent to which each of the 
hypotheses observable implications pointed to significant, swift, and enduring change 
on the one hand, and a macroeconomic crisis on the other. Nevertheless, 70 per cent of 
the observable implications for the first hypothesis, and 75 per cent of observable 
implications for the second hypothesis, indicated a high level of empirical-theoretical fit 
for Ireland in 1959. Both of these findings exceed the 60 per cent threshold set out in 
Chapter II. From this it is confirmed that a critical juncture has been uncovered.
In summation, 1959 was to witness a significant, swift, and enduring change in 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy, this at a time of macroeconomic crisis. 
The 1950s proved to be a depressing decade for the Irish economy, and trade unions. 
Economic performance had been disastrous up until 1959. This view was unanimously 
shared by the national media, political and economic commentators, the central bank, 
domestic and international organisations monitoring economic performance, and finally 
elected representatives. However, after Lemass came to power in 1959 all this changed. 
A new approach was adopted towards both the economy and the trade unions by the 
Fianna Fail administration. Access to the Taoiseach, representation on government 
committees, trade union membership, government economic policies and policies 
towards organised labour, the trade unions’ influence, and ministerial attitudes, all 
improved in the trade unions’ favour, with policies in particular coming to reflect the 
policies desired by the unions themselves. It was at a time of macroeconomic crisis that 
the unions’ influence over public policy changed. According to the observable 
implications criteria set out in Chapter II this change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy constituted a critical juncture.
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figure 4.1: The Critical Juncture Grid, Ireland, 1959






Potential Critical Juncture 2: 1970- Centralised Pay Agreements and the Trade Unions
The growing openness of the Irish economy in the 1960s and 1970s provided a strong 
incentive to devise new patterns of collective bargaining. Trade liberalisation altered 
the context of domestic policy formation and wage determination. From the late 1950s 
government policy was committed to effecting the progressive integration of the Irish 
economy into the broader European economy. The changed orientation of economic 
policies contributed to a transformation in the structure of the Irish economy and society 
(Rottman and O’Connell, 1982, p. 68). Ireland came to rely on an inflow of foreign 
capital to promote industrialisation and job creation. As a consequence, public policy 
was directed towards minimising strikes and restraining the rate of pay increases. The 
move to free trade, and the heavy reliance on foreign investment, succeeded as long as 
international growth continued. Prior to 1973 it appeared that Ireland had hit on an 
economic strategy that maximised national welfare (Grant, 1982, p. 69). However, then 
came the first oil crises, and economic pressures common to small open economies 
began to manifest themselves in Ireland. Inflation was to become a major and persistent 
problem throughout the decade. As a consequence, the necessity of adapting the 
structures in the area of wage regulation became obvious. Here the logic of 
concertation appeared to have certain advantages as a means of overcoming the 
consequence of distributive conflict.
The Economy. Policies, and the Trade Unions
The high level of industrial conflict in 1969 and 1970 was widely regarded as 
representing a crisis in collective bargaining practices (McCarthy, 1973, p. 151). 
Economic expansion and decentralised collective bargaining were viewed as 
incompatible in the NIEC’s 1970 Report on Incomes and Prices Policy. This proposed
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an institutionally supported prices and incomes policy, effectively the implementation 
of new structures for collective bargaining, a new mode of wage determination. The 
institution of these new structures would have constituted a high point in trade union- 
government joint economic planning (McCarthy, 1980, p. 36). The proposal, after 
finding initial support within Congress, was ultimately rejected by the trade unions. 
The tripartite element in establishing the pay norm, and the evaluative role of 
government departments in the process, were unacceptable to Congress. The problem 
in this regard appears to have been a reluctance on the part of the trade union movement 
to go so far in participating in joint economic institutions. This harked back to their 
traditional advocacy of free collective bargaining.
National commentators, the media, and domestic and international organisations, 
regarded the economy as in difficulty by 1970. In 1970 the Irish economy was far from 
healthy, with the rate of economic expansion slowing considerably from that 
experienced in 1967 and 1968 (OECD, 1971, p. 5). The Economist commented that the 
rate of inflation had been running at about 8.5 per cent, its highest level since 1952.36 
The ESRI (1970, p. 1) pointed out that statistics for industrial output, employment, 
volume of imports, and retail sales all indicated economic stagnation. The OECD 
(1971, p. 5) argued that ‘this was partly due to the direct and indirect effects of labour 
disputes.’ The Central Bank pointed out that industrial production and construction 
activities were affected by a five months’ strike, while investment was depressed, at 
least temporarily, by the uncertainties concerning financing possibilities created by a 
long bank closure.37 The Irish Independent observed that as pay increases were running 
well beyond production the result was record price increases that ate away at most of
36 The Economist, 24-30 October, 1970, p. 80.
37 The Central Dank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn, 1970, p. 5.
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the real benefits of those pay increases. The Irish Times pointed out that the 
improvements in livings standards that had been earned in the 1960s were in danger of
• 39being lost due to inflation. However, the rise in prices was the end result, not the 
direct cause, of the country’s economic troubles.40 ‘No one can feel happy about the 
way the economy is moving at present. The trouble is that the pace of inflation here is 
running ahead far faster than in other much more powerful countries.’41 The Central 
Bank emphasised the fact that Ireland had reached the dangerous extreme of having the 
worst price increase record amongst the OECD countries in the latter part of 1970.42 
This had a knock on effect in the form of a rising level of unemployment in the 
economy.43 The level of unemployment was close to a high of 6 per cent (Leddin and 
Walsh, 1998, p. 21). The ESRI (1971, p. 1) pointed out that a considerable proportion 
of the increase in Irish unemployment after 1969 was due to a fall in emigration as a 
result of the high level of unemployment in the United Kingdom. At the same time 
economic openness began to decline, while the number of days lost through economic 
disputes peaked at over 1 million (Appendix D). The Irish Times also pointed out that 
the value of exports had not improved over 1969.44 The economic prospects looked 
somewhat better for the following year, however the ESRI (1970, p. 1) still predicted 
that the balance of payments deficit would rise to almost £85 million. The Central Bank 
also gave the grim warning that the penalty for a high and prolonged rate of price 
inflation would be the decline of sales in the first instance and then a falling off in 
production and employment if things did not change.45
38 Irish Independent, 7 October, 1970.
39 ibid, 12 October, 1970, p. 14.
40 Irish Independent, 9 October, 1970.
41 ibid, 10 October, 1970, p. 3.
42 The Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn, 1971, p. 5.
43 ibid.
44 The Irish Times, 7 October, 1970, p. 1.
45 The Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn, 1971, p. 7.
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There was a change in both the government’s economic policies and its policies 
toward the trade unions. ‘The chief lesson emerging from the operation of collective 
bargaining in the 1960s was that decentralised wage rounds as they operated were by 
their nature unstable and prone to inflation’ (Gunnigle et al., 1999, p. 193). The 
government’s economic policy, traditionally geared to long-term growth commitments 
and industrialisation targets, from 1969 became increasingly concerned with 
inflationary developments and their implications for the external balance (OECD, 1971, 
p. 15). Irish demand and output were depressed by a restrictive policy stance adopted 
on anti inflationary grounds, and by the recession in the United Kingdom (OECD, 1973, 
p. 5). With stagnating production appearing alongside a price and wage explosion, 
economic conditions deteriorated during the course of 1970. The combination of 
relatively slow growth, strong inflation, and a large current external deficit, presented a 
dilemma for economic policy. The ESRI (1971, p. 1) argued that ‘the authorities [did] 
not appear to have a great deal of room to manoeuvre in their short-term demand 
management.’ The balance of payments deficit imposed a strong constraint on the 
degree of expansion that could be permitted. As prices became the primary concern of 
the Government, the budgetary strategy was aimed at moderating the rise in government 
spending so as not to contribute to inflation (OECD, 1972, p. 15). This was to lead to a 
change in the government’s policies towards organised labour, with the approach 
emerging in the 1970s being more aggressive.
The NIEC viewed economic expansion and decentralised collective bargaining 
as incompatible in 1970.46 The 1970 budget argued that ‘it is beyond doubt that the 
principle need at present is for a more orderly and rational development of incomes if 
we are to bring the present inflationary situation under control.’47 Another lesson from
45 N[ational], Industrial] and E[conomic] C[ouncil], Report on Incomes and Prices Policy, No. 27, 1970.
41 Budget, 1970, p. 12.
the 1960s was the need fo r a jo in t body to administer .the national pay agreements.48 It 
was against this background o f  industrial strife, and economic d ifficu lties, that the 
N IE C  prepared its Report on Incomes and Prices Policy. A  consequence o f  this was the 
reconstitution o f  the E LC  in M ay 1970. This was a s ign ificant happening in the long­
term restructuring o f  the adversarial method o f  conduct o f  industrial relations 
(M cG in ley and F ilby , 1997, p. 202). The government became a participant in the ELC 
w ith  the intention o f  in fluencing the wage round norm. This was because, as the 
M in is te r fo r Finance, George Colley, stated, the economy could not afford to pay wage 
increases that were not related to productiv ity increases. He said that the pressing 
urgency o f  the situation w ould force the government’ s hand.49 Taoiseach Jack Lynch 
warned that, fo llo w in g  the collapse o f  talks at the Em ployer-Labour Conference on a 
voluntary national incomes policy, the government would take action aimed at 
stabilis ing prices and protecting employment.50 The chairman o f  the ELC, Professor 
Basil Chubb, said that he believed that the tim e had come fo r the government to show 
its hand in some form  o f  wage restraint and price control. He argued that action was 
needed to be taken to ‘ see the country through the present situation which, in fact, was a 
dangerous one from  the point o f  v iew  o f  exports and was placing at danger all the 
progress that had been made in the last few years.’51 Thereafter, the government took 
the drastic measure o f  threatening to introduce statutory controls on wages and salaries 
in the form  o f  a Prices and Incomes B il l  (OECD, 1971, p. 16).
The trade un ions’ access to the Taoiseach changed. A lthough there had been a 
number o f  meetings held between the IC TU  and the M inisters fo r Finance and Labour, 
there is no record o f  any encounter w ith  the Taoiseach in 1969, or in 1970 prior to
48 N I E C ,  N o .  27 , 1970.
49 Irish Independent, 9 O c to b e r, 1970.
50 T h e  Irish Press, 8 O c to b e r, 1970.
51 T h e  Irish T im e s , 12 O c to b e r, 1970.
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October o f  that year.52 However, fo llow ing  the government’ s in troduction to the D ail o f 
the Prices and Incomes B ill there were three meetings held in qu ick succession between 
the IC T U  and the Taoiseach (Appendix A ).53 A t these encounters the IC T U  sought the 
w ithdraw al o f  the Prices and Incomes B il l .54 This B i l l  was subsequently w ithdrawn on 
17 December.55 U ltim ate ly , argues W einz (1986, p. 98), the threat o f  the B i l l ’ s 
in troduction resulted in the firs t national agreement fo r s ix years in  December 1970, this 
in spite o f  IC TU  opposition to being coerced into a deal, and its advocacy o f  free 
collective bargaining. The Irish Times regarded this agreement as effectively 
constituting an economic life-preserver fo r the country, and at the same time an 
im portant experiment in industria l relations.56 However, it  should be noted that 
between the announcement o f  the government’ s in itia l proposals and the ratification o f 
the national agreement the government was forced to make concession after concession 
to the unrelenting pressure o f  the IC TU , M ost notable o f  these concessions was the 
IC T U ’ s refusal to ra tify  the agreement un til the government w ithdrew  its Prices and 
Incomes B il l  (IC T U , 1971). However, government budgetary prerogatives were not 
impaired by the 1970 N W A . I t  is noteworthy that the number o f  meetings between the 
IC T U  and the Taoiseach was maintained at three into the firs t year o f  the N W A , and 
that this frequency o f  meetings was sustained for the remainder o f  the 1970s.57
There was a changed relationship in the economy between the trade unions, the 
employers’ peak organisation, and the government. The 1970 agreement marked the 
beginning o f  a prolonged engagement in centralised collective bargaining that would 
span the decade. M oreover, it  marked a significant change in the politics o f  pay
52 A R ,  I C T U ,  1970.
53 ib id ., 1971.
54 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 12 D e ce m b e r, 1970.
55 D i i l  E ire a n n , V o l .  250, 17 D e ce m b e r, 1970.
56 T h e  Irish  T im e s , D e c e m b e r 17, D e ce rn b e r 18, 1970.
57 AR, ICTU, 1972.
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determ ination.58 Over the decade from  1970 to 1980 a further eight central agreements 
were concluded that w ould profound ly altered the Irish industrial relations climate. 
Between 1972 and 1978 six o f  these agreement were reached by way o f  bipartite 
negotiations between unions and employers. The other tw o agreements reached in 1979 
and 1980, National Understandings (NU), were arrived at through tripartite  negotiation. 
A l l  the centralised pay agreements were negotiated through the ELC. However, Roche 
(1994a, p. 158) warns that in  rea lity the distinction between bipartite and tripartite 
negotiations cannot be identified d istinc tly  over this decade.
B y  the m id-1970s the new collective bargaining approach was marked by quid 
pro quo arrangements on taxation issues between the unions and the state, and the 
integration o f  government budgetary po licy  into national pay determination. The 
linkage between the national pay agreements and government budgetary po licy was 
argued by O ’B rien (1981, p. 144) as possibly ‘ the most profound change in the nature, 
functions and prerogatives o f  democratic government in the h istory o f  the state.’ W ith  
active state involvem ent in  industria l relations came direct trade union involvement in 
pub lic  po licy  making. These agreements were more form al in character than their 
h istorica l antecedents, such as the National Wage Recommendation from  1964. The 
agreements running from  the 1940s to 1970s, w h ile  prototypes fo r what was to come, 
were conceived o f  as ad hoc responses to particular economic situations. They were not 
seen as a serious firs t step towards the development o f  permanent institutions fo r the 
orderly adjustment o f  employee incomes (O ’Brien, 1981, p. 8). The relationship in the 
economy between the trade unions, the employers’ peak organisation, and the 
government had undergone sign ificant change.
S8 Budget, 1971.
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There was change in  trade union representation on government committees. The 1970 
agreement proved to be a watershed, as the boundary separating po litics and industrial 
relations was now to be dismantled by the state and the trade unions (Roche, 1989, p. 
121). A lthough by the late 1960s the IC T U  had significant representation on 
government committees in the economic and social fields, th is was to expand further 
during the 1970s. P rior to 1970 the trade unions had ceased to be represented on certain 
o f  the bodies that had come into existence in the early 1960s, as some o f  these had 
closed down, w h ile  the IC T U  had w ithdraw n from  others fo r one reason or another 
(Append ix B ).59 This was m ain ly to do w ith  disputes w ith  the government. However, 
post 1970 the IC T U  was represented on a number o f  new bodies in  both the industrial 
relations, and economic and social, fie lds (Append ix B ). Certain o f  the new bodies, 
such as the reconstituted ELC , had come into existence on account o f  the national wage 
agreement reached in 1970. Nevertheless, these bodies were to endure fo r long after the 
proposed c ritica l juncture .60 I t  is evident from  this that the trade un ion ’ s representation 
on government committees had increased both quantita tively and qualitative ly.
Throughout the 1970s bargaining institutions became more significant than any 
other institu tion  o f  jo in t  planning. A l l  centralised pay agreements were drafted and 
concluded by the employer and trade union representatives in  the reconstituted ELC and 
thereafter adopted as state po licy  (Hardiman, 1988, p. 53). The establishment o f the 
ELC  on a permanent basis offered the pay agreement greater s tab ility  than the ill-fa ted 
N W A  o f  1964. Membership o f  this body consisted o f  an equal number o f 
representatives from  both the employer and trade union sides. The terms o f  reference o f
59 A R ,  I C T U ,  1970
60 ib id ,  1973.
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the ELC  were broad. In  addition to provid ing a forum  fo r the discussion and review o f 
developments and problems in industrial relations its b r ie f extend to many other areas. 
However, during the 1970s most o f  the w ork  o f  the ELC  centred on the negotiation o f 
the centralised pay agreements. The institu tionalisation o f  pay bargaining through the 
ELC  enhanced the influence and po litica l leverage o f  Congress and its constituent 
unions. In particular, Congress could norm ally  deliver on agreements, a major reason 
for this was the level o f  democratic accountability among the unions. This allowed 
Congress to approach government w ith  a mandate on issues other than pay and 
conditions. The OECD (1972, p. 15) observed that the government its e lf was left w ith  
the task o f  m ainta in ing the conditions favouring the observance o f  the agreements.
Overall, there was some variation in  rate o f  change in trade union membership. 
B y the late 1960s trade union membership in Ireland surpassed the 400,000 level, 
reaching 409,000 in  1969 (Appendix C). This meant that over the 1960s trade union 
membership had increased by 95,500, or over 30.4 per cent. In 1970 trade union 
membership increased by 3.6 per cent over 1969, an increase that constituted 14,900 
new members, bring ing tota l union membership up to 424,100. The year fo llow ing  the 
proposed c ritica l juncture  trade union membership continued on its upward trajectory, 
albeit at a much slower rate than heretofore. In  1971 union membership increased by 
on ly 3,000 or 0.7 per cent. The early 1970s saw the level o f  trade union membership in 
the economy continue to grow, but at a somewhat slower rate than in the 1960s. The 
rate o f  union grow th was not to accelerate again un til a short spurt between 1976 and
1979 saw membership increase by a further 63,200.
Between 1969 and 1971 there was a marked change in the level and content o f 
trade union polic ies that were incorporated into the government’ s policies towards 
organised labour. In  1969 the trade unions were to an extent frustrated w ith  the
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government. D uring  the late 1960s the IC T U  had unsuccessfully sought the 
introduction o f  legislation concerning the m in im um  period o f  notice on the term ination 
o f  employment.61 The fo llow ing  November the IC T U  asked the M in is te r fo r Education 
to re-examine the question o f  extending university grants w ithou t success. B y  this time 
the Trade Union B il l  o f  1963 had s till not become law. The unions, frustration boiling 
over, went so far as to accuse the M in is te r fo r Labour o f  ly ing  to the D a il on 5 March 
1969 when he said he had received no IC T U  request to consult on the B il l .62 However, 
in  late M arch the IC T U  met w ith  the M inisters fo r Labour and Finance to discuss, non­
wage incomes, prices, tax allowances, and aid to lower paid workers.63 In  the budget 
that fo llow ed the government made the requested adjustments in tax allowances.64 In 
late September 1969 the M in is te r fo r Labour met w ith  the IC T U  to discuss the w ork o f 
his department in  order to improve its function ing.65
In  early 1970 the IC T U  made a successful submission to the M in is ter fo r Labour 
on the need fo r improvements in the 1967 Redundancy Payments Act. The 1970 
budget66 made changes to the income tax system sought by Congress.67 On 6 
November 1970 the IC T U  had sought an increase in workers’ insurab ility  under the 
Social W elfare Acts.68 The fo llow ing  A p r il the M in is te r fo r Social W elfare announced 
an increase in the insurab ility  lim it.69 The IC T U  contacted the M in is te r fo r Education in 
M ay 1970, and again in M arch 1971, on U C D ’ s decision to restrict entry to its night 
courses. The issue was subsequently resolved to the IC T U ’ s satisfaction. The IC TU  
also had input in to both the Pensions and Sick Pay proposals o f  the government in
61 ib id ,  1969.
62 D a il E ire a n n , V o l .  2 3 8 , 5 M a rc h , 1969.
63 A R ,  I C T U ,  1969.
64 B u d get, 1969.
65 A R ,  I C T U ,  1969.
66 B u d get, 1970.
67 A R ,  I C T U ,  1970.
68 ib id ,  1971.
69 D a il E ire a n n , V o l .  2 5 3 , 22 A p r i l ,  1971.
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1970.70 The Industria l Relations A ct o f  1971 largely fo llow ed the proposals put 
forward by the IC T U  The National Prices Commission was established by the M in ister 
fo r Industry and Commerce in line w ith  Congress’ s proposals to the M inister. In 
December 1971 the Department o f Labour inv ited  IC T U  input on the updating o f 
existing health and safety regulations in  factories.71
D uring the 1970s Irish industrial relations reached high levels o f  centralisation. 
The conduct o f  industria l relations moved towards the neo-corporatist model. As the 
state sought to promote central wage deals between unions and employers, their 
federations became m ajor actors in industrial relations po licy  form ulation. As the 
decade wore on talks on pay became increasingly tripartite , and trade union influence 
over public po licy  expanded. W orking parties consisting o f  public servants, union, and 
employer representatives became an increasing feature o f  po licy making. Meetings 
between representatives o f  the social partners and m inisters became commonplace. The 
N W A  o f  1975, although concluded in  a climate o f  economic d ifficu lty , and w ithout 
establishing the princip le  o f  a trade-o ff between pay and public po licy commitments, 
created a degree o f  expectation that the N W A s and budgets to fo llo w  m ight be linked, 
as u ltim ate ly  came to pass in 1977. B y  the close o f  the 1970s formal tripartite 
agreements were concluded.
Over the course o f  the decade governments went from  using budgetary po licy to 
underwrite national pay deals, to placing a range o f  public po licy issues on the 
negotiation table. W hat had been a decentralised system o f  pay determination and 
industria l relations, underpinned by an auxilia ry trad ition o f  State policy, had been 
recast in im portant ways in a neo-corporatist mould. The IC TU , through its dialogue
70 A R ,  I C T U ,  1971.
71 ib id ,  1972.
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w ith  the government, possessed influence over the most important economic policy 
instruments in  the hands o f  the State (Roche, 1994a, p. 165).
W ith  the ‘National Understanding’ the government had form ally 
acknowledged a new positive role fo r the m ajor pressure groups in an 
im portant sector o f  economic po licy-m aking and had incurred 
commitments to them; they in turn had incurred reciprocal obligations 
invo lv ing  the conduct o f  the ir members (Chubb, 1992, p. 127).
In retrospect it was industria l relations d ifficu lties  attributed to the wage round system, 
and free co llective bargaining, such as infla tion, loss o f  competitiveness, and industrial 
conflic t, along w ith  reassessment o f  bargaining by the state, unions and employers, that 
represented the mediate influences in the centralisation o f  collective bargaining (Roche, 
1994a, p. 177).
However, a d istinct sh ift in the power balance between the corporate groupings 
became evident by the late 1970s. By 1978 the employers appeared weak. In contrast 
the IC TU  had grown stronger due to the state’ s w illingness to grant it concessions. This 
was demonstrated fo r a ll to see in 1980 when the main decisions concerning the second 
N U  were taken by Congress and government, and then communicated to the employers 
(W einz, 1986, p. 99). W hen the employers resisted the im plications o f  this the 
Taoiseach pressured the FUE into concession.72 The N U  reached in 1980 was to be the 
last central pay agreement un til 1987.
72 T h e  Irish T im e s , 5 January , 1981, p. 5.
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Table 4.2: The E m pirical-T heoretical F it 1970
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 H igh M e d iu m Low None
O l: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime m inister
X
0 2 : Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
0 3 : Change in  the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
0 4 :  Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
w ith  a po litica l party
X
0 5 :  Change in the level o f  trade union 
membership in the economy
X
0 6 : Change in  the government’ s policies 
towards organised labour
X
0 7 :  Change in the level o f  trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’ s 
policies towards organised labour
Y
0 8 :  Change in the government’ s economic 
policies
X
0 9 :  Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public po licy  as identified by national 
economic, po litica l, and industrial relations 
commentators a like
X
0 1 0 :  Change in  m in isteria l attitudes towards 
the role o f  trade unions in the po lity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 H igh M e d iu m Low None
O l: Are  the country ’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
0 2 :  Do op in ion po lls  find  that the public 
regards the economic state o f  the country as in 
crisis?
X
0 3 :  Do the national media regard the economic 
state o f  the country as in  crisis?
X
0 4 :  D o national economic and po litica l 
commentators regard the economic state o f  the 
country as in crisis?
X
0 5 : Does the central bank regards the 
economic state o f  the country as in crisis?
X
0 6 :  D o  d o m e s t ic  a n d  in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n isa tio n s  
re g a rd  th e  e c o n o m ic  state o f  th e  c o u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 7 : Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state o f  the country as in crisis?
X
0 8 :  A re government pronouncements on the 




Table 4.2 shows that while 90 per cent o f the observable implications o f  the first 
hypothesis pointed to medium or high em pirical-theoretical fit, only 40 per cent o f the 
observables indicated a high fit. This is below the m in im um  threshold o f  60 per cent 
established in Chapter II. None o f  the second hypothesis’ s observable implications 
pointed to a high em pirical-theoretical fit. This confirm s that the findings satisfied 
neither o f  the hypotheses, and that there was no critica l juncture in the IC TU  influence 
over public policy.
In summation, 1970 was to witness a sw ift and enduring change in the trade 
unions’ influence over public policy. However, this was at a tim e o f  macroeconomic 
d ifficu lties  rather than macroeconomic crisis. In this instance the change that occurred 
in the IC T U ’ s influence was not in fact that significant, as it was bu ild ing upon change 
that had already occurred in 1959. A lthough the 1960s had been a boom time for the 
economy, by the end o f  the decade, w ith  the economy in  downturn and dependent on 
foreign investment, the industria l con flic t o f  the period was seen as unacceptable. The 
v iew  that the economy was in downturn was shared by the national media, po litica l and 
economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and international organisations 
m onitoring economic performance, and fin a lly  elected representatives. Economic 
po licy  came to focus on the problem o f  in fla tion, and a knock on effect o f  this was the 
introduction o f  the firs t o f  many national agreements in December 1970. This 
agreement marked the beginning o f  a prolonged engagement in centralised collective 
bargaining, a change in the po litics o f  pay determination. The IC T U ’s access to the 
Taoiseach im proved to an extent, as did its representation on government committees, 
and its overall membership. The government’ s policies towards the trade union, the 
economy, and the level o f  trade union policies incorporated into the government’ s 
policies, also underwent change. The central agreements gave the IC TU  unprecedented
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access to the government, its policies, and their formulation, over the rest o f  the 1970s. 
It was at a time o f  macroeconomic difficulties, as opposed to crisis, that the unions’ 
influence over public policy changed to an extent. However, according to the 
observable implications criteria set out in Chapter II, the change in the trade unions’ 
influence over public policy did not constitute a critical juncture. The level o f  change in 
the trade unions’ influence was not that significant, and just as importantly, there was 
no macroeconomic crisis in the first place.
figure 4.2: The Critical Juncture Grid, Ireland, 1970_________________________
Generative Cleavage Change (Significant, Swift, and Enduring)
(Macroeconomic Crisis)




P o ten tia l C ritic a l J u n c tu re  3: 1981 -  Decentralised Agreements and the Trade Unions
B y the close o f  the 1970s, the centralised agreements had moved w e ll beyond their 
orig ina l fa ir ly  modest beginnings. They had acquired a macroeconomic significance 
that pay bargaining had never before possessed. They were no longer simply pay 
agreements, but had become w ide-ranging po licy  agreements. But, by the tim e the 
Second National Understanding expired in 1981, both unions and employers had 
become disillusioned w ith  them. The sought after economic s tab ility  was not derived 
from  the centralised agreements. Unemployment continued to rise, this despite 
government commitments to making the achievement o f  fu ll employment its objective. 
The national debt was grow ing at an unsustainable rate, w h ile  the onset o f  another 
international recession offered a prospect o f worsening economic conditions.
The Economy Crisis and Economic Policy
By the early 1980s economic indicators, national commentators, the media, and 
domestic and international organisations, regarded the economy as in crisis. The 
centralised pay agreements o f  the 1970s were implemented as solutions to problems 
orig inating in the economic grow th o f  the 1960s. However, they increasingly came to 
be relied upon to address problems created by the economic circumstances o f  the 1970s 
(Hardiman, 1992, p. 329). Irish economic performance in the early 1980s was very 
d ifferent from that o f  the preceding decade. The latter years o f  the 1970s had seen the 
economy recover from  the downturn that fo llow ed the 1974 o il crisis. In fla tion  and 
unemployment began to fa ll, w h ile  strong growth returned (Leddin and Walsh, 1998 p. 
26). Real GDP increased on average by about 5.3 per cent from  1976 to 1979 (OECD, 
1982, p. 8). The O ECD (1982, p. 10) went on to argue that the Fianna Fail government 
that came to power in  1977 employed an expansionist fiscal po licy  at a tim e when the
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economy was already grow ing at an unsustainable rate. However, strong pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies led to a major deterioration in fiscal balances w ith  the public sector- 
borrow ing requirement ris ing from  around 13 per cent o f  GNP in 1976 to almost 17 per 
cent by 1979. The structural problems highlighted by the firs t o il crisis had remained 
unresolved by the tim e the second o il crisis struck in 1979. The OECD (1983, p. 7) 
observed that internal and external imbalances in the economy grew worse in the wake 
o f  the second o il shock, w ith  an exacerbation o f  in fla tionary pressures and record 
defic its in both the current external balance and the public sector accounts. The average 
rate o f  consumer price increase in 1980 was 18.25 per cent.73 The economic downturn 
that fo llow ed this event affected Ireland badly.
‘The second o il shock, the protracted international recession and the failure to 
achieve the fiscal po licy  retrenchment o rig ina lly  sought led to a worsening o f 
imbalances in  the tw o years to 1981’ (OECD, 1983, p. 10). Adjustm ent to the EMS, 
entered in 1979 after severing the lin k  w ith  Sterling, proved uncertain, and inflation 
iron ica lly  fe ll at a slower rate in Ireland than in the U K  during the early 1980s. 
Fo llow ing  rapid grow th in  the second h a lf o f  the 1970s domestic demand fe ll sharply in
1980 and remained weak in  1981. A t the same time, the O ECD (1982, p. 7) pointed out 
that in fla tion  accelerated and the current external de fic it widened substantially. The 
Irish Independent went on to argue that tackling in fla tion , the e lim ination o f 
government borrow ing, and increased incentives fo r industry were all essential to 
righ ting  the economy.74 The NESC (1983, p. 3) pointed out that GDP growth fe ll to 1.1 
per cent that turned into a fa ll o f  1.4 per cent in GNP due to outflow s associated w ith  
the servicing o f  the external debt. W ith  a marked slowdown in  GDP growth the rate o f 
unem ploym ent and in fla tion  began to rise towards h isto rica lly  high figures (Appendix
73 T h e  C e n tra l B a n k  R ep ort, A n n u a l R ep ort, 1981, p. 15.
74 Irish Independent, 2 June, 1981, p. 5.
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D), this despite government commitments to making the achievement o f fu ll 
em ploym ent its objective (OECD, 1982, p. 10). The NESC (1981, p. 1) pointed out that 
unemployment reached 9.3 per cent by m id -1981, w ith  manufacturing industry 
experiencing a fa ll in output o f  2 per cent. Accord ing to The Irish Times manufacturing 
industry, battling through a severe recession, had lost 9,300 jobs.75 Simultaneously, the 
bu ild ing  industry was also in the doldrums.76 The increase in fiscal defic it, which was 
intended to be o f  a temporary nature, became impossible to elim inate in an economic 
climate o f  decline. B y  1981 Irish national debt had reached £10.195 b illion , o f  which 
£3.7 b illio n  was external in nature (Leddin and Walsh, 1998, pp. 155-156). Leddin and 
O ’ Leary (1995, p. 167) state that at this tim e the public sector borrow ing requirement 
peaked at the very high level o f  20.1 per cent o f  GNP, w h ile  the current budget defic it 
stood at an equally unsustainable 7.3 per cent o f  GNP. Bacon et al., (1982, p. 6), 
w ritin g  fo r the ESRI, argued that almost h a lf o f the total borrow ing by the Exchequer in 
1981 was to finance the current budget deficit. The Central Bank pointed to the fact 
that consumer prices rose by 20.5 per cent in 1981, w h ile  the de fic it on the current 
account o f  the balance o f  payments was £1,327 m illion , equivalent to 13 per cent o f 
GNP.77
The early 1980s were to see a dramatic change in the government’ s economic 
policies. John Carro ll, the president o f  the Irish Transport and General W orkers’ Union 
(IT G W U ), argued that w ith  over 126,000 people unemployed the economy found itse lf 
in a crisis situation.78 A  member o f  Fine Gael, A lex is  Fitzgerald, remarked that there 
were more people unemployed by June 1981 than at any other tim e in the country’ s 
history. He went on to argue that Fianna Fail had reduced the national growth rate from
75 T h e  Irish T im e s , 1 June, 1981, p. 12.
75 ib id ,  1 June, p. 14.
77 C e n tra l B a n k  o f  Ireland, A n n u a l R ep ort, 1982, p. 16,
78 T h e  E v e n in g  Press, 28 M a y ,  1981.
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over five  per cent in  1977 to zero, and in the space o f  four years had doubled the 
borrow ing level that took 57 years to bu ild  up.79 In fact the government’ s spending was 
so high that the tota l amount budgeted fo r 1981 had been m ostly consumed by June o f 
that year. B y m id -1981 concern for the deteriorating economic performance, and more 
particu larly the need to control public expenditure, reduce the defic it, and prevent 
excessive reliance on foreign borrow ing, dictated the adoption o f  progressively tighter 
fiscal policies. D irect household taxes rose and disposable income fe ll substantially. 
The longstanding system o f  income determination also changed w ith  the breakdown o f 
talks on a national agreement, and a sh ift to freer collective bargaining in November 
1981. Thereafter, the OECD (1985, p. 7) points out, fiscal po licy  in  Ireland became 
directed to correcting massive economic imbalances that peaked in 1981.
The Unions and the Ending o f  the National Agreements
The negotiation o f  second N U  in  1980 had fo llow ed a s im ilar pattern to that o f  1979. 
However, the institu tiona l channels through w hich negotiations were conducted were 
d ifferent, in that the non-pay elements o f  the agreement were negotiated directly w ith
the Taoiseach and senior ministers. In 1980 Taoiseach Haughey met w ith  the IC TU
80five  times (Append ix A ). ‘He considered [meeting the IC T U ] a fundamental part o f 
the role o f  Taoiseach.’ 81 Congress supplied a pre-budget submission that received a 
reply from  Government in the budget speech in February 1980. A t the tim e Haughey, 
who had come to power in December 1979, needed to prove his authority to a divided 
Fianna Fail party w ith  an election v ictory. This need appeared to colour the approach 
the government adopted to trade union pressure on pay and other issues. Essentially, it
79 T h e  Irish T im e s , 6 June, 1981.
80 A R ,  I C T U ,  1980 and 1981.
81 ib id ,  1980, p. 22.
82 B u d g e t, 1980.
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was reluctant to adopt measures that could prove unpopular. A lthough high levels o f 
current expenditure produced a budgetary over-run in 1979, the government continued 
its expansionary policies in 1980 (OECD, 1982, p. 50). This was due to the worsening 
international economic climate resulting from  the second o il crisis, and the sharply 
accelerating increases in Irish unemployment and em igration. However, this situation 
was in its e lf to bring about renewed in fla tionary expectations amongst Irish workers. 
M eanwhile, the FUE had changed its views on centralised bargaining. In September, as 
the talks entered the ir fina l stages, they collapsed tw ice in ten days. This resulted in 
intervention by the government. ‘The Taoiseach managed to press the FUE national 
executive into resuming negotiations by pledging them guarantees on the content o f the 
1981 budget’ (La lor, 1982, p. 83). The second N U  was ra tified  in September 1980 
(O ’ Brien, 1981, p. 154). However, the conclusion o f  th is second understanding drew 
the resentment o f  the FUE at the undue po litica l pressure brought to bear upon it.
The economic partnership between the trade unions, the employers, and the 
government, underwent change. Taking a ll into account, centralised bargaining was not 
meeting the objectives o f  any o f  the parties to the agreements. This fact was to 
compound the d ifficu ltie s  inherent in renegotiating the national agreements. A  creeping 
d is illusionm ent was clearly evident in the grow ing reluctance o f  the FUE to continue its 
participation in the agreements by 1980. For the trade unions the agreements were not 
transform ing pay restraint into jo b  creation at a level necessary to meet the growing 
labour supply. W h ile  improvements in State social po licy  provisions constituted part o f 
the agreements, they made no inroads into social inequality and disadvantage. This left 
unions w ith  the perception that government had failed to fo llo w  through on its pledges. 
A lthough the agreements contained procedures fo r containing industrial conflict, its 
level during the 1970s was higher than in  any other decade in the history o f  the state
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(B rannick and Doyle, 1994, pp. 260-161). The state looked to the national agreements 
to restrain pay increases in order to preserve international competitiveness and deliver 
economic growth. However, this objective was compromised by the extensive and 
sign ificant bargaining that was conducted below the national level. The result what that 
an effective second tie r o f  pay determination developed during the 1970s (Fogarty et al., 
1981, p. 32). For employers, the agreements sought to impose s im ila r basic wage 
norms on a ll sectors o f  the economy. This was viewed by certain sections o f  the 
business com m unity, particu larly indigenous companies in exposed sectors, as 
underm ining the ir competitiveness.
The catch-all nature o f  Irish po litica l parties imposed an inducement on 
governments to buy o f f  short-term pressure from  interest groups through ad hoc policy 
concessions. This worked against the creation o f  enduring agreements between the 
State and the economic interest groups evident in continental neo-corporatism. The 
social partners fa ilin g  to share comparable views on the policies needed for tackling 
economic problems compounded these d ifficu lties . Employers warned that spiralling 
wages fue lled in fla tion , and contributed to ris ing unemployment. The unions rejected 
th is view . For them unemployment was a consequence o f  deficient demand. Their 
solution was an expansionary fiscal policy. Employers resisted the demands for public 
sector jo b  creation on grounds that increased public spending w ould have a crowding 
out effect. These divergent approaches to economic d ifficu lties  greatly complicated the 
process o f  reaching national pay agreements. Close ideological a ffin ity  between the 
trade unions and the government, a common feature o f  stable neo-corporatist 
arrangements, was also lacking in  Ireland.
N ational pay bargaining was to come to an end in 1981. A lthough talks opened 
towards negotiating a new N U  in 1981, and the IC TU  met w ith  Taoiseach Haughey
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three times in the firs t h a lf o f  the year,83 an impasse was soon encountered on pay terms 
between employers and unions. The parties to industrial relations faced the prospect o f 
a return to decentralised pay determination.
P rior to the June general election the Fianna Fail manifesto Our Programme for 
the 80s, and the Fine Gael m an ifes to^ Better Future, had painted diam etrically opposed
04
images o f  the economy. Despite this, the picture o f  the economy painted by the 
Central B ank at the tim e was one o f  unrem itting grimness.85 The leader o f  the 
opposition, Dr. Garrett FitzGerald o f  Fine Gael, argued that under Fianna Fail the 
economy had endured four years o f  indecision and inaction.86 He went on to state that 
Fianna Fail had fa iled to control the rampant in fla tion  a fflic tin g  the economy.87 The 
Taoiseach countered that he had called the election in order to put h im se lf in a strong
position from  w h ich  to impose a d iscipline on the public finances his government had
88not so far achieved. John K e lly , a Fine Gael front-bencher, stated that his party’s 
p rio rity  was the stim ulation o f  jobs.89 The Irish Times argued that in essence ‘the 
purpose o f  the election was to decide who w ould  become crisis manager fo r the 
econom y.’90 The Irish Independent pointed out that the m a jo rity  o f  the populace were 
unconvinced that the po litica l leaders could ‘ run the country r ig h t.’91 The general 
election o f  June 1981 saw a m inority  coalition government com prising Fine Gael and 
the Labour Party come to power. A t the most inopportune tim e in the Republic’ s
83 A R ,  I C T U ,  1981
84 Our Programme for the 80s, 1981, F ia n n a  F a il;  A Better Future, 1981, F in e  G a e l.
85 C en tra l B a n k  o f  Ireland, Q u a rte rly  B u lle t in , S u m m er, 1982, p. 10.
86 T h e  Irish T im e s , 8 June, 1981.
87 Irish  Independent, 1 June 1981, p. 4.
88 T h e  Irish T im e s , 15 June, 1981, p. 5.
89 ib id ,  9 June, p. 9.
90 ib id ,  6 June, 1981, p. 9.
91 Irish  Independent, 2 June, 1981, p. 1.
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affairs, remarked The Irish Times, it suddenly found itself condemned to, what 
ultimately proved to be, a period of weak and unstable government.92
Coakley (1982, p. 91) points out that in the run up to the election Fine Gael had 
‘emphasised the need for corrective action to improve the state of the economy.’ This 
conformed with the statements coming out of the Central Bank which argued that the 
‘ fundamental problem is that the community still does not realise, apparently, that it 
must adjust its living standards and expectations downwards in the face of both 
deteriorating terms of trade and the need to commit resources to servicing the increased
93external debt. Polls had shown that unemployment, and especially jobs for young 
people, were easily the most important questions on the minds of the voters, with prices 
being of next greatest importance.94 The new government was determined to bring 
order to the public finances. According to the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC) (1986, p. 43) a spiralling current budget deficit, public sector borrowing 
requirement, and national debt, precipitated a new approach to economic management 
by the government. As The Irish Times saw it; in a situation marked by economic crisis 
harsh economic decisions could not be avoided.95 Regaining control of the public 
finances would entail constraining the rising public service pay much more tightly than 
under previous administrations (FitzGerald, 1991, p. 385). The supplementary budget 
introduce in July 1981, was designed to reduce the central government borrowing 
requirement and the balance of payments deficit. The ESRI (1981, p. 15) pointed out 
that the changes were estimated by the government to reduce the borrowing requirement 
by £336 million compared with what it otherwise would have been.
92 ib id ,  15 June, 1981, p. 12.
93 C en tra l B a n k  o f  Ireland, A n n u a l R ep ort, 1982, p. 8.
94 Irish Independent, 1 1 June, 1981.
95 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 29  June, 1981.
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Redmond (1985) points out that there were also indications that certain Fine 
Gael ministers were less than convinced of the merits of the national tripartite 
agreements. Consequently, in spite of the fact that Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald met 
four times with the ICTU96 prior to the breakdown of discussion on a new NU, when the 
breakdown occurred the government was unwilling to intervene to save the talks as it 
considered the terms on the table incompatible with economic correction. Although this 
brought the ICTU’s overall encounters with the Taoiseagh to seven in that year, from
1981 onwards the ICTU was pushed out of the policy making process, and its influence 
over the national budget ceased to exist. The Fine Gael wing of the coalition essentially 
decided that the social partners had no right to influence economic and social policy.97 
The government’s policy towards, and relationship with, the trade unions had 
essentially changed. ‘It was to be a bleak period for Congress and labour,’ (Girvin,
1994, p. 129). National pay bargaining was not to be reinstituted before 1987.
The seeds of collapse, the agreements’ failure to correct national economic 
problems, and to close gap between their objectives and achievements, had been sown 
over a number of years. Unrealised expectations, and undelivered commitments, 
bought about the demised of national bargaining. From late 1981 onwards, in the 
context of worsening economic conditions, wage rounds again became decentralised 
(Cox, 1983). The Irish Times points out that as the country battled through a severe 
recession demands for the correct management of the public finances, and curbs in 
public spending, were placed at the top of the political agenda.98 By 1982 all political 
parties were committed to curbing public spending. This objective was not compatible 
with underwriting collective agreements on the sorts of terms that had characterised the
96 A R ,  I C T U ,  1982.
97 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 3 F e b ru a ry , 1982, p. 1.
98 ib id ,  1 June, 1981.
146
two NUs. As a consequence, trade union influence on public policy was to be reduced 
drastically during the first half of the 1980s.
Political and Economic Instability
The period from June 1981 to November 1982 was distinguished by a level of political 
instability not previously experienced in Ireland. Three general elections were 
contested, each of which brought with it a change of government. The minority Fine 
Gael-Labour Party coalition, falling on budget day 1982 after introducing an upwardly 
redistributive budget that led the independent deputies sustaining it to withdraw their 
support, was succeeded by a minority Fianna Fail administration in March 1982. 
Thereafter, Haughey met with the ICTU only twice. This Fianna Fail government 
promised a more humane approach towards balancing the books. However, Taoiseach 
Haughey soon reversed policy course (Hardiman, 1988, p. 179). Fianna Fail’s budget 
of March 1982 makes no reference to reviving the NUs." The publication in the 
autumn of Fianna Fail’s economic plan The Way Forward,100 based on redirecting 
wealth upwards, proved too much for the minority government’s left-wing 
parliamentary support. To this point Fianna Fail had been relying on socialist deputy 
Tony Gregory, and three Workers’ Party TDs (Lee, 1989, p. 509). Gregory and the 
Workers’ Party deputies choose to withdraw their support from Fianna Fail in protest at 
The Way Forward. Fine Gael subsequently tabled a motion of no confidence in the 
government, and when the vote was taken on 4 November the government was defeated 
by 82 votes to 80 (Collins, 1992, p. 62). Another general election was held in 
November 1982, and this saw Fianna Fail replaced by a majority Fine Gael-Labour 
coalition government.
99 B u d g e t, 1982.
100 The Way Forward, 1982, F ia n n a  F d il.
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‘Not only politically, but also economically, instability peaked in 1981-1982’ 
(Mjoset, 1992, p. 381). For national development the governments of 1981 and 1982 
were of such short duration, and unstable character, that no discernible economic 
policies emerged. With the national debt and current budget deficit spiralling out of 
control, the latter having reached £12.8 billion and the former £998 million by 1982101, 
a coherent policy approach was essential for corrective purposes. By the time the 
second Fine Gael-Labour Coalition of the 1980s came to power in November 1982 the 
national debt had exceeded GNP. ‘The fact that Fine Gael profited from the 24 
November election [1982] might well be a tribute to the potency of free market 
ideology’ (Jacobsen, 1994, p. 149).
This government, Garret FitzGerald’s second administration, was to remain in 
power until 1987. The state of the public finances allowed government little scope for 
action on issues of trade union concern.102 By 1982 all the major parties agreed on the 
need to stabilise the national debt/GNP ratio (Mjoset, 1992, p. 381). The state’s policy 
for much of the 1980s was to maintain the trade unions at a remove from the policy 
making process (Roche, 1994a, p. 172). After 1981 the government’s policies towards 
the trade unions were to see the ICTU marginalised as a policy making force. 
Ultimately the trade unions were, as argued by Fianna Fail TD Sean Calleary, to face 
unprecedented attacks from the government on pay and negotiating procedures.103 The 
state changed its overall policy from focusing on employment to balancing budgets, 
export growth, and international competitiveness. The trade unions’ access to the 
Taoiseach diminished dramatically after 1981. The ICTU met with Taoiseach Garret
101 C jen tra l] S ta t is t ic s ]  0 [ f f ic e ] ,  S ta t is tic a l]  A[bstract] o f  I[reland], 1982-1985, p. 298,
102 P o lic y  o f  E c o n o m ic  R e c o v e ry , 1982, F in e  G a e l.
103 D a il E ire a n n , V o l .  3 6 3 , 6 F e b ru a ry , 1986.
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FitzGerald only once in 1983, and not at all in 1984.104 Persistent turbulence over 
public service pay, and the Government’s disinclination to return to tripartism, made for 
difficult relations between the government and the trade union movement in general. 
Meetings between the government and ICTU at this time were formal, tense, and in 
general unproductive, and remained so throughout this government’s term (FitzGerald, 
1991, p. 454). FitzGerald (1991, p. 454) goes on to say that ‘the only personal 
recollection I have of a genuine worthwhile discussion with the unions is of an 
encounter between the ICTU and the Fine Gael Ministers that took place in our party 
office.’ He further observes that certain of the unions’ hostility towards the government 
might have related to the fact the Labour Party constituted part of a Government taking 
a determined stand on pay and decentralised collecting bargaining.
Overall, the early 1980s saw an overdose of electoral entertainment in 
which the major parties played on the theme of “stability” to shed the 
independent deputies and fringe parties with which they allied after the 
June 1981 and February 1982 contests (Jacobsen, 1994, p. 146-7).
At the time Fianna Fail and Fine Gael had competed over the right to impose the least 
agonising cuts necessary to stave off the spectre of IMF domination.
Union Strength, Policies, and Economic Decline
The early 1980s saw change in the nature of the trade unions’ representation on 
government committees. In the years leading up to the proposed critical juncture in 
1981, the ICTU maintained a presence on a substantial number of committees integral
104 A R ,  I C T U ,  1983, 1984, an d  1985.
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to its position in the national agreements (Appendix B).105 However, after 1981, 
although the number of committees on which the ICTU was represented did not 
diminish substantially, the ending of central pay agreements saw the kinds of 
committees on which it was represented change. The presence of the ICTU’s 
membership on a number of new sectorial committees pointed to the ending of the 
national agreements.106 However, the true significance of this change is not captured 
fully here, as this observable implication’s significance was measured quantitatively as 
opposed to the qualitatively.
Trade union membership, that had been expanding for the previous two decades, 
finally suffered a setback in 1981. The level of trade union membership in Ireland in
1980 had stood at 545,200, an increase of 11,000 on 1979 (Appendix C). This figure 
constituted an all-time high. However, the following year, 1981, the year of the third 
proposed critical juncture, trade union membership fell by 3,000, or 0.4 per cent, to 
542,200. Although a small fall, and not significant according to the measures set out in 
Chapter II, its significance could more easily be recognised qualitatively as opposed to 
quantitatively. This was the first time in 23 years that Irish trade union membership had 
actually fallen. In 1982 trade union membership fell by a further 5,300, to 536,900. At 
this time unemployment climbed from 8.9 per cent in 1981 to 12.8 per cent in 1982 as 
the recession began to bite (Conniffe and Kennedy, 1984, pp. 8-18). Over the next five 
years trade union membership was to continue falling, while the annual rate of decrease 
became higher year on year. This slide in membership was not arrested until 1988, by 
which time it had acquired a stark and worrying significance for the movement as a 
whole.
105 ib id ,  1980.
106 ib id ,  1983.
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Roche and Larragy (1989, pp. 34-35) argue that some of this decline in 
membership can be attributed to structural shifts in the composition of the labour force. 
Employment dwindled in the traditionally highly unionised areas of manufacturing and 
grew in the services sector where obstacles to unionisation were considerable. As a 
consequence of falling membership the unions’ capacity to engage in militant action 
was reduced. The period from 1980 to 1987 saw a lower number of strikes, and days 
lost through strikes, than had the late 1970s. Yet, the years from 1982-1986 recorded 
the highest ever number of workers involved in strikes (Brannick and Doyle, 1994, p. 
261).
There was also a dramatic change in the level of trade union policies that were 
incorporated into the government’s policies. By the late 1970s the trade unions’ polices 
had been regularly finding their way into the government’s legislation. The Minister for 
Labour was continuously accepting representations from the ICTU on various Bills and 
Acts. The Department of Labour approved the amendments sought by the ICTU to the 
Safety in Industry B ill in July 1979, and the Payment of Wages Act 1979. At the 
ICTU’s urgings, on 6 February 1980 the Minister for Labour implemented EEC
recommendation on 40-hour working weeks.107 In April 1980 the ICTU set out its
108views on the Redundancy Payments Acts to the government. The following March 
the Minister for Labour informed Congress that, with the consent of the Minister for 
Finance, he had implemented their requested changes.109 In early 1981 the Department 
of Labour introduced legislation on the protection of young people in employment, 
which conformed to Congress’s proposals.110 In April the Night Work (Amendment)
107 ib id ,  1980.
108 ib id .
' 09A R ,  I C T U ,  1981.
110 ib id .
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Bill was passed by the Dail.111 This had been sought by Congress in its Executive 
Council Report to the 1980 Annual Delegate Conference.112 Under the second NU 
Congress had an input into the Maternity Protection of Employees Bill, the Social 
Welfare (Amendment) Bill, and the Working Hours B ill.113 However, in July 1981 the 
ICTU condemned114 the deflationary policy of the budget introduce by Fine Gael 
Minister for Finance John Bruton.115
By January 1982 the ICTU was at loggerheads with the Fine Gael-Labour 
Coalition over their proposed budget. Congress sought a reduction in the tax burden on 
workers, by increasing taxes on farmers and the self-employed."6 Following the 
change of government in March 1982 Fianna Fail’s budget incorporated a number of the 
ICTU’s pre-budget submissions relating to increases in the rate of social insurance
117benefits, and child allowances. However, the ICTU was simultaneously growing 
annoyed at the government’s lethargy in implementing certain legislation, such as the 
Green Paper on Services for the handicapped.118 Although the ICTU expressed support 
for the EEC Commission’s proposal for a council directive on voluntary part-time work, 
the government opposed this. Determined to deflate the economy, government also 
rejected the unions’ policy on pay in the public and private sectors.119 The government 
did pass the Trade Disputes Act in July 1982, extending the protection of the 1906 Act 
to all workers apart from the security forces.120 However, on 30 July 1982, a 
government statement on public expenditure policy insisted that public employees
111 D d il E ire a n n , V o l .  328 , 2 A p r i l ,  1981.
112 A R ,  I C T U ,  1980.
113 ib id ,  1981.
114 ib id .
115 B u d g e t, 1981.
116 A R ,  I C T U ,  1982.
117 B u d g e t, 1982.
118 A R ,  I C T U ,  1982.
119 ib id .
120 D a il E ire a n n , V o l .  337 , 8 Ju ly , 1982.
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would not be paid any further special pay increases that had been agreed with the ICTU 
in January. In the Fine Gael budget of February 1983 the tax burden on PAYE workers 
was increased, and social welfare was cut,121 to the dismay of the ICTU.122 Thereafter, 
it was clear that on the issues of taxes, wages, and welfare, the government and the 
ICTU were firmly in opposing camps. The ICTU’s pre-budget submission on housing 
was also ignored by the government in 1983.123 After 1981 the level of trade union 
policies incorporated into the government’s policies towards organised labour 
underwent change.
From mid-1982 onwards, in the face of an unsustainably high and increasingly 
difficult to reduce national debt, the tide had effectively turned against Keynesianism. 
Munck (1993, p. 38) argues that all the political parties became committed to curbing 
the volume of public expenditure as an essential precondition for any plan of economic 
recovery. However, the Coalition government of November 1982 to February 1987 
experienced considerable difficulty in devising an effective strategy (O’Byrnes, 1986, p. 
219). ‘An attempt to achieve fiscal correction and disinflation through increased 
taxation rather than expenditure reduction, completed the economic picture’ (McCarthy, 
1999, p. 5). This development was to greatly worry the business community. Leading 
businessman, Michael Smurfit, observed prophetically that the continual delay in 
actually tackling the underlying problems in the economy would only make the cure 
more difficult, and harder to achieve, in the future.124 However, economic growth was 
negative in 1982 and 1983, while unemployment doubled between 1980 and 1983
121 B u d g e t, 1983.
122 A R ,  I C T U ,  1983.
123 ib id .
124 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 9  June, 1981, p. 7,
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(Mjoset, 1992, p. 380). The government’s attempt to control expenditure was an 
abysmal failure (Brunt, 1988, p. 29).
The 1980s saw the economy enter a vicious downward spiral, with taxes 
remaining high while high interest rates depressed investment and reduced the 
productive capacity of the economy. Control over current spending proved difficult to 
achieve at a time of high unemployment and rapid population growth. Government 
spending on social services jumped from 28.9 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 35.6 per cent 
in 1985 (Leddin and Walsh, 1998, p. 302). However, the stabilisation of the debt to 
GNP ratio required sharp cuts in borrowing and consequently in current spending.
The inescapable consequence of sustained heavy borrowing to finance 
expenditure which does not contribute adequately to developing 
productive potential is that the service of past borrowing absorbs a large 
and growing proportion of tax revenue (Kennedy, 1981, p. 140).
The 1980s saw the economy stagnant, the public finances deteriorate, and 
unemployment reached unprecedented levels. However, the OECD (1986, p. 12) 
pointed out that by the mid-1980s the rate of increase in unemployment was being 
offset by the growing rate of emigration. Total net emigration began to approach the 
very high levels experienced during the mid-1950s. The NESC (1986, p. 304) showed 
that between 1981 and 1986 75,000 people left the country. As the recession deepened 
the rate of emigration accelerated. In 1985-1986 a net emigration of 31,000 occurred, in 
contrast to only 1,000 in 1981-1982 (Brunt, 1988, p. 34). For the first time in a quarter 
of a century 1986 saw the population of the country decrease (Munck, 1993, p. 37). By 
1987 the Irish economy was in the worst state it had ever been. O’Donnell (1998, p. 6)
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states that the period 1980 to 1987 had been one of prolonged recession, falling living 
standards, huge unemployment, and the return of emigration. Even more worrying was 
a report contained in The Economist that calculated that the economic situation would 
take over a decade to show any signs of improvement.125 The NESC (1986, p. 39) 
slated that the absence of centralised agreements limited the influence of the trade union 
movement at a time when the economic situation of employees was worsening.
Commentators observed that the trade unions’ influence over public policy 
diminished at this time, as the government’s polices towards the unions changed, 
becoming less accommodating. Throughout the depressed years of the early 1980s the 
state’s posture was to keep the unions at arms length from the public policy process 
(Roche, 1994a, p. 172).
It was evident during the period of Coalition government that influential 
Fine Gael members of the cabinet were not willing to accord the ICTU 
special status in consultation over economic policy (Hardiman, 1988, p.
225-6).
They regarded it as simply one among a number of interests. Between 1982 to 1987 the 
ICTU’s relations with the Labour Party also grew increasingly strained (Collins, 1993). 
The Party’s shared responsibility for the level and range of public spending cuts 
introduced by the government served only to distance it from Congress. The ICTU no 
longer had the direct access to the government it had enjoyed during the 1970s 
(Wickham, 1992, p. p. 85). It was to prove a bleak period for both Congress and labour. 
Most of the actions of Congress, and individual trade unions, between 1981 and 1987 
were thus defensive in nature.
125 T h e  E c o n o m is t , 3-9  O cto b e r, 1987.
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Table 4.3: The E m pirical-T heoretical F it 1981
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High M e d iu m Low None
O l: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High M e d iu m Low None
O l: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




From Table 4.3 it is clear that both of the hypotheses’ observable implications 
pointed to a significant, swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s influence over public 
policy, this at a time of macroeconomic crisis. With the first hypothesis, 80 per cent of 
the observable implications pointed to medium or high empirical-theoretical fit, while 
70 per cent indicated a high fit exclusively. In the case of the second hypothesis, all of 
the observables indicated a medium to high empirical-theoretical fit, with 75 per cent 
indicating a high fit. With the level of high empirical-theoretical fit for both hypotheses 
surpassing the minimum 60 per cent threshold the table confirms that there was a 
critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1981.
In summation, the early 1980s were to see a significant, swift, and enduring 
change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy. At the time the economy was 
performing disastrously. With the economy in crisis, and some of the main economic 
indicators hitting historic lows, a period of politically instability manifested itself. This 
view of the economy was unanimously shared by the national media, political and 
economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and international organisations 
monitoring economic performance, and finally elected representatives. At this time 
centralised bargaining was abandoned by the political parties in their efforts to find a 
solution to the economy’s problems. As the political establishment came to recognize 
the necessity of the correct management of the public finances it became committed to 
reducing public spending. As part of this approach, government policy towards 
organised labour came to concentrate on maintaining the ICTU at a remove from the 
public policy making process, as its policies were seen as incompatible with economic 
recovery. A new approach was adopted towards both the economy and the trade unions 
by the Fine Gael-Labour Party coalition government. Consequently, the ICTU’s access 
to the Taoiseach, its representation on government committees, the government’s
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economic and industrial relations policies, the trade unions’ influence on these policies, 
and ministerial attitudes, all changed to the trade unions’ disadvantage. Ultimately, the 
ending of the central agreements denied the ICTU access to the government, and the 
formulation of its policies, that it had gained in 1970. The unions were to remain in the 
political wilderness until 1987. It was at a time of macroeconomic crisis that the 
ICTU’s influence over public policy changed significantly, swiftly, and enduringly. 
According to the observable implications criteria set out in Chapter II the change in the 
trade unions’ influence over public policy was a critical juncture.
figure 4.3: The Critical Juncture Grid, Ireland, 1981






Potential Critical Juncture 4: 1987 -  The Return to Centralised Agreements 
The hiatus from centralised collective bargaining that began in 1981 came to an end in 
1987 with the conclusion between the government and the social partners of a new 
central pay agreement. By that year the problems with the Irish economy, locked in 
vicious circle of stagnation, rising taxes, and rocketing debt, had reached crisis 
proportions. This national pay agreement, part of a strategy designed to right the Irish 
economy, was to be first in a series of such three-year agreements. The social 
partnership, deriving from these agreements, produced a transformation in Ireland’s 
public finances. It became the cornerstone of a sustained period of economic growth 
that provided the much-needed recovery from the fiscal crisis of the early to mid-1980s. 
The ICTU’s influence over public policy was to be dramatically enhanced by this return 
to centralised collective bargaining.
The Economy and Union Membership
Certain of the country’s economic indicators had reached historic lows, while national 
economic and political commentators, the media, as well as domestic and international 
organisations, regarded the economic state of the country as in crisis by 1987. The 
macroeconomic policies that had attempted to shelter the Irish economy from the 
consequences of the two oil shocks of the 1970s had by the early 1980s led to 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances. The OECD (1987, pp. 11-15) pointed out 
that the 1979-1987 period was one of very poor economic performance on almost all 
counts: slow growth, rapidly deteriorating public finances, stagnation of per capita 
disposable income, huge balance of payments deficits, industrial relations turmoil, and a 
large drop off in domestic demand. NESC (1986, p. 7) stated that over those years
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annual average GNP growth was negative. A ll in all, by the mid-1980s a number of 
acute imbalances confronted the Irish economy (OECD, 1987, p. 77).
Bacon (1986, p. 1), writing for the ESRI, commented that ‘the first half of the 
decade of the 1980s, taken as a whole, was a period of appalling economic performance 
in Ireland.’ Bradley and FitzGerald (1989, p. iii), also writing for the ESRI, pointed out 
that from 1980 to 1987 growth averaged only 0.5 per cent per year. In the period 
between 1982 and 1987 the national debt doubled, rising to over £23 billion, 40 per cent 
of which was sourced abroad (Jacobsen, 1994, p. 161). This represented 130 per cent of 
GNP. According to The Economist
the people of Ireland were deeply in debt to the outside world, three 
times as much per head as Mexico. The government borrowed vast 
sums, and spent them on welfare services that can be sustained only by 
more borrowing.126
As a consequence of this The Irish Times pointed to the fact that there were those 
economic commentators who began to actively advocate a policy of debt repudiation.127 
At the same time, although the inflation rate had fallen from 17 per cent to less than 4 
per cent, the borrowing requirement still stood at 13 per cent of GNP by 1986 
(Jacobsen, 1994, p. 160). Unemployment rose rapidly during the 1980s (Appendix D). 
It climbed from 8.9 per cent in 1981 to peak at a historic high of 17.7 per cent in 1987 
(Daly, 1994, p. 122), with a total of 254,526 people out of work.128 Job loss statistics 
had in fact risen to the top of the European unemployment league.129 However, the
126 ib id ,  24-30 Ja n u ary , 1987, pp. 53-55.
127 T h e  Irish T im e s , 12 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
128 C S O ,  S A I ,  1990.
129 T h e  Irish  Press, 15 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
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numbers at work had been in decline since the late 1970s. They fell from a peak of 
1,145,000 in 1979 to 1,095,100 by 1986 (Leddin and Walsh, 1998, p. 320). According 
to the Irish Independent ‘manufacturing industry is in crisis. Since 1980 the number of 
people employed in manufacturing has dropped by over 40,000. One in six jobs have 
disappeared.’130 The Irish Independent observed that overall it had been four years of 
disastrous coalition government.131 The Irish Times used the term ‘battered’ to describe 
the state of the economy by early February 1987.132 The general consensus in the 
newspapers on the state of the economy, as voiced by the Irish Independent, was one of 
stagnation and crisis.133
The Central Bank viewed the situation in 1987 with great pessimism. It also 
foresaw no prospects for an improvement in the employment situation.134 'It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that Irish economic performance has been the least impressive 
in Western Europe, perhaps in all Europe,’ (Kennedy and Conniffe, 1986, p. 288). ‘By 
1987 the Irish economy was universally seen to have reached its nadir’ (EIU, 1992, p. 
6). As the Central Bank saw it, the situation did not permit for any improvements in the 
state of the nation’s social welfare benefits to needy members of society.135 Poverty
resulting from the depression was eroding the lives of a growing segment of the
i
population. Consequently, Irish society was close to crisis due to the state the 
economy found itself in.137 The business community was also growing extremely 
worried about the problems confronting the economy and the policy makers. Leading 
businessman, Tony O ’Reilly, warned of the possibility of IMF involvement in the
130 Irish Independent, 4 F e b ru a ry , 1987, p. 8.
131 Irish Independent, 11 F e b ru ary , 1987.
132 T h e  Irish T im e s , 3 F e b ru a ry , 1987, p. 6.
133 Irish  Independent, 17 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
134 T h e  C entra l B a n k  o f  Ireland , Q u a rte rly  B u lle tin , S u m m e r 1987, p. 7.
135 T h e  Irish  T im e s ,  2 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
136 ib id ,  12 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
137 ib id ,  10 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
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affairs of the country if the crisis in the economy was not dealt with in a decisive 
manner. This would give the IMF a degree of control over the economy, effectively 
ending Irish economy sovereignty. ‘Bitter’ and ‘hard’ decision would have to be taken, 
he warned, in order to right the economy.138
The fall in trade union membership was finally arrested in 1987/88. Rising 
unemployment, and the deepening recession between 1981 and 1987, saw trade union 
membership fall significantly. Virtually all sectors of the trade union movement 
suffered during the most sustained and serious loss in trade union membership recorded 
since the Second World War (Roche 1994b, p, 133). By 1986 the number of people in 
Irish trade unions had fallen to 482,700 (Appendix C). This in itself constituted a fall of 
18,800 from 1985. In 1987, the year of the proposed critical juncture, union 
membership fell by another 14,100, or 2.8 per cent (Roche, 1994a, p. 61). This left 
468,600 trade union members in the Republic of Ireland, a decrease of 76,600, or more 
than 14 per cent, since 1980. A ll of the membership gains that had been made during 
the latter half of the 1970s had been wiped out during the mid-1980s. However, in 1988 
trade union membership increased for the first time since 1980, reaching 470,500 
(Roche, 1997). Although constituting an increase of only 0.4 per cent, this marked the 
beginning of a turn around for the Irish trade union movement. Over the eight years 
following the proposed critical juncture, trade union membership in Ireland grew by 
10.5 per cent in total, reaching 517,900 by 1995.
The NESC Report
By the mid-1980s the Coalition government had made little progress on gaining control 
over debt and unemployment. The Sunday Press pointed out that more than half of the
138 Irish Independent, 14 Fe b ru ary , 1987, p. 8.
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national debt had been incurred while under the coalition administration, rising from 
£11.82 billion in 1982 to £23.29 billion in 19 8 6.139 Taoiseach FitzGerald said that ‘the 
national debt and interest payments were rising faster than national income, and 
constituted a vicious circle.’140 The leader of the opposition, Charles Haughey, 
remarked that ‘the economy is at a total stand-still.141 In this context of deep despair the 
government became interested in the prospect of building support among the main 
economic and social interests behind a national recovery strategy. Through the 
involvement of all the major economic interests and of government representatives, the 
NESC, which had been established in 1973, acted as a forum for discussing the 
economic crises. In the autumn of 1986 the NESC produced a report entitled A Strategy 
fo r  Development, 1986-1990 (Murphy, 1999, p. 275). The report predicted that existing 
government policies would give rise to further emigration, deterioration of the public 
finances, and reduced flexibility for policy makers (NESC, 1986, p. 307). ‘The 
argument against a continuation of present policies is sometimes based on the 
consideration that discretion over economic and social policy would ultimately be 
removed from [Irish] control’ (NESC, 1986, p. 304). The report was comprehensive, 
and set within a medium term framework.
The NESC report emphasised the necessity of a national plan to tackle the crisis 
in public expenditure. It recommended a simultaneous assault on the problems of 
unemployment and fiscal imbalance. This would require an integrated medium term 
strategy that would command acceptance throughout society. The report was conceived 
of as a means of giving new life to the economic recovery plans of the Coalition 
government. While still in opposition Fianna Fail proposed building on the NESC’s
139 T h e  S u n day Press, 11 Ja n u ary , 1987.
M0 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 11 F e b ru a ry  1987, p. 10.
H1 ib id ,  4  F e b ru ary , 1987.
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consensus. Ironically, the method and approach set out in A Strategy fo r  Development 
was absorbed into Fianna Fail’s 1987 election manifesto The Programme for National 
Recovery (Breen et al., 1990, p. 220). ‘It was referred to directly in both the Fianna Fail 
budget of March 1987 and the Programme for National Recovery [national agreement]’ 
(Trench, 1988, p. 6).
The 1987 Election
By 1986 Fianna Fail, in opposition, was freer than the Labour Party to criticise the 
incidence of expenditure cuts. Consequently, it was better able to capitalise on popular 
discontent with government policy. At the time Fianna Fail was aware that the unions 
were growing disillusioned with the government and especially the Labour Party (Allen,
1997, p. 169). In the absence of political links the trade union movement faced the 
daunting prospect of continued marginalization from policy debates. Spotting an 
opportunity, Fianna Fail embarked on a strategy of wooing the trade unions. It did not 
regard arms length dealings with them as ideal for imposing fiscal discipline. It was 
more willing to involve the unions in policy discussions than the Coalition government. 
Haughey (1986) denounced the monetarist policies of the Fine Gael-Labour 
government, and supported the calls of union leaders for a return to social partnership 
agreements. These policies were put on a more formal basis after 1986 when the Fianna 
Fail Trade Union Committee began a series of meetings with figures in the unions. This 
was to lay the foundation for a future agreement between the party and the unions.
Labour ministers had struggled in cabinet, with some successes, to maintain or 
improve the value of social benefits (NESC, 1990, p. 199). This stance imposed 
considerable strain on the Coalition (FitzGerald, 1991, p. 640). Yet, the Labour 
ministers’ stance had not made their relationship with the trade unions any easier
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(Collins, 1993). The Coalition government struggled with chronic fiscal problems, until 
eventually, in 1987, disagreement over expenditure cuts proposed for the budget led to 
the resignation of the Labour ministers from the government (Mjoset, 1992, p. 382).
The general election of 1987 saw all party leaders making the case for fiscal 
rectitude, and declare that no additional promises could be made during the 
campaign.142 Both the leader of Fianna Fail, Haughey, and the deputy leader, Lenihan, 
stressed that the election was about economic recovery.143 Taoiseach Dr. FitzGerald 
regarded the burden of the national debt as a set of handcuffs that bound the country’s 
hands with high taxes and high interest rates.144 At the time FitzGerald proposed an all­
party forum approach to dealing with the country’s economic crisis after the election. 
However, this suggestion was met with cool disapproval by Fianna Fail.145
Due to the state of the economy a change in economic policy was recognised as 
a necessity by all the political parities. The Fine Gael 1987 election manifesto, 
Breaking out o f  the Vicious Circle, proposed reduced public spending and borrowing.146 
During the 1987 general election Fianna Fail campaigned on a platform of opposition to 
cuts in social spending, and advocated a return to centralised pay agreements. Opinion 
polls conducted leading up to the election in February found that unemployment 
constituted the major campaign issue for the electorate, followed by taxation, prices, 
finance, crime, and lastly Northern Ireland.147 There was a general consensus amongst 
the public that the country was in the midst of a serious financial crisis.148
142 T h e  T im e s , 7 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
143 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 2 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
144 ib id ,  3 F e b ru ary , 1987.
145 T h e  S u n d a y  Press, 6 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
146 B re a k in g  out o f  the V ic io u s  C ir c le ,  E le c tio n  ’ 87, 1987, F in e  G a e l.
147 T h e  Irish T im e s , 5 F e b ru a ry , 1987, p. 8.
148 Irish  Independent, 16 F e b ru ary , 1987.
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The election saw a shift of urban working-class support towards Fianna Fail, this 
in protest at the harshness of the measures proposed by the coalition (Laver et al, 1987, 
p. 104). ‘A  huge drop in Fine Gael’s vote in the election of February 1987, coupled 
with Labour’s determination to go it alone, opened the way for a minority Fianna Fail 
administration’ (O’Grada, 1997, p. 32). Independent deputies, such as Neil Blaney 
from Donegal, were willing to support the government provided it took the necessary 
steps to right the economy.149 The independents placing the economy before demands 
concerning their own constituencies’ interests was an indication of the desperate 
economic situation of the time.
The Economist argued that two things were needed from the new government: 
changing the consensus on the acknowledgement of the crisis in the economy into an 
acceptance of what was needed to be done, and providing the leadership needed to carry 
out the measures necessary to bring about an economic turnaround.150 As the new 
Fianna Fail administration was a minority government it was considered likely to want 
to avoid the electoral risk of implementing severe spending cuts. However, the new 
administration soon made it clear that it proposed little modification to the outgoing 
government’s plans.151 After Mr Haughey visited the Department of Finance for a 
briefing on the state of the national finances Fianna Fail promptly recanted on its 
manifesto promises (O’Halpin, 1993, p. 202). The Taoiseach said that the economic 
situation the country found itself in was one of extreme difficulty (Trench et al., 1987, 
p. 18). He remarked that people were worried about unemployment and emigration, and 
that they ‘wanted someone to take the situation by the scruff of the neck.’152 The 
budget introduced in March 1987 implied much greater fiscal adjustment than was
149 ib id ,  F e b ru a ry  20 , 1987.
150 T h e  E c o n o m is t , 13 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
151 F in a n c ia l T im e s , 1 A p r i l ,  1987.
152 Irish Independent, 13 F e b ru a ry , 1987.
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either intended or achieved in the preceding years. The OECD (1989, p. 16) argued that 
this constituted a marked shift in policy emphasis and a determination to reduce the 
large government deficit. Expenditure was reduced by £250 million while tax revenue 
was increased by £117 million (OECD, 1987, p. 21).
This blast of fiscal rectitude was pragmatic, driven by the necessity to get the 
public debt under control (Burda, 1997, p. 103). The Government’s public expenditure 
cuts, especially in health, were greatly resented (Marsh and Sinnot, 1990, p. 6). 
However, the measures imposing fiscal restraint, and seeking to ensure low inflation, 
were ultimately to result in a macroeconomic stability that was to facilitate an economic 
boom for much of the 1990s (O’Heam, 1998, pp. 140-141). Nevertheless, given the 
scale of the task the Fianna Fail government set itself, and the hugely deflationary 
implications of bringing the public finances under control, it was concerned to avoid 
confrontation with the trade unions, especially the unions in the public service.
The unions’ access to the Taoiseach changed at this time. The number of 
meetings between the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, and the trade unions increased 
significantly after the general election. In contrast to Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald, who 
met with the ICTU once in 1985 and not at all in 1986,153 Taoiseach Haughey met with 
the ICTU four times in 1987 (Appendix A). Most of these meeting concerned the 
government’s plans for economic recovery.154 The following year the Taoiseach was to 
personally meet with the ICTU on four more occasions.155 The years thereafter were to 
see more such encounters.
153 A R ,  I C T U ,  1986 and 1987.
154 ib id ,  1987 and 1988.
155 ib id ,  1988.
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There was to be a dramatic change in the relationship between the trade union, the 
employers, and the government. The government’s actions on first assuming office 
appeared unpromising from the ICTU’s point of view. The severity of public spending 
cuts caused difficulties for trade union leaders, especially those with members in the 
health services where the heaviest cuts were falling. However, this Fianna Fail 
government was to revive tripartite bargaining. Within a few months of assuming 
office the new government promoted talks on a national pay agreement in accordance 
with the principles laid down in the NESC report (Jacobsen, 1994, p. 177). The 
administration was interested in securing a three-year tripartite agreement throughout 
the economy (Allen, 1997, p. 170). ‘The Taoiseach invited the unions, along with the 
other major social partners, to take part in an effort to spur recovery by means of 
consensus’ (Mjoset, 1992, p. 383). It became apparent during the discussions that to 
facilitate this pay agreement the government was willing to modify its restrictive stance 
on public service pay, and discuss tax concessions, job creation targets, and welfare 
provisions.156
The new government’s policies towards organised labour were different to those 
of its predecessor. Fianna Fail supported a centralised pay agreement on account of its 
benefits in terms of industrial peace and trade union commitment to a painful but
1 S7necessary series of spending cuts. Where the Coalition government had set its face 
against any revival of this form of influence by the trade union movement158, Fianna 
Fail revealed a preference for defusing rather than opposing industrial conflict, and for 
seeking trade union support rather than excluding them from political deliberations
156 T h e  Irish  T im e s , 5 A u g u st, 1987.
157 ib id ,  10 O cto b e r, 1987.
158 ib id ,  17 O c to b e r  1987.
The Unions and the PNR
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(Hardiman, 1988, p. 237). By 1987, after six years of decentralized agreement, the 
unions were predisposed to return to centralised pay determination (Roche, 1994a, p. 
180). However, the prospect of agreement on a very moderate pay rise, combined with 
tight control over second-tier bargaining, drew the employers into the national 
agreement.
The trade union movement entered into these negotiations in a much weaker 
position than during the 1970s. Although the unions had not been consulted on 
economic and social policy by the Coalition government in the years between 1982 and
1987, they had still possessed a level of leverage in the Dail with both the Labour Party 
and Fianna Fail. However, with Fine Gael now in opposition, and supporting 
government policy, the unions had few options besides doing a deal with the 
government. If they failed to achieve an agreement they would be consigned to the 
politics of protest. Once it was obvious the government was interested in concluding a 
centralised agreement, the opportunity to engage in discussions on a wide range of 
issues placed a great deal of pressure on ICTU not to abandon the talks.
The talks developed from the links that had been cultivated between the unions 
and Fianna Fail while in opposition (Allen, 1997, p. 169). They built upon the NESC 
report, whose analysis of the scale of the economic crisis had the support of the trade 
union movement, as well as that of the employers. For the trade union movement the 
point of departure was the wish to regain influence over issues like jobs and social 
policies on inequality (Hardiman, 1992, p. 348). They also wanted a say in the 
measures taken against unemployment, improvements for workers on low pay, and 
some concessions on taxation. At the ICTU’s annual conference of November 1987, at 
which delegates voted to put job creation at the top of the trade union agenda, the 
Executive Council of the ICTU recommended acceptance of the PNR.
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Their argument in support of the Programme for National Recovery was 
that it was a way of preventing Ireland going down the Thatcherite road 
where the unions had been excluded from power (Allen, 1997, p. 170).
The union movement decided to enter into a national agreement with the government 
and employers that included specific commitments on job creation (ICTU, 1995). The 
result was the conclusion between government, ICTU, and employers, all acting 
through the tripartite NESC, of the PNR in October 1987 (O’Donnell and Thomas, 
1998, p. 118). By the mid-1990s job creation was at the top of the agenda of every 
political party, and every relevant organisation and institution, in the state.
The PNR was designed to bring Ireland out the vicious circle of stagnation, 
rising taxes, rocketing debt, and spiralling unemployment and emigration (Bradley,
1988, p. 61). For the trade union movement the PNR enabled it avoid the 
marginalization suffered by the TUC in Britain under Margaret Thatcher. Subsequent 
years saw more neo-corporatist agreements concluded. Unlike the 1970s, the 
agreements of the 1980s and 1990s were based on a shared understanding of the 
problems facing the economy and society and the policy required to address them 
(NESC, 1996, p. 14).
The PNR proved to be the crowning achievement of Haughey’s period in office 
as it restored stable social partnership bargaining that brought considerable benefits for 
Irish capitalism (Allen, 1997, p. 169). The terms of the national pay agreement 
resembled the NUs in scope, but not in content. The central issue was an agreement on 
wage levels in both the private and public sectors for a three-year period. However, the 
PNR, and its successor national programmes, involved agreement on a wide range of 
economic and social policies. The PNR also established a Central Review Committee
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to monitor the implementation of the programme, and ensure ongoing dialogue between 
government and the social partners on economic and social policy issues (O’Donnell,
1998, p. 11).
The strategically weak position of the trade union movement by 1987 must be 
appreciated in order for this development to be fully comprehended. The trade union 
militancy of the late 1970s and early 1980s had been eroded through economic 
hardships (Brunt, 1988, p. 39). With this weakening of the trade unions their leaders 
found themselves with a relatively free hand to pursue the type of social partnership 
arrangements they had long desired. They looked upon the miners defeat in Britain in 
1984-1985 as a warning of what could come to pass in Ireland if they did not cement 
their alliance with Fianna Fdil. Consequently, the social partnership arrangements of 
the late 1980s mainly grew out of the economic demoralisation of that time. 'Ireland’s 
social partnership approach [was] one of the most significant developments in public 
policy in the European Union’ (NESF, 1997, p. 9).
The Unions and Policy Developments
The change in the government’s economic policy, first encapsulated in the fiscal 
adjustment of its March 1987 budget as a determination to reduce the large government 
deficit, was subsequently elaborated on in the PNR of October 1987. In contrast to the 
experience with most earlier programmes to reduce the budget deficit, the expenditure 
reductions targeted for 1987 were more than achieved. Expenditure proposals for 1988 
implied a further tightening of fiscal policy. The 1988 budget aimed at a continuation 
of fiscal consolidation in line with the PNR objectives (OECD, 1989, p. 18). 
Subsequent budgets were designed to be in harmony with the terms of the PNR, and the
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other agreements thereafter.159 They provided for the implementation of several 
specific initiatives included in the PNR, and over which the trade unions had a direct 
input, such as reductions in taxation and the maintenance of social welfare payments.160 
This was in stark contrast to the budgets of the mid-1980s that had done did little for 
organised labour. Following the recommendations of the NESC, the authorities set as 
their budgetary objective the debt/GNP ratio, as a first step towards reducing it to a 
sustainable level. This decisive effort to reduce the debt, and to turn the economy 
around, was based upon a broad political consensus.
There was to be a certain level of change in the trade unions’ representation on 
government committees. The PNR, brought about by the macroeconomic dilemma the 
country found itself in, was to see the reintegration of the battered trade union 
movement into the public policy making process. On returning to power in 1987 
Charles Haughey enhanced the influence of the Secretary of the Taoiseach’s 
Department (Farrell, 1993, pp 178-179). The result was that the Secretary of the 
Department of the Taoiseach in large measure negotiated, and oversaw, through the 
monthly meetings of the Programme for National Recovery-Central Review Committee 
that he chaired, the implementation of the agreement. The Ministerial-ICTU group also 
met monthly to review progress on the economy.161 Three joint government-ICTU 
working parties on Employment and Development Measures, Taxation, and Social 
Policy, were established. They were also chaired and serviced by the Secretary of the 
Department of the Taoiseach. The ICTU now found itself with direct access to the 
Department of the Taoiseach. Further such committees were formed following 
subsequent national pay agreements.162 It is noteworthy that in 1987 the overall number
159 B u d g e t, 1988, 1989, 1990.
160 ib id .
161 A R ,  I C T U ,  1988.
162 ib id ,  1988.
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of committees on which the ICTU was represented did not change substantially, 
decreasing in fact. However, nationally, unions had secured input into public policy­
making through the Programmes themselves and through consolidating their position as 
an essential constituency with rights of representation on state boards, committees, and 
policy forums. As this observable implication’s significance is measured quantitatively, 
the true qualitative significance of the above change in the trade unions’ representation 
on government committees is overlooked to an extent.
The level of trade union policies that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour changed in 1987. During 1986 the trade unions’ 
polices had been regularly ignored by the government. In 1985 and 1986 Congress had 
sought the provision of more training for young people. However, the Minister for 
Labour cut funding to the Industrial Training Authority (AnCO).163 Congress’s policy 
on the more extensive taxing of farmers to ease the burden on PAYE workers fell upon 
deaf ears in the Fine Gael-Labour Coalition Government. In March 1986 the ICTU 
found the government reluctant to implement amending legislation on the Unfair 
Dismissals Act 1977 and the Companies Act. It was equally reluctant to consider the 
unions’ request for a reduction in the working week to below 40 hours.164 The 
Congress pre-budget submission of 1986 encouraged an increased public construction 
programme, more funds for youth employment, increased social welfare payments, and 
the easing of the embargo on recruitment in the public service.165 However, the budget 
implemented none of these suggestions.166 The government was promoting its own 
policies and then inviting Congress’s observations after the fact. A  host of ICTU policy
163 D ä il E ire n n , V o l .  368, 3 J u ly , 1986.
164 Seanad E ire a n n , V o l .  103, 16 M a y , 1986.
165 A R ,  I C T U ,  1986.
166 B u d g e t, 1986.
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objective were left by the wayside.167 Its advocacy of the report of the Commission on 
Social Welfare came to naught as the Minister announced the government did not have 
the resources to implement its recommendations.168 One notable exception, Congress 
policy on the health and safety aspects of Visual Display Units (VDUs) was taken up by 
the government. But this was only because the ICTU came to the issue first.
In January 1987 the policies of the ICTU’s pre-budget submission ‘A Plan to 
Work,’ 169 were ignored by the Coalition government.170 The following March its pre­
budget submission171 failed to influence the new Fianna Fail government to increase 
income tax allowances.172 However, the government did increase social welfare in line 
with inflation.173 The ICTU’s advocacy of a national plan was accepted by the 
government and, along with the employers, they ultimately formulated the PNR. From 
1987 onwards Congress policy on pay, tax, and social welfare, became incorporated in 
the PNR. This provided that the government would maintain the overall value of social 
welfare benefits and, within the resources available, consider special provisions for 
greater increases for those receiving the lowest payments. In late 1987 the Congress 
advocated Worker Participation (State Enterprises) B ill was placed on the government’s 
agenda, and become law the following summer.174 The recommendations of the Interim 
Board on Occupational Health and Safety, upon which the ICTU had representation, 
were given effect in a Framework B ill introduced under the PNR. The ICTU viewed 
the 1988 budget in the context of the PNR, a first step towards the implementation of 
the tax reform and social equity elements of the agreement. The ICTU considered the
167 A R ,  I C T U ,  1986.
168 D A il E ire a n n , V o l .  36 8 , 24  June, 1986.
169 A R ,  I C T U ,  1987.
170 B u d g e t, Jan u ary , 1987.
171 A R ,  I C T U ,  1987.
172 B u d g e t, M a rc h , 1987.
173 ib id .
174 A R ,  I C T U ,  1988.
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social welfare increase of 3 per cent adequate.175 In line with its pre-budget submission, 
the burden on the PAYE workers was reduced.176 After 1987 the trade unions’ policies 
were again finding their way into the government’s policies towards organised labour. 
The essence of the agreement reached in 1987 was inclusiveness and accommodation.177
Subsequent years saw more neo-corporatist agreements concluded. Ireland had 
embarked on a tripartite approach to income policy (Prondzynski, 1992, p. 82). 
However, ‘there was a fundamental change in Ireland’s approach to social partnership 
between that practised up to the early 1980s and that practiced from 1987 onwards’ 
(Teahon, 1997, p. 53). The agreements of the 1980s and 1990s were not confined to 
wages alone, but encompassed a wide range of economic and social policies. In 
particular, the emphasis of these tripartite deals has been on macroeconomic stability, 
greater equity in the tax system, and enhanced social justice (Rhodes, 1995). ‘In the 
decade after 1987, when the PNR was launched, interest group activity in Ireland 
attained centre stage, with the tripartite agreements of the 1990s cementing social 
partnership’ (Murphy, 1999, p. 291). The making and implementing of these 
agreements shows how closely the trade unions have become involved in public policy 
making and its administration.
The social partnership shifted Irish economic policy, and particularly Ireland’s 
political economy, from a British towards a European mode of consensus between the 
social partners. ‘These new arrangements have re-established a reciprocal relationship 
between Congress, the government, and employers on a much stronger institutional 
footing than heretofore’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 130). The Irish trade union movement has 
benefited handsomely since the introduction of the PNR in 1987. From that time
175 ib id .
176 B u d get, 1988.
177 D & il E ire a n n , V o l .  3 7 4 , 20  O cto be r, 1987.
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onwards the ICTU was to play a central role in the formulation of government 
economic and social policies through the central agreements instituted following the 
expiry of the PNR.
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Table 4.4: The E m pirical-T heoretical F it 1987
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High Medium Low None
O l: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
OlO: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High Medium Low None
O l: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public regard 
the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
03 : Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




Table 4.4 shows that the observable implications of both hypotheses pointed to a 
significant, swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy, this 
at a time of macroeconomic crisis. With the first hypothesis, 70 per cent of the 
observable implications pointed to a high empirical-theoretical fit. In the case of the 
second hypothesis, 87.5 per cent of the observables indicated a medium to high 
empirical-theoretical fit, while 75 per cent indicating a high fit exclusively. As the 
minimum 60 per cent threshold for high empirical-theoretical fit was surpassed by both 
hypotheses the table confirms that there was a critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence 
over public policy in 1987.
In summation, there was a significant, swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s 
influence over public policy in 1987. This was at a time when the economy was in a 
state of crisis. The period from 1980-1987 proved to be depressing years for the Irish 
economy, and trade unions. Economic performance was disastrous up until 1987. 
Continuation with the policies that had brought this situation to a head was no longer a 
viable option (NESC, 1986, p. 320). This view was unanimously shared by the national 
media, political and economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and 
international organisations monitoring economic performance, and finally elected 
representatives. With its economy in a terrible state the Irish political establishment 
came to recognise that there was a need for a consensual approach to this problem if it 
was to be resolved. The economic crisis precipitated a general election early in 1987 
that saw Fianna Fail returned to government. A  new approach was adopted towards 
both the economy, and the trade unions, by a Fianna Fail administration determined to 
right the economy, and reduce the large government deficit through expenditure 
reductions. This was to ultimately involve the trade unions in policy consultation with 
the reinstitution of centralised bargaining. As a consequence, the ICTU’s access to the
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Taoiseach, representation on government committees, overall trade union membership, 
government economic and industrial relations policies, the trade unions’ influence on 
government policies, and ministerial attitudes, all changed in the trade unions’ favour, 
with policies in particular coming to reflect those advocated by the unions themselves. 
This significant, swift, and enduring change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy 
took place at the time of a macroeconomic crisis. According to the observable 
implications criteria set out in Chapter II the change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy was a critical juncture.
rigure 4.4: The Critical Juncture Grid, Ireland, 198^ 7






This chapter has examined in detail four instances of where the Irish trade unions’ 
influence over public policy was, prima facie, recognised as having changed to the 
extent of constituting possible critical junctures. These proposed critical junctures were 
initially set out in Chapter III after conducting an examination of change in the ICTU’s 
influence over public policy in the period from 1945 to 2000. Of these four proposed 
critical junctures, three: 1959, 1981, and 1987, were found to constitute actual critical 
junctures according to the criteria laid out in Chapter II. In each of these cases, and 
conforming with the critical juncture framework, the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature, at a time when the 
economy was in a state of crisis. In each of these cases the empirical-theoretical fit, as 
set out in the Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 was very high for both hypotheses. Consequently, 
this satisfied the hypotheses, and their observable implications criteria, as set out in 
Chapter II.
A number of other important implications can be drawn from the chapter. 
Firstly, the change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1970 does not 
constitute a critical juncture. Although there was a swift and enduring change in the 
ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1970, with the introduction of the first national 
agreement since 1964, this agreement came about at a time of macroeconomic 
difficulties rather than macroeconomic crisis. This means that none of the observable 
implications of the second hypothesis indicated a crisis in the economy. The national 
agreements, although providing the ICTU with unprecedented access to the government 
and its policies, did not result in a significant change in the trade union’s influence over 
public policy, as they were building upon influence that had already been gained in
1959. As significant change and a macroeconomic crisis (generative cleavage) are
Conclusion
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central to the concept of a critical juncture, their absence in the case of 1970 reduces the 
change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy to something less that a critical 
juncture. In this case the empirical-theoretical fit, as set out in Table 4.2, averaged 
above medium for the first hypothesis and below medium for the second, consequently 
failing to satisfy either of the hypotheses in the end. Nevertheless, there was a change 
in the trade unions’ influence over public policy in 1970, this coinciding with the 
economic difficulties at that time.
The second major implication of this chapter is that a critical juncture has been 
identified with a legacy that that lasts for only six years in total. The early 1980s were a 
time of economic and political turmoil in Ireland. In 1981 the government abandoned 
centralized bargaining as it sought a solution to the economy’s problems. As a 
consequence, the trade unions were maintained at a remove from the policy making 
process until 1987. By that time the economy had been hitting new lows annually. The 
Irish political establishment, casting around for answers to the economic dilemma it 
found itself in, came to recognise the need for a new consensual approach to the 
economy if  its problems were to be resolved. The new Fianna Fail administration 
sought to involve the trade unions in policy consultation with the reinstitution of 
centralised bargaining. The centralised agreements provided the ICTU with access to 
the government and the formulation of its policies, this coming after years of exclusion. 
Consequently, the critical juncture that occurred in 1981 possessed a legacy that 
endured for a mere six crisis-ridden years. Against this it is possible to contrast the 
critical juncture from 1959, and its legacy that endured for 22 years. In relation to the 
literature, and what Collier and Collier (1991, pp. 33-34) have to say concerning critical 
junctures, a legacy that lasts only six years is not in any way extraordinary. They only 
insist that one has to have explicit criteria for determining when a legacy ends, and that
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one must be open to ambiguities about end points. The political and economic dynamic 
in Ireland in the early 1980s was inherently unstable. This was largely due to the 
macroeconomic problems gripping the country at the time. This instability was to work 
against the 1981 critical juncture possessing a legacy of substantial duration.
A third issue worthy of discussion here was that of the three proposed critical 
junctures that were in fact found to constitute actual critical junctures, two of these 
occurred in years in which general elections were held, namely 1981 and 1987. 
Electoral landslides may create critical junctures by producing an overwhelming 
mandate for policy and/or structural change. But even elections that produce modest 
victories (1981 and 1987) and limited mandates are nearly always followed by modest 
alterations in policies (Cortell and Peterson, 1999, p. 184). Nevertheless, it is the case, 
from the evidence as set out, that the political parties that came to power in those years 
drastically altered their policies towards the trade unions, despite constituting either 
coalition or minority governments. This resulted in the ICTU’s exclusion from the 
corridors of power in 1981, and its subsequent reintegration with the reinstitution of 
national pay agreements in 1987. The changes in the ICTU’s influence over public 
policy in the case of 1959 (dramatic) and 1970 (more incremental) were not in general 
election years. It should also be noted that there were no critical junctures in the 
ICTU’s influence over public policy in any of the other years that witnessed general 
elections between 1945 and 2000, even years marked by landslide electoral victories 
(1977). Consequently, this permits us to discount elections as the catalyst for change in 
the trade unions’ influence over public policy.
182
Figure 4.5: T he C ritica l Ju n c tu re  G rid  for Ire land , 1945-2000
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Britain possesses ‘a unitary system of government dominated by the executive’ (Allum,
1995, p. 76). Under this system a political party can take substantially less than 50 per 
cent of the national popular vote in a general election, but can still win substantially 
more than 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The system is one of alternating 
single-party governments (Finer, 1975, p. 9). Single-party governments have to seek 
neither political compromise, as in Sweden and Ireland, nor endure interest group 
politics, as found in America. Consequently, power is more centralized in Britain than 
in any of the other countries under examination in this thesis. The British political 
landscape is effectively populated by three political parties. Yet, the British political 
system is best described as a two-party system, as this reflects the situation in 
Parliament rather than the voting behaviour of the electorate (Heywood, 1997, p. 261).
This chapter shall examine changes in the TUC’s influence over public policy. 
It is searching for changes in influence of a significant, swift, and enduring nature at 
times of macroeconomic crises. This search shall be conducted by testing the potential 
critical junctures in the TUC’s influence over public policy, as set out in Chapter III, 
against the hypotheses and observable implications set out in Chapter II. Based upon 
the prima facie data in Chapter III, this chapter will focus on the four instances, 1945, 
1970, 1974, and 1979, where the TUC’s influence over public policy was identified as 
having changed to the extent of constituting possible critical junctures. As with the 
previous chapter, the objective here is to investigate whether or not the hypotheses 
relating to change in trade union influence over public policy, as set out in Chapter II, 
can identify critical junctures.
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Potential Critical Juncture 1: 1945-War, The Labour Party, and the Trade Unions 
The British trade union movement’s roots lie in the Industrial Revolution (Edwards et 
al., 1998, pp. 2-3). As a consequence of these origins craft unions of skilled workers 
grew up first. This resulted in the British union movement possessing a fragmented 
structure. Coordination from above, via central organizations, was weak. As craft 
unions prevented the admission of those of different occupations, less skilled workers 
sought solidarity among themselves. They formed the general unions that began to 
emerge at the end of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 179).
The British union movement has never been divided on the grounds of religious 
or political affiliation. There is only a single peak organization, the TUC, which was 
founded in 1868. Like the CBI, the TUC has no bargaining mandate. Nor does it have 
the resources to coordinate collective bargaining or strike behaviour. Among the trade 
union centres of Europe the TUC is probably the weakest in terms of staff, and financial 
resources (Visser, 1990, p. 77). ‘The TUC was not able to acquire an unquestioning 
authority or power over its affiliate members’ (Taylor, 2000, p. 13). Its lack of central 
leadership has been a recurring theme in post-war British politics.
The genesis for the post-war consensus in Britain can be found in the Second 
World War. The conflict united the country against a common enemy, while the 
privations endured inspired a widespread desire for a new and better beginning. The 
coalition government that endured from 1940 to 1945 fostered social and intellectual 
links between the Labour Party and the Conservatives. The Conservatives, who had 
always maintained that central planning of the economy would not work, could look to 
the spectacular success of the government’s tightly controlled war economy. The years 
of effort to defeat Hitler took certain of the bite out of ideological differences between 
the parties. The acceptance of Keynesianism was evidenced in the 1941 budget, and the
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1944 White Paper that commanded the support of the three main political parties in its 
objective of full employment. From 1944 until the 1980s all British governments 
accepted, at least publicly, a prime responsibility for maintaining full employment 
(Farnham and Pimlott, 1986, p. 30).
The relationship between Britain’s trade unions and the state was transformed 
during the war. In the 1930s the TUC had established limited access to consultation. 
However, it was the war that accelerated this process (Taylor, 2000, pp. 83-84). The 
trade unions’ participation in the war effort was vital. In the week prior to the end of 
the Second World War in Europe Churchill remarked that ‘we owe an immense debt to 
the trade unions and never can this country forget about how they have stood by and 
helped.’1 ‘The unions could claim to have influenced -  almost decided -  manpower 
policies vital to the war effort and worked in partnership with Government to administer 
those policies’ (Barns and Reid, 1991, p. 152). This contribution placed the unions in a 
strong position to ask for regular post-war consultation on matters of concern to them. 
By 1945 argued Citrine (1964, p. 382) the TUC had established the right to be heard on 
‘those questions of general policy which were of common interest.’ By the end of 
World War II all the ingredients for a new widely supported consensus were present in 
the country’s political culture.
Trade Unions and the 1945 Election
Several major developments in British industrial relations can be dated back to the war. 
Amongst the most important developments was full employment, the involvement of 
trade unions in government policy-making bodies over wide areas of the economy, and 
the acceptance by all major parties of a commitment to the construction of a welfare
1 H a nsard  P a rlia m e n ta ry  D ebates, V o l .  410, 2 M a y  1945, c. 1405.
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State (Crouch, 1979, p. 19). Full employment was of major importance to the labour 
movement generally. Before the Second World War society had been characterized by 
alternating periods of boom and slump. The 1920s and 1930s had seen a prolonged 
economic depression throughout the industrial world. During that era unemployment in 
Britain had reached 20 per cent, and trade union organization had been massively 
weakened.
On major issues of trade and industry, poverty and unemployment, 
collective security and rearmament, peace and war, the TUC in the 1930s 
found it almost impossible to get a serious hearing from the National 
Government, the Baldwin Government or the Chamberlain Government 
(Birch, 1968, p. 84).
However, trade union representation on advisory committees was greatly increased 
under Chamberlain’s wartime administration, while the National Joint Advisory 
Council was established in October 1939 (Crouch, 1979, p. 21). At the same time, the 
mass of social legislation passed in those years led to the establishment of a range of 
tribunals, supervisory committees, and so forth, at regional and local levels to oversee 
the new services. Trade unionists were present on many of these committees. This 
enabled the unions to exercise influence in areas from which they had previously been 
excluded. It also gave them access to information about how the political and economic 
systems worked. ‘On the other hand, this involvement fell short of any bodies which 
exercised real control over the economy’ (Crouch, 1979, p. 21).
Labour’s new status was symbolized by the appointment of Ernest Bevin as 
Minister for Labour and National Service in the coalition government in 1940 (Bullock,
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1960, p. 1). Bevin, General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union 
(TGWU), was the leading figure in British labour and had played an important part in 
the General Strike of 1926. His appointment had been in recognition of the unions’ 
importance to the war effort. As Minister he acquired vast powers over the allocation of 
labour to the war effort. ‘He brought unions further into government and gave greater 
confidence to workers than in 1914-18’ (Booth, 2001, p. 173).
The political consensus on the development of a welfare state provided a further 
admission of working-class interests into politics, though in a manner that did not 
challenge radically the established power structure. It therefore gave added reality to 
the consensus to which all interests seemed to be committed in the newly emerging 
pattern of institutions. ‘A strong harmony of interest and outlook existed between the 
political and industrial wings of the Labour movement in 1945. The “contentious 
alliance’ had never seemed more at ease with itself (Taylor, 1993, p. 31).
The ending of World War II, like World War I, was followed immediately in 
Britain by a general election. Churchill, like Lloyd George, had initially sought to 
perpetuate the wartime coalition. But here the parallel ends. In 1945 all the political 
parties contested the general election independently. ‘They went to the polls in 1945 
committed to a broad range of economic and social policies of a qualitatively different 
kind from anything enacted in the interwar years’ (Seldon, 1994, p. 43). During the 
war, the Labour Party had maintained its organization, and had issued statements of 
post-war policy. In contrast, the Conservative Party had done neither.
Angry with Labour for breaking away from the Coalition, Churchill would not 
await the ending of the Japanese war, and resigned on 23 May (McCallum and 
Readman, 1999, p. 21). Polling day was set for 5 July 1945. ‘The TUC issued a ‘call to
2 T h e  T i m e s ,  2  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p.  3 .
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workers’ urging them to vote for the Labour Party’ (Taylor, 2000, p. 100). During the 
election campaign Churchill sought to associate Labour with socialism, and thereby 
show that it was dangerous. He also promoted the achievements of the wartime 
coalition, with particular emphasis on the part played in it by the Conservatives. For 
Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, the important issue was the future. In this 
regard Labour had a comprehensive programme, contained in their election manifesto 
Let us Face the Future, whereas the Conservatives did not (Childs, 2002, p. 80).
The outcome of the 1945 general election was a stunning result for the Labour 
Party, a victory that surpassed all expectations. Labour took 47.9 per cent of the total 
vote and 393 seats in Parliament.3 With an overall majority of 146, the Labour Party 
formed its first single-party government (Sked and Cook, 1979, p. 15). Clement Attlee 
came to power with an authority never before possessed by a socialist prime minister in 
Britain.4 “Labour comes of age,’ proclaimed Kingsley Martin in the New Statesman 
shortly after the party’s stunning election victory’ (Jefferys, 2000, p. 68). For the 
Conservatives, returning to Parliament with only 213 MPs, the outcome was most 
unexpected.
The Economy
National commentators, the media, and politicians, regarded the economy as in crisis in 
1945. The Labour government ‘inherited economic and social problems of the utmost 
severity’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 20). By the end of the war the British economy was in a 
terrible state. The Governor of the Bank of England observed that “we emerge from the 
struggle with a gravely distorted economy, with an enormous burden of external debt,
3 F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  2 7  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  5 .
4 The Times, 27 July, 1945, p. 5.
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and a balance of payments problem such as we have never before had to face.”5 During 
the six years of conflict Britain had lost approximately one quarter of its national wealth 
(Morgan, 1984, p. 144). As early as 22 August 1940 Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, presented a paper to Cabinet indicating that Britain was virtually 
bankrupt. This ‘marked the effective end of Britain’s status as an independent power’ 
(Ponting, 1994, p. 501). ‘By 1941 its foreign exchange reserves had vanished. Britain 
then became dependent on American Lend-Lease’ (Childs, 2001, p. 8). The Times 
warned that with the ending of the war Britain had to face up to the complex economic 
problems of the transition to peace.6 At this time 55 per cent of the populace thought 
that food shortages were greater than in the midst of the war (Wybrow, 1989, p. 21).
The economy was, in many fundamental respects outdated by 1945. In fact it 
had been in a run-down state even before the war began. However, during that conflict 
the economy, stretched to the point of breaking, had been distorted from top to bottom 
in order to produce the maximum war effort. Consequently, the iron and steel industries 
faced a depression as the war ended and the demands of the military slackened.7 Labour 
Party deputy leader Herbert Morrison observed “our great producing industries have 
been going downhill for years, and are now in a dangerous mess. And it will take an 
effort almost a great as the effort of war itself to get them right.” He went on to pose 
the grave question as to whether Britain would be able to pay it way in the post-war 
world.9 Ernest Bevin had warned prior to the election that a Conservative victory would
5 i b i d ,  5  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p.  2 .
6 i b i d ,  2 2  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  8 .
7 i b i d . ,  3  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  8 .
8 T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t ,  3 0  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p.  2 .
9 i b i d .
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have meant a return to the dole queues of the 1930.10 At the same time Winston 
Churchill pointed out that every sort of consumer good was in short supply.11
As a result of the war certain of the country’s main economic indicators had 
reached historic lows. By 1945 the national debt, running at 232 per cent of GNP, had 
tripled, while the country’s standard of living had fallen considerably (Appendix D). 
The Bank of England foresaw a total Sterling Area deficit of some £700 -  £1,000 
million over the first two post-war years (Fforde, 1992, p. 62). Consequently, it was 
necessary for Britain to ask the other countries in the Sterling area to restrict their 
claims on the UK for dollars to essential needs.12 According to Conservative 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, the external economic position of the 
country was dire. ‘We have gone almost to the limit of our physical and economic 
strength.’13 The Times warned that ‘the nation cannot allow expenditure to outstrip its 
revenue indefinitely. That way lies economic disaster.’14 It went on to point out that 
the results would be unemployment and social deprivation.15 The economy was 
contracting at the time, with GDP falling by 7 per cent in 1945, while the number of 
days lost to industrial disputes reached a high of 2.8 million (Appendix D). However, 
on the positive side unemployment stood at the small figure of 103,000,16 while the rate 
of inflation was also low. The low level of unemployment was due primarily to the fact 
that millions of citizens were either in the armed forces, or working in industries 
supplying the war effort.
10 T h e  T i m e s ,  11 J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
"  i b i d ,  4  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  7 .
12 i b i d ,  7  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p . 6 .
13 i b i d ,  3  J u l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
14 T h e  T i m e s ,  8  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
15 i b i d ,  2 1  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
16 A j n n u a l ]  R [ e p o r t ] ,  T [ r a d e s ]  U [ n i o n ]  C [ o n g r e s s ] ,  1 9 4 7 ,  p .  2 4 5 .
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On 21 August 1945 President Truman cancelled lend-lease. His economic 
advisers could not see the wisdom of quickly restoring a worldwide trading equilibrium 
(Sked and Cook, 1979, p. 28). ‘By the autumn of 1945 Britain was only able to pay for 
about 40 per cent of its overseas expenditure’ (Caimcross, 1992, p. 45). ‘As Keynes put 
it, Britain was in danger of a financial Dunkirk’ (Crafts and Woodward, 1991, p. 25). 
To compound matters ‘about two-thirds of its merchant fleet was lost and about one- 
third of the housing stock had been damaged or destroyed’ (Stevenson, 1984, pp. 448- 
449). Britain sought financial help from Washington and was subsequently offered a 
credit of up to $3,750 million at 2 per cent interest (Fforde, 1992, p. 85). However, in 
return for this loan Britain was required to end its Empire preferences in trade. The US 
was setting the international economic agenda in the post-war world.
The Trade Unions in Post-War Britain
More than anything else, it was the wartime changes that prepared the way for the 
development of the welfare state. During the war there had been a massive expansion in 
the role of government. It had taken on large-scale powers over the production and 
distribution of resources, and over the labour force. The war had also seen the 
development of blueprints for vast new government responsibilities in the provision of 
welfare, and the maintenance of full employment.17 The primary developments were 
the Beveridge Report (1942) and the White Paper on Employment Policy (1944). The 
Beveridge Report, the popular name for Social Insurance and Allied Services, called for 
a new social security system based on compulsory social insurance, and fixed 
subsistence-level benefits in return for flat-rate contributions. In the White Paper on 
Employment, the government accepted the maintenance of a high and stable level of
17 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 6  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
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employment as one of the primary aims and responsibilities of government after the 
war.
Following the war there were dramatic changes in the government’s economic 
policies and in its policies towards the trade unions. Government commitment to post­
war social reconstruction was signaled in 1944 with the Education Act, and the White 
Papers entitled A National Health Service (a comprehensive health service with free 
treatment financed by taxation) and Social Insurance (which accepted the whole of the 
Beveridge report from 1942). There had been a leftward lurch in the ideological of both 
elite and public opinion. Post-war social reconstruction enjoyed widespread support 
from reformist intellectuals, civil servants, the political parties, leading figures in the 
Churches, universities, and media, and from the public. This achievement ‘was made 
by a government that nationalized the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy and 
preached higher efficiency to private industrialists at every opportunity’ (Booth, 2001, 
p. 174). It also created a welfare state to make good the effects of market failure on 
ordinary workers and extend to all citizens the right to social security (Lowe, 1993, p. 
55). The main leftward measures introduced by the Labour governments (1945-1951) 
were broadly continued by the Conservative Governments in the 1950s.
Clement Attlee’s Cabinet of 1945 consisted of a group of individuals of great 
social contrasts and life experiences, as well as great personal rivalries. ‘Yet it is 
doubtful whether any other peace time Cabinet was made up of members with greater 
moral purpose’ (Childs, 2002, pp. 83-84). However, Labour faced an appalling 
situation when it took office. Apart from the problems with the economy Britain had 
more responsibilities than ever before, in Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, the former 
Italian colonies, and the old British Empire (Booth, 2001, p. 174). The only advantage 
was that Germany and Japan, key pre-war economic rivals, were temporarily ‘out of
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commission.’ Yet ‘it had to manage these commitments with an astonishingly weak 
export sector and the worst balance of payments deficit of any nation in history’ (Booth, 
2001, p. 174).
From 1940 onwards trade union leaders had begun to play an active role in 
government policy making. ‘The return of a Labour administration in 1945 brought 
about an even closer degree of involvement on the part of the trade union establishment 
in the machinery of government’ (Hawkins, 1976, p. 19). After 1945 the number of 
bodies on which unions had representation expanded as the administration was 
committed to establishing new institutions of government and economic planning. The 
trade unions possessed wide representation on an increased number of advisory 
committees, Royal Commissions, departmental committees, and a variety of ad hoc 
agencies.18 At all levels of the industrial system, therefore, the unions were becoming 
more active. There are difficulties of definition, but the number of government 
committees on which the TUC has representatives seems to have hovered at around 60 
for most of the period between 1945 and the 1970s (Taylor, 2000, p. 145). From this it 
is clear that the trade unions’ representation on government committees underwent 
change of an enduring nature.
The TUC now had a receptive audience in government for its proposals. The 
unions held a dominant position in the policy making of the Labour government, and 
they gained from this influence. Once in office Labour promptly implemented its 
comprehensive programme of reforms with a flurry of legislation. Labour created a 
‘welfare state,’ or more accurately, extended in dramatic fashion the social services 
granted by the state. Legislation provided insurance against unemployment, sickness, 
industrial injury, and old age. The National Health Service Act (1946) -  which did not
18 AR, TUC, 1946, p. 30.
195
go into effect until July 1948 -  provided medical care for all, regardless of ability to 
pay. In order to implement the education Act of 1944, the government, by 1951, had 
trained 35,000 new teachers, constructed 1,000 new buildings, extended the school 
leaving age to 15, and had underwritten higher education (Budge et al., 2001, p. 607). 
Legislation was also passed abolishing most of the provisions of the Trade Disputes and 
Trades Unions Act of 1927. At this time, ‘the relationship between the government and 
the top echelons of the trade union movement was particularly close’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 
59).
The trade unions’ access to the Prime Minister changed. Up to 1945 contact 
between Prime Minister Churchill and the TUC was limited to the exchange of letters.19 
However, following the 1945 general elections things changed for the TUC, albeit 
slowly. In early September 1945 Prime Minister Attlee addressed the 77th Annual 
Trades Union Congress in Blackpool, becoming the first Prime Minister to do so. Yet, 
this was the only occasion in 1945 when the TUC met with the Prime Minister 
(Appendix A).20 However, the following year the TUC met with Attlee seven times. 
The topics discussed at these meetings went beyond trade union issues to encompass the 
United Nations (UN), the conditions for trade unionists in fascist Spain, and the reasons 
for the continuation of conscription.21 This frequency of meeting between the TUC and 
the Prime Minister was maintained in the following years.
Between 1943 and 1946 there was a marked change in the level of trade union 
policies incorporated into the government’s policies towards organized labour. In 1943 
the TUC tried to influence aspects of the government’s Education Bill without
19 i b i d . ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  6 9 .
20 i b i d , ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  3 1 2 .
21 i b i d . ,  1 9 4 6  a n d  1 9 4 7 .
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success. However, in 1944, after three years of Congress urgings, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer introduced an increase in pensions for retired local government 
employees.23 In February 1944 the TUC gained representation on the Civil Nursing 
Reserve Advisory Council.24 The same year saw the government agree to the TUC’s 
demand for an overhaul of the Workmen’s Compensation Legislation.25 Following 
representations from the TUC general council, the Home Secretary undertook a review 
of the law relating to the employment of children.26 At this time the TUC also sought 
changes to the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act of 1927. However, Prime Minister 
Churchill informed the TUC that he could not see Conservative MPs supporting such a 
move.27 Soon afterwards the TUC was invited to submit observations to various 
government committees reviewing aspects of the economy. The trade unions also had 
an input into the White Papers on Social Insurance, Workmen’s Compensation and A 
National Health Service in 1944.28
In 1945 the TUC influenced the Labour government into extending the life of 
the 1944 Pension (Increase) Act.29 The TUC also had an input into the National 
Insurance Bill in June 1946,30 and got the government to agree to remove all wartime
o 1
labour controls as quickly as possible. The TUC secured the reduction of weekly 
working hours to 40 in many industries.32 On 2 November 1945 the TUC met with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to discuss the budget. A similar meeting took place in 
April 1946 after that budget, and more discussions on questions arising out of the April
22 i b i d . ,  1 9 4 4 ,  p .  7 6 .
23 i b i d ,  1 9 4 4 ,  p .  4 5 .
24 i b i d ,  1 9 4 4 ,  p .  5 8
25 i b i d ,  1 9 4 4 ,  p .  6 1 .
26 i b i d ,  1 9 4 4 ,  p .  7 2 .
27 i b i d ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 0 6 .
28 i b i d ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  7 2 .
29 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p ,  5 4 .
30 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p.  6 3 .
31 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  1 7 4 .
32 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  1 8 5 .
22
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budget were held in July.33 The TUC also held frequent meetings in 1946 with the 
Minister of National Insurance to discuss the National Insurance Act. The following 
year the TUC had a direct input into the Pensions Act 1947.34 The recommendations of 
the TUC regarding juvenile employment were taken on board by the Minister of Labour 
in 1947. The government also sought the TUC’s views on matters as diverse as the 
National Service Bill and the Transport Bill.36 In late 1946 the TUC met with the 
Minister of Supply John Wilmot, to discuss the nationalization of the iron and steel 
industry. At this meeting the minister sought the TUC’s views on the nationalization 
Bill itself.37
The Evolution of the Welfare State
There was a change in the relationship between the government and the trade unions. 
The Attlee government, for the first time in peacetime, brought the unions into formal 
contact with the government in a continuing relationship. The rationale of corporate 
bias for government was the need to avoid the damaging industrial conflicts that had 
marked the 1920s. The rationale of the informal incorporation for business and the 
trade unions was that it gave them a permanent voice in policy-making. This increased 
their capacity to serve the interest of their members.
The major theme of post-war economic policy was closer government 
involvement in running the economy than at any previous time. This encompassed the 
creation of a mixed economy. That was done by a series of important nationalizations. 
First came the nationalizations of the Bank of England, the coal mines, electric power,
33 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  2 2 6 .
34 i b i d ,  1 9 4 7 ,  p .  1 1 5 .
35 i b i d ,  1 9 4 7 ,  p .  1 6 9 .
36 i b i d ,  1 9 4 7 ,  p p .  2 5 6 - 2 5 7 .
37 i b i d ,  1 9 4 7 ,  p .  2 7 2 .
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and inland transport.38 These moves had all be set out in the Labour Party’s election 
manifesto L et us Face the Future in 1945 (Craig, 1975, p. 126). As Clement Attlee 
remarked; “in the present state of affairs you cannot afford to allow vital organs of 
economic power to rest in the hands of people who are outside the control of the 
community.”39
Various commentators observed how the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy changed in 1945. Seldon (1994, p. 45) argues that the unions’ formal contact 
with government gave them the feeling that they had a virtual right to make an input 
into policy via their leaders. In delivering the Welfare State, substantial measures of 
nationalization, and much else, the Attlee governments were in effect carrying out a 
‘social contract’ with the trade unions. This was a quarter of a century before the more 
explicit understandings between the unions and the governments of Harold Wilson and 
James Callaghan in 1974-1979. Minkin (1991, p. 72) points out that the imprint of the 
unions ‘lay on many key features of the post-war settlement.’ The government’s firm 
commitment to the maintenance of full employment reflected the TUC concerns that 
there must be no return to the dole queues of the 1930s. ‘But it would be quite wrong to 
suggest that the Attlee government was a mere transmission belt for the implementation 
of TUC policy’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 40).
The fall in trade union membership was finally arrested in 1946. The years prior 
to the election of the Labour government had seen trade union membership fall in 
Britain. In 1944 the unions lost 85,000 members, with overall membership falling to 
7,890,737. This constituted a decrease of 1.06 per cent. However, this trend was not 
that surprising considering so many workers had joined the armed forces. The 
following year union membership decreased by 15,737, or 0.2 per cent, falling to
38 i b i d ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  2 2 7 .
39 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 6  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p.  7 .
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7,875,000 member overall (Appendix C). However, in 1946 trade union membership 
increased by a dramatic 928,000, or 11.8 per cent. This was the largest annual change 
in trade union membership recorded in Britain during the years under examination. 
Nevertheless, with the gradual demobilization of an army numbering 5,090,000 from 
June 1945,40 an abrupt increase in the civilian workforce, and trade union membership, 
was not that unexpected. Throughout this period the TUC had been urging rapid 
demobilization in order to free more personnel for industry.41 In 1946 trade union 
membership in fact surpassed the previous high watermark attained in 1920 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999). In the years afterwards there was a gradual upward 
trend in British union membership. By 1953 there were over 9.5 million trade unionists 
in Britain, an increase of almost 21 per cent on 1944.
After 1945 the Conservatives’ adapted to the interventionist welfare state and 
managed economy. Ideologically, the Conservatives’ acceptance of the radical 
programme of the Attlee government, although initially enacted by a partisan majority, 
signified that it had won the general assent of the British people. ‘Majoritarianism had 
been converted into consensus’ (Beer, 2001, p. 19). Post-war consensus was born.42 
The Conservatives stated that they regarded the trade union movement as vital to the 
workings of the economy, and they took the approach that they would ‘do everything to 
help the trade unions to serve the best interests of the nation and their members’ (Craig, 
1975, p. 143).
In the general election of 1951 the Conservative Party won 321 seats, giving
them an overall majority of 17 in the House of Commons. It was a modest victory, but
significant in ending the post-war rule of the Labour Party which itself had won a
40 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p .  2 2 7 .
41 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 8  J u n e ,  1 9 4 5 ,  p .  2 .
42 T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t ,  2 8  A u g u s t  1 9 8 9 .
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narrow victory in the general election of the year before (Sked and Cook, 1979, p. 111- 
112). This brought the curtain down on what was ‘the greatest peacetime 
administration of the twentieth century, its achievements marvelous, its leadership 
remarkable, its legacy both comprehensive and radical’ (Blair, 2000, p. xvi). During 
Churchill’s post-war government, ministers appointed even more trade unionists to 
consultative committees than had been the case under Attlee (Seldon, 1981, p. 206).
The heyday of consensus in the late 1940s and early 1950s existed 
simultaneously with the growth of forces that were to eventually undermine it. A 
primary force was the relatively decline of the British economy. For most of second 
half of the twentieth century economic growth in Britain was to lag behind that of its 
main competitors. This placed severe strain on the welfare state as national income 
failed to keep pace with government commitments. Economic policy from the 1950s to 
the 1970s was characterized by stop-go cycles of expansion, producing inflation and a 
balance of payments crisis, which in turn led to a sharp recession (Edwards et al., 1992).
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Table 5.1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1945
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
v
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
N/A
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




As Table 5.1 shows, 70 per cent of the observable implications of the first 
hypothesis pointed to a high empirical-theoretical fit, indicating significant, swift, and 
enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy. With the second 
hypothesis, six of the seven observables, or 85.7 per cent indicated a medium to high 
empirical-theoretical fit, while five of the seven observable implications, or 71.4 per 
cent, indicated a high fit exclusively, thus pointing to a macroeconomic crisis. The 
findings for both hypotheses surpassed the minimum 60 per cent threshold for high 
empirical-theoretical fit, confirming that there was a critical juncture in the TUC’s 
influence over public policy in 1945.
In summation, the 1940s were a time of great difficulty for the British economy 
and trade unions. The economy, overstressed by the years of conflict, and having been 
pushed to the limits of its endurance, was in a bad way by 1945. This view of the 
economy was unanimously shared by the national media, political and economic 
commentators, the central bank, and elected representatives. Nevertheless, 1945 was to 
witness a significant, swift and enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy. After the Labour Party came to power in 1945 everything changed for 
the unions. A new approach was taken towards the economy and the trade unions by 
the new government. Access to the Prime Minister, union representation on 
government committees, trade union membership, government economic and industrial 
relations policies, the trade unions’ influence as seen by observers, and ministerial 
attitudes, all improved in the trade unions’ favour, with government policies in 
particular coming to reflect the policies desired by the unions themselves. Government 
granted the TUC an integral part in the development of the thinking that lay behind its 
economic and social policies and programmes. The TUC’s influence over public policy 
changed radically at a time of macroeconomic crisis. According to the observable
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implications criteria set out in Chapter II this change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy was a critical juncture.
figure 5.1: The Critical Juncture Grid, Britain, 1945






The Conservatives made a strong comeback after their electoral defeats in 1945 and 
1950, with the party going on to win three general elections in succession (1951, 1955, 
and 1959). Both of Churchill’s successors as Prime Minister -  Sir Anthony Eden and 
Harold Macmillan were ‘One Nation’ Conservatives who were disinclined to confront 
the trade unions. Nevertheless, both were concerned with the pressure of wage rises on 
inflation, and with industrial disputes, especially unofficial strikes. However, 
Macmillan was less inclined to deflate the economy, instead favoring the involvement 
of the trade unions and employers in consultations on running the economy.
Superficially, the thirteen years of Conservative rule between 1951 and 1964 
appear to have been fairly successful. However, Tory economic complacency ensured 
that the necessary economic growth would never be generated. The Economist argued 
that Britain had failed to aspire to economic growth, to improve its living standards, and 
to respond to change with the eagerness and effectiveness that so many other countries 
had accustomed themselves to doing.43 Not enough money was channeled to key 
industries, stop-go economic policies undermined the confidence of industry to invest in 
the long term, and too much money was permitted to go abroad. Moreover, bad 
industrial relations bedeviled attempts to put things right, for the workers began to see 
that the real beneficiaries of the affluent society were those who had money to invest.
The pillars of voluntarism began to crumble in the 1960s, although the process 
was not continuous. The acceleration of Britain’s relative economic decline 
increasingly brought into question the utility of Keynesian demand management. As 
such, governments, notably the Labour governments of 1964-1970, turned to supply 
side management and neo-corporatist solutions. Under Wilson’s administrations a
43 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  1 3 - 1 9  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  10 .
Potential Critical Juncture 2: 1970-The Cracks in Consensus
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voluntary prices and incomes policy was first introduced (1964-1966), and then a 
statutory policy (1966-1970).
The trade unions reacted to incomes policy with, at best, a reluctant acceptance 
or, most often, opposition that took two forms. First, the trade unions, through the TUC 
and their position within the Labour Party, attempted to change policy. Second, strikes 
by individual unions in both the private and the public sector had obvious political 
repercussions. Marsh (1992b, p. 33) argues that ‘there can be little doubt then, that 
trade unions became increasingly involved in politics from the end of the 1960s, or that 
they were more militant in support of their political ends.’
The OECD (1970, p. 11) points out that in the autumn of 1969 incomes policy 
was abandoned. From then on the guidelines on wages and price increases were not 
applied, and no use was made of the powers to refer specific increases to the Board for 
Prices and Incomes. During the first half of 1970 average earning rose 13 per cent, and 
retail prices by over 8 per cent (OECD, 1970, p. 12). Fiscal and monetary strategies 
aimed at diverting resources from home demand to exports, and import replacement, by 
holding down the growth of disposable incomes, and maintaining a high savings ratio, 
had yielded results by late 1969 (OECD, 1970, p. 14). There was a massive switch to 
surplus in the financial position. Subsequent months saw some relaxation of fiscal 
policy and monetary conditions.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the unions had been increasingly incorporated 
by the government into decision-making, this in an effort to strengthen economy’s 
performance. This reflected the failure of successive governments to solve the 
problems with the economy. The governments believed that both the national interests, 
and their own electoral success, rested upon the achievement of a renewed economic 
prosperity. As such they increasingly turned to economic planning. This inevitably
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ensured the involvement of the trade unions more directly in consultations on policy 
making. The consequence of this increased politicization was to strengthen the position 
of the TUC. However, during the 1960s such trends were overlain by a developing 
detachment between the Labour Party and the unions. Shared identification with the 
record of 1945-1951 had begun to fade.
However, in almost direct contradiction, government’s concern with growing 
economic problems led them to intervene more in matters that directly affected the trade 
unions. In effect, both the Labour and Conservative governments argued that in order 
to make industry more efficient and productive they needed to become increasingly 
involved in supply side management in a way that threatened to restrict the autonomy of 
the unions. Labour’s decision to legislate on industrial relations in 1969 had the effect 
of altering the character of its relationship with the trade unions. Such intervention 
inevitably led to antagonism between the unions and government that in turn further 
politicized the unions.
The Conservatives and the Economy
As trade unions had been invited to serve on important committees by both the Labour 
and Conservative governments, political scientists during the 1960s talked of a 
corporate state developing in Britain. On the surface it seemed as if policy was forged 
from a consensus amongst ministers, employers, and union leaders, on how the 
economy should develop. In exchange for the government’s maintenance of full 
employment, participation in such bodies as the NEDC (National Economic 
Development Council), and influencing policy, union leaders were expected to deliver 
their members’ agreement and cooperation on pay restraint. However, during the late 
1960s, with considerable publicity being given to a rash o f ‘wildcat strikes,’ particularly
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in the car industry, it seemed that union leaders wielded little control over their 
members. The lessons learned by politicians was that union leaders ‘could not deliver' 
their side of the bargain, even to Labour governments.
National commentators, the media, the Bank of England, and domestic and 
international organisations, regarded the economy as in difficulty by 1970. 
Hodgkinson, writing in the British Economic Survey (BES) (1971, p. 1), observed that 
the five dominant problems with the British economy in 1970 were inflation, 
unemployment, bad industrial relations, low growth of production, and uncertainty 
about the value of joining the EEC. The TUC observed that ‘1969-70 [was] a period of 
very slow economic growth, with record post-war unemployment and a slow rate of 
productivity growth.44 The BES (1971, p. 36) argued that economists could no longer 
talk of having cured the endemic problem of unemployment. The Economist pointed 
out, with a sense of concern, that by 1970 the British economy was expanding at only 
2.2 per cent per annum.45 However, at the same time unemployment had reached a high 
of 2.5 per cent. The only other post-war year to see a higher rate of unemployment was 
1963, and 2.5 per cent was, as the Tories pointed, the highest level for May since 
1940.46 The Economist explained that the maximum variation in the rate of 
unemployment across the regions of Britain in 1970 stood at 4.8 per cent, compared 
with 2.2 per cent in 1966.47 The OECD (1970, p. 5) found that the rate of inflation had 
reached its highest level in eighteen years in 1970, peaking at 7.06 per cent. Concurring 
with this view the Bank of England (1971, p. 3) observed that the three months from 
March to June saw the economy grow only very slowly, while industrial costs and 
prices rose rapidly. This made inflation a problem in its own right, not simply
44 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  4 3 3 .
45 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  2 0 - 2 6  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  7 3 .
46 T i m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  1 J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 .  V o l .  9 5 ,  N o .  2 2 ,  p.  2 7 .
41 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  2 3 - 2 9 ,  M a y ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  1 1 .
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something that had to be tackled due to its impact on the value of Sterling. The 
Guardian went further, arguing that inflation constituted the most serious problem 
confronting the government.48 This is how the public in general also saw the situation, 
with three times as many people regarding the cost of living as the primary problem 
facing the country than any other issue (Wybrow, 2001, p. 264). For Cairncross (1995, 
p. 183) the 1970s, as a whole, were to be marked by the struggle to contain inflation.
There was an absence of real growth in exports since 1969 (van Blankenstein, 
1971, p. 27). The number of days lost due to industrial disputes stood at a post-war 
high of almost 11 million in 1970 (Appendix D). The Bank of England (1970, p. 268) 
argued that the sharp increase in industrial disputes impaired the productive potential in 
a number of important sectors of industry. At the same time the OECD (1970, p. 11) 
warned that incomes increasing without commensurate increases in productivity would 
result in inequitable shifts in the distribution of purchasing power. This situation was 
becoming of increasing concern to the business community. Businessman Viscount 
Watkinson, Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, argued that industry and the unions 
needed to put their houses in order, and removed their burden from the government.49 
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research’s (NIESR) (1970) quarterly 
review predicted a small growth rate for the economy and consequently the bleak 
prospect of a further rise in unemployment. ‘The main feature of this period is one of 
deteriorating economic performance’ (Woodward, 1991, p. 197).
Although the life of the outgoing Parliament in 1970 had witnessed 15 by- 
election defeats for the Labour Party it was surprising, therefore, that Labour looked 
like winning the general election of 18 June 1970 (Norton, 1996, p. 54). The Tory lead 
in the opinion polls, which had stood at 15 per cent in January, had been reduced to a
48 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  8  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  1 0 .
49 T h e  T i m e s  1 7  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  2 7 .
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neck and neck race by early May 1970,50 with the polls showing Labour leading by the 
following week.51 The country appeared somewhat on edge at the prospect of 
Conservative leader Ted Heath, who came across as cold and distant, becoming prime 
minister. At the time the government received its highest approval rating in over three 
years (Wybrow, 2001, p. 168-169). This was the reason why Wilson decided to go to 
the country when he did.
Political opinion on the state of the economy was very partisan. Peter Walker, 
the Conservative shadow housing minister, commented that it was scandalous that with 
thousands of people wanting a home, Labour should go into the 1970 election with
100,000 unemployed in the building industry.52 Ian Macleod, shadow Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, remarked that men were deliberately being kept unemployed because every 
additional 60,000 unemployed meant an improvement of £100m in the balance of 
payments.53 Robert Carr, Conservative spokesman on employment, observed that the 
period leading up to the general election had witnessed the worst strike record in British 
history.54 Ted Heath warned that if the Labour party remained in power there would be 
an economic crash afterwards.55 However, Prime Minister Wilson rejected all of what 
he called ‘the Conservatives’ doom laden predictions of economic disaster.’56
However, in a non-partisan fashion the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Roy 
Jenkins] admitted that the UK economy had, for some considerable time, 
been moving in a ‘vicious circle’ consisting of periods of rapid growth
50 T h e  D a i l y  M a i l ,  2  M a y ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  3 .
51 T h e  E v e n i n g  S t a n d a r d ,  7  M a y ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  1.
52 T h e  T i m e s ,  J u n e  1 5 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  7 .
53 i b i d . ,  J u n e  1 6 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p. 1
54 i b i d . ,  J u n e  1 7 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p. 4 .
55 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  6  J u n e ,  19 7 0 ,  p.  I .
5<> i b i d ,  9  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  I .
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accompanied inevitably by a serious deterioration in the balance of 
payments.57
The Labour Party’s election manifesto, Now Britain’s Strong -  Let’s Make it 
Great to Live In, and the Conservative’s A Better Tomorrow, both promised Britons a 
better life, but apart from faster growth disagreed on how to achieve it.58 On election 
day only 72 per cent of the electorate cast their votes (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 
1971, p. 23). Labour’s share of the national poll fell to 43 per cent, a drop of 4.9 per 
cent on 1966. But that of the Conservatives increased by 3 per cent to 46.4 per cent. 
This gave the Conservatives 330 seats, while Labour’s presence in the House of 
Commons fell to 287 MPs, a loss of 76 seats. The result left the Conservative Party in 
possession of an overall majority of 30 in the Commons. It was an unexpected victory 
for the Conservatives that the Guardian compared to Truman’s 1948 presidential victory 
in America.59 A poor set of trade figures, released three days prior to polling, told 
against Labour (Jenkins, 1991, p. 92). The Times concluded that in its defeat Labour 
was reaping the results of three years of economic stringency, of wage restrain and of 
slow growth, and that these failures sprang from the neglect of long-term strategy in the 
early 1960s.60 A clear indication that dealing with the economy could prove a poison 
chalice for the incoming Tory government was signaled on 23 June 1970 when figures 
from the Central Statistics Office showed a sharp fall in economic activity in the first 
quarter of the year.61 The Times pointed out that this was evidence of an incipient 
recession at a time of accelerating pay and price inflation.
57 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  4 3 5 .
58 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  2 3 - 2 9  M a y ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  2 0 .
59 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  1 9  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  5 .
60 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 2  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  1 1 .
61 i b i d ,  2 4  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  2 1 .
62 i b i d ,  2 4  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  2 1 .
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The build up of economic problems, along with concerns over the TUC’s 
domination of government, was to significantly alter the TUC’s influence over public 
policy in the early 1970s (Crouch, 1977, p. 79). The Conservative Party was elected on 
a ticket to right the economy and reform the trade union movement (Craig, 1990, p. 
116-119). For the first time, at least since the war, industrial relations had figured as a 
prominent general-election issue. The unpopularity of incomes policy, the evidence that 
pay claims and strikes were out of control, and the Labour government’s capitulation to 
the unions over its Industrial Relations Bill, were all issues that had been used by the 
Conservatives in their campaign. Although TUC relations with the Labour Party had 
deteriorated in 1969, the unions had still possessed an influence over the Labour 
government’s policies through their sponsorship of Labour MPs. However, now, due to 
economic circumstances, the political goal posts had shitted. The TUC had no such 
influence over the Conservatives.
The relationship between the TUC and the Conservative party changed at this 
time. The Conservatives were committed to radical changes in, if not an ending of, the 
post-war consensus. They came to power intent, as their manifesto stated, on trade 
union reform (Lindsay and Harrington, 1979, p. 263). Their programme constituted ‘a 
fundamental departure from many of the established features of the voluntary system’ 
(Goodman, 1981, p. 610). ‘The principle labour quangos either had been or were about 
to be wound up by the end of the year’ (Blake, 1985, p. 312). The new government 
proceeded to implement policies such as standing firm against public-sector pay claims, 
and preparing a detailed Industrial Relations Bill. Less tangibly, but at least as 
important, they cut off many of the accustomed channels of communication between 
government and the unions. The TUC that, on the election of the Conservatives, had 
repeated its 1951 offer of co-operation to the Tory government, was aggrieved at this
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curtailment of its accustomed role. However, by 1972 these developments were to be 
reversed as the Conservatives performed a radical policy u-turn.
The TUC’s access to the Prime Minister changed in 1970. In 1969 there were 
25 meetings between the TUC and Labour Party Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
(Appendix A). Almost half of these meetings concerned the government’s White Paper, 
In Place of Strife. This proposed the introduction of legislation to reverse the increasing 
shop-floor power that was undermining the union leaders control over their members. 
However, following the stirrings of opposition to the Bill in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) the government withdrew the legislation (Ellis and Johnson, 1974, pp. 23- 
24). The remaining 13 meetings of 1969 were conducted in the NEDC.63 There were 
eight further meetings between Prime Minister Wilson and the TUC up to the general 
election of June 1970.64 In contrast, there were only three meeting between the 
Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath and the TUC in the remaining months of 1970. 
The following year Heath met with the TUC only three times in all.65 At the NEDC ‘in 
contrast to previous years, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has normally taken the 
Chair at Council meetings rather than the Prime Minister.’66
Apart from his positive stance towards Europe and entry to the EEC, Heath 
really did not have the slightest idea of what he wanted to do in government (Clark, 
1998, p. 348). He had negotiated British entry to the EEC at the time of Macmillan, and 
was know as a convinced European. Heath was better able than most other politicians, 
Conservative or Labour, to put a convincing case for Britain in Europe (Childs, 2002, p. 
187). The Commons ultimately approved the application by 356 to 244 votes. It was 
for Britain ‘one of the decisive votes of the century,’ (Jenkins, 1991, p. 329).
63 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p.  1 0 9 .
64 ib i d . ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  1 7 4 .
65 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p.  1 5 5 .
66 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  2 6 7 .
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The year 1970 was to see a dramatic change in the government’s economic 
policies. The Labour government’s April 1970 budget included some tax cuts, and 
there was a substantial rise in the money supply.67 Total expenditure was to be reduced 
by £330 million in 1971/72. The monetary policy outlined in the budget implied 
continued restraint on the supply of credit, though not as severely as in the previous 
financial year. Various prices and incomes policies were devised to persuade those 
responsible to take price and income decisions different from those which they would 
otherwise have taken. According to the OECD (1970, p. 18) wage rates and earnings in 
the UK had been rising much faster relative to productivity than in other major 
countries. After coming to power the Conservatives conducted a review of public 
spending with the objective of securing substantial savings (OECD, 1970, p. 15). The 
new Government took the view that it would be neither useful nor practicable to attempt 
a detailed intervention into wage bargaining either by laying down norms and criteria or 
by re-imposing a statutory incomes policy. In its view, past experience of a statutory 
and detailed policy suggested not only that its success was likely to be limited, in that 
influence over national settlements did not effectively limit the growth of earnings at 
local level, but that it would be counted-productive. Instead, the new policy was to rely 
mainly on the tougher stand that the Central Government itself took towards pay claims, 
and the similar hardening of attitudes that it hoped to inculcate in the rest of the 
economy. An important element was the government’s declared greater readiness to sit 
out strikes, and its refusal to intervene to secure compromise settlements in disputes 
involving excessive wage claims (OECD, 1971, p. 23). The Conservatives also sought 
to bring with them a new style of government. In a White Paper entitled The 
Reorganization of Central Government, published in October 1970, plans were
67 The Economist, 18-24 April, 1970, p. 15.
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announced for an extensive reorganization of the machinery of government in an 
attempt to get less government, and better government carried out by fewer people 
(Skuse, 1971, p. 12).
Following Labour’s defeat moves were made to re-establish the party’s links 
with the trade unions. A Labour Party-TUC Liaison Committee was established, this 
bringing together the National Executive Committee (NEC), the parliamentary 
leadership, and the General Council of the TUC. It was envisaged from the outset as a 
key forum for policy formulation. In effect, the direct participation of individual unions 
in the Labour Party was transcended by this new channel of collective representation. 
This gave the TUC, for the first time in its history, a direct line into Labour Party policy 
making and thus into general election manifestos (Elliott, 1978). It was through this 
mechanism that the party negotiated the ‘social contract’, a corporatist deal between the 
Labour Party and the unions, covering the main elements of economic policy 
(Goodman, 1981, p. 611). Already in 1970 the NEC and the PLP had agreed on total 
opposition to the Conservative’s proposed Industrial Relations Bill, promising its repeal 
and replacement with a scheme based on the report of the Donovan Commission. Over 
time Labour in opposition shifted sharply to the left under the impact of radicalized 
trade unions.
Overall, there were some minor fluctuations in trade union membership. 
Despite the change of government, and the frayed relations between the political parties 
and organized labour, the unions’ membership continued to expand. In 1969 the level 
of trade union membership in Britain was 10,479,100 (Appendix C). That year had 
seen an increase of 279,100 in trade union membership. By the end of 1970 trade union 
membership had increased by a further 6.8 per cent to 11,187,000. This increase of 
707,900, over two and a half times that of the previous year, was somewhat surprising
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considering the election of a hostile Conservative administration in June 1970. The 
year following the proposed critical juncture saw trade union membership slump by 
52,000, or 0.4 per cent. However, in 1972 union membership grew again, and was to 
continued growing for the remainder of the 1970s
Between 1968 and 1970 there was a distinct change in the level of TUC policies 
incorporated into the government’s policies towards organized labour. In December
1968 the TUC called on the government to introduce legislation providing for adequate 
pensions in all occupations. Soon afterwards the government published a White Paper 
containing the TUC’s proposals.68 The policies contained in another White Paper, In 
Place of Strife -  A Policy for Industrial Relations, antagonised the unions greatly,69 and 
were ultimately dropped. The TUC’s demand that the government introduce legislation
7 0regulating Asbestos was successful in 1969. However, the TUC did not have 
everything its own way. Its demands for compulsory employer insurance for work 
accidents, and its desire to see the rate of coal mine closures reduced, came to nothing.71 
The TUC was also disappointed when the April 1969 budget was not as expansionary as 
demanded.72 Nevertheless, the TUC was consulted by both the Departments of 
Education and Employment on policy issues.73 The unions’ calls for equal pay, and 
amendment of the Industrial Training Act, were answered in September and November
1969 when the government announced its intention to introduce Bills on both topics.74 
However, Labour fell from power before either Bill became law.
68 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p.  1 7 0 .
69 i b i d . ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  2 1 4 .
70 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  2 7 4 .
71 i b i d ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  2 8 1 .
72 i b i d ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  4 2 8 .
73 i b i d ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  2 9 6 .
74 i b i d ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p .  2 0 9 .
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When the Conservatives came to power the new Employment Secretary gave no 
commitment on equal pay legislation.75 After June 1970 the TUC decided not to 
cooperate with the Commission on Industrial Relations due to the government’s 
Industrial Relations Bill.76 However, all was not bleak, in November 1970 a Bill 
increasing public service pensions was introduced containing all the TUC had sought 
for a number of years.77 But, then the Government published a Consultative Document 
on the Code of Industrial Relations Practice that the unions found unsatisfactory.78 In 
March 1971, without consulting the TUC, the government introduced a Social Security 
Bill that imposed substantial cuts in National Insurance unemployment benefits. The 
unions vehemently protested this move.79 However, not consulting the unions became a 
trademark of Conservative policy-making. At the same time the government refused to 
implement the Employed Persons (Health and Safety) Bill, despite TUC urging.80 
Although the TUC sought meetings with the government on the Employers’ Liability 
Act, and on education policy in 1971, this was refused.81 Although many of the Labour 
government’s policies on regional development were reversed by the Conservatives,82 
the government did agree to the TUC request to increase the number of Special 
Development Areas.83 However, the Conservative’s budget of March 1971, although 
providing for increased retirement pensions, did not satisfy TUC demands.84
75 i b i d . ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p.  6 4 .
76 i b i d . ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  7 9 .
77 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  8 8 .
78 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  1 0 5 .
79 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  1 1 3 .
80 i b i d . ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  1 1 7 .
* '  i b i d . ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p.  1 3 7 .
82 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  2 1 4 .
83 i b i d ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  2 1 5 .
84 i b i d . .  1 9 7 1 ,  p.  2 5 3 .
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Although the Labour government’s efforts to reform industrial relations came to naught, 
this did not deter the Conservatives, whose manifesto proposed changes in industrial
I
relations law (Kessler and Bayliss, 2001, p. 23). The Conservative’s Industrial 
Relations Bill sought a comprehensive redirection of the law to bring trade unions under 
greater statutory regulation and public accountability. This was despite the fact that 62 
per cent of the population approved of the trade unions at the time (Wybrow, 1989, p. 
160). The TUC saw the Bill as an attack on trade unionism.85 Consequently, millions 
of workers struck in protest at the legislation, and left wing Labour MPs created rowdy 
scenes in parliament (Heffer, 1971, pp. 220-223). Nevertheless, the legislation was 
given Royal Assent on 5 August 1971 (Hollinshead et al., 1999). The TUC ‘strongly 
advised’ affiliates not to register under the Act and expelled those that did (Moran, 
1977, p. 122). Ultimately a political failure, the legislation estranged the unions and the 
government.
This Conservative administration was to lurch from economic crisis to crisis. 
The Conservatives, when in opposition, had attacked the policy of assisting failing 
enterprises to stay in business in the hope that they could become profitable again. 
However, once in government they were less enthusiastic about letting market forces do 
their ruthless work (Craig, 1990, p. 120). This policy ‘u-turn’ came in the middle of the 
miners’ strike in early 1972. At that time several major companies were faced with 
grave problems of survival. The government, having come to power with the intention 
of not rushing to the rescue of companies that could not survive market competition, 
now found itself nationalizing firms. As a consequence the government ended up 
nationalizing several major companies.
85 T h e  T i m e s ,  J u n e  2 5 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  p.  2 0 .
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Following a sterling crisis in June 1972 the pound was allowed float. However, 
the trade balance deteriorated to a record deficit of almost £700 million. Towards the 
end of the year the Conservatives’ abandoned the Industrial Relations Act that had been 
rendered totally ineffective by union non-cooperation (Marsh, 1992b, p. 21-22). In 
November, the Heath government, in its most famous u-turn, went ahead with a 
statutory prices and incomes policy to combat inflation.86 By the end of the year the 
British economy, experiencing stagflation, had reached crisis point. The problems 
forced the government to abandon, or reverse, many of the policies started in 1970.
During the first year of the Heath government there was no substantial change in 
trade union representation on government committees. Yet, throughout the 1970s the 
TUC’s level of representation on tripartite institutions gradually expanded. This began 
under the Conservatives after their 1972 u-turn. Heath sought to bring the TUC and the 
CBI into discussions on the creation of a new national economic consensus. The 
unions’ access to the Prime Minister underwent substantial change at this time. There 
were 13 meetings between Prime Minister Heath and the TUC in 1972, in stark contrast
0 7
to only three in 1971. This increase was due to Heath’s use of the NEDC, of which 
the Prime Minister was chairman,88 in an effort to draw the unions into closer contact 
with the government during its economic U-turn (Taylor, 1978, p. 93). In 1973 11 
meetings were conducted between the Conservative Prime Minister and the leadership 
of the TUC.89 In its attempt to reach agreement on overall economic policy the 
government ended up reversing its objective of depoliticizing industrial relations. The 
government’s u-turns meant that the 1970 collapse in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy did not endure.
86 T i m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  2 5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 .  V o l .  1 0 3 ,  N o .  8 ,  p .  1 9 .
87 A R ,  T U C ,  1 9 7 3 .
88 i b i d ,  1 9 7 2 ,  p .  2 1 4
89 i b i d . ,  1 9 7 3  a n d  1 9 7 4 .
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Table 5.2: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1970
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
y-v p* * 4 l_ 1 1 p i 1 • 1**O / • v/tiân c^ in t n c  level ol xr^ cic u n i o n  p o i i o i G S  
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
A
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High M e d i u m Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
N/A
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




In Table 5.2 it is clear that none of the observable implications for either of the 
hypotheses indicated a high empirical-theoretical fit. It can also be seen that while 60 
per cent of the observable implication of the first hypothesis indicated a medium 
empirical-theoretical fit, only 14 per cent of the second hypothesis’s observable 
implications indicate a medium empirical-theoretical fit. The table confirms that there 
was no critical juncture in the TUC’s influence over public policy in 1970.
In summation, in early 1970 there was a significant, swift, but not enduring 
change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, this at a time of macroeconomic 
difficulties rather than crisis. The level of influence the trade union’s possessed over 
the previous Labour government was unacceptable to the Conservatives who came to 
power in June 1970. They were committed to change in, if not the ending of, the post­
war consensus. The view that the economy was in downturn was shared by the national 
media, political and economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and 
international organisations monitoring economic performance, and finally elected 
representatives. In response to the danger to Britain’s competitive position the 
Conservative Government’s policy came to focus upon righting the economy and 
reforming the trade union movement. A consequence of this was the introduction of the 
Industrial Relations Act of 1971. At the time the TUC’s access to the prime minister 
diminished substantially, however, its representation on government committees, and its 
overall membership level, remained largely unchanged. The government’s policies 
towards the trade unions, the economy, and the level of trade union policies 
incorporated into the government’s policies, also underwent change to the TUC’s 
disadvantage. Ultimately, this coolness towards the unions was not possessed of an 
enduring legacy, and ended in a series of dramatic u-turns two years later. It was at a 
time of macroeconomic difficulties that the unions’ influence over public policy
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changed to an extent in 1970. However, this change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy did not constitute a critical juncture as it did not possess an enduring 
legacy, and the economic was not in crisis at the time.









Potential Critical Juncture 3: The 1973 Oil Crisis and the 1974 Election
On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, with the intention of regaining 
territory lost in the war of June 1967. The Yom Kippur War ended in a truce on 24 
October. The OPEC states, meeting on 15-17 October 1973 cut back oil supplies to the 
industrial states of the west and increased their price four-fold. This created enormous 
problems for all Western Nations for several years. As Britain depended on oil for 50 
per cent of her energy needs ‘this had disastrous implications for an already grim 
balance of payments situation’ (Sked and Cook, 1979, p. 319).
National commentators, the media, the Bank of England, and domestic and 
international organisations, regarded the economy as in difficulty by 1974. The Bank of 
England (1974, p. 3) pointed out that during the last three months of 1973 the economy 
was subject to abnormal strains. As the UK had to pay a much higher price for oil than 
previously this led to a re-evaluation of fuel in general, and coal in particular. Prior to 
this the coal industry had faced years of downgrading (McKie and Cook, 1974, p. 76). 
OPEC’s decision created a major political crisis as suddenly the labour-market position 
of workers in industries competing with oil had been considerably strengthened. 
Among the groups with pay claims looming in late 1973 were the coal miners, who put 
in for a 40 per cent pay claim. After the failure of talks with Heath in Downing Street, 
they introduced an overtime ban on 12 November. The following day the government 
declared a State of Emergency.90 However, through November and December no 
settlement was found. By 30 December, the government imposed large scale power 
cuts, and reduced industry to a three-day working week, in order to conserve coal 
supplies (Childs, 2002, p. 197). ‘In short, 1973 has been a year of increasing State 
intervention in the private sector by a government elected on a contrary manifesto’
90 T i m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  2 6  N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 7 3 .  V o l .  1 0 2 ,  N o .  2 2 ,  p.  7 .
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(Gilson, 1974, p. 10). The Economist pointed out that the output of industry, and the 
incomes of families dependent upon industry, was sharply cut.91 A knock on 
consequence, highlighted by the Bank of England (1974, p. 5), was that exports 
declined in relations to imports. By the beginning of the new year the Financial Times 
argued that Britain was effectively experiencing a double recession with a winter coal
♦ • • 92 •shortfall as well a continuing oil shortfall. The current account deteriorated sharply in 
the fourth quarter of 1973, before worsening further in January (Bank of England, 1974, 
p. 4). At this time opinion polls found that over 48 per cent of the electorate considered
93 * • •that the economy would worsen rather than improve in 1974. Donaldson, writing in 
the BES (1974, p. 6), observed that ‘at the beginning of 1974, Britain is in a state of 
crisis.’ The Times simply observed that the British economy was in a terrible muddle.94 
The Guardian, stated that the economy was in worse difficulties that at any time since 
the end of the Second World War. Inflation was accelerating, growth had vanished, and 
for most people real standards of living were going down.95 A few days later the paper 
went so far as to refer to the situation facing the economy as ‘nightmarish.’96
Healey (1989, p. 32) points out that in the second half of 1973 the balance of 
payments was in deficit by over £1 billion, while the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) stood at well over £4 billion. For the Bank of England (1974, p. 
5) the two most pressing problems facing the economy in early 1974 were the balance 
of payments and inflation. But the NIESR (1973, p. 7) predicted a balance of payments 
deficit of £2.1 billion for 1974. The inflation rate, after the quadrupling of oil prices, 
rose to over 24 per cent by 1975 (Coxall and Robins, 1994, p. 29). For the public
91 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  5 - 1 1  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  11 .
92 F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  3  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  5 .
93 T i m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  2 4  D e c e m b e r ,  1 9 7 3 .  V o l .  1 0 2 ,  N o .  2 6 ,  p.  4 .
94 T h e  T i m e s ,  5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  1 1 .
95 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  1 5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1 2 .
96 i b i d ,  1 8  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1 2 .
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inflation became the most urgent problem facing the country, almost to the exclusion of 
all others (Wybrow, 2001, p. 265). Unemployment, having hovered between 1.5 and 
2.5 per cent during the 1950s and 1960s, increased sharply (Deaton, 1983, p. 237). 
Mitchell (2003, p. 168) point out that in 1974 835,000 people were unemployed, the 
highest number since 1940. However, the numbers without work were to rise to an 
annual average of 1.25 million in the period 1974-1979. Economic growth, which had 
averaged 2.8 per cent per annum between 1948-1973 plummeted to a mere 1.4 per cent 
between 1973-1979, and was negative in 1974 (Appendix D). The number of days lost 
to industrial disputes, at over 14 million, was to that time the second highest in British 
history. ‘The increase in oil prices above the October 1973 levels are estimated to have 
added about $6.25 billion to the value of imports in 1974, approximately half of the 
trade deficit of $12 billion’ (OECD, 1975, p. 18). The NIESR (1974, p, 12) observed 
that the government found itself confronted with the possibility of a simultaneous 
failure to achieve all four of it policy objectives -  adequate economic growth, full 
employment, a satisfactory balance of payments, and reasonably stable prices. 
However, the Bank of England (1974, p. 123) did point out that the first three months of 
1974 were clearly an exceptional period. Output was seriously curtailed by the shorter 
working week and the general restrictions on the use of energy in industry.
On 4 February 1974, the same day as Heath’s final meeting with the TUC, 81 
per cent of miners voted for strike action. The Times called this an economic 
catastrophe for Britain, and British industry.97 ‘Several interest associated with the 
Conservative Party began to urge Heath to call a general election on the issue of who 
governs Britain: the unions or the government?’ (Childs, 2002, 168). At first he 
demurred, but despite a flurry of activity there was no progress in reconciling the
91 i b i d . ,  6  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1 a n d  p .  1 9 .
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dispute. Three days later Heath finally called an election for 28 February. A Daily Mail 
poll released the day after the dissolution of parliament showed that if the election was 
fought purely on the issue of the miners dispute the Conservatives would have a 9 per 
cent lead over Labour.98
The tone of the Conservative’s manifesto, Firm Action for a Fair Britain, 
suggested at a final confrontation with the unions following an election victory, while 
Labour’s, Let Us Work Together -  Labour’s Way Out of the Crisis, spoke of 
reconciliation if victorious. Initially, public opinion polls suggested considerable 
support for the government in its firm stand against the miners. If it went to the country 
it could expect an increased presence in the House of Common, and consequently to 
hold the line against the miners. The voices in the press, and in the Conservative Party, 
that urged Heath to go to the country from December 1973 onwards, were not of despair 
urging abdication. They wanted the Conservatives to capitalize on what was seen as 
widespread public loathing for trade unions (Crouch, 1977, p. 248). So deeply held 
were anti-trade union views in right-wing circles that any show of trade union strength 
generated not just resistance but something akin to hysteria -  a ‘levee en masse’ of 
petit-bourgeois prejudice (Thompson, 1980, p. 39). It was at this time that right-wing 
anger at the ‘effrontery’ of trade unionism came to boiling point (Coates, 1989, p. 119). 
The Times observed that the Prime Minister seemed to be trying to paint ordinary trade 
unionists as enemies of the state.99 However, the public was soon showing sympathy 
for the miners (Wybrow, 1989, p. 105).
In the extraordinary setting of a State of Emergency, and a three-day working 
week, there began the first election campaign in British history in which industrial 
relations was the central issue (Crouch, 1979, p. 86). By January 1974 nearly 750,000
98 T h e  D a i l y  M a i l ,  8  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  5 .
99 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  6 .
226
workers had been laid off due to the three-day working week.100 The Economist warned 
that the shadow of hyperinflation hovered over Britain.101 Initially opinion polls in The 
Times and Daily Telegraph put the Tories ahead of Labour by a range of 2 to 3.9 per 
cent.102 However, as the election day drew closer this lead was reversed. By late 
January it appeared to The Economist that the TUC had wrecked Heath’s government as 
effectively as it had wrecked Wilson’s in 1969.103 The price increases on a vast range 
of foodstuffs in January were the highest since the Second World War.104 Despite this, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, insisted that a tight grip on public 
expenditure, and continued wage controls, was essential if the country was to surmount 
its economic difficulties.105 In the week before polling The Times predicted that the 
announcement by the Department of Trade and Industry of the £383 million deficit on 
visible trade in January could severely hurt the Conservatives as this was the biggest 
monthly deficit in British history.106
Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, predicted that the wider 
economic crisis meant there would be little scope for increased living standards in the 
years thereafter.107 However, elected representatives also regarded the economy as in 
crisis. At the start of the election campaign the Prime Minister admitted that the 
economy was going through a difficult patch.108 The economic difficulties, and their 
repercussions, provided ample ammunition for the opposition.109 Shadow Home Office 
Spokesman Roy Jenkins commented that the government, on its dissolution of
100 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  5 - 1 1  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  7 4 .
101 i b i d . ,  1 9 - 2 5  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  7 4 .
102 T h e  T i m e s ,  1 5  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ;  D a i l y  T e l e g r a p h ,  1 6  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 .
103 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  2 6  J a n u a r y  -  1 F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  11 .
104 F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  1 6  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
105 i b i d . ,  2 1  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  1.
106 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
107 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  1 9 - 2 5  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  1 3 .
108 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  8  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  5 .
109 F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  2 0  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
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parliament, became the only administration in history to leave the country with an 
emergency but without a parliament.110 Labour leader Wilson regarded the economic 
crisis facing Britain as unparalleled,111 and went on to say that the Conservatives had 
put the country on the road to economic ruin.112 The Guardian argued that the true 
nature of the problems facing Britain could be judged from Heath’s begging the miners
113to return to work in mid February. However, Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberals, 
condemned Heath for suggesting that the miners were the enemies of the nation while 
still trying to reach an agreement with them.114 The gravity of the situation was 
unambiguous when Heath and Wilson both pointed out, in the same edition of The 
Guardian, that whichever government came to power there was no easy way out of the 
crisis.115 Wilson went on to say that ‘on every count the handling of the nation’s 
economy by this Conservative government has been a disaster.’116 ‘We have never had 
a run of figures like these before in our history,’ observed James Callaghan of 
Labour.117
The election campaign, which ended with polling on 28 February 1974, was 
fought by Heath asking for the return of a strong government to fight inflation, a 
government that would not be forced to give in to one particular group of workers. 
However, Wilson claimed that the Conservatives were using the miners dispute to 
distract the electors from the real issue, high prices, high mortgage rates, and the 
disastrous terms negotiated by Heath for entry to the EEC (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975, 
pp. 73-74). During the campaign the Social Contract between the Labour Party and the
110 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  8  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  8.
111 i b i d . ,  9  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
112 i b i d . ,  9  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  6 .
113 i b i d . ,  1 4  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
114 i b i d . ,  1 5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  7 .
115 i b i d . ,  2 5  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  1.
116 i b i d . ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y ,  p.  1.
117 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y ,  p .  2 .
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TUC was announced. It terms were a twelve-month interval between wage settlements, 
and that negotiated increases be confined to compensating for price increases since the 
last settlement, or for anticipated future price increases before the next settlement.
The electors produced results that had never been seen in post-war politics. On 
a turnout of 78.1 per cent, the Conservatives took 297 seats to Labour’s 301. However, 
it was an election marked by the unprecedented success of the minor parties -  the 
Liberals, Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, and Ulster Unionists -  and while the 
Conservatives secured a slightly bigger share of the popular vote than Labour, it still 
ended up with less seats. For the first time since 1929 no party held an overall majority
(Childs, 2002, p. 199). However, Heath’s hopes of a reinforced mandate to govern were
118blighted by the result. The Conservatives failed in their gamble to reinforce their 
authority by an appeal to the country on who should govern through Britain’s crisis.119 
The Times argued that it was a moral defeat for Heath as when he had dissolved 
parliament he had a workable majority of 15, but afterwards had none.120
The Fall of the Conservative Government
Heath did not offer his resignation immediately. Instead he sought a Coalition with the 
Liberals on the basis that his party had gained more votes than Labour, and that the 
Conservatives and Liberals agreed on Europe and on incomes policy. The Liberals 
refused this, consequently sealing Heath’s fate. Wilson then formed the first minority 
government in Britain since 1929.121 Right-wingers Sked and Cook (1979, p. 330) 
argue that ‘for Heath the politics of confrontation ended in failure.’ ‘The Heath
118 i b i d ,  1 M a r c h ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  1.
119 i b i d ,  2  M a r c h  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  2 .
120 i b i d ,  2  M a r c h ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p. 2 .
121 T i m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  11 M a r c h ,  1 9 7 4 .  V o l .  1 0 3 ,  N o .  1 0 ,  p .  6 .
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government’s U-turn and subsequent collapse merely confirmed the conviction of those 
on the new right that the next Conservative government needed to break trade union 
power and find an alternative to social democratic Keynesian management’ (Booth, 
2001, p. 178).
During the Heath administration it became apparent that there had been a 
fundamental shift of power towards the unions. To many, in pursuing excessive wage 
demands, they appeared the root cause of national decline. The new power of trade 
unions had been underlined when Wilson failed to put In Place of Strife on the statute 
books. However, the irony was that it was Heath’s attempt to shackle this power that 
confirmed it beyond doubt.
The dire economic consequences of the oil crisis proved the undoing of the 
Conservatives. With the Conservative’s electoral defeat Labour returned to power, its 
links to the TUC reestablished after their differences of the late 1960s. This provided 
the unions with the assurance that their goals would be at the forefront of the 
government’s policies.
What the election did show was: that yet another central pillar of the 
post-war consensus -  the avoidance of the politicization of industrial 
conflict -  had finally crumbled as the preferred policy of a Conservative 
government (Crouch, 1979, p. 88).
The Labour Governments and the Social Contract
This period marked a change in the trade unions’ relationship with the government. The 
collapse of the Heath government gave Labour the opportunity to put its new schemes, 
the social contract, into effect. Thereafter began an unprecedented period of close co­
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operation between the unions and the state (Jones and Keating, 1985, p. 195). Union 
leaders were regularly consulted about government policies as part of the renewed 
corporatism of the ‘social contract.’ The period from 1974 to 1979 is seen by some 
political scientists as the time when union leaders exercised great influence, almost 
control, over the Labour governments (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995, p. 34).
There was change in the government’s economic policies. The OECD (1975, p. 
24) pointed out that although demand slowed down considerably through 1973, the 
prospect of excess demand in 1974 prompted restrictive measures from the 
Conservatives prior to their election defeat. The first change in economic policy came 
in November when public expenditure cuts of £1.2 billion were announced. At the 
same time the rate of inflation increased and the current balance of payments position 
deteriorated, largely reflecting the steep rise in commodity prices and strong domestic 
demand pressures. The jump in unemployment reflected an initial shedding of labour, 
due to the oil crisis, that was not taken back once output recovered (OECD, 1975, p. 
14). At this time opinion polls found that the public looked negatively upon the 
economic situation (Wybrow, 2001, p: 312). Many have argued that inflation, and not 
the miners’ strike, was the main issue at the heart of the election (Grant and Nath, 1984, 
p. 24). Denis Healey (1989, p. 32) remarked that when he became Chancellor he 
inherited from the Conservatives an economy that was ‘practically beyond repair.’ The 
demand management policies of the Labour government were restrictive in the first half 
of 1974. However, with output stagnant and unemployment rising, the OECD (1975, p. 
24) pointed out that Labour acted to boost demand, at first marginally in its July budget, 
and then rather more substantially in the November budget. Statutory pay controls were 
abolished in July with the TUC agreeing to voluntary restraint of pay claims under a 
wider social contract (OECD, 1975, p. 8). However, the primary reason for the July
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budget, as argued by the OECD (1975, p. 24), was the need to slow the rate of price 
increases.
The budgets of 1974 were received with rapture by the Labour movement 
as representing the first step in that irreversible transfer of wealth and 
power to working people, and their families, which we had promised in 
the election (Healey, 1989, p. 392).
The trade unions’ access to the Prime Minister changed at this time. Coates and 
Topham (1986, p. 53) argue that a TUC -  Labour Party Liaison Committee, formed in 
January 1972, with the Labour Party leader as a joint chair, ensured the unions of at 
least a monthly meeting with the Labour Prime Minister after the election of 1974. In 
fact, in 1974 the TUC met 29 times with Prime Ministers (Appendix A). They met with 
Heath four times prior to the February election,122 and with Wilson 25 times after that 
election. A further 27 meetings were conducted between the TUC and the Prime 
Minister throughout 197 5.123 This rate of meetings continued after James Callaghan 
took over from Wilson as Prime Minister in March 1976.124
Early concessions to the unions by the new Labour government, all of which 
had been set out in its manifesto included the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act and 
the Housing Finance Act. New legislation gave increased rights to trade unions, greater 
employment protection, and provided for sexual equality and equal pay. New agencies 
in the employment field, the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), and the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) were established, with trade-union involvement in their
122 AR, TUC, 1974 and 1975.
123 i b i d ,  1 9 7 5  a n d  1 9 7 6 .
124 i b i d ,  1 9 7 6  a n d  1 9 7 7 .
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running (Coates, 1980, p. 58). Representatives of both the unions and employers had 
called for the establishment of a conciliation and arbitration service independent of both 
government and civil service influence. The result was the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS), which took up formal duties in September 1974. ACAS 
was created as the embodiment of the voluntary approach to industrial relations.
‘From early 1974, under the last Wilson administration, the TUC enjoyed the 
most intimate relationship it has ever shared with a government’ (Martin, 1980, p. 299). 
The trade unions had members on about 60 advisory bodies, the number which 
increased during the years of the Labour Government (May, 1975, p. 92). The spread of 
industrial tripartiteism in the early 1970s reflected a political bipartisan attitude at the 
time.
By 1979 the TUC maintained a list of the General Council’s 
appointments to government committees and outside bodies, which 
named 67 major and subsidiary bodies, 10 of which were in the education 
field’ (Coates andTopham, 1986, p. 34).
Consequently, at this time the TUC possessed a wide range of informal contacts with 
Whitehall departments, most particularly with the Department of Employment (Marsh, 
1992b, p. 43). Throughout the 1970s the level of trade union representation on 
government committees increase gradually, but more importantly, the qualitative nature 
of this representation improved. It was the nature of the committees, as opposed to the 
number of committees, that the trade unions gained representation upon, that was of real 
importance in this case. But, as this observable implication’s significance is measured
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quantitatively, the qualitative significance of this change is missed out on to an extent 
here, and more importantly in the table below.
The Shortest Parliament Since 1681
Within a few days of the first Labour Cabinet meeting on 5 March, the miners’ strike 
was settled. Thereafter, the three-day week, and the state of emergency, came to an end. 
However, the new Labour government found itself in a difficult situation. It had no 
clear majority in Parliament, faced a terrible trade deficit, with higher inflation, 
declining production, national disputes awaiting settlement, rising nationalism in Wales 
and Scotland, the issue of the EEC unresolved, and violence in Northern Ireland. 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Wilson, not prepared to preside over a lame duck 
administration, instilled vigor in his ministers. However, the whole of the 1974 
parliament was dominated by the prospect of another general election (Childs, 2002, p. 
202).
By this time trade union membership in Britain stood at 11,764,000 (Appendix 
C). This constituted an increase of 308,800, or 2.7 per cent, over 1973. That year had 
witnessed an increase of 96,200, or 0.8 per cent, in trade union membership on 1972. 
The Labour Party’s returned to government in 1974 assured the TUC that its policy 
objectives would receive the government’s attention. In 1975 trade union membership 
increased again, this time by 3.6 per cent, or 420,000, with overall membership crossing 
the 12,000,000 mark. Trade union membership was to increase every year after 1975, 
albeit at varying rates, until it peaked in 1979 at 13,289,000. All in all, during the 
period of Labour party governments from 1974 to 1979 trade union membership 
increased by roughly 1,525,000 members or 12.96 per cent.
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Between 1973 and 1974 there was a distinct change in the level of TUC policies 
incorporated into the government’s policies towards organized labour. The TUC 
contacted the Department of Employment in February 1973 concerning its review of 
redundancy payments. However, the Secretary of Employment replied that the review 
was incomplete. When the TUC contacted the new Labour Employment Secretary in 
March 1974 a meeting was promptly arranged and their views were incorporated within 
the Employment Protection Bill.125 The TUC had made repeated representations to the 
Conservative government for an Order to be made under the Equal Pay Act, 1970, so 
women would have the statutory entitlement to at least 90 per cent of the appropriate 
male rates. However, the Conservatives had refused this.126 But the Labour
1 97government enforced the Equal Pay Act. Although the Conservatives informed the 
TUC that they would introduce anti-discrimination legislation in 1973 it was Labour 
that ultimately did so in 1974.128
Urged by the TUC the new Labour government immediately set about repealing 
the Industrial Relations Act of 1971,129 and introducing a Social Security Act.130 
Through 1973, and into 1974, the TUC first asked the Conservatives, and then Labour, 
to introduce legislation on social insurance. In April 1974 Labour introduced the 
National Insurance Bill to increase retirement pensions.131 After unsuccessfully 
pressing the Conservatives to increase unemployment benefit in 1973, Labour introduce 
a White Paper late in 1974 setting out proposals for improvements to the National 
Insurance Scheme, including unemployment benefit.132 But even under Labour the
125 i b i d . ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  5 0 .
126 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  5 1 .
127 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  5 1 .
128 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  6 2 .
129 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p.  6 8 .
130 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  8 7 .
131 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  8 9 .
132 i b i d ,  1 9 7 5 ,  p .  7 1 .
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TUC did not get things all its own way. In 1973 the TUC had sought their members 
appointment to new Authorities established under the reorganisation of the NHS. 
However, the Conservatives insisted upon appointing on managerial ability alone. 
When the TUC raised the issue with Labour in March 1974 it received a similar 
response.133 The TUC criticism of the Conservative government’s statement on 
education policy: Education: A Framework for Expansion came to naught. But with the 
change of government Labour’s Secretary of State for Education met with the unions, 
welcomed their proposals, and suggested much closer consultation with his Department 
at both the Ministerial and official level.134 The Labour Government’s March budget 
incorporated many proposals contained in the TUC’s Economic Review 1974.135 This 
was in contrast to the Conservative’s budget of 1973.136 Labour Chancellor Denis 
Healey had assured the TUC that he would take their views into account when drawing 
up his budgets.137
The shortest parliament since 1681 came to an end on 18 September, when 
Wilson called for elections on 10 October (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975). The campaign, 
a re-run of the previous one, saw Labour Party candidates returned in 319 
constituencies, an increase of 18 on February. However, the Conservatives’ presence in 
the Commons declined to 277. The Labour Party was back in government with enough 
seats to run the country. Following Heath’s second election defeat he was replaced by 
the Conservatives in February 1975 with Margaret Thatcher. She, and her associates, 
repudiated consensus Keynesianism. They favoured an economic approach based upon
133 i b i d ,  1974, p. 114.
134 i b i d ,  1974, p. 133.
135 i b i d ,  1974, p. 217.
136 i b i d ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p. 2 2 5 .
137 i b i d ,  1974, p. 231.
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tight monetary control, an anti-inflationary policy that eschewed prices and incomes 
measures but entailed unemployment, and cuts in public spending.
During the era of the Social Contract the unions played a major role in the 
evolution of public policy (Dorfman, 1983, p. 15). Overall, 1974-1978 was to see 
remarkable co-operation between the unions and the Labour Government. Barns and 
Reid (1980, p. 222) suggest that during this period the Labour Government was a 
creature of the trade unions. The unions, increasingly led by left-wingers, appreciated 
the leverage that the government’s fear of inflation provided. As a member of that 
Government admitted ‘we frequently paid a high price to obtain the cooperation of our 
trade union friends’ (Barnett, 1982 p. 60). The government ended the constraints on 
collective bargaining, while continuing and strengthening the system of price controls, 
increased pensions and raised taxes on the rich, repealed the Industrial Relations Act, 
and created ACAS. ‘After its reelection in October 1974, the government honoured its 
commitments under the Social Contract, passing the Employment Protection Act (1975) 
and amending the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (1976)’ (Marsh, 1992b, p.
However, in 1977, after two years of rigid incomes policy, the TUC was 
unwilling, due to rank-and-file pressure and wage anomalies, to agree to 
a uniform maximum figure for wage increases in the next period 
(Goodman, 1981, p. 612).
Thereafter, the Callaghan government unilaterally set the wage target. Pay increases 
were fixed at 10 per cent per annum for 1977-1978, and 5 per cent per annum for 1978- 
1979 (Wrigley, 1997, p. 126). As Denis Healey later reflected, the 5 per cent figure for
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1978-1979 was too low -  and the policy collapsed in the so-called ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ (Healey, 1989, p. 345). The ‘Winter of Discontent’ was to see Britain 
paralyzed by strikes. Holmes (1985, p. 156) argues that the crisis destroyed the 
credibility of the Labour Government as the party that could ‘work with’ the trade 
unions. The ‘social contract’ finally collapsed amid a welter of high wage demands, 
strikes, and industrial unrest.
238
Table 5.3: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1974
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High M e d i u m Low None
O l: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07 : Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
__X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High M e d i u m Low None
O l: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




As Table 5.3 makes clear, the first hypothesis’s observable implications pointed 
to a significant, swift, and enduring change in the TUC’s influence over public policy, 
while the second hypothesis’s observables pointed to a macroeconomic crisis at this 
time. In the case of the first hypothesis, 80 per cent of its observables indicated a 
medium or high empirical-theoretical fit, while 70 per cent indicated a high fit 
exclusively. For the second hypothesis all observable implications indicated a medium 
or high empirical-theoretical fit, with 87.5 per cent indicating a high fit exclusively. As 
the findings for both hypotheses far exceed the minimum 60 per cent threshold for high 
empirical-theoretical fit, this confirms that there was a critical juncture in the TUC’s 
influence over public policy in 1974.
In summation, 1974 witnessed a significant, swift, and enduring change in the 
TUC’s influence over public policy. That the economy was in crisis at this time was a 
view unanimously shared by the national media, political and economic commentators, 
the central bank, domestic and international organisations monitoring economic 
performance, and finally the elected representatives of both major parties. With 
economy in crisis, and experiencing a period of industrial relations collapse, a minority 
Labour administration came to power. A social contract already agreed with the unions, 
Labour proceeded to resolve the industrial relations problems, and implemented policies 
favourable to its union allies. Ultimately, the social contract was to give the TUC 
unprecedented access to the government, its policies, and their formulation, over the 
remainder of the 1970s. A new approach was taken towards both the economy and the 
trade unions by the new government. Consequently, the TUC’s access to the Prime 
Minister, trade union membership, government economic and industrial relations 
policies, the trade unions’ influence as seen by observers, and ministerial attitudes, all 
improved in the trade unions’ favour, with government policies in particular coming to
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reflect the policies desired by the unions themselves. The unions’ influence over public 
policy changed significantly, swiftly, and enduringly at a time of macroeconomic crisis. 
According to the observable implications criteria set out in Chapter II the change in the 
trade unions’ influence over public policy constituted a critical juncture.









Potential Critical Juncture 4: 1979-The Conservatives Return to Power
In spite of the problems the Labour government had faced since 1974 its defeat in the 
1979 general election was not a foregone conclusion. Denis Healey’s 1978 budget was 
regarded by 68 per cent of the population as fair. This made it the most acceptable 
budget since the question was first posed in 1952 (Wybrow, 1989, p. 117). As Prime 
Minister, Wilson, and then Callaghan, were far more popular than Heath had been, and 
were far more popular than Thatcher as either opposition leader or later Prime Minister 
(Parkinson, 1992). However, due to the ‘Winter of Discontent’ the government lost 
significant support (Wybrow, 1989, p. 119). In the end it was the adverse results of 
referenda on devolution for Scotland and Wales that brought the government down. On 
28 March 1979, the Labour government was defeated in the Commons by 311 votes to 
310 on a Scottish National Party (SNP) no confidence motion. The Economist observed 
that ‘the British Parliament, for the first time since 1924, asserted its constitutional right 
to vote out of office Her Majesty’s ministers and force them to call a general 
election.’138
During the general election campaign of 1979 the Labour government was not 
as willing as the Conservatives in 1974 to admit that the economy was in difficulty. 
This was simply because the situation, on the surface, did not appear as grave. 
Consequently, most, though not all, of the opinions expressed by elected representatives 
divided along partisan lines. However, mid way through the campaign Prime Minister 
Callaghan did admit that the public had suffered during the winter of 1978-79. Thatcher 
warned that to return Labour to office would be ‘to accept our national decline as 
inevitable and simply make the best of it.’ She went on to argue that there had been no 
economic progress at all under Labour.139 A couple of days later Thatcher pointed out
138 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  3 1  M a r c h  -  6  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  9 .
139 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  1 7  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p. 3 .
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that Britain’s inflation rate under Labour rule stood at 107 per cent, compared with 23 
per cent in West Germany. And that the government was responsible for the highest 
level of unemployment since the end of the Second World War.140 Conservative MP Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, who was expected to be the next Chancellor of the Exchequer, spoke of 
‘a dismal inheritance of industrial decline.’141 Denis Healey, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, admitted that unemployment was the biggest problem Labour had to deal 
with.142 David Steel, leader of the Liberal Party, declared that the election was all about 
‘how we can stop Britain sliding down hill.’143 Sir Ian Gilmour, Conservative 
spokesman on defense, argued that the average family paid two and a half times as 
much income tax in 1979 as in 1973, yet had experienced no improvements under 
Labour144
The Conservatives’ election manifesto in 1979, originally drafted by Chris 
Patten, was particularly specific. It set out as its primary priority controlling inflation 
and the trade unions.145 It pledged substantial cuts in all areas apart from the health 
service and defense. The manifesto stated that the Tories would limit the right to 
picketing, allow appeals to courts against expulsion from a union, and allow 
compensation for loss of job due to closed shop, provide public money to finance postal 
ballots, and require unions to contribute towards support of strikers. However, The 
Guardian observed that ‘while the Labour manifesto [The Labour Way is the Better 
Way] is the usual shopping list -  the Conservative manifesto is remarkably free from 
detailed pledges.’146
M0 i b i d ,  1 9  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 5 ,  p.  2 8 .
141 i b i d ,  1 M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  2 1 .
' 42 i b i d ,  1 8  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  4 .
143 i b i d ,  1 M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  2 1 .
144 i b i d ,  1 7  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  3 .
145 T h e  E c o n o m i s t  1 4 - 2 0  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 7 .
146 T h e  G u a r d i a n .  1 6  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 1 .
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Monday 1 April 1979 saw a one day civil service strike -  hardly the ideal 
backdrop for a Labour government about to fight a general election on the claim that it 
could live with the unions better than the Tories argued The Economist.147 The 
Financial Times pointed out that ‘the view remains that the issue of the trade unions and 
their relations with the government will benefit the Conservatives after the industrial 
unrest of the winter.’148 Yet, the Labour government consoled itself to the fact that the 
May election was far enough away from January and February’s strikes to render them a 
fading memory for voters.149 However, the opinion polls were running against the 
government. Newsweek pointed out that ‘the current Conservative surge springs largely 
from public fury over the endless string of strikes last January and February.’150 A 
national opinion poll in The Daily Mail in mid April put the Tories six points ahead of 
Labour.151 To compound matters, Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, remarked that the 
power of the trade unions presented the greatest challenge to the rule of law. This came 
in the wake of former Metropolitian Police Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark’s 
observation comparing the trade unions with the Nazis.152 On 3 May 1979 76 per cent 
of the voters turned out, and gave the Conservatives 339 seats in the Commons. Labour 
fell from 319 MPs to 269, while the Liberals presence in Parliament was reduced to 
only 11 seats. Newsweek observed that Thatcher’s victory reflected the disenchantment 
with Callaghan and his failure to avert the winter’s strikes.
Developments in British society were bringing changes in the political thinking 
and aspirations of the electorate. Broadly speaking, the old working class was in
147 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  7 - 1 3  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  2 5 .
148 F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  3 0  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  7 .
149 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  7 - 1 3  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  2 5 .
150 N e w s w e e k ,  9  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  2 4 .
151 T h e  D a i l y  M a i l ,  1 7  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1.
152 T h e  F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  2 1  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p. 1.
153 N e w s w e e k ,  1 4  M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p. 1 0 .
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decline, and the Conservatives were increasing their share of support amongst that class. 
However, Labour also was improving its position among the middle classes. Yet, the 
general election of 1979 is now seen as having turned on the votes of trade unionists. 
The experience of the 1970s -  the Labour government’s swing from the intimacy of the 
Social Contract to the disagreement of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ -  caused more trade 
unionists than ever before to vote Conservative (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995, p. 37).
National commentators, the media, the Bank of England, and domestic and 
international organisations, regarded the economy as in difficulty by 1979. Prior to the 
election The Economist warned that the next government would be hamstrung by a lack 
of cash, and that it could do little more than cut expenditure.154 The Guardian stated 
that neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party had a miracle cure for Britain’s 
economic ills, nor for reversing its industrial decline.155 The Times warned that things 
would get worse before they got better for Britain’s manufacturing industries.156 The 
Times went on to comment that the economic heritage of the government elected in 
1979 would be dreadful.157
Thatcher inherited an economy with unemployment at 1 million, a high level by 
post-war standards (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995, p. 38). Inflation was running at over 13
158per cent, economic growth was stagnant, and 29 million days had been lost through 
industrial disputes (Appendix D). The Bank of England (1979, p. 362) pointed out that 
this was the largest amount of days lost for any year since the general strike of 1926. 
Bone, writing in the BES (1979 p. 29), observed that during the first three months of 
1979 ‘hospitals have been under siege, schools closed, rubbish piled up in the streets,
154 T h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  1 4  -  2 0  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  1 1 .
155 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  1 M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  2 1 .
156 T h e  T i m e s ,  2 4  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  1 4 .
157 i b i d ,  2 5  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  7 .
158 T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  2 8  A p r i l  - 4  M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p.  1 3 .
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ambulance crews have refused to handle emergency calls, dead bodies have been 
unburied, and municipal airports silenced.’ The Financial Times warned that there 
would be no quick fixes for the problems with the economy.159 The inflationary spiral 
was soon to be given a further boost by another increase in OPEC oil prices in 1979- 
1980, and by the Thatcher government’s first budget that doubled the rate of VAT. The 
Bank of England (1979, p. 37) pointed out with some concern that the PSBR for the 
first half of 1979 stood at £6.5 billion. The Economist warned that Britain had 
borrowed on the collateral of North Sea oil, and without the oil the current account 
would have been far deeper in deficit.160 Despite this Morris, writing in the BES (1979, 
p. 28), warned that that ‘the current account deficit for the first half of the year [1979] 
could be as high as £2,300 million.’ The government was also burdened by the fact that 
it still had to repay almost three quarters of $3.9 billion loan it had received from the 
IMF at the time of the Sterling crisis in 1976 (Callaghan, 1987, p. 498).
Economic performance in 1979 was characterised by little growth and 
accelerating inflation. Accelerating unit labour costs, and the sizable appreciation of 
sterling, combined to give a loss of competitiveness. This not only induced imports, but 
resulted in weak export growth, entailing a substantial negative contribution to the 
growth of real GDP, and a swing in the current external account from a small surplus in
1978 to a deficit of 1.25 per cent of GDP in 1979 (OECD, 1980, p. 5). The OECD 
(1981, p. 5) pointed out that all components of domestic demand were relatively weak 
in 1979. Import penetration -  reflecting the general loss of competitiveness -  played a 
major role in the weakness of the balance of payments, which had shown a surplus of 
£966 million in 1978, but a deficit of £661 million in 1979 (Bank of England, 1979, p. 
116). The combination of higher real earnings, tax cuts, and increased transfers
159 T h e  F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s ,  2 8  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p. 2 6 .
160 i b i d ,  7 - 1 3  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  7 6 .
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exceeded the economy’s supply capacity: real personal incomes in 1978 and 1979 rose 
by about 12 per cent and real output by about 4 per cent. Consequently, there was a 
spillover into inflation and imports. These developments meant that the benefits of 
rising North Sea oil production were used to finance consumption rather than 
productive investment (OECD, 1980, p. 46). The Bank of England (1979, p. 109) 
warned that the consequence of failing to arrest the country’s economic decline was 
likely to become more pressing as time went on. Condemned to very slow growth, the 
British people might even have to accept declines in real living standards. Opinion 
polls found that the public saw the cost of living at the primary problem facing the 
country, but that unemployment had also become a grave concern (Wybrow, 2001, p. 
267).
Bone (1979, p. 33) points out that:
There is an interesting parallel that can be drawn between the way in 
which a previous Parliament came to an end in 1974 and how this 
Parliament has ended. Although details are different, the collapse of the 
Heath Government five years ago and the industrial relations troubles of 
Mr. Callaghan both follow an intense three-year effort to combat 
inflation by controlling wage rises.
The period between 1979 and 1981 was to constitute the worst economic recession of 
the post-war years. GDP at constant prices declined by over 3 per cent between 1979 
and 1981, before beginning to grow again, while manufacturing output over the same 
period fell by 14 per cent (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995, p. 39). Unemployment increased
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from 4.6 per cent in 1979 to 9.0 per cent, or 2.8 million people, by 1981, almost 
doubling in the space of just two years (Appendix D).
The cause of the recession in 1979-1981 was partly the worldwide recession, 
and partly the Government’s economic policy, itself a reaction to the economy it 
inherited. The Conservative Government in its battle against inflation, which it saw as 
the greatest economic evil, pursued a tight monetary policy, raised interest rates to a 
peak of 17 per cent, sought reductions in public expenditure, and removed all exchange 
controls. The effect of high interest rates, and an emerging balance of payments surplus 
as a result of North Sea oil, boosted the exchange rate of the pound against the dollar to 
an unrealistic level for British exporters.
In retrospect, the ‘Winter of Discontent’ marked an important watershed for the 
Labour Government, the Conservative opposition, and the trade unions. As a result of 
trade union unrest, and Jim Callaghan’s decision not to call an election in autumn 1978, 
the Conservatives won the election when it was held in May 1979 (Richardson, 1993, p. 
95). The decision not to hold the general election in October 1978 put the Labour 
government’s fate at the mercy of the unions’ bargaining behaviour during the winter 
(Crouch, 1979, p. 106). Thatcher became prime minister in 1979, at least in part, 
because of the unpopularity of the unions resulting from the winter of 1978-1979 
(Edwards and Bain, 1988, p. 320). In addition, the unrest strengthened the resolve of 
the Conservatives to reform the trade unions, hardened up their proposals, and increased 
public support for such reform. At this time public opinion was extremely negative 
concerning the economic situation the country found itself in, and its prospects for 
recovery (Wybrow, 2001, p. 314).
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The Economist argued that the level of interference by the Labour government in the 
private sector, by attempting to assert control over it by removing its two major 
disciplines -  the threat of bankruptcy and the threat of unemployment -  would have to 
end. Political support for such industries as aviation, shipbuilding, and cars was having 
an incalculable impact on the economy in terms of labour immobility and more 
productive investment opportunities foregone.161 ‘The unions are to modem 
governments what the French barons were to medieval kings,’ argued The Economist, 
‘an ever-present threat to their political stability to be met alternately with bribes or 
armies.’162 If Britain was to go into the 21st century a pluralist democracy, continued 
The Economist, there had to be a switch of emphasis back to private wealth creation and
163private choice.
There was change in the government’s economic policies. ‘The Conservatives 
came to power in 1979 with a mandate to embark upon a new direction in economic 
policy’ (Booth, 2001, p. 180).
If the radicalism of a government is to be measured by the extent to 
which it is prepared to break with the dominant assumptions of the 
governments that have gone before it, then the Conservative Government 
that returned to office in 1979 must count amongst the most radical 
governments of the century (Coates, 1989, p. 113).
Thatcher and the Trade Unions
161 i b i d ,  1 4 - 2 0  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 1 .
162 i b i d ,  1 4 - 2 0  A p r i l ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 1 .
163 i b i d ,  2 8  A p r i l - 4  M a y ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 6 .
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Thatcher, and the bulk of her cabinet colleagues, entered office determined to pursue a 
significantly different set of policies to those that had constituted the corporatism of 
earlier Labour and Conservative administrations. They entered office also committed to 
a set of ideas significantly at variance with those accepted as commonplace in the ruling 
circles in Britain since 1945. The Thatcher Government believed in the value of 
inequality, in the desirability of self-help and the importance of individuality, and set its 
face against the egalitarian aspirations of the welfare state and the collective strength of 
organized trade unions. It accepted the idea that markets left to themselves perform 
better for all their participants than do markets subject to government direction and 
control. ‘It was also convinced that economic decline, unemployment, and inflation 
were all to be explained by the excessive role of successive post-war British 
governments’ (Coates, 1989, p. 113). ‘They were committed to ‘roll back’ the state, to 
implement tougher policies on trade unions, welfare benefits and aid to uncompetitive 
industry, and with the ultimate goal of lowering taxes’ (Booth, 2001, p. 180). The BES 
(1979, p. 1) points out that first step in this direction was taken with Sir Geoffrey 
Howe’s budget, which lowered the standard rate of income tax from 33 to 30 per cent, 
reduced public expenditure by £1.5 billion, and set a limit of 7-11 per cent on the annual 
rate of increase in M3.
The gradual accretion of the TUC’s role as general representative of the unions’ 
economic interests was accompanied by growing centralization of decision-making. 
Policy initiative came almost exclusively from the General Council, which itself merely 
endorsed the detailed proposals generated within the TUC committee structure. In 1979 
438 trade union organizations were officially recorded, with an aggregate membership 
of 13.28 million members, an all time high. Trade union density peaked at 55.4 per cent 
(Price and Bain, 1983, p. 47). The TUC affiliates constituted 108 trade unions, with a
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t o t a l  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  1 1 .6  m i l l i o n  ( H y m a n ,  1 9 8 3 ,  p p .  3 6 - 3 7 ) .  T h e  p r e v io u s  y e a r  o v e r a l l  
t r a d e  u n io n  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  B r i t a i n  s t o o d  a t  1 3 ,1 1 2 ,0 0 0  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .  T h i s  in  i t s e l f  h a d  
b e e n  a n  in c r e a s e  o f  2 .1  p e r  c e n t ,  o r  2 6 6 , 0 0 0  m e m b e r s ,  o v e r  1 9 7 7 .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  ra te  
o f  g r o w t h  in  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  s la c k e n e d  t o  1 .4  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 7 9  w a s  a  r a t h e r  
o m i n o u s  s ig n  in  s p i t e  o f  o v e r a l l  m e m b e r s h ip  r e a c h in g  n e w  h e ig h t s .  T h i s  g r o w t h  ra te  
w a s  t h e  lo w e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  in c r e a s e  in  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  s i n c e  0 .8  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 7 3 . In  
f a c t ,  it  w a s  l o w e r  t h a n  in  a n y  o f  t h e  in t e r v e n in g  y e a r s  o f  L a b o u r  P a r t y  r u le .  Y e t ,  w i t h in  
a  f e w  y e a r s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a d  c h a n g e d  d r a m a t i c a l l y ,  w i t h  t h e  u n io n s  s u f f e r in g  a n  
e n o r m o u s  lo s s  o f  p o w e r  a n d  m e m b e r s h ip .  W h a t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  T U C  h a d  s t i l l  p o s s e s s e d  
o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  w h i l e  u n d e r  t h e  e s t r a n g e d  m i n o r i t y  L a b o u r  a d m in is t r a t i o n  c e a s e d  to  
e x is t .
T h e r e  w a s  c h a n g e  in  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  o r g a n i z e d  la b o u r .  In
1 9 7 9  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  u n i o n  p o w e r  w a s  a  p r o b l e m  p r o v e d  a  v o t e  w i n n i n g  is s u e  f o r  th e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e s  ( M a r s h ,  1 9 9 2 b ,  p .  6 5 ) .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s p h i l o s o p h y  c o n t a in e d  e le m e n t s  
t h a t  w e r e  d i s t i n c t l y  ‘ l i b e r a l ’ in  t h e  n in e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  s e n s e  o f  t h a t  t e r m  -  a  p h i l o s o p h y  
o f  ‘ t h e  f r e e  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  s t r o n g  s t a t e ’ ( G a m b l e ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 ) . It w a s  a  p h i l o s o p h y  th a t  
w a s  e x p l i c i t l y  a n d  d e f i n i t e l y  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i s t  in s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  d o m in a n t  p o l i c y  
c o m m i t m e n t s  o f  t h e  p o s t - w a r  s e t t le m e n t .  T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  c a m e  t o  p o w e r  p le d g e d  t o  
r e f o r m  t h e  u n io n s .  I t  p l a n n e d  t o  le g is la t e  o n  t h r e e  f r o n t s ;  s e c o n d a r y  p ic k e t i n g ;  th e  
c l o s e d  s h o p ;  a n d  p u b l i c  f in a n c e  t o  a s s i s t  s e c r e t  b a l lo t s  ( H o d g k i n s o n ,  1 9 7 9 , p . 1). T h i s  
s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g le .  A t  t h a t  t im e  t h e  s t a n d in g  o f  t h e  u n io n s  a m o n g  th e  
g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  w a s  a t  a n  a l l  t im e  lo w .  A n  o p i n i o n  p o l l  in  1 9 7 9  s h o w e d  t h a t  o n l y  51 p e r  
c e n t  o f  t h e  a d u l t  p o p u l a t i o n  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  w e r e  a  g o o d  t h in g  f o r  B r i t a in  
a s  a  w h o l e ,  d o w n  s i x  p o in t s  o n  t h e  y e a r  b e f o r e  ( W y b r o w ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p .  1 6 0 ) .  T h i s  f ig u r e  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  t a k e  o n  t h e  u n io n s ,  d e s p it e  th e
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a p p a r e n t  s t r e n g t h  s u g g e s t e d  b y  t h e i r  h i g h  m e m b e r s h i p  le v e ls .  T h e  ‘ W i n t e r  o f  
D i s c o n t e n t ’ e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n v i n c e d  la r g e  s e c t io n s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  p u b l i c  t h a t  th e  t r a d e  
u n io n s  w e r e  in  n e e d  o f  r e f o r m .  T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  w e r e  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  c a r r y  t h is  r e f o r m  
t h r o u g h  ( T h a t c h e r ,  1 9 9 3 ,  p . 4 0 ) .
T h a t c h e r i s m  c a m e  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  g r e a t  m o v e  t o  t h e  r ig h t  ( H a l l ,  1 9 8 3 ) .  S o  
t r a u m a t ic  h a d  b e e n  L a b o u r ’ s  f a i l u r e  t o  c r e a t e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  c o r p o r a t i s t  s o c i a l i s m  b a s e d  o n  
p r o d u c e r  g r o u p s  t h a t  M a r g a r e t  T h a t c h e r ’ s  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  w e r e  t h e n  a b le  t o  p e r s u a d e  
w i d e  s e c t io n s  o f  s o c i e t y  t h a t  t h e i r  f r e e d o m  a s  c o n s u m e r s  c o u l d  o n l y  b e  e n h a n c e d  i f  t h e  
p o w e r  o f  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p s  in  t h e  la b o u r  m a r k e t  w a s  n o t  m e r e l y  f r o z e n  b u t  w a s  a c t u a l ly  
r e d u c e d .  It w a s  q u i t e  a n  a c h ie v e m e n t :  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p o p u la t io n  th a t  
t r a d e  u n i o n s  a r e  a  b a d  t h in g  a n d  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l i s t  m o n o p o l i e s  a  g o o d  o n e ,  a t  t h e  v e r y  
t im e  w h e n  c a p i t a l i s t  c o n c e r n s  w e r e  l e a v i n g  la r g e  n u m b e r s  o f  p e o p l e  u n e m p lo y e d  
( C o a t e s ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p . 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 ) .
A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  u n i o n s  t h e r e  w a s  a ls o  a  g e n e r a l  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  in  B r i t a i n  w it h  
t r ip a r t i t i s m ,  a n d  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t io n is t  p o l i c i e s  a im e d  a t  s o l v i n g  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s 
e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s .  T h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  G o v e r n m e n t  in  1 9 7 9  m a r k e d  th e  
r e j e c t io n  o f  i n c o m e s  p o l i c i e s  a n d  m a n y  f o r m s  o f  m a j o r  g o v e r n m e n t  in t e r v e n t io n  in  t h e  
e c o n o m y .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  p r o m i s e d  a  r e t u r n  t o  a  m o r e  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  a p p r o a c h  
t o  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y ,  r e l y i n g  u p o n  s t r ic t  m o n e t a r i s t  m e a s u r e s  t o  c o n t r o l  in f la t io n .  I f  t h is  
m e a n t  h i g h e r  u n e m p l o y m e n t  t h e n  t h a t  w a s  a c c e p t e d  a s  a  s h o r t - t e r m  c o n s e q u e n c e .
T h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 8 0 ,  p .  2 9 )  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e ’ s  e le c t io n  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  c h a n g e d  t o w a r d s  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  o n  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  
m o n e y  s u p p l y ,  a n d  a  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  c o n s is t e n t  w i t h  t h is  a n d  t h e  f r e e  w o r k i n g  o f  m a r k e t  
f o r c e s .  T h i s  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  p r o g r a m m e  d i f f e r e d  r a d i c a l l y  f r o m  e a r l i e r  a p p r o a c h e s .  
T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s l u g g i s h  o u t p u t  g r o w t h ,  s t r o n g  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  w e a k
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b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  p o s i t i o n ,  h a d  n o t  p r o v e d  a m e n a b le  t o  s o l u t i o n  b y  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s  a d o p t e d  p r e v i o u s l y  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  2 9 ) .  I n  t h e  J u n e  b u d g e t  t h e  p r e v io u s  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  p la n s  f o r  1 9 7 9 / 8 0 , p r e s e n t e d  in  t h e i r  A p r i l  b u d g e t ,  
w e r e  c u t  in  o r d e r  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  P S B R  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  3 6 ) .  A t  t h e  s a m e  
t i m e  p e r s o n a l  i n c o m e  t a x  r a t e s  w e r e  r e d u c e d ,  a n d  V A T  w a s  in c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n t ia l ly .  
T h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 8 0 ,  p .  2 9 )  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  in  e s s e n c e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  a t t e m p t in g  t o  p u t  
t h e  e c o n o m y ,  o v e r  t h e  m e d i u m  t e r m ,  o n t o  a  r e l a t i v e l y  r a p i d  n o n - i n f l a t i o n a r y  g r o w t h  
p a t h  b y  d i m i n i s h i n g  t h e  r o le  o f  t h e  s ta te  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  g i v i n g  g r e a t e r  e c o n o m i c  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t h r o u g h  i m p r o v i n g  in c e n t i v e s  t o  e n t e r p r is e ,  in n o v a t io n ,  
a n d  e f f i c i e n t  w o r k i n g .  I n  o r d e r  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  i m b a l a n c e s  in  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  a n d  c r e a t e  a  
m o r e  s t a b le  e n v i r o n m e n t  in  w h i c h  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c t o r  c o u l d  o p e r a t e  w it h  g r e a t e r  
c e r t a in t y ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  it s  in t e n t io n  t o  e s c h e w  f r e q u e n t  c h a n g e s  o f  p o l i c y  
i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  s h o r t - t e r m  m o v e m e n t s  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  1 9 ) .
T h e  m a i n  in s t r u m e n t  o f  t h e  n e w  a p p r o a c h  w a s  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ,  t h e  e m p h a s is  
g i v e n  t o  m o n e t a r y  f a c t o r s  b e i n g  s o m e w h a t  g r e a t e r  t h a n  in  p r e v i o u s  y e a r s  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 0 ,  
p . 2 6 ) .  I n  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e s e  a im s ,  p u b l i c  e x p e n d it u r e  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P  d e c l in e d  
o v e r  t h e  m e d i u m  t e r m ,  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s t a r t e d  t o  s e l l  o f f  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  h o ld in g s  in  
in d u s t r y .  F i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r  a n d  r e g io n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
p r o g r a m m e s  w e r e  a l s o  r e d u c e d .  I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  m a j o r  r e v i s i o n  o f  in d u s t r ia l ,  
e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  f o l l o w i n g  m i d - 1 9 7 9  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 7 ) .
T h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 8 2 ,  p .  1 6 )  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  in  l i n e  w i t h  it s  m a r k e t - o r ie n t a t e d  
p h i l o s o p h y  t h e  n e w  G o v e r n m e n t ,  in  a  m a j o r  c h a n g e  o f  lo n g - s t a n d in g  p o l i c y ,  r e la x e d  
e x c h a n g e  c o n t r o l s  i n  J u n e  a n d  J u l y  1 9 7 9  a n d  t h e n  a b o l i s h e d  t h e m  t o w a r d s  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  
y e a r .  T h e  B a n k  o f  E n g l a n d  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 3 7 8 )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h i s  r e m o v e d  a  d is t o r t io n  in  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  t h a t  c o u l d  n o w  f r e e l y  d i r e c t  r e s o u r c e s  t o  e i t h e r  o v e r s e a s  o r  d o m e s t i c
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in v e s t m e n t s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h e r e  t h e  b e s t  r e t u r n  w a s  e x p e c t e d .  I n  o r d e r  t o  b r e a k  o u t  o f  
t h e  h i g h - i n f l a t i o n / s l o w - g r o w t h  t r a p ,  a n d  a d j u s t  t o  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
a d o p t e d  a  f r e s h  a p p r o a c h  w h i c h  p l a c e d  g r e a t e r  e m p h a s is  t h a n  in  t h e  p a s t  o n  s t a b le  
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  in c r e a s e d  m a r k e t  o r ie n t a t io n  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  
a n d  o n  a  s m a l l e r  r o le  f o r  t h e  S t a t e  c o n f i n e d  t o  s e t t in g  a  c o n s is t e n t  f r a m e w o r k  w i t h in  
w h i c h  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r is e  a n d  in i t i a t i v e  c o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 1 , p .  6 5 ) .
T h e  T h a t c h e r  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  h o s t i le  t o w a r d s  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  a n d  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c s  o f  ‘ b e e r  a n d  s a n d w ic h e s  a t  N u m b e r  T e n ’ c a m e  t o  a  s h a r p  e n d  in  
1 9 7 9 .  It w a s  a ls o  p r o b a b l y  t h e  f i r s t  g o v e r n m e n t  t h is  c e n t u r y  t h a t  a c t i v e l y  d is c o u r a g e d  
c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  a s  p a r t  o f  its  p u r s u i t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  a n d  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i s m  
( V i s s e r  a n d  V a n  R u y s s e v e l d t ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p p .  4 7 - 4 8 ) .  H e a t h ’ s  d e f e a t  in  F e b r u a r y  1 9 7 4  h a d  
l e f t  a n  i n d e l i b l e  m a r k  o n  t h e  p a r t y  t o  p u t  t h e  u n io n s  in  t h e i r  p la c e ,  m o v i n g  t h e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e s  t o w a r d s  a  p o l i c y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  ( Y o u n g ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p .  7 5 ) .  G a m b l e  ( 1 9 8 8 ,  
p . 1 0 3 )  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  s p e c t e r  o f  in d u s t r ia l  m i l i t a n c y  h a u n t e d  p a r t y  t h in k e r s .
T h e  u n i o n s  t h e m s e l v e s  w e r e  in  n o  m o o d  f o r  a n  i m m e d i a t e  f ig h t  w it h  th e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h a t c h e r  p o s s e s s e d  a  s t r o n g  s t r a t e g ic  p o s i t i o n  in  r e la t io n  to  
t h e m  ( J o n e s  a n d  K a v a n a g h ,  1 9 9 4 ,  p .  2 2 7 ) .  T h e  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n  a n d ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  
d r a m a t i c a l l y  r i s i n g  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  d e i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  w e a k e n e d  t h e  u n i o n s ’ 
p o s i t i o n  ( E d w a r d s  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 2 ) .  C h a n g e s  in  t r a d e  u n i o n  le a d e r s h ip ,  t o g e t h e r  w it h  th e  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  T U C  t o  e x e r c i s e  a  le a d e r s h ip  r o le ,  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  m o v e m e n t  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  
b e  w e a k e r  in  it s  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  n e w  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a n  it  h a d  b e e n  i n  1 9 7 0  w h e n  H e a t h  
w a s  e le c t e d .  T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  m a in t a in e d  t h e  in i t ia t iv e  b y  f r e e z i n g  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s  
o u t  o f  t o p  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  m a k i n g .  T h a t c h e r  m e t  w i t h  T U C  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  o n l y  s ix  
t im e s  b e t w e e n  M a y  1 9 7 9  a n d  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 1  ( M i t c h e l l ,  1 9 8 7 ,  p .  5 1 3 ) .  S h e  s a w  t h e m  a s  
a t  b e s t  i r r e le v a n t ,  a n d  a t  w o r s t  a  d a n g e r .  T h i s  w a s  in  s t a r k  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  1 7  m e e t in g s
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c o n d u c t e d  b e t w e e n  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  C a l l a g h a n  a n d  t h e  T U C  t h r o u g h o u t  1 9 7 8 ,  a n d  t h e  
f u r t h e r  1 7  m e e t i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e m  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  m o n t h s  o f  1 9 7 9  ( A p p e n d i x  A ) .  T h e  
t r a d e  u n i o n s  f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  e x p e l l e d  f r o m  t h e  c o r r i d o r s  o f  p o w e r .
T h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ r e p r e s e n t a t io n  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m m i t t e e s  u n d e r w e n t  c h a n g e .  
U n d e r  T h a t c h e r  t h e r e  w a s  a  r e a c t io n  a g a in s t  t h e  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  in t e r e s t  g r o u p s  in  
p o l i c y m a k i n g  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h is  w a s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  j o b  ( P u n n e t t ,  1 9 8 7 , p .  1 5 4 -  
1 5 5 ) .  T h a t c h e r  d i d  n o t  d e s t r o y  a t  a  s t r o k e  t h e  t r ip a r t i t e  in s t i t u t i o n s .  C o n g r e s s  H o u s e  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  a p p o i n t  it s  n o m i n e e s  t o  s t a t u t o r y  t r ip a r t i t e  b o d i e s  l i k e  A C A S ,  t h e  M S C  a n d  
t h e  E q u a l  O p p o r t u n i t i e s  C o m m i s s i o n  ( E O C ) .  B u t  t h e s e  n o m i n e e s  e x e r c i s e d  a t  b e s t  o n l y  
a  l i m i t e d  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  c o n t e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c i e s .
B y  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 1 ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  a b o l i s h e d  b e t w e e n  f i v e  a n d  s ix  
h u n d r e d  q u a n g o s  ( o u t  o f  t h r e e  t h o u s a n d  i n  1 9 7 9 ) .  T h o s e  a b o l i s h e d  t h a t  
s e e m e d  o f  s o m e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  T U C  -  t h e  E n e r g y  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  
t h e  C o n s t r u c t i o n  I n d u s t r y  M a n p o w e r  B o a r d  -  a c t u a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  v e r y  
s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  c o n t a c t s  i n  t h e  L a b o u r  y e a r s  ( M i t c h e l l ,  1 9 8 7 ,  
p ,  5 1 1 ) .
T h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a d v i s o r y  b o d i e s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m m it t e e s  o n  w h i c h  
t h e  T U C  h a d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  p r o v e d  g r a d u a l .  T h e  M S C  w a s  n o t  c lo s e d  u n t i l  1 9 8 8  
( C r o u c h ,  1 9 9 0 ,  p .  3 4 1 ) .  T h e  N E D C  w a s  s p a r e d  T h a t c h e r ’ s  a x e ,  a n d  a b o l i s h e d  f i n a l l y  b y  
J o h n  M a j o r  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 3 .  B u t  i t s  s c o p e  o f  w o r k  h a d  b e e n  r e s t r ic t e d ,  a n d  its  
s e c r e t a r ia t  r e d u c e d  t o  a  p i t i f u l  r u m p . 164
164 A R ,  T U C , 1994.
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T h e  n e w  g o v e r n m e n t  m a d e  m o n e t a r y  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  l o w  i n f l a t i o n  it s  p r io r i t y .  
U n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  S i r  K e i t h  J o s e p h ,  T h a t c h e r  g a i n e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  id e a s  o f  E n o c h  
P o w e l l ,  F r i e d r i c h  v o n  H a y e k ,  a n d  M i l t o n  F r i e d m a n ,  w h o  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  h i g h  in f la t io n  
w a s  t h e  c e n t r a l  p r o b l e m  f r o m  w h i c h  a l l  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  d e r iv e d .  J o s e p h  
w a s  a  k e y  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  T h a t c h e r i s m .  H i s  p a m p h le t ,  Solving the Union 
Problem is the Key to B rita in’s Recovery, a r g u e d  t h a t  u n i o n  p o w e r  s h o u l d  b e  r e d u c e d ,  
a s  it  w a s  p r e v e n t i n g  n a t io n a l  e c o n o m i c  r e c o v e r y .  ‘ P o l i t i c i a n s  e s p o u s i n g  s u c h  v i e w s  
t o t a l l y  a l t e r e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  s u r r o u n d i n g  t r a d e  u n i o n i s m ’ ( C o a t e s ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p . 1 2 0 ) .  
T h a t c h e r ’ s  g o v e r n m e n t  ‘ r e j e c t e d  r e l i a n c e  o n  a c t iv e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  in  f a v o u r  o f  e f f o r t s  t o  
s e c u r e  b a la n c e d  b u d g e t s ’ ( H a l l ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  9 1 ) .  I n  t h e  e y e s  o f  m a n y  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  th e  
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  u n io n s  w a s  l a r g e l y  t o  b la m e  f o r  B r i t a i n ’ s r e l a t i v e l y  p o o r  p o s t - w a r  
e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  s in c e  a c t in g  t o g e t h e r  u n i o n s  w i e l d e d  m o r e  t h a n  s u f f i c i e n t  p o w e r  
t o  p r e v e n t  m a r k e t s  f r o m  w o r k i n g  f r e e l y .
B e t w e e n  1 9 7 8  a n d  1 9 7 9  t h e r e  w a s  a  m a r k e d  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  T U C  p o l i c i e s  
in c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  o r g a n i z e d  la b o u r .  T h e  L a b o u r  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p r o p o s a l s  o n  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  u s u a l l y  m e t  w i t h  u n i o n  a p p r o v a l ,  a s  t h e y  
h a d  b e e n  r e a c h e d  j o i n t l y .  H o w e v e r ,  in  M a y  1 9 7 9  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ’ p r o p o s a ls  o n  
p i c k e t i n g ,  t h e  c l o s e d  s h o p ,  a n d  s e c r e t  b a l lo t s  w e r e  s i m p l y  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  u n i o n s . 165 
T h e  T U C  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e s e  p r o p o s a ls  w o u l d  r e s t r ic t  t h e  in t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  m e m b e r s . 166 
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a l s o  i n f o r m e d  t h e  T U C  o f  it s  in t e n t io n  t o  d o u b l e  t h e  q u a l i f y i n g  p e r io d  
f o r  u n f a i r  d i s m i s s a l . 167 T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ’ J u n e  1 9 7 9  b u d g e t  c u t s  t o  t h e  M a n p o w e r  
S e r v i c e s  S c h e m e  m e a n t  t h a t  p r o g r a m m e s  a d v o c a t e d  b y  t h e  T U C ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  Y o u t h  
O p p o r t u n i t i e s  S c h e m e ,  w e r e  e i t h e r  c u r t a i le d  o r  s c r a p p e d . 168 T h e  T U C  a d v o c a t e d
165 ib id ,  1979, p. 33.
166 ib id ,  1979, p. 76.
167 ib id ,  1979, p. 34.
168 ib id ,  1979, p. 15.
256
H o m e w o r k e r s  ( P r o t e c t io n )  B i l l ,  t h a t  L a b o u r  p u t  b e f o r e  t h e  C o m m o n s ,  w a s  s u b s e q u e n t ly  
d r o p p e d  b y  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s . 169
H o w e v e r ,  n o t  e v e r y t h i n g  w e n t  a g a in s t  t h e  u n io n s .  I n  1 9 7 8  t h e  T U C  p u s h e d  
L a b o u r  t o  in c r e a s e  p e n s i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  f e l l  p r i o r  t o  p a s s in g  t h e  le g is la t io n .  
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h e y  w o u l d  im p le m e n t  th e  
in c r e a s e s  a g r e e d  b y  t h e i r  p r e d e c e s s o r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  T U C  la t e r  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  th e  
in c r e a s e s  w e r e  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e y  h a d  p r o p o s e d . 170 T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
v i e w s  o n  t h e  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  N H S  a ls o  m e t  w i t h  t h e  T U C ’ s  d i s a p p r o v a l ,  a s  it  
a t t a c h e d  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  a l l  c i t i z e n s  h a v i n g  e q u a l  o p p o r t u n i t ie s  t o  r e c e i v e  m e d ic a l  
c a r e . 171 I n  J u l y  1 9 7 9  t h e  T U C  d e m a n d e d  c o n s u l t a t io n  w i t h  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  o f  th e  
E x c h e q u e r  p r i o r  t o  b u d g e t a r y  d e c i s i o n s  b e in g  t a k e n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  d e m a n d  w a s  
i g n o r e d . 172 T h e  u n i o n s  a ls o  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p la n s  f o r  s e l l i n g  o f f  th e
1 7^
p r o f i t a b l e  p a r t s  o f  n a t i o n a l i s e d  in d u s t r ie s .  T h e  T U C ’ s  c a l l  f o r  in c r e a s e d  s p e n d in g  o n  
h o u s i n g  c a m e  t o  n o t h i n g ,  a s  t h e  J u n e  b u d g e t  s a w  r e d u c t io n s  i n  p u b l i c  e x p e n d it u r e  o n  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  £ 2 5 0  m i l l i o n .  I n  A u g u s t  t h e  T U C  m e t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  
E n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  H o u s i n g  a n d  C o n s t r u c t i o n .  A t  t h is  m e e t in g  t h e  T U C  
r e f e r r e d  t o  it s  r e la t io n s  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  s t r e s s e d  t h e  v a lu e  o f  
a d v a n c e d  c o n s u l t a t i o n  t o  l i t t le  e f f e c t . 174 T h e  o n e  s u c c e s s  t h e  u n i o n  h a d  w a s  w h e n  th e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e  T r a n s p o r t  M i n i s t e r  a g r e e d  t o  k e e p  t h e m  i n f o r m e d  r e g a r d in g  t h e  p la n s  to  
c l o s e  s o c i a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  b u s  r o u t e s  d u e  t o  c o s t . 175
169 ib id ,  1979, p. 42.
170 ib id ,  1979, p. 89.
171 ib id ,  1979, pp . 136-137.
172 ib id ,  1979, p. 284 .
173 ib id ,  1979, p. 305.
174 ib id ,  1979, p. 309.
175 ib id ,  1979, p. 345.
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T h e  u n i o n s ’ l e g a l  p r i v i l e g e s  b e c a m e  t h e  t a r g e t  o f  a t t a c k  f o r  t h e  n e w  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h t .  V o n  
H a y e k ,  N o b e l  P r i z e  w i n n e r  in  e c o n o m i c s ,  n a m e d  u n i o n  p o w e r  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  th e  
e c o n o m i c  d e c l i n e  o f  B r i t a i n  ( R i c h a r d s o n ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p .  2 1 9 ) .  I n  h i s  v i e w  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s  
o w e d  t h e i r  in o r d i n a t e  p o w e r  t o  t h e  la w  ( v o n  H a y e k ,  1 9 8 4  p .  5 5 ) .  H i s  w r i t in g s  p r o v e d  a n  
im p o r t a n t  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e ’ s  l e g i s l a t i v e  a s s a u l t  o n  t h e  u n io n s  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .  
‘ T h e r e  c a n  b e  n o  s a l v a t i o n  f o r  B r i t a i n  u n t i l  t h e  s p e c i a l  p r i v i l e g e s  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  t r a d e  
u n i o n s  a r e  r e m o v e d , ’ ( v o n  H a y e k ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p . 5 2 ) .
J a m e s  P r i o r ,  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  E m p l o y m e n t  u n t i l  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 1 ,  
i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  E m p l o y m e n t  A c t  1 9 8 0 .  T h i s  m o d i f i e d  t h e  A c t s  o f  1 9 7 4  a n d  1 9 7 6 ,  
b r o u g h t  in  b y  t h e  p r e v i o u s  L a b o u r  a d m in is t r a t i o n .  T h e  n e w  A c t  r e s t r ic t e d  la w f u l  
p i c k e t i n g ,  m a d e  it  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a c k  c o n s c i e n t i o u s  o b j e c t o r s  t o  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h ip ,  a n d  
r e s t r ic t e d  l e g a l  i m m u n i t i e s  f o r  s y m p a t h y  s t r ik e s ,  b l a c k i n g ,  a n d  b l o c k a d i n g .  P r i o r  d id  
n o t  g o  f a r  e n o u g h  f o r  T h a t c h e r ,  a n d  s h e  r e p la c e d  h i m  w i t h  t h e  r ig h t - w in g e r  N o r m a n  
T e b b i t  ( W r i g l e y ,  1 9 9 7 ,  p .  2 0 ) .  W i t h  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t  o f  T e b b i t  c o n t a c t  b e t w e e n  th e  
u n i o n s  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e c r e a s e d  f u r t h e r .  T e b b i t  ( 1 9 8 8 ,  p .  5 6 )  a s s e r t e d  ‘ I s c a r c e l y  
s a w  t h e m  [ t h e  u n i o n  le a d e r s ]  a t  a l l  e x c e p t  a t m e e t in g s  o f  “ N e d d y  [ N E D C ] . ” ’ U n d e r  
T e b b i t ’ s  1 9 8 2  E m p l o y m e n t  A c t  u n i o n  le g a l  i m m u n i t i e s  w e r e  e r o d e d ,  a n d  t h e  c lo s e d  
s h o p  w a s  f u r t h e r  u n d e r m i n e d  ( T e b b i t ,  1 9 8 8 ) .  F o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  1 9 0 6  t h e  A c t  m a d e  
t r a d e  u n i o n  f u n d s  l i a b l e  t o  c l a i m s  f o r  d a m a g e  f r o m  e m p l o y e r s  f o r  lo s s e s  i n c u r r e d  a s  a  
r e s u l t  o f  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  t r a d e  d is p u t e  ( M a r s h  a n d  K i n g ,  1 9 8 7 ) .  S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e  u n io n s  
h a r d l y  t a l k e d  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  f o r  t w o  y e a r s  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  T U C  
C o n f e r e n c e  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 3 .  ‘ O v e r a l l ,  t h e  T U C  h a d  l i t t le  c o n t a c t  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t  
a n d  v i r t u a l l y  n o  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  p o l i c y ’ ( M a r c h ,  1 9 9 2 a ,  p .  7 1 ) .  T h e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  w e r e  ‘ t h e  f i r s t  s in c e  t h e  w a r  t o  p u r s u e  a  p o l i c y
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011 in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  w h i c h  [ w a s ]  in t e g r a l l y  g e a r e d  in t o  [ t h e ir ]  o v e r a l l  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s ’ ( W e d d e r b u r n ,  1 9 8 5 , p .  3 6 ) .
O m i n o u s l y ,  t r a d e  u n io n  m e m b e r s h ip  f e l l  f o r  t h e  f ir s t  t i m e  s in c e  1 9 6 7  in  1 9 8 0 . 
In  th a t  y e a r  t h e  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  u n io n s  lo s t  3 4 2 , 0 0 0  m e m b e r s ,  o r  2 .5  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e ir  
o v e r a l l  s t r e n g t h .  In  t h e  p o s t  W o r l d  W a r  II p e r io d  t h is  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  la r g e s t  lo s s  o f  
m e m b e r s h i p  b o t h  n u m e r i c a l l y  a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  w i s e  t o  t h i s  p o in t .  H o w e v e r ,  m u c h  w o r s e  
w a s  to  f o l l o w  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s  in  1 9 8 1  a n d  in  t h e  y e a r s  t h e r e a f t e r .  B y  1 9 9 6  t ra d e  
u n io n  m e m b e r s h i p  h a d  f a l le n  t o  7 , 9 8 7 ,0 0 0 ,  a  d e c r e a s e  o f  a  s t a g g e r in g  5 ,3 0 2 ,0 0 0  
m e m b e r s ,  o r  3 9 .9  p e r  c e n t ,  o n  t h e  1 9 7 9  a p o g e e  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .
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Table 5.4: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1979
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  1 H i g h M e d iu m L o w N o n e
O l :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
p r i m e  m i n i s t e r
X
0 2 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  
o n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m m it t e e s
X
0 3 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in  th e  e c o n o m y  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  t h e  e m p l o y e r s ’ p e a k  
o r g a n is a t io n ,  a n d / o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
X
0 4 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ r e la t io n s h ip  
w i t h  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y
X
0 5 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  
m e m b e r s h i p  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y
X
0 6 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l ic ie s  
t o w a r d s  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r
X
0 7 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  w e r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r
X
0 8 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s
X
0 9 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ in f l u e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a s  id e n t i f i e d  b y  n a t io n a l  
e c o n o m i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  a l i k e
X
0 1 0 :  C h a n g e  i n  m i n i s t e r i a l  a t t it u d e s  t o w a r d s  
t h e  r o le  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  p o l i t y
X
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  2 H i g h M e d iu m L o w N o n e
O l :  A r e  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  m a i n  e c o n o m i c  
in d i c a t o r s  a t  d e c a d e - l o n g  lo w s ?
X
0 2 :  D o  o p i n i o n  p o l l s  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  r e g a r d  
t h e  e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 3 :  D o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  m e d i a  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 4 :  D o  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a s  i n  c r i s i s ?
X
0 5 :  D o e s  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  r e g a r d s  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 6 :  D o  d o m e s t ic  a n d  in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n isa tio n s  
re g a rd  th e  e c o n o m ic  state o f  the c o u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 7 :  D o  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  r e g a r d  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  i n  c r i s i s ?
X
0 8 :  A r e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  o n  t h e  
s ta te  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  c o n s is t e n t  w i t h  a  c r i s i s -  
m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o a c h ?
X
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It c a n  b e  s e e n  in  T a b l e  5 .4  t h a t  7 0  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  h y p o t h e s i s ’ s o b s e r v a b le  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  p o in t e d  t o  a  h i g h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t  in  1 9 7 9 . I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  th e  
s e c o n d  h y p o t h e s is ,  8 7 .5  p e r  c e n t  o f  it s  o b s e r v a b le  i m p l i c a t i o n s  p o in t e d  t o  a  h ig h  o r  
m e d i u m  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t ,  w h i l e  6 2 .5  p e r  c e n t  i n d ic a t e d  a  h ig h  f i t  e x c l u s i v e l y .  
W i t h  t h e  f i n d i n g s  f o r  b o t h  o f  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  s u i p a s s i n g  t h e  6 0  p e r  c e n t  t h r e s h o ld  f o r  
h ig h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t ,  T a b l e  5 .4  c o n f i r m s  t h e r e  t o  h a v e  b e e n  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  in  
t h e  T U C ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  1 9 7 9 .
I n  s u m m a t i o n ,  in  M a y  1 9 7 9  t h e r e  w a s  a  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  s w i f t ,  a n d  e n d u r i n g  c h a n g e  
in  t h e  T U C ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  t h is  a t  a  t im e  o f  c r i s i s  in  t h e  e c o n o m y .  In  a  
c l i m a t e  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  c a m e  t o  p o w e r  w i t h  a  s e t  o f  p o l i c i e s  
r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h o s e  o f  th e  L a b o u r  P a r t y .  T h e  u n i o n s ’ l e v e l  o f  i n f lu e n c e  o v e r  
b o t h  t h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  C o n s e r v a t iv e s  
w h o  h a d  s e t  t h e m s e l v e s  a g a in s t  th e  w e l f a r e  s ta te  t r a d i t i o n .  T h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  
w a s  in  d o w n t u r n  w a s  s h a r e d  b y  t h e  n a t io n a l  m e d i a ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ,  d o m e s t i c  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n is a t io n s  m o n i t o r i n g  
e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a n d  f i n a l l y  e le c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s .  T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ’ p o l i c i e s  
f o c u s e d  o n  r e m o v i n g  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ in f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  a n d  c o r r e c t in g  th e  
p r o b l e m s  w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  b o t h  o f  w h i c h  t h e y  v i e w e d  a s  i n e x t r i c a b l y  l in k e d .  T h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s r a d i c a l  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  b u i l t  a r o u n d  t h e  f r e e  w o r k i n g s  o f  m a r k e t  
f o r c e s ,  w i t h  m o n e t a r y  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  l o w  i n f l a t i o n  a s  o b j e c t iv e s .  A t  t h is  t im e  t h e  T U C ’ s 
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r  d i m i n i s h e d  s u b s t a n t ia l ly ,  a n d  it s  o v e r a l l  m e m b e r s h ip  w e n t  
in t o  w h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  b e  a  l o n g  a n d  s t e a d y  d e c l i n e .  T h i s  p r o lo n g e d  a n d  
u n in t e r r u p t e d  f a l l  i n  m e m b e r s h i p  w a s  o n l y  f i n a l l y  a r r e s t e d  in  2 0 0 0 .  S o o n  le g is la t io n  
w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  t h a t  r e s t r ic t e d  t h e  u n i o n s ’ r ig h t s .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  th e  
t r a d e  u n io n s ,  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  p o l i c i e s  in c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  th e
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g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s ,  a l l  u n d e r w e n t  c h a n g e  t o  t h e  T U C ’ s  d i s a d v a n t a g e .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  
t h e  u n i o n s ’ w e r e  t o  b e  m a in t a in e d  a t  a r m ’ s  le n g t h  f r o m  t h e  p o l i c y  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  f o r  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  17 y e a r s .  It w a s  a t  a  t im e  o f  a  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  th a t  th e  u n i o n s ’ 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  c h a n g e d .  T h i s  d r a m a t ic  c h a n g e  in  t h e  T U C ’ s  in f lu e n c e  w a s  
t o  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  s w i f t ,  a n d  p o s s e s s e d  o f  a n  e n d u r i n g  l e g a c y .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  th e  
o b s e r v a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  c r i t e r ia  s e t  o u t  in  C h a p t e r  II t h is  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ 
in f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e .
f i g u r e  5 .4 :  T h e  C r i t i c a l  J u n c t i i r e  G r i d ,  B r i t a i n , 19 7 9
G e n e r a t i v e  C l e a v a g e C h a n g e  ( S i g n i f i c a n t ,  S w i f t ,  a n d  E n d u r i n g )
( M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C r i s i s )
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T h i s  c h a p t e r  e x a m in e d  f o u r  in s t a n c e s  o f  c h a n g e  in  th e  T U C ’ s in f lu e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l ic y .  
E a c h  o f  th e s e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  h a d  b e e n  id e n t i f ie d  in  C h a p t e r  III a f t e r  a  p r im a  
f a c ie  e x a m in a t io n  o f  c h a n g e  in  t h e  T U C ’ s in f lu e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  B r i t a in  b e tw e e n  
1 9 4 5 - 2 0 0 0 .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  in  1 9 4 5 , 1 9 7 4 , a n d  1 9 7 9  w e r e  f o u n d  to  
c o n s t it u t e  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  c r i t e r ia  s e t  o u t  in  C h a p t e r  II. In  e a c h  o f  th e s e  
in s t a n c e s  t h e  T U C ’ s in f lu e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  u n d e r w e n t  c h a n g e  o f  a  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  s w if t ,  
a n d  e n d u r in g  n a t u r e  a t  t im e s  w h e n  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  id e n t i f ie d  a s  i n  c r is is .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  
t h e  e m p ir i c a l - t h e o r e t ic a l  f i t  in  th e  T a b le s  5 .1 ,  5 .3 ,  a n d  5 .4  w a s  v e r y  h ig h .  T h e  c r is e s  in  th e  
e c o n o m y  h a d  in f lu e n c e d  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  n e w  a p p r o a c h e s  t o w a r d s  b o th  th e  e c o n o m y  a n d  th e  
t r a d e  u n io n s  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  e it h e r  i n  p o w e r ,  o r  c o m in g  t o  p o w e r ,  at t h o s e  t im e s .
H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  c a n  b e  d r a w n  f r o m  t h is  
c h a p t e r .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  i n  1 9 7 0  t u r n e d  o u t  n o t  t o  b e  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w a s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d  s w i f t  c h a n g e  in  t h e  T U C ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  
p o l i c y ,  t h is  c h a n g e  d i d  n o t  e n d u r e .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  s t a g n a t in g  a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  b e i n g  l o c k e d  in t o  s o m e  k i n d  o f  v i c i o u s  c r i s i s .  T h e  v a r i o u s  o b s e r v e r s  w h o s e  
v i e w s  f o r m e d  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b le s  w i t h i n  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  
s e c o n d  h y p o t h e s i s  s h a r e d  t h is  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  a t  t h a t  t im e .  A s  a n  e n d u r i n g  
l e g a c y ,  a n d  a  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  ( g e n e r a t iv e  c l e a v a g e ) ,  a r e  t w o  o f  t h e  c r i t e r ia  c e n t r a l  
t o  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e ,  t h e i r  a b s e n c e  i n  t h is  c a s e  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  c h a n g e  in  t h e  T U C ’ s 
i n f l u e n c e  in  1 9 7 0  d i d  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e .  T h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  w h o  c a m e  t o  
p o w e r  in  1 9 7 0 ,  a t  a  t i m e  o f  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  w e r e  in t e n t  o n  r e d u c i n g  th e  
T U C ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  w i t h i n  t w o  y e a r s  a l l  w a s  t o  c h a n g e ,  
w it h  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t  p e r f o r m i n g  a  s e r ie s  o f  d r a m a t ic  u - t u r n s .  I t  w a s  a s  a  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  t h e  u n i o n s ’ in f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  
p o l i c y  f lu c t u a t e d  w i l d l y  u n d e r  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s .  I n  t h is  in s t a n c e  t h e  e m p i r i c a l -
Conclusion
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t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t ,  a s  s e t  o u t  in  T a b l e  5 .2 ,  b a c k s  u p  o u r  f i n d i n g s  in  t h a t  it  w a s  q u i t e  l o w  f o r  
b o t h  h y p o t h e s e s ,  b u t  e s p e c i a l l y  s o  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  o n e  r e la t in g  t o  t h e  e c o n o m y .  D e s p i t e  
t h is ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  d r a m a t ic ,  i f  s h o r t - l i v e d ,  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f lu e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  1 9 7 0 .
T h e  s e c o n d  i m p l i c a t i o n  t o  b e  d r a w n  f r o m  t h is  c h a p t e r  is  t h a t  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  
h a d  b e e n  f o u n d  t h a t  la s t s  f o r  j u s t  o v e r  f i v e  y e a r s ,  o r  o n e  s t a n d a r d  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s t e r m  o f  
o f f i c e .  T h e  m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ,  w i t h  o i l  c r i s i s  in d u c e d  i n f l a t i o n  a n d  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  t r o u b le s ,  
w e r e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  B r i t a i n .  B y  e a r l y  1 9 7 4  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  a  s ta te  o f  
c r i s i s .  T h i s  p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  p o w e r  o f  a  m i n o r i t y  L a b o u r  a d m in is t r a t i o n .  A  
n e w  a p p r o a c h  w a s  a d o p t e d  t o w a r d s  b o t h  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s  b y  t h is  
g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  g a v e  t h e  T U C  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  a c c e s s  to  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  it s  p o l i c i e s ,  a n d  t h e i r  f o r m u la t io n ,  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s .  H o w e v e r ,  b y  
1 9 7 9  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  m o v i n g  t o w a r d s  c r i s i s  a g a in .  T h e  ‘ W i n t e r  o f  D i s c o n t e n t ’ 
w it n e s s e d  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  a n d  in d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n s  u n r e s t  o n  a  m a s s iv e  
s c a le .  T h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  c o n t r ib u t e d  t o  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  w in n i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  
e le c t io n .  T h e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  
a s  t h e y  v i e w e d  it  a s  d e t r im e n t a l  t o  t h e  e c o n o m y .  S o o n  le g i s l a t i o n  w a s  in t r o d u c e d  th a t  
r e s t r ic t e d  t h e  u n i o n s ’ r ig h t s .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  w e r e  t o  r e m a in  in  p o w e r  f o r  
1 7  y e a r s ,  t h r o u g h o u t  w h i c h  t h e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  P a la c e  o f  W e s t m in s t e r  w a s  
m i n i m a l .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  in  1 9 7 4  p o s s e s s e d  a  le g a c y  
t h a t  e n d u r e d  f o r  a  m e r e  f i v e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  y e a r s .  A g a i n s t  t h is  it  is  p o s s ib le  t o  
c o n t r a s t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  f r o m  1 9 4 5 , a n d  it s  l e g a c y  t h a t  e n d u r e d  f o r  2 5  y e a r s .  A s  
w a s  d i s c u s s e d  in  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t o  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e ’ s le g a c y  t h a t  
la s t s  f o r  o n l y  t h e  m i n i m u m  f i v e  y e a r s  is  n o t  t h a t  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  in  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  A s  s e t  
o u t  in  t h e  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  f r a m e w o r k  in  C h a p t e r  II  a  l e g a c y  o f  t h is  d u r a t io n ,  a  s t a n d a r d
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g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e ,  j u s t  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  m i n i m u m  a m o u n t  o f  t im e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
t h e  c h a n g e  in  t h e  T U C ’ s i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e .  
A s  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  I r e l a n d  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  B r i t a i n  in  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  
w a s  t o  e r o d e  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  1 9 7 4  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e ’ s  le g a c y .
T h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  f o u r  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  o c c u r r e d  in  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  y e a r s  is  a n  im p o r t a n t  is s u e .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  
j u n c t u r e s  t h a t  w e r e  in  f a c t  f o u n d  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a c t u a l  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  o c c u r r e d  in  y e a r s  
i n  w h i c h  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  w e r e  h e ld ,  n a m e l y ,  1 9 4 5 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  a n d  1 9 7 9 .  H o w e v e r ,  d e s p it e  
t h is ,  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  in  t h e  T U C ’ s i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  e i t h e r  
1 9 7 0 ,  o r  a n y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  y e a r s  t h a t  w i t n e s s e d  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  1 9 4 5  a n d  2 0 0 0  
f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r .  T h e  o n e  f a c t o r  c o m m o n  t o  a l l  t h r e e  p e r i o d s  o f  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  s w i f t ,  a n d  
e n d u r i n g  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  w a s  t h e  c r i s i s  s ta te  o f  
t h e  e c o n o m y  a t  t h o s e  t im e s .  I n  t h o s e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  y e a r s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
t h a t  c a m e  t o  p o w e r  a lt e r e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  a p p r o a c h  t o w a r d s  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s .  T h e  
r e s u l t s  w e r e  t h e  d r a m a t i c  in c r e a s e s  in  t h e  T U C ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  b o t h
1 9 4 5  a n d  a g a in  in  1 9 7 4 ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e i r  t o t a l  e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  i n f lu e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  
p o l i c y  a f t e r  1 9 7 9 .  E v e n  t h e  c h a n g e  in  T U C  in f l u e n c e  in  1 9 7 0  t o o k  p la c e  a g a in s t  t h e  
b a c k d r o p  o f  e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
F i g u r e  5 .5 :  T h e  C r i t i c a l  J u n c t u r e  G r i d  f o r  B r i t a i n ,  1 9 4 5 - 2 0 0 0
G e n e r a t i v e  C l e a v a g e C h a n g e  ( S i g n i f i c a n t ,  S w i f t ,  a n d  E n d u r i n g )
( M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C r i s i s )
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T h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  t w e n t ie t h  c e n t u r y  w a s  t o  w it n e s s  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  A m e r i c a  a s  
o n e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ’ s  t w o  s u p e r p o w e r s .  U n t i l  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  its  e c o n o m y  d o m in a t e d  th e  
c a p i t a l i s t  w o r l d .  A l t h o u g h  it  g r a d u a l l y  lo s t  g r o u n d  in  in t e r n a t io n a l  m a r k e t s  t o  W e s t  
G e r m a n y ,  t h e  C o m m o n  M a r k e t ,  a n d  J a p a n ,  A m e r i c a  r e m a in e d  a t  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  w o r ld  
c o m m e r c e .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  B e r l i n  W a l l  in  1 9 8 9 ,  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n ,  a n d  t h e  e n d in g  o f  th e  C o l d  W a r ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s t o o d  a p a r t  a s  t h e  m o s t  
p o w e r f u l  c o u n t r y ,  b o t h  m i l i t a r i l y  a n d  e c o n o m i c a l l y ,  in  t h e  w o r l d .
T h e  A m e r i c a n  p o l i t i c a l  l a n d s c a p e  is  e f f e c t i v e l y  p o p u la t e d  b y  t w o  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t ie s .  W i t h  f e w  e x c e p t io n s  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  a n d  R e p u b l i c a n s  p e r s i s t e n t l y  p o l l  o v e r  9 0  
p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  n a t io n a l  p o p u l a r  v o t e ,  a n d  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l i t t le  m u l t i p a r t y i s m  ( M a i d m e n t  
a n d  T a p p i n ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p p .  8 5 - 8 6 ) .  I n  A m e r i c a  t h e r e  is  ‘ a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t w o - p a r t y  s y s t e m  in  
o p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  m o s t  i n c l u s i v e  s o r t ’ ( V i l e ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p . 4 1 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  is  a  t w o  p a r t y  
s y s t e m  o n l y  in  v e r y  s p e c i a l  s e n s e .  T h e  n a m e s  ‘ D e m o c r a t ’ a n d  ‘ R e p u b l i c a n ’ t e n d  t o  
o b s c u r e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  m o s t  p u r p o s e s  A m e r i c a  o p e r a t e s  u n d e r  a  m u l t i - p a r t y  s y s t e m  
t h a t  c o a l e s c e s  in t o  t w o  g r e a t  c o a l i t i o n s  f o r  s t r i c t ly  l i m i t e d  p u r p o s e s  ( D a r k ,  1 9 9 9 , p . 2 3 ) .  
W i t h i n  t h is  c o n t e x t  A m e r i c a n  p l u r a l i s t  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  c a n  o n l y  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  b y  a n  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  s e p a r a t io n s  o f  p o w e r s ,  a n d  th e  
c o n s e q u e n t  d i f f u s i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  ( S t e in m o ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p .  5 0 3 ) .  ‘ I n t e r e s t - g r o u p s  
a c t i v i t y  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  U S  C o n g r e s s  is  u s u a l l y  s e e n  a s  t h e  m o s t  in t e n s e  in  t h e  w o r l d ’ 
( H e y w o o d ,  1 9 9 7 ,  p .  2 6 3 ) .  D e s p i t e  t h is  ‘ t r a d e  u n io n s  h a v e  n e v e r  a c h i e v e d  th e  c e n t r a l  
s t a t u s  in  U S  s o c i e t y  a n d  p o l i t i c s  e n j o y e d  b y  t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  in  m o s t  o t h e r  w e s t e r n  
i n d u s t r ia l  n a t io n s ,  a n d  h a v e  b e e n  a f f e c t e d  b y  a  c u l t u r e  w h i c h  s t r e s s e s  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r is e  
a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  l ib e r t y  a s  a g a in s t  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  c la s s  r i g h t s ’ ( U p h a m ,  1 9 9 3 ,  p .  1 0 8 ) .
T h i s  c h a p t e r  s h a l l  e x a m in e  v a r i a t io n s  in  th e  A m e r i c a n  t r a d e  u n io n  p e a k  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  w i t h i n  t h e  t i m e f r a m e  1 9 4 5 - 2 0 0 0 .  F o u r
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p a r t i c u l a r  p e r i o d s  o f  in t e r e s t ,  d e r i v e d  f r o m  p r i m a  f a c i e  d a t a  in  C h a p t e r  III, w i l l  b e  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  u p o n ,  1 9 4 6 ,  1 9 6 0 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a n d  1 9 9 2 .  I n  t h e s e  y e a r s  t h e  A F L - C I O ’ s 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  id e n t i f i e d  a s  h a v i n g  c h a n g e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
c o n s t i t u t in g  p o s s i b l e  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s .  A s  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h is  
e x a m i n a t i o n  is  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  o f  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  s w i f t ,  a n d  e n d u r i n g  n a t u r e ,  t h i s  a t  t im e s  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s is .  T h i s  
s e a r c h  s h a l l  b e  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t e s t in g  p o t e n t i a l  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  in  t h e  A F L - C I O ’ s 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a g a in s t  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  a n d  o b s e r v a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  d r a w n  
u p  e a r l i e r .
T h e  D e p r e s s i o n ,  t h e  W o r l d  W a r ,  a n d  A f t e r m a t h
I n  1 8 8 6  t h e  A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  L a b o r  ( A F L )  w a s  f o u n d e d .  T h e  A F L  w a s  a n  
a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  a u t o n o m o u s  u n i o n s  t h a t  s o u g h t  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  w e l l  b e in g  o f  t h e ir  
m e m b e r s  t h r o u g h  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h r o u g h  t h e  b a l l o t  b o x  ( I p p o l i t o  a n d  
W a l k e r ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  2 8 6 ) .  T h e  A F L  p o s s e s s e d  l i t t le  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  it s  a u t o n o m o u s  m e m b e r  
u n io n s .  T h e  n a t io n a l  u n io n s ,  n o t  t h e  f e d e r a t io n ,  c o n d u c t e d  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a in in g .  T h e  
A F L  s e t t le d  d is p u t e s  b e t w e e n  u n io n s ,  a n d  a c t e d  a s  a  s p o k e s p e r s o n  f o r  la b o u r  o n  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  ( G o o d m a n ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  6 2 8 ) .
B y  1 9 3 2 ,  in  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  d e p r e s s io n ,  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  t h a t  s t o o d  a t  o v e r  5 
m i l l i o n  i n  1 9 2 0  h a d  f a l l e n  t o  u n d e r  3 m i l l i o n  ( G o l d f i e l d ,  1 9 8 7 ,  p .  8 ) . T h e  P r e s id e n t ia l  
c a m p a i g n  o f  1 9 3 2  o f f e r e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  t h e  f a i lu r e  o f  t h e  
H o o v e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  D e s p i t e  A F L  n e u t r a l i t y  w o r k e r s  h e l p e d  t o  s w e l l  t h e  g r e a t  
m a j o r i t y  t h a t  F r a n k l i n  D .  R o o s e v e l t  g a i n e d  ( D u b o f s k y  a n d  D u l l e s ,  1 9 9 9 , p . 2 4 9 ) .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e r e  d e v e l o p e d  a  n e w  u n i o n i s m  t h a t  s t r e s s e d  in d u s t r ia l  u n io n is m ,  m a s s
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m e m b e r s h ip ,  p o l i t i c s ,  a n d  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  g o a l s  t o  i n c l u d e  a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  
A m e r i c a n  l i f e .
R o o s e v e l t ’ s  e l e c t i o n  p r o v e d  a  w a t e r s h e d  in  A m e r i c a n  p o l i t i c s .  T h e  D e m o c r a t s  
w o u l d  c o n t r o l  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t w o  d e c a d e s ,  a n d  t h e  C o n g r e s s  f o r  m o s t  o f  
t h o s e  y e a r s .  A s  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  a n d  o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r  g r e w  c l o s e r  t h e  u n io n s  w e r e  
a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  t h e i r  g o a l s  w o u l d  b e  g i v e n  c o n s id e r a t io n  b y  g o v e r n m e n t .  W i t h  t h e  N e w  
D e a l ,  t h e  s t r u g g le s  a n d  h a r d s h ip s  o f  a  c e n t u r y  a p p e a r e d  t o  h a v e  c u lm in a t e d  in  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o m p l e t e  a t t a in m e n t  o f  w o r k e r s ’ h i s t o r i c  o b j e c t iv e s .  T h e  N a t i o n a l  L a b o r  
R e l a t i o n s  A c t  o f  1 9 3 5  s e a le d  t h e  N e w  D e a l ' s  p a r t n e r s h ip  w i t h  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r .  
G u a r a n t e e i n g  l a b o u r ’ s  r ig h t  t o  o r g a n is e  a n d  e n g a g e  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a in in g ,  t h e  A c t  w a s  
t h e  m o s t  im p o r t a n t  p i e c e  o f  A m e r i c a n  la b o u r  l e g is la t io n  in  t h e  2 0 th c e n t u r y .
U n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  in c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y  a f t e r  1 9 3 2 .  A t  t h is  t im e  t h e  c r a f t  u n io n is m  
t h a t  d o m in a t e d  t h e  A F L  w a s  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  in d u s t r ia l  u n i o n i s m  ( G o o d m a n ,  1 9 8 1 , p .  
6 3 2 ) .  I n  1 9 3 5  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  I n d u s t r ia l  O r g a n i s a t i o n  ( C I O )  w a s  f o r m e d  w i t h in  th e  
A F L .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  t h e  C I O  e s t a b l is h e d  la b o u r 's  N o n - P a r t i s a n  L e a g u e ,  t o  g e t  th e  
l a b o u r  v o t e  o u t  f o r  R o o s e v e l t  i n  t h e  1 9 3 6  p r e s id e n t ia l  e l e c t i o n  ( H a s k i n s ,  1 9 7 6 , p . 8 4 ) .  
In  1 9 3 8  t h e  C I O  b r o k e  w i t h  t h e  A F L  b e c o m i n g  t h e  C o n g r e s s  o f  I n d u s t r ia l  O r g a n is a t io n  
( C I O ) .
P o t e n t i a l  C r i t i c a l  J u n c t u r e  1 : 1 9 4 6  -  T h e  T r u m a n  Y e a r s
I n  1 9 4 1 ,  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ u n d e r t o o k  t o  s u p p l y  t h e  A l l i e d  p o w e r s ,  p r o d u c t io n  in  th e  
s o - c a l l e d  " w a r  in d u s t r ie s "  in c r e a s e d .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  w e n t  f r o m  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c r i p p l i n g  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c  d e p r e s s io n ,  t o  f u l l  e m p lo y m e n t  
a n d  e c o n o m i c  r e c o v e r y .  W i t h  t h e  f u r t h e r  in c r e a s e  in  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w e d  th e  
d e c la r a t io n  o f  w a r  t h e r e  w a s  a n  a c t u a l  l a b o u r  s h o r t a g e  ( H a s k i n s ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  ‘ F r o m  1 9 4 2
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t h r o u g h  1 9 4 5 ,  t h e  h ig h e s t  l e v e l  o f  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  in  A m e r i c a n  h i s t o r y  p r e v a i l e d ’ 
( D u b o f s k y  a n d  D u l l e s ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p .  3 1 2 ) .  W o r l d  W a r  II b r o u g h t  e c o n o m i c  r e c o v e r y  f r o m  
t h e  G r e a t  D e p r e s s i o n  ( B e r n s t e in ,  1 9 9 5 ,  p .  1 4 ) .
G o v e r n m e n t ,  la b o u r ,  a n d  b u s i n e s s  d i d  n o t  w a n t e d  a n y  in t e r r u p t i o n  t o  t h is  n e w  
p r o s p e r i t y .  H a r m o n i o u s  la b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t  r e la t io n s  w e r e  e s s e n t ia l  t o  t h e  w a r  e f f o r t .  
O r g a n i z e d  l a b o u r  p l e d g e d  t o  a v o i d  s t r ik e s ,  a n d  a g r e e d  t o  a  4 8 - h o u r  w e e k  i n  d e f e n s e  
p r o d u c t i o n .  I n  1 9 4 2 ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  r e w a r d e d  la b o u r 's  a s s i s t a n c e  w it h  th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  P r i c e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  w o r k e r s  f r o m  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  i n f l a t i o n .  A  N a t i o n a l  W a r  L a b o r  B o a r d  ( N W L B )  w a s  la t e r  e s t a b l is h e d  t o  m o n i t o r  
d is p u t e s  b e t w e e n  l a b o u r  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  s e e  t o  i t  t h a t  w a g e s  w e r e  k e p t  o n  a  p a r  
w it h  t h e  e v e r - r i s i n g  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g .
I t  m u s t  b e  n o t e d  h e r e  t h a t  A m e r i c a n  u n i o n s ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  
b o d i e s  d u r i n g  a n d  a f t e r  t h is  t im e ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e  2 0 th c e n t u r y ,  w a s  a lm o s t  
n o n - e x i s t e n t . 1 W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t io n  o f  c e r t a in  t r ip a r t i t e  c o m m it t e e s  c r e a t e d  d u r i n g  W o r l d  
W a r  II , s u c h  a s  t h e  N a t i o n a l  D e f e n c e  M e d i a t i o n  B o a r d  ( N D M B )  a n d  t h e  N W L B ,  th e  
A F L - C I O  h a s  h a d  n o  in s t i t u t i o n a l  p r e s e n c e  o n  o f f i c i a l  s t a n d in g  c o m m it t e e s  o f  th e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  g o v e r n m e n t  ( C o h e n ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  8 6 ) .  O c c a s i o n a l l y  t a s k  f o r c e s ,  o r  s p e c ia l  
c o m m it t e e s ,  a r e  a p p o in t e d  t o  a d d r e s s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t o p i c ,  a n d  t h e y  m a y  h a v e  la b o u r  
r e p r e s e n t a t io n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L a b o r  R e l a t i o n s  B o a r d  ( N L R B ) ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  
d i d  n o t  h a v e  a n  o f f i c i a l  l a b o u r  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e ,  n o r  is  t h e r e  a n  o f f i c i a l  b u s in e s s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  e i t h e r .2
I n  1 9 4 4  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r  t h r e w  i t s e l f  in t o  t h e  c a m p a i g n  f o r  R o o s e v e l t ' s  r e -  
e l e c t io n .  T h e  C I O  c r e a t e d  t h e  n a t io n w i d e  P o l i t i c a l  A c t i o n  C o m m i t t e e  ( P A C )  t o  e n s u r e  
t h e  R o o s e v e l t - T r u m a n  t i c k e t  o f  la b o u r 's  b a c k i n g  ( W i l s o n ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  3 ) .  T h i s  r e p r e s e n t e d
1 C orre sp o n d e n ce : R o n  F il ip p e ll i  to  author, 2003.
2 ib id .
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t h e  C I O ’ s  f o r m a l  e n t r y  in t o  p o l i t i c s .  T h e  A F L  m a in t a in e d  its  t r a d i t i o n a l  n o n -  
p a r t i s a n s h i p ,  b u t  its  m e m b e r  u n io n s  w o r k e d  f o r  R o o s e v e l t ’ s r e - e le c t io n .  T h e  u n io n s  
w e r e  d r i v e n  b y  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  i f  R o o s e v e l t  w a s  d e f e a t e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  b r e a d  l in e s  
w o u l d  r e t u r n .
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r  e m e r g e d  f r o m  t h e  w a r  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  e v e r  
b e f o r e ,  a n d  it  c o n t i n u e d  t o  g a i n  in  s t r e n g t h  a n d  n u m b e r s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  it  c o u ld  s t i l l  c o u n t  
o n  t h e  f r i e n d  it  h e l p e d  t o  r e - e le c t  t o  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e .  H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  H a r r y  S .  T r u m a n  
b e c a m e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  in  1 9 4 5  h e  w a s  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o m p l i c a t e d  t a s k  o f  
o v e r s e e i n g  t h e  r e - c o n v e r s i o n  f r o m  w a r t i m e  t o  p e a c e t im e  p r o d u c t io n ,  a n d  w it h  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  r e m o v i n g  w a r t i m e  w a g e  a n d  p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  w i t h o u t  d a m a g in g  th e  
e c o n o m y .  T h e r e  w a s  f e a r  a m o n g s t  w o r k e r s  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  c o n v e r s i o n ,  c o u p le d  
w it h  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  m i l l i o n s  f r o m  t h e  a r m e d  s e r v i c e s  t o  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t ,  w o u l d  c r e a te  
h u g e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  t r ig g e r  a  d e p r e s s io n ,  a s  h a p p e n e d  a f t e r  t h e  G r e a t  W a r .  T h e r e  
w a s  a  s w i f t  c o n t r a c t i o n  in  g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n d in g ,  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  n e a r l y  3 0  p e r  c e n t  o f  
n a t io n a l  i n c o m e ,  b e t w e e n  1 9 4 5  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 4 6  ( G o r d o n ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p p .  9 0 - 9 1 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  
a f t e r  l a y i n g  o f f  d e f e n s e  w o r k e r s ,  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t o o l e d  u p  a n d  b e g a n  p r o d u c in g  
c o n s u m e r  g o o d s  in  v o l u m e .
F o r  t h e  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t  e c o n o m i c  e x p a n s io n ,  i n f l a t i o n ,  a n d  r e la t iv e ly  f u l l  
e m p l o y m e n t  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 6  f r o m  t h e  e c o n o m i c  c o n t r a c t io n ,  d e f la t io n ,  a n d  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  o f  1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 1 .  U n i o n  m e m b e r s h ip  e x p a n d e d  a n d  d e n s i t y  p e a k e d  in
1 9 4 6  ( K o c h a n  a n d  W e i n s t e i n ,  1 9 9 4 ,  p .  4 8 4 ) .  A t  f i r s t ,  m a n y  o b s e r v e r s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  in  
p o s t - w a r  A m e r i c a  l a b o u r  h a d  b e c o m e  a  n e w  p o w e r  in  t h e  la n d .  S o m e  e v e n  a r g u e d  th a t  
A m e r i c a n  w a s  a l m o s t  b e c o m i n g  a  s o c i a l i s t  s o c ie t y  ( D u b o f s k y  a n d  D u l l e s ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p . 3 3 3 ) .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  w e r e  s o o n  t o  b e  d a s h e d .
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S o o n  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  e n d e d  a  t r e m e n d o u s  n u m b e r  o f  s t r ik e s  t o o k  p la c e ,  t h e  r e s u lt  
o f  w o r k e r s ’ p e n t - u p  d e m a n d s  f o r  w a g e s  t o  m a t c h  r i s i n g  p r i c e s . 3 T h e  W a g e  S t a b i l i s a t io n  
B o a r d ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  T r u m a n  t o  w o r k  o u t  s e t t le m e n t s  in  s u c h  d is p u t e s ,  s t r u g g le d  to  
a r b it r a t e  w a g e  a n d  p r i c e  in c r e a s e s  a c c e p t a b le  t o  b o t h  p a r t ie s .  T h e  T r u m a n  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a p p e a r e d  h e lp le s s  t o  h a lt  t h e  t r e n d .  T h e  A m e r i c a n  p u b l i c  r e s e n t e d  th e  
d is p u t e s  a n d  c a m e  t o  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  u n io n s  h a d  b e c o m e  t o o  p o w e r f u l .  T h e  p r e s id e n t ,  
l a c k i n g  p o l i t i c a l  v i s i o n ,  a n d  f a i l i n g  t o  p u r s u e  a  c o h e r e n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o g r a m m e  o f  h is  
o w n ,  t r ie d  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  t h e  N e w  D e a l .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  p o s t - w a r  m o o d  w a s  n o t  
c o n d u c t i v e  t o  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  N e w  D e a l  r e f o r m s .  A m e r i c a n s  w e r e  w e a r y  o f  s h o r t a g e s  
a n d  s a c r i f i c e s  ( D i v i n e  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 5 ,  p .  8 6 5 ) .  I n  m i d - O c t o b e r  1 9 4 6  G a l l u p  f o u n d  t h a t  5 3  
p e r  c e n t  o f  c i t i z e n s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  p r i c e  c o n t r o ls  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  r e m o v e d . 4 A  f u r t h e r  71  
p e r  c e n t  o f  c i t i z e n s  a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  f i n d i n g  it  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a k e  e n d s  m e e t  
t h a n  t h e y  h a d  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  2 0 0 ) .  I n d u s t r y  
a t t a c k e d  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s  in t e n t io n  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  N e w  D e a l ’ s  f a v o u r i t i s m  o f  
l a b o u r .  I n  t h e  f a c e  o f  r i s i n g  d is c o n t e n t ,  T r u m a n ’ s  e f f o r t s  t o  e x t e n d  t h e  N e w  D e a l  m e t  
w it h  l i t t le  s u c c e s s .  B y  la t e  O c t o b e r  1 9 4 6  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s a p p r o v a l  r a t in g  w a s  d o w n  t o  a  
p a l t r y  3 2  p e r  c e n t . 5 T h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  v o t e r s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  P r e s id e n t  w a s  d o i n g  a  b a d  j o b  
w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m y . 6
T h e  m e d i a ,  n a t io n a l  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  a n d  n a t io n a l  c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  r e g a r d e d  th e  
e c o n o m y  a s  i n  d i f f i c u l t y .  B y  m i d - 1 9 4 6  t h e  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m y  h a d  a n  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
r a t e  o f  3 .9  p e r  c e n t ,  m o r e  t h a n  d o u b l e  t h a t  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .  T h e  C o m m e r c e  
D e p a r t m e n t  w a s  w a r n i n g  o f  t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a t  a  l e v e l  o f  5 m i l l i o n  b y  
1 9 4 8  ( K o l k o  a n d  K o l k o ,  1 9 7 2 ,  p .  2 1 ) .  T h e  B u r e a u  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  E c o n o m i c s  w a r n e d
3 T im e  International, 2 Septem ber, 1946, V o l.  48, N o .  11, p. 8,
4 ib id ,  14 O c to b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o .  16, p. 9.
5 ib id ,  21 O c to b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o .  17, p. 9.
6 ib id ,  21 O c to b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o .  17, p. 11.
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t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  s l i d i n g  in t o  r e c e s s i o n . 7 A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  i n f l a t i o n  h a d
s k y r o c k e t e d ,  i n c r e a s i n g  b y  o v e r  8 0 0  p e r  c e n t ,  t o  a  r a t e  o f  1 8 .1 3  p e r  c e n t  ( A p p e n d i x  D ) .
T h i s  w a s  t o  b e  t h e  h ig h e s t  le v e l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  in  p o s t  W o r l d  W a r  II A m e r i c a .
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i n f l a t i o n  p r o v e d  a  s e r io u s  is s u e .  I n  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h is  T r u m a n
e s t a b l is h e d  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  E c o n o m i c  S t a b i l i s a t i o n  ( B y r n e s ,  2 0 0 0 ,  p . 2 7 ) .  A s  a  r e s u lt  o f
d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s id e n t  a n d  C o n g r e s s  o v e r  p r i c e  c o n t r o ls  t h e  c o n s u m e r  p r ic e
i n d e x  d i d  n o t  s t a b i l i s e  u n t i l  1 9 4 8 .  B y  t h e n  p r i c e s  w e r e  m o r e  t h a n  a  t h i r d  a b o v e  t h e ir
1 9 4 5  le v e l ,  w h i l e  w a g e  a n d  s a la r y  i n c o m e s  h a d  r is e n  o n l y  15  p e r  c e n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e
t h e  d e b t  t o  G D P  r a t io ,  o n  a n  u p w a r d  t r a j e c t o r y  d u r i n g  t h e  w a r ,  p e a k e d  a t  a n  a l l - t im e
h i g h  o f  1 2 1 .7  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 4 6 .  W i t h  t h e  e n d i n g  o f  t h e  w a r  t h e  e c o n o m y  c o n t r a c t e d  b y  a
w h o l e  1 9  p e r  c e n t ,  a l m o s t  o n e  f i f t h  o f  G D P  c e a s i n g  t o  e x is t .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  d a y s  lo s t  to
i n d u s t r ia l  d i s p u t e d  i n  1 9 4 6 , s t a n d in g  a t  a  s t a g g e r in g  1 1 6  m i l l i o n ,  a lm o s t  t h r e e  t im e s
m o r e  t h a n  in  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ,  w a s  t h e  h ig h e s t  in  A m e r i c a n  h is t o r y  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d
K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 2 0 0 ) .  T h i s  f ig u r e  w a s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  le v e l  o f  in d u s t r ia l  c o n f l i c t  th e
c o n t r a c t in g  e c o n o m y  e x p e r ie n c e d  ( A p p e n d i x  D ) .  Time c a l l e d  it  ‘ t h e  g r e a t e s t  e p id e m ic
• 8
o f  w i l l f u l  id le n e s s  in  t h e  a n n a ls  o f  u n i o n i s m . ’
In  la t e  O c t o b e r  1 9 4 6  Time p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  a f t e r  1 2  y e a r s  o f  t h e  N e w  D e a l  a n d  a  
y e a r  a n d  a  h a l f  o f  T r u m a n i s m ,  t h e  p e o p l e  w a n t e d  a  c h a n g e . 9 Time e x p r e s s e d  t h e  v i e w  
t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  d e f i a n t l y  in  a  s lo w d o w n ,  b u t  r e f u s e d  t o  u s e  t h e  w o r d  d e p r e s s io n  
f o r  fe a r ,  i t  e x p l a i n e d ,  t h a t  it  c o u l d  b e  m is i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  s i t u a t io n  o n  a  p a r
w i t h  t h e  d e p r e s s io n  o f  1 9 3 0 s .10 T h e  c o u n t r y  w a s  in  a  r e c e s s i o n ,  it  w e n t  o n ,  i f  n o t  a
d e p r e s s i o n . 11 G e n e r a l  E l e c t r i c ’ s P r e s id e n t  C h a r l e s  E .  W i l s o n  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y
7 ib id ., 17 M a rc h , 1947, V o l .  49, N o . I I ,  p. 33.
8 ib id ,  13 Jan u ary , 1947, V o l .  49, N o .  2, p. 33.
9 ib id ,  28 O c to b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o . 18, p. 8.
10 ib id ,  11 N o v e m b e r, 1946, V o l .  48 , N o . 20, p. 35.
11 ib id ,  18 N o v e m b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o . 22, p. 6.
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w a s  in  s e r io u s  d i f f i c u l t y .  T h e  t r o u b le  c a m e  f r o m  p r i c e  c o n t r o ls  a n d  in c r e a s e d  la b o u r  
c o s t s  h e  e x p l a i n e d .  T o  c o m p o u n d  t h is  m e s s a g e  C i v i l i a n  P r o d u c t i o n  A d m i n i s t r a t o r  J o h n  
D .  S m a l l  w a r n e d  t h a t  U S  i n d u s t r ia l  p r o d u c t i o n  w a s  d o w n  in  S e p t e m b e r ,  a n d  t h a t  it  
c o u l d  n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  in c r e a s e  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  y e a r . 12 H o w e v e r ,  C o m m e r c e  
S e c r e t a r y  A v e r e l l  H a r r i m a n  r e f u s e d  t o  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  a  d e p r e s s io n .  H e  
s ta te d  t h a t  ‘ I f e e l  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  f e a r s  o f  a  d e p r e s s io n  a r e  b a s e d  o n  u n r e a s o n i n g  d e f e a t is m  
a l t h o u g h  n a t u r a l l y  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  p e r io d s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t . ’ 13
T h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  r e la t io n s  w i t h  C o n g r e s s  b e c a m e  s t o r m ie r  a f t e r  t h e  G O P ’ s 
v i c t o r y  i n  t h e  m i d - t e r m  e le c t io n s  o f  1 9 4 6 .  T h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  w o n  m a j o r i t ie s  i n  b o t h  t h e  
H o u s e  a n d  S e n a t e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  s in c e  1 9 3 0 .  T h e y  t o o k  5 1  s e a t s  i n  t h e  S e n a t e ,  t h e n  a  
c h a m b e r  o f  9 6 ,  a n d  2 4 6  s e a ts  in  t h e  H o u s e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s ,  g i v i n g  t h e m  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  
5 8  in  t h a t  c h a m b e r .  Time p o in t e d  o u t  th a t:
T h e  e l e c t i o n  h a d  b e e n  q u ie t  a n d  u n e m o t io n a l ,  b u t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  m i s t a k i n g  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  A m e r i c a n s  h a d  c a s t  a  p r o t e s t  v o t e .  It w a s  a  
c o l d  b u t  n o n e t h e le s s  a n g r y  v o i c e  r a i s e d  a g a in s t  m a n y  t h in g s :  p r i c e  
m u d d l e s ,  s h o r t a g e s ,  b l a c k  m a r k e t e r s ,  s t r ik e s ,  G o v e r n m e n t  b u n g l i n g  a n d  
c o n f u s i o n ,  a n d  t o o  m u c h  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t o o  m a n y  t h i n g s . 14
T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  P a r t y ,  w i t h  s t r o n g  a n t i - l a b o u r  e le m e n t s  w i t h i n  it ,  h a d  g a i n e d  c o n t r o l  o f  
t h e  C o n g r e s s .  ‘ I n  v o t i n g  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  t h e  p e o p l e  h a d  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  
v o t i n g  f o r  a  c l i m a t e  o f  f r e e d o m  a n d  f o r  a  p a r t y  w h i c h  w o u l d  m a k e  a  n e w  e f f o r t  t o  s o lv e
U S  in d u s t r ia l  s t r i f e . ’ 15 B r o g a n  ( 1 9 9 9 ,  p .  5 9 1 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t  w a s  d u e
12 ib id ,  4 N o v e m b e r, 1946, V o l .  48, N o .  19, p. 33.
13 ib id ,  11 N o v e m b e r , 1946, V o l .  48 , N o .  20, p. 35.
14 ib id ,  18 N o v e m b e r , 1946, V o l .  48 , N o .  21, p. 5.
15 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 14 N o v e m b e r, 1946, p. 4.
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a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  p a i n f u l  p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  f r o m  w a r  t o  p e a c e .  
‘ I n t e r p r e t in g  t h e  r e s u l t  a s  a  m a n d a t e  f o r  g r e a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i s m  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  m a j o r i t y  in  
t h e  8 0 th C o n g r e s s ,  b a c k e d  b y  m a n y  S o u t h e r n  D e m o c r a t s ,  s la s h e d  p u b l i c  e x p e n d it u r e ,  
a n d  r e d u c e d  t a x e s  in  a n  e f f o r t  t o  s t im u la t e  t h e  e c o n o m y ’ ( J o n e s ,  1 9 9 5 ,  p . 5 2 6 ) .
I n f l a t i o n  h a d  c o n t r ib u t e d  t o  t h e  g r o w i n g  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e r v a t i s m .  N e w  D e a l  
l i b e r a l i s m  w a s  p o s s i b l e  d u e  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  d is a s t e r  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  t h e  G r e a t  
D e p r e s s i o n .  I t  w a s  a t  t h a t  t im e  t h a t  A m e r i c a n s  o v e r c a m e  t h e i r  a v e r s i o n  t o  b ig  
g o v e r n m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  B y r n e s  ( 2 0 0 0 ,  p .  2 7 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  in f l a t i o n  r e v e r s e d  th a t  
d y n a m i c .  S i n c e  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  m e a n t  t o  c o n t r o l  p r ic e s ,  it  w a s  b la m e d  f o r  
i n f l a t i o n .  T h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  u s e d  i n f l a t i o n  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  f a i l u r e s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
i n t e r v e n t io n  in  t h e  e c o n o m y .
O b s e r v e r s  n o t e d  a  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  a n d  
t h is  w a s  r e f le c t e d  in  t h e  p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d  t h e m  c o m i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s .  ‘ O r g a n i z e d  
l a b o r  t o o k  a  l o n g  l o o k  a t  t h e  e le c t io n  r e t u r n s  a n d  k n e w  d e f i a n t l y  t h a t  a n  e r a  h a d  
p a s s e d . ’ 16 I t  h a d  lo s t  a l l  i t s  s t a lw a r t s  i n  t h e  H o u s e  a n d  m a n y  in  t h e  S e n a t e .  ‘ T h e  
R e p u b l i c a n s  h a d  h a d  n o t  r e c a p t u r e d  C o n g r e s s  t o  p l a y  s e c o n d  f i d d l e  t o  t h e  D e m o c r a t s .  
O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  a c t e d  a t t im e s  a s  i f  t h e y  h o p e d  t o  u n d o  t h e  e n t ir e  n e w  d e a l ’ 
( B r o g a n ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p .  5 9 5 ) .  T h e  b i l l s  o f  m o s t  i m p o r t a n c e  w e r e  d e s ig n e d  t o  s t r a ig h t e n  o u t  
t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  c h a n g e  l a b o u r  l e g i s l a t i o n . 17 ‘ T h e  d a y s  o f  r u n n i n g  t o  W a s h i n g t o n  f o r  
a lm o s t  a n y t h i n g  it  w a n t e d  w e r e  o v e r , ’ a r g u e d  Time. ‘ T h e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  b e in g  b a i l e d  o u t  
b y  g o v e r n m e n t  w h e n  it  g o t  in t o  t r o u b le  w a s  g o n e . ’ 18 T h e  8 0 th C o n g r e s s  p r o v e d  t o  b e  
e x t r e m e ly  c o n s e r v a t i v e  ( D y e ,  1 9 9 7 ,  p .  7 0 1 ) .  W e l c h  e t  a l . ,  ( 2 0 0 1 ,  p .  6 8 2 )  p o in t  o u t  th a t  
t h e  m i d - t e r m  e l e c t i o n s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  h a n d  o f  t h e  a n t i - l a b o u r  f o r c e s .
16 T im e  International, 18 N o v e m b e r  1946, V o l .  48, N o .  21, p. 7.
17 ib id ,  6 January, 1947, V o l .  49, N o . 1, p. 3.
18 ib id ,  18 N o v e m b e r  1946, V o l .  48, N o .  21, p. 7.
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T h e  R e p u b l i c a n ’ s  v i c t o r y  w a s  in t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  p o p u l a r  m a n d a t e  t o  t a k e  d r a s t ic  a c t io n  o n  
t h e  la b o u r  i s s u e  in  s p i t e  o f  P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n ’ s p o s i t i o n .  I m m e d ia t e ly  a f t e r  t h e  m i d ­
t e r m  e le c t io n s  R e p u b l i c a n  S e n a t o r  R o b e r t  T a f t  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  h e  a n d  a n t i - l a b o u r  
c o l l e a g u e s  w o u l d  s e t  a b o u t  e x a m i n i n g  la b o u r  l e g i s l a t i o n  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  r e f o r m in g  
c e r t a in  a s p e c t s  o f  i t . 19 ‘ T h e  S e n a t e  L a b o r  a n d  P u b l i c  W e l f a r e  c o m m it t e e  s e t  i t s e l f  th e  
t a s k  o f  w r i t i n g  a  w h o l e  n e w  b a t c h  o f  la b o r  l e g i s l a t i o n . ’ 20 ‘ S e n a t o r  J o s e p h  H u r s t  B a l l  
w a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d r a f t i n g  f o u r  B i l l s  a t t a c k in g  u n i o n  r ig h t s  a n d  p r i v i l e g e s . ’ 21 Time 
o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  B a l l  m e a s u r e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  s u c h  a  b a s i c  r e w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  g r o u n d  r u le s  
p a s s e d  b y  t h e  n e w  d e a l  t h a t  t h e  a s tu t e  R o b e r t  T a f t  e v e n  b a c k e d  a w a y . 22 T h e  le a d e r s h ip s  
o f  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O  a t t a c k e d  w h a t  t h e y  t e r m e d  a  d e l ib e r a t e  m o v e m e n t  in t e n d  o n  
d e s t r o y i n g  la b o u r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  w e r e  u n a b l e  t o  r a l l y  s u f f i c i e n t  s u p p o r t ,  e i t h e r  in  
C o n g r e s s  o r  t h e  c o u n t r y .  P r i c e s  a n d  w a g e s  r o s e  q u i c k l y  in  t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  C o n g r e s s  
v o t e d  t o  e n d  w a r t i m e  c o n t r o l s  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n . 23
I n  1 9 4 5  t h e  l e v e l  o f  u n io n  m e m b e r s h ip  i n  A m e r i c a  s t o o d  a t  1 4 .3  m i l l i o n ,  a n  
in c r e a s e  o f  1 .2  p e r  c e n t ,  o r  1 7 6 ,0 0 0  m e m b e r s ,  o v e r  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .  
T h i s  in c r e a s e  w a s  a  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  g r o w t h  in  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  f r o m  t h e  e a r ly  
1 9 3 0 s .  T h i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  a b o u t  3 5 .8  p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k e r s  ( B y r n e s ,  
2 0 0 0 ,  p . 2 5 ) .  I n  1 9 4 6 ,  t h e  y e a r  i n  w h i c h  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y  lo s t  c o n t r o l  o f  C o n g r e s s  
t o  a n t i - l a b o u r  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h ip  in c r e a s e d  b y  o n l y  7 3 ,0 0 0  o r  0 .5  p e r  
c e n t .  I n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  e n d i n g  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r ,  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  m i l i t a r y  
d e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  t h i s  w a s  a  s u r p r i s i n g l y  s m a l l  in c r e a s e .  B u t  a t  t h e  t im e  f a c t o r ie s  w e r e  
r e o r i e n t a t in g  t o w a r d s  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o n s u m e r  g o o d s ,  a n d  w o r k f o r c e s  w e r e  t u r n in g
19 ib id ,  25 N o v e m b e r  1946, V o l .  48, N o .  22, p. 8.
20 ib id ,  3 M a rc h , 1947, V o l .  49 , N o .  9, p. 7.
21 ib id ,  p. 8.
22 ib id .
23 ib id ,  18 N o v e m b e r, 1946, V o l .  48 , N o .  21, p. 6.
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o v e r .  H o w e v e r ,  t r a d e  u n i o n  d e n s i t y  p e a k e d  a t  t h is  t im e .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  t r a d e  u n io n  
m e m b e r s h i p  in c r e a s e d  a g a in ,  t h is  t im e  b y  3 9 2 , 0 0 0 ,  t o  1 4 .7  m i l l i o n .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  t h is  
in c r e a s e  w a s  l a r g e r  t h a n  e v e n  in  t h e  y e a r  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  it s e l f .  
A l t h o u g h  1 9 4 8  t h r o u g h  1 9 5 0  s a w  t h r e e  y e a r s  o f  d e c l i n i n g  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h ip ,  b y  1 9 5 4  
o v e r a l l  m e m b e r s h i p  h a d  s u r p a s s e d  1 7  m i l l i o n  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .  F r o m  t h is  it  c a n  b e  
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  d i s c e r n i b l e  t r e n d  i n  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  a t  t h is  t im e  w a s  
u p w a r d s .
P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n ,  w h o  a s s u m e d  o f f i c e  o n  12  A p r i l  1 9 4 5 ,  m e t  w it h  th e  
P r e s id e n t s  o f  t h e  A F L ,  W i l l i a m  G r e e n ,  a n d  t h e  C I O ,  P h i l i p  M u r r a y ,  o n  11 a n d  f o u r  
o c c a s io n s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h a t  y e a r  ( A p p e n d i x  A ) .  I n  a l l ,  T r u m a n  m e t  w i t h  t r a d e  u n io n  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  1 8  t im e s  in  1 9 4 5 .24 I n  1 9 4 6  P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n  m e t  w i t h  W i l l i a m  G r e e n  
s e v e n  t im e s ,  a n d  w i t h  P h i l i p  M u r r a y  1 0  t im e s .  I n  t o t a l  T r u m a n  m e t  w it h  t h e  
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  o f  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n  p e a k  o r g a n is a t io n s  1 9  t im e s  in  1 9 4 6 .25 T h e  f o l l o w i n g  
y e a r  P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n  m e t  w i t h  W i l l i a m  G r e e n  o f  t h e  A F L  s i x  t im e s  a n d  w it h  P h i l i p  
M u r r a y  o f  t h e  C I O  o n  t w o  o c c a s i o n s .  I n  a l l  T r u m a n  m e t  w i t h  le a d in g  t r a d e  u n io n is t s  o n  
11 o c c a s i o n s  in  1 9 4 7 .  H o w e v e r ,  in  1 9 4 8 , a  P r e s id e n t ia l  e l e c t i o n  y e a r ,  T r u m a n  m e t  w i t h  
t h e  le a d e r s  o f  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O  o n  2 3  o c c a s i o n s  in  t o t a l .26 F r o m  t h is  it  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  
a f t e r  1 9 4 6  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O ’ s  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  P r e s id e n t  d i p p e d  b e f o r e  in c r e a s in g  a g a in .
T r u m a n ’ s  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  r e f le c t e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  A m e r i c a n  p e o p l e  w a n t e d  a  
‘ r e s t  f r o m  e x p e r i m e n t s ’ ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  2 0 0 ) .  T h o s e  w h o  w is h e d  t o  
e x t e n d e d  f u r t h e r  t h e  M e w  D e a l  w o u l d  b e  d i s a p p o i n t e d  w i t h  t h e  F a i r  D e a l .  H o w e v e r ,  
p u b l i c  a n d  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  p o w e r  o f  l a b o u r  r e a c h e d  its  p e a k  in  1 9 4 7 .  
L a b o u r  w a s  g e a r in g  u p  f o r  a n o t h e r  c r a c k  a t  w a g e  n e g o t ia t i o n s ,  w h i l e  C o n g r e s s  w a s
24 T ru m a n  P re s id e n tia l M u s e u m  and L ib ra ry , 2003. T h e  Presidents D a y . ’ A c c e s se d  from  
http://w w w .trum anlibrary.org/calendar/
25 ib id .
26 -.u ; a
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p r e p a r in g  a  c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e  o f  it s  o w n .  P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n  w a s  c a u g h t  in  t h e  m i d d le .  
S e n s i t i v e  t o  u n i o n  d e m a n d s ,  h e  p e r m it t e d  b u s i n e s s m e n  t o  n e g o t ia t e  la r g e  p a y  in c r e a s e s  
f o r  t h e i r  w o r k e r s  a n d  t h e n  p a s s  o n  t h e  c o s t  t o  c o n s u m e r s .  H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  a  r a i l  s t r ik e  
t h r e a t e n e d  t o  c r i p p l e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  T r u m a n  c a l l e d  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  p o w e r s .  M a n y  
t h o u g h t  it  t im e  t o  c h e c k  t h e  p o w e r  o f  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r  b e f o r e  it  b e c a m e  u n m a n a g e a b le .  
T h e  A m e r i c a n  p e o p l e  w e r e  a n g e r e d  a t  w h a t  w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  la b o u r 's  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  
d e m a n d s  a t  a  t im e  o f  d i f f i c u l t  e c o n o m i c  r e a d ju s t m e n t .
B y  1 9 4 7  m a n y  s t a t e s ,  p r i m a r i l y  in  th e  S o u t h ,  h a d  p a s s e d  r ig h t - t o - w o r k  la w s  th a t  
r e s t r ic t e d  b o y c o t t s ,  p i c k e t i n g ,  a n d  c l o s e d - s h o p  a g r e e m e n t s .  T h e s e  r e s t r a in e d  t h e  im p a c t  
o f  O p e r a t i o n  D i x i e ,  a  S o u t h e r n  u n i o n - o r g a n i s i n g  d r i v e  c o n c e i v e d  i n  1 9 3 7 , a n d  la u n c h e d  
a f t e r  t h e  w a r .  I n  t h e  M i d w e s t  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a n t i - u n io n  e m p l o y e r s  m o v e d  t o  c o u n t e r  th e  
u n i o n s ’ w a r t i m e  g a i n s ,  a n d  r ig h t - t o  w o r k  la w s  w e r e  p a s s e d  a c r o s s  t h e  S o u t h  a n d  in  
s ta te s  a s  f a r  n o r t h  a s  I n d i a n a  a n d  I l l i n o i s  ( N e l s o n ,  1 9 9 5 ,  p .  6 4 ) .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  th e  
r e l o c a t i o n  o f  U S  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  t o  t h e  S o u t h  w e a k e n e d  t h e  u n i o n s  ( Z i e g e r ,  1 9 9 1 ) .
T h e  p o s t - w a r  s t r ik e  w a v e  i n t e n s i f ie d  a n  a n t i - u n io n  d r i v e  t h a t  h a d  o r ig in a t e d  in  
t h e  la t e  1 9 3 0 s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  S m i t h - C o n n a l l y  A c t ,  a n d  h a d  d e v e l o p e d  a  
n e w  v i g o r  in  1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 7 .  T h e  a n t i - u n io n  d r i v e  c o a l e s c e d  a r o u n d  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  th e  
a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  W a g n e r  A c t  o f  1 9 3 5 . I n  l ig h t  o f  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p o l i t i c a l  s it u a t io n ,  
l a b o u r ’ s  p o s i t i o n  w a s  w e a k .  I n  r e f u s in g  t o  c o m p r o m i s e  o v e r  t h e  p r o p o s e d  le g is la t io n ,  
a n d  s e e k in g  t o  h o l d  r e a c t i o n a r y  e m p l o y e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d r i v e  t o  m o d i f y  p r o ­
l a b o u r  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  W a g n e r  A c t ,  b o t h  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O  m i s j u d g e d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
r e a l i t ie s .
T h e  a n t i - u n i o n  d r i v e  c u lm in a t e d  in  C o n g r e s s ' s  a p p r o v a l  o f  th e  L a b o u r -  
M a n a g e m e n t  R e l a t i o n s  A c t  o f  1 9 4 7 , m o r e  c o m m o n l y  k n o w n  a s  t h e  T a f t - H a r t l e y  A c t .  
M a n y  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  M a n u f a c t u r e r s  ( N A M ) ,
278
r e p r e s e n t in g  t h e  b u s i n e s s  c o m m u n i t y ,  w e r e  in c o r p o r a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  A c t  ( R o s e n b e r g ,  
2 0 0 3 ,  p .  7 1 ) .  W h e r e a s  t h e  W a g n e r  A c t  h a d  b e e n  d e s ig n e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  la b o u r e r  f r o m  
h is  e m p l o y e r ,  t h e  T a f t - H a r t l e y  A c t  s e r v e d  th e  o p p o s i t e  p u r p o s e ,  a l t h o u g h  it s  b a c k e r s  
c l a i m e d  t h e  a c t  w a s  d e s ig n e d  t o  p r o t e c t  la b o u r 's  r a n k  a n d  f i l e  f r o m  t h e  a b u s e s  o f  t h e ir  
l e a d e r s  ( W i l s o n ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  7 ) .  T h e  l a w  s h a r p ly  c u r t a i le d  t h e  f r e e d o m  o f  a c t io n ,  a n d  
c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  in d u s t r ia l  p o w e r ,  o f  t h e  u n io n s .  T h e  la w  w o u l d  n e v e r  h a v e  g o t  
t h r o u g h  i f  t h e  s t r u g g le s  b e t w e e n  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  la b o u r  i n  t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r io d  o f  r a p id  
i n f l a t i o n  h a d  n o t  b e e n  s o  b it t e r  ( B r o g a n ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p .  5 9 5 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  w h a t  t h e  A c t  a c t u a l ly  
m e a n t  d e p e n d e d  o n  t h e  N L R B ’ s  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  it  a n d ,  i f  its  d e c i s i o n s  w e r e  a p p e a le d ,  
t h e  c o u r t s .  S i n c e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  b o a r d  w e r e  a p p o in t e d  b y  t h e  P r e s id e n t ,  la b o u r  u n io n s  
a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  o r g a n is a t io n s  b e c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  w h o  w o u l d  b e  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  A c t  c h e c k e d  u n io n  g r o w t h  in  th e  S u n  
B e l t .
T h e  T a f t - H a r t l e y  A c t  w a s  p a s s e d  o v e r  t h e  v e t o  o f  P r e s id e n t  T r u m a n  ( H a m b y ,  
1 9 7 3 ,  p .  1 8 5 ) .  ‘ T r u m a n  c a l l e d  it  a  ‘ s h o c k i n g  p i e c e  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ’ ( B y r n e s ,  2 0 0 0 ,  p . 5 7 ) .  
T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  P a r t y ,  a n d  r i g h t - w i n g  D e m o c r a t s ,  o b j e c t e d  t o  w h a t  t h e y  b e l ie v e d  w a s  
t h e  p r o - t r a d e  u n io n  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  R o o s e v e l t ’ s  a d m in is t r a t i o n .  T h i s  in  i t s e l f  s e e m e d  to  
d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  A m e r i c a n  la b o u r  w a s  p o l i t i c a l l y  w e a k .  T h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  A F L  
u n i o n s  c o u l d  a f f o r d  t o  i g n o r e  p o l i t i c s  w a s  s h a t t e r e d .  T h e  A F L  c o m f o r t e d  i t s e l f  w i t h  th e  
n o t i o n  t h a t  c o n g r e s s m e n  w h o  h a d  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  A c t  w o u l d  b e  d e f e a t e d  a t  th e  n e x t  
e l e c t io n .  I n  r e s p o n s e  t h e  A F L  u n i o n s  c r e a t e d  L a b o r ’ s  L e a g u e  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  E d u c a t io n  
( L L P E )  in  1 9 4 7 ,  it s  o w n  e le c t o r a l  m a c h i n e r y  ( T a f t ,  1 9 6 8 ) .  T h i s  w a s  p r o v id e d  a  b u d g e t  
o f  $ 3 4 3 ,2 9 3  f o r  t h e  1 9 4 8  e le c t io n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  k n o c k - o n  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
p r o b l e m s  t h a t  s a w  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  d i m i n i s h e d  b y  th e  
R e p u b l i c a n  r e c o v e r y  o f  C o n g r e s s  a n d  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  T a f t - H a r t l e y  A c t ,  w a s  t o  s e e
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o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r ’ s  i n v o l v e m e n t  in  p o l i t i c s  in c r e a s e d .  H o w e v e r ,  w i t h  t h e  in t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
T a f t - H a r t l e y  t h e  c u r t a in  c a m e  d o w n  o n  t h e  N e w  D e a l  e r a  o f  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r  e x p a n s io n  
u n d e r  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o t e c t io n .
T h e  G o v e r n m e n t .  E c o n o m y ,  a n d  t h e  U n i o n s  in t o  t h e  1 9 5 0 s
I n  t h e  1 9 4 8  e l e c t io n ,  w h i c h  s a w  T r u m a n  r e t u r n e d  a s  P r e s id e n t ,  l a b o u r  c o n c e n t r a t e d  o n  
e l e c t i n g  p r o - l a b o u r  le g is la t o r s  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s  a n d  s ta te  le g is la t u r e s .  U n i o n  s u p p o r t  
( n o w  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  A F L  a n d  it s  L L P E )  p r o v e d  v i t a l  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  d r i v e  t h a t  s a w  th e  
D e m o c r a t s  g a i n  7 5  s e a t s  in  t h e  H o u s e  a n d  n in e  i n  t h e  S e n a t e ,  r e g a i n i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  
C o n g r e s s .  L a b o u r  l o o k e d  f o r w a r d  t o  t h e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  T a f t - H a r t l e y  A c t .  B u t  a n t i - la b o u r  
f o r c e s  in  C o n g r e s s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  h o l d  s w a y ,  a n d  T a f t - H a r t l e y  w a s  n o t  r e p e a le d  ( W i l s o n ,  
1 9 7 9 ,  p . 6 3 ) .
S o m e  t r a d e  u n i o n  a d v o c a t e d  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  f i n d i n g  t h e i r  w a y  in t o  la w  w h i le  
o t h e r s  w e r e  n o t .  I n  J a n u a r y  1 9 4 9 ,  u r g e d  b y  t h e  u n io n s ,  T r u m a n  s o u g h t  t o  in t r o d u c e  a  
b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  F a i r  D e a l  m e a s u r e s .  C o n g r e s s  a p p r o v e d  a  h i g h e r  m i n i m u m  w a g e ,  th e  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t o  1 0  m i l l i o n  a d d i t io n a l  p e r s o n s ,  a n d  m o r e  p u b l i c  w o r k s .  
H o w e v e r ,  T r u m a n  f a i l e d  t o  p e r s u a d e  C o n g r e s s  t o  r e p e a l  T a f t - H a r t l e y ,  t o  s e c u r e  f e d e r a l  
a id  t o  e d u c a t io n ,  o r  t o  a c c e p t  h is  p r o p o s a l  f o r  n a t io n a l  h e a l t h  in s u r a n c e  ( D i v i n e  e t  a l. ,  
1 9 9 5 ,  p . 8 6 6 ) .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  T r u m a n  s u c c e e d e d  in  p r o t e c t in g  t h e  N e w  D e a l  p r in c ip le s  
o f  f e d e r a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,  a n d  h e l p e d  f o r m  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  a g e n d a  f o r  
t h e  1 9 6 0 s .  T h e  T r u m a n  y e a r s  w e r e  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  
a d v a n c i n g  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  e c o n o m i c  in i t ia t iv e s  f r o m  t h e  1 9 3 0 s .  A t  t h is  t im e  th e  
d e v a s t a t i o n  i n  E u r o p e  a n d  J a p a n  p l a c e d  th e  U S  e c o n o m y  in  a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  p o w e r f u l  
p o s i t i o n ,  w i t h  U S  p r o d u c t i o n  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  4 5  p e r  c e n t  o f  w o r l d  o u t p u t  in  1 9 4 8  
( F r e n c h ,  1 9 9 7 ,  p .  1 9 7 ) .
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I n  1 9 5 2  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  lo s t  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e .  T h e  p r o b l e m s  w it h  th e  
e c o n o m y  in  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 5 0 s  c o n t r ib u t e d  t o  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  v i c t o r y ,  a n d  s a w  o r g a n is e d  
l a b o u r ’ s  in f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  d i m i n i s h e d  f u r t h e r .  T h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  a l l i e d  i t s e l f  
t o  b ig  b u s i n e s s .  T h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  g a v e  g r e a t e r  im p e t u s  t o  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O ’ s  d r iv e  f o r  
r e u n i f i c a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  E i s e n h o w e r  w a s  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  h e  a c c e p t e d  m o s t  
N e w  D e a l  r e f o r m s .
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Table 6.1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1946
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  1 H i g h M e d iu m L o w N o n e
O l :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
P r e s id e n t
X
0 2 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  
o n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m m it t e e s
N / A
0 3 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  r e la t io n s h ip  in  t h e  e c o n o m y  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  t h e  e m p l o y e r s ’ p e a k  
o r g a n is a t io n ,  a n d / o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
X
0 4 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ r e la t io n s h ip  
w it h  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y
X
0 5 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n io n  
m e m b e r s h i p  in  t h e  e c o n o m y
X
0 6 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  
t o w a r d s  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r
X
0 7 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  w e r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r
X
0 8 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s
X
0 9 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a s  id e n t i f i e d  b y  n a t io n a l  
e c o n o m i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  i n d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  a l i k e
X
0 1 0 :  C h a n g e  i n  m i n i s t e r i a l  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  in  t h e  p o l i t y
X
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  2 H i g h M e d iu m L o w N o n e
O l :  A r e  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  m a i n  e c o n o m i c  
i n d ic a t o r s  a t  d e c a d e - l o n g  lo w s ?
X
0 2 :  D o  o p i n i o n  p o l l s  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  
r e g a r d s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  
c r i s i s ?
X
0 3 :  D o  t h e  n a t io n a l  m e d i a  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 4 :  D o  n a t io n a l  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 5 :  D o e s  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  r e g a r d s  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 6 :  D o  d o m e s t ic  an d  in te rn a t io n a l o rg a n isa t io n s  
re g a rd  th e  e c o n o m ic  state o f  th e  c o u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 7 :  D o  e le c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  r e g a r d  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 8 :  A r e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o n o u n c e m e n t  o n  t h e  
s ta te  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  a r e  c o n s is t e n t  w i t h  a  
c r i s i s - m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o a c h ?
X
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F r o m  T a b l e  6 .1  i t  is  c le a r  t h a t  o n l y  o n e  o f  t h e  o b s e r v a b le  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  e a c h  o f  th e  
h y p o t h e s e s  in d ic a t e d  a  h ig h  le v e l  o f  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t .  It c a n  a l s o  b e  s e e n  th a t  
w h i l e  4 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  o b s e r v a b le  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  h y p o t h e s is  in d ic a t e d  a  
m e d i u m  o r  h i g h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t ,  o n l y  3 7 .5  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  h y p o t h e s i s ’ s 
o b s e r v a b l e s  p o in t e d  t o  a  m e d i u m  o r  h i g h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t .  W i t h  t h e  f in d i n g s  f o r  
b o t h  h y p o t h e s e s  f a l l i n g  f a r  b e lo w  t h e  6 0  p e r  c e n t  t h r e s h o ld  f o r  h ig h  e m p i r i c a l -  
t h e o r e t i c a l  f i t ,  t h e  t a b le  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  in  t h e  A F L  a n d  
C I O ’ s i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  1 9 4 6 .
In  s u m m a t io n ,  1 9 4 6  w it n e s s e d  a  s w i f t  a n d  e n d u r i n g  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  T h i s  c h a n g e  t o o k  p la c e  a t  a  t im e  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  n o t  c r i s i s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h is  c h a n g e  w a s  n o t  t r u l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  t h a t  it  d id  n o t  
r e p r e s e n t  a  c o m p l e t e  r e v e r s a l  o f  f o r t u n e  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  w a r  h a d  
b e e n  g o o d  f o r  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  it s  e n d i n g  im p a c t e d  u p o n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f lu e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  T h e  b u i l d i n g  e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  w i t h  i n f l a t i o n  o u t p a c i n g  w a g e  
in c r e a s e s ,  a n d  i n d u s t r ia l  d is p u t e s  e r u p t i n g ,  s a w  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  r e g a in  c o n t r o l  o f  
C o n g r e s s .  T h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  d o w n t u r n  w a s  s h a r e d  b y  th e  n a t io n a l  
m e d ia ,  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  w i t h  t h e  p o l l s  h in t in g  a t p u b l i c  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  T h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  c a m e  t o  p o w e r  p r o m i s i n g  t o  f r e e  u p  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  
t a k e  a c t io n  a g a in s t  t h e  p o w e r  o f  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r .  D e s p i t e  t h is ,  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O ’ s 
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e m a in e d  s t a t ic ,  w h i l e  u n io n  m e m b e r s h i p  in c r e a s e d  in  1 9 4 6 . T h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s  b e c a m e  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n  th a t ,  a l t h o u g h  th e  
E x e c u t i v e ’ s  a t t i t u d e  r e m a in e d  u n a l t e r e d ,  C o n g r e s s ’ s  h a d  c h a n g e d ,  a n d  t h is  p r e v e n t e d  
c e r t a in  p r o - u n i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n  w h i l e  p e r m i t t in g  a n t i - u n io n  le g i s l a t i o n  t o  g o  t h r o u g h .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  D e m o c r a t i c  P r e s id e n t ,  t h e  u n i o n s ’ l e v e l  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  u n d e r w e n t  a  d e c l i n e  o f  a  s w i f t ,  a n d  e n d u r i n g  n a t u r e .  B u t ,
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a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  c r i t e r ia  s e t  o u t  in  C h a p t e r  II, t h e  c h a n g e  in  th e  
t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  w a s  n o t  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e ,  a s  t h e r e  w a s  n e i t h e r  a  s ig n i f i c a n t  
c h a n g e  in  i n f l u e n c e ,  n o r  a  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  ( g e n e r a t iv e  c le a v a g e )  in  t h e  f i r s t  p la c e .  
B y r n e s  ( 2 0 0 0 ,  p .  2 7 )  s u m s  it  u p  b e s t  w h e n  h e  s a y s :
w h a t e v e r  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  m e a n i n g ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c  t r o u b le s  o f  t h e  e a r ly  
T r u m a n  y e a r s  a c t u a l l y  m a s k e d  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  
e c o n o m y .  L a b o r  s t r i f e  a n d  in f l a t i o n  w e r e  m e r e ly  s h o r t - t e r m  p a in s  o f  
r e c o n v e r s i o n .  In  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  in  s o u n d  e c o n o m i c  s h a p e .
f i g u r e  6 .1 :  T h e  C r i t i c a l  J u n c t u r e  G r i d ,  A m e r i c a ,  1 9 4 6
G e n e r a t i v e  C l e a v a g e C h a n g e  ( S i g n i f i c a n t ,  S w i f t ,  a n d  E n d u r i n g )
( M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C r i s i s )





T h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  o f  T r u m a n  a n d  E i s e n h o w e r  w e r e  n o t a b l e  f o r  t h e ir  c o n t in u i t y .  
G a l e n s o n  ( 1 9 9 6 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  a f t e r  y e a r s  o f  d e p r e s s io n  a n d  w a r  p e o p l e  w e r e  in t e r e s t e d  in  
a c h i e v i n g  s t a b le  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h .  U n l i k e  F D R  a n d  T r u m a n ,  E i s e n h o w e r  h a d  n o  
c o m m i t m e n t  t o  s o c i a l  c h a n g e .  H o w e v e r ,  u n l i k e  e x t r e m e  r i g h t - w i n g  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  h e  
a ls o  h a d  n o  p l a n s  t o  d i s m a n t l e  t h e  s o c i a l  p r o g r a m m e  o f  t h e  N e w  D e a l  e it h e r .
B y  1 9 5 5  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  w o r k e r s  in  n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p l o y m e n t ,  b e lo n g in g  to  
t r a d e  u n io n s ,  s t o o d  a t  3 3 .4  p e r  c e n t  ( T r o y  a n d  S h e l f l i n ,  1 9 8 5 ) .  ‘ R e u t h e r  [ P r e s id e n t  o f  
t h e  C I O ]  a n d  M e a n y  [ P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  A F L ]  w e r e  c o m m i t t e d  t o  l a b o u r  u n i t y  a s  a  b a s is  
f o r  e n h a n c e d  p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g t h ’ ( R e n s h a w ,  1 9 9 1 ,  p .  1 4 7 ) .  B o t h  f e d e r a t io n s  p r e s e n c e  in  
t h e  N o r t h e a s t e r n  a n d  M i d w e s t e r n  t r a n s la t e d  in t o  l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  in f l u e n c e ,  a n d  a  r o le  in  
n a t io n a l  a f f a i r e s  ( M a r s h a l l ,  1 9 6 7 ) .  T h e  u n it e d  A F L - C I O  w a s  f o r m e d  in  1 9 5 5  
( G o l d b e r g ,  1 9 5 6 ) .  F o l l o w i n g  u n i f i c a t i o n  b o t h  c o n g r e s s e s ’ P A C s  m e r g e d  t o  f o r m  th e  
C o m m i t t e e  o n  P o l i t i c a l  E d u c a t i o n  ( C O P E ) ,  o n e  o f  s t r o n g e s t  P A C s  in  A m e r i c a  ( I p p o l i t o  
a n d  W a l k e r ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  3 4 8 ) .
‘ T h e  u n i o n s  p l a y e d  a  p u n y  p a r t  in  A m e r i c a n  p o l i t i c s  u n t i l  t h e  1 9 5 0 s ’ ( W i l s o n ,  
1 9 7 9 ,  p .  3 ) .  B u t  t h e r e a f t e r  t h is  c h a n g e d .  M i e r r y k  ( 1 9 6 2 ,  p .  7 7 )  n o t e d  t h a t  o n  t h e  e v e  o f  
t h e  m e r g e r  b e t w e e n  t h e  A F L  a n d  C I O ,  w h i l e  t h e y  h a d  n o t  lo s t  f a i t h  in  t h e  v a lu e  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  f o r  i m p r o v i n g  w o r k e r s ’ lo t ,  t h e  u n i o n s  h a d  e le v a t e d  in v o l v e m e n t  
in  p o l i t i c s  t o  s o m e t h in g  a p p r o a c h i n g  a n  e q u a l  r o le .  H o w e v e r ,  b y  t h e  m i d - 1 9 5 0 s  
w o r k e r s ’  r a d i c a l i s m  w a s  o n  t h e  w a n e  ( B o y e r  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p . 9 4 3 ) .  V i c t o r i e s  a t  th e  
b a r g a i n i n g  t a b le  h a d  s e c u r e d  s o  m a n y  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  s o l i d a r i t y  g a v e  w a y  t o  c o m p l a c e n c y .  
T h e  m i d d l e - c l a s s  a s p i r a t io n s  o f  w o r k e r s  le d  t o  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m  ( B e l l ,  
2000, p .  2 2 0 ) .
Potential Critical Juncture 2: 1960-The Kennedy Years
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T h e  u n i o n s  e m e r g e d  f r o m  th e  1 9 5 0 s  w i t h  t h e  s t ig m a  o f  c o r r u p t i o n  a b o u t  t h e m ,  
t h is  a r i s i n g  f r o m  F e d e r a l  in v e s t i g a t io n s ,  c h a r g e s  o f  “ r a c k e t e e r in g , ”  a n d  t h e  in t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  t h e  L a n d r u m - G r i f f l n  A c t  ( I p p o l i t o  a n d  W l a k e r ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  3 8 1 ) .  T h e  a c t ,  d e s ig n e d  to  
p r o t e c t  u n io n  m e m b e r s  f r o m  t h e i r  le a d e r s '  a b u s e  o f  p o w e r ,  in s t i t u t e d  n e w  u n io n  e le c t io n  
r e g u la t io n s ,  a n d  v a r i o u s  o t h e r  m e a s u r e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r ig h t s  o f  t h e  r a n k  a n d  f i le .  T h i s  
w a s  s y m p t o m a t i c  o f  a  g r o w i n g  t r e n d  t o w a r d  e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g  g o v e r n m e n t a l  in t e r f e r e n c e  
i n  l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t  r e la t io n s  ( R a y b a c k ,  1 9 6 6 ,  p p .  4 3 5 - 4 3 6 ) .  R o s e n b e r g  ( 2 0 0 3 ,  p . 8 1 )  
a r g u e s  t h a t  a t  t h e  c l o s e  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0 s  u n i o n s  w e r e  o n  t h e  d e f e n s i v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e y  w e r e  
n o t  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e i r  e x is t e n c e .
T h e  E c o n o m y ,  a n d  t h e  P r e s id e n t ia l  E l e c t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0
I n t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  t h e  m e d ia ,  a n d  n a t io n a l  c o m m e n t a t o r s  r e g a r d e d  th e  
e c o n o m y  a s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  1 9 6 0 .  T h e  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  a t t h e  e n d  o f  th e  
1 9 5 0 s ,  h i g h  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  a  la r g e  d e f i c i t ,  c o n t r ib u t e d  t o  t h e  r o u t in g  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c a n s  i n  t h e  1 9 5 8  m i d - t e r m  e le c t io n s .  B y  1 9 5 9  t h e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  s t o o d  a t  a  
p e a c e t im e  r e c o r d  o f  $ 1 2 .6  b i l l i o n .  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  r e a s o n  f o r  t h is  d e f i c i t ,  o b s e r v e d  Time, 
w a s  t h e  r e c e s s i o n ,  a s  t h i s  c u t  t a x  r e v e n u e s  b y  $ 6 .2  b i l l i o n . 27 T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  t h e  ra te  
o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  h a d  r e a c h e d  5 .5  p e r  c e n t ,  o r  3 .7  m i l l i o n  c i t i z e n s . 28 A c c o r d i n g  t o  a  
L a b o r  D e p a r t m e n t  r u l e  o f  t h u m b  a n y t h i n g  a b o v e  3  m i l l i o n  w a s  a  s u r e  s ig n  o f  e c o n o m i c  
w e a k n e s s . 29 T h i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  p a r t  o f  a  t r e n d  t h a t  h a d  s e e n  U S  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r i s in g  
g r a d u a l l y  s i n c e  t h e  e n d  o f  W o r l d  W a r  II ( O E C D ,  I 9 6 0 ,  p .  5 ) .  R e f l e c t i n g  t h e  w a n i n g  
s ta te  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  w e r e  t h e  d e c l i n e s  in  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  s t e e l  a n d  o t h e r  p r i m a r y  m e t a l s .30 
T h e  s t e e l  in d u s t r y  w a s  r e d u c e d  t o  o p e r a t in g  a t  5 3 .9  p e r  c e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y  b y  t h e  e a r ly
27 T im e  International, 13 J u ly  1959, V o l .  74, N o .  2, p. 14.
28 ib id ,  3 O cto be r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  14, p. 58.
29 N e w sw e e k , 5 Sep tem b er, 1960, V o l.  56, N o .  10, p. 48.
30 T im e  International, 24 O c to b e r  1970, V o l .  76, N o . 17, p. 66
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a u t u m n  o f  1 9 6 0 .  ‘ B y  1 9 6 0  m o s t  b u s i n e s s m e n  a n d  e c o n o m i s t s  a g r e e d  t h a t  th e  
e c o n o m y  w a s  s l u m p i n g  d a n g e r o u s l y ’ ( H e a t h ,  1 9 7 5 ,  p . 6 3 ) .  A l t h o u g h ,  t h e  ra te  o f  
in f l a t i o n ,  d e c l i n i n g  s i n c e  1 9 5 7 ,  s t o o d  a t  t h e  l o w  l e v e l  o f  1 .3  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 6 0 ,  t h e  L a b o r  
D e p a r t m e n t  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  h a d  r e a c h e d  a n  a l l - t i m e  h i g h  in  S e p t e m b e r  
o f  t h a t  y e a r . 32 A c c o r d i n g  t o  C a p e l  ( 1 9 9 1 ,  p . 3 )  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  in  r e c e s s io n  
a t  t h is  t im e .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  t h e  r a t io  o f  d e b t  t o  G N P  c a m e  t o  5 6  p e r  c e n t .  T h e  O E C D  
( 1 9 6 2 ,  p . 6 )  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  U S  r a t e  o f  e c o n o m i c  e x p a n s io n  h a d  s lo w e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  d u r i n g  t h e  la t t e r  y e a r s  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0 s ,  w i t h  g r o w t h  la g g i n g  b e h in d  th a t  
e x p e r ie n c e d  in  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e .  W h e r e a s  1 9 5 9  h a d  s e e n  t h e  e c o n o m y  s u d d e n l y  e x p a n d  
b y  7 .2  p e r  c e n t  a f t e r  y e a r s  o f  r e c e s s i o n ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r ’ s g r o w t h  r a t e  f e l l  t o  o n l y  a  
t h i r d  o f  t h is ,  2 . 4  p e r  c e n t .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  d a y s  lo s t  t o  in d u s t r ia l  d is p u t e s  in  1 9 6 0  s t o o d  
a t  o v e r  1 9  m i l l i o n  ( A p p e n d i x  D ) .  A l t h o u g h ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c  in d ic a t o r s  in  1 9 6 0  
w e r e  a t  d e c a d e - l o n g  lo w s ,  F r e n c h  ( 1 9 9 7 ,  p .  4 4 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  w a s  in  r e c e s s io n .
T h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t  f e l l  in  la t e  1 9 6 0  d u e  t o  b u s i n e s s  w o r r ie s  o v e r  t h e  s ta te  o f  th e  
e c o n o m y . 33 I n la n d  S t e e l  C h a i r m a n  J o s e p h  B l o c k  s a id  t h a t  h e  h a d  n e v e r  s e e n  a  y e a r  
w h e n  e c o n o m i c  f o r e c a s t s  w e r e  s o  o u t  o f  l i n e  w i t h  a c t u a l  p r o d u c t i o n . 34 Time a ls o  
o b s e r v e d  t h a t  o v e r  o p t i m i s m  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  s ta te  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  h a d  v a n is h e d ,  
r e p la c e d  b y  a  s o b e r  r e a l i s a t io n  t h a t  it  w a s  n o t  m o v i n g  f o r w a r d  in  l in e  w it h  
e x p e c t a t i o n s . 35 G o v e r n m e n t  e c o n o m is t s  w e r e  p o in t i n g ,  w i t h  c o n c e r n ,  t o  th e  c o n t i n u i n g  
s l i d e  in  p r o d u c t i o n . 36 I n d u s t r ia l i s t s  A d o l p h  G .  A b r a m s o n  o f  S K F  I n d u s t r ie s ,  M o r r i s  
C o h e n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  I n d u s t r ia l  C o n f e r e n c e  B o a r d ,  R o b e r t  W o o d w a r d  o f  B e t h le h e m  
S t e e l ,  a n d  N a t h a n i e l  R o g g  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e  B u i l d e r s ,  a l l  r e g a r d e d
31 N e w sw e e k , 3 O c to b e r , 1960, V o l .  56, N o .  14, p. 50.
32 T im e  International, 7 N o v e m b e r, 1960, V o l.  76, N o .  19, p. 68.
33 N e w sw e e k , 26  Sep tem b er, 1960, V o l.  56, N o . 13, p. 54.
34 T im e  International, 3 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l .  74, N o .  14, p. 58.
35 ib id ,  3 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  14, p. 58.
36 N e w sw e e k , 10 O c to b e r , V o l .  s56 , N o . 14, p. 57.
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t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  in  d e c l in e .  A f t e r  1 9 5 0 , w i t h  t h e  r e b u i l t  e c o n o m i e s  o f  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  
a n d  J a p a n  p r o v i d i n g  b r i s k  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  in t e r n a t io n a l  t r a d e ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o u n d  
i t s e l f  r u n n i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  in t o  t h e  r e d  in  it s  o v e r a l l  in t e r n a t io n a l  a c c o u n t s .38 Time 
p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  f r o m  1 9 5 7  t o  1 9 6 0  U S  g o ld  r e s e r v e s  d w i n d l e d  b y  2 0  p e r  c e n t  a s  b u l l i o n  
w e n t  a b r o a d  t o  b a l a n c e  it s  a c c o u n t s , 39 a n d  t h a t  1 9 6 0  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  t h i r d  s t r a ig h t  y e a r  in  
w h i c h  A m e r i c a  h a d  a  b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  d e f i c i t  o f  m o r e  t h a n  $ 3  b i l l i o n . 40 T h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  e v e n t u a l l y  h a d  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h is  s i t u a t io n .  In  N o v e m b e r  1 9 6 0  T r e a s u r y  
S e c r e t a r y  R o b e r t  B .  A n d e r s o n  m e t  w i t h  P r e s id e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  o n  t h e  is s u e  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t  
in  in t e r n a t io n a l  p a y m e n t s  a n d  r e s u l t in g  d r a i n  o n  t h e  U S  g o l d  r e s e r v e s .  S o o n  a f t e r w a r d s  
E i s e n h o w e r  im p o s e d  a  P r e s id e n t ia l  d i r e c t i v e  d e s ig n e d  t o  s l o w  t h e  o u t f l o w  o f  g o ld  b y  
c u r b i n g  U S  s p e n d i n g  o v e r s e a s . 41
B y  1 9 6 0  m o s t  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m is t s  w e r e  a g r e e d  t h a t  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s  e c o n o m y  
w a s  in  d i f f i c u l t y .  J a m e s  A .  B y r d ,  e c o n o m i c  a d v i s e r  f o r  H u s t o n ’ s B a n k  o f  C o m m e r c e ,  
W i l l i a m  B u t l e r ,  a n  e c o n o m i s t  f o r  C h a s e  M a n h a t t a n  B a n k ,  a n d  Wall Street Journal 
c o l u m n i s t  G e o r g e  S h e a ,  a l l  s t a t e d  in  Time t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  a l r e a d y  w e l l  in t o  a  
r e c e s s i o n . 42 T h i s  w a s  a l s o  t h e  v i e w  e x p r e s s e d  b y  2 0 0  e c o n o m is t s  a t t e n d in g  th e  
c o n v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  B u s i n e s s  E c o n o m i s t s  in  M a n h a t t a n  in  la te  
O c t o b e r . 43 T h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  C o u n c i l  o f  E c o n o m i c  A d v i s o r s  ( P C E A )  c o n f i r m e d  t h a t  th e  
e c o n o m y  w a s  c o n t r a c t i n g . 44 T e s t i f y i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  J o i n t  E c o n o m i c  C o m m i t t e e  o f  
C o n g r e s s  e c o n o m i s t  C h a r l e s  L .  S c h u l t z e  o f  I n d i a n a  U n i v e r s i t y  d e s c r ib e d  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g
37 T im e  International, 31 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l.  76, N o .  18, p. 57.
38 N e w sw e e k , 17 O c to b e r  1960, V o l .  56, N o . 16, p. 52.
39 T im e  International, 28 N o v e m b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  22 p. 12.
40 ib id ., 19 D e ce m b e r, 1960, V o l.  76, N o . 25, p. 15.
111 ib id ., 28 N o v e m b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  22, p. 11
42 ib id ., 3 O cto b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  14, p. 58.
43 N e w sw e e k , 31 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l .  56, N o .  18, p. 56.
44 T im e  International, 31 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  18, p. 57.
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c o n d i t i o n s  a s  “ c r e e p i n g  s t a g n a t io n . ” 45 R o s e n b e r g  ( 2 0 0 3 ,  p .  1 0 3 )  a g r e e d  t h a t  b y  1 9 6 0  
t h e  e c o n o m y  a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  s t a g n a t in g .
F r e d r i c k  R .  K a p p e l ,  P r e s id e n t  o f  A m e r i c a n  T e l e p h o n e  &  T e l e g r a p h  C o . ,  
s p o k e  f o r  m a n y  w h e n  h e  s a id :  “ W e  h a v e  m o r e  p r o b l e m s  t h a n  w e  r e a l i z e d .
T h i s  is  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  i n  m y  l i f e t i m e  t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t  o f  t h e  U S  h a s  b e e n  
q u e s t io n e d .  A  v e r y  s e r io u s  s h a d o w  l ie s  o v e r  t h e  A m e r i c a n  b u s in e s s  
p i c t u r e . ” 46
E a r l y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  P r e s id e n t  E i s e n h o w e r ’ s  c h i e f  o f  t h e  P C E A ,  R a y m o n d  S a u ln ie r ,  
a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e  la t t e r  q u a r t e r  o f  1 9 6 0  h a d  b e e n  v e r y  b a d  e c o n o m i c a l l y  47 In  s u m m i n g  
u p  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 6 2 ,  p .  5 )  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  in  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  e a r l i e r  p o s t - w a r  
p e r io d ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  e c o n o m y  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  w a s  m a r k e d  b y  a  s l o w  ra te  o f  
g r o w t h ,  h i g h  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  a n  u n c o m f o r t a b l y  la r g e  f o r e i g n  d e f i c i t .
D e s p i t e  t h e  c o n c e r n s  o v e r  t h e  e c o n o m y  i n  1 9 6 0  J o h n  F i t z g e r a l d  K e n n e d y  
p e r s o n i f i e d  t h e  e n e r g y  a n d  s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e  o f  A m e r i c a n  y o u t h .  T h e  le a d e r s  o f  
o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r  w a r m e d  t o  K e n n e d y  a s  t h e y  h a d  t o  R o o s e v e l t  t w e n t y - e ig h t  y e a r s  
b e f o r e .  I n  h i m  t h e y  s a w  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t h e i r  d r e a m s .  H i s  p o p u l a r i t y ,  a n d  f o r m i d a b l e  
p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  g a i n e d  h i m  a  f i r s t - b a l l o t  v i c t o r y  a t  t h e  1 9 6 0  D e m o c r a t i c  
n o m i n a t i n g  c o n v e n t i o n .  “ T h e  e le c t io n  o f  J o h n  F .  K e n n e d y  is  l a b o r ’ s  n u m b e r  o n e  j o b , ’ 
p r o c l a i m e d  G e o r g e  M e a n y  in  I 9 6 0 ’ ( C r o w n ,  1 9 6 1 ,  p .  2 6 5 ) .  U n i o n  h a l l s  a c r o s s  th e  
c o u n t r y  w e r e  t u r n e d  in t o  K e n n e d y  c a m p a ig n  c e n t e r s ,  a n d  u n i o n  r e g is t r a t i o n  d r iv e s  in  th e  
c i t i e s  w e r e  o f  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  im p o r t a n c e  t o  h is  c a m p a i g n  ( K o e n i g ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p .  2 7 7 ) .  T h e
45 ib id ., 19 D e ce m b e r, 1960, V o l .  76, N o .  25, p. 56.
46 ib id ., 6 Jan u ary , 1961, V o l .  77 N o .  2, p. 17.
47 ib id ., 27  Ja n u ary , 1961, V o l .  77 N o .  5, p. 17.
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a r r i v a l  o f  a  n e w  a g e  w a s  s ig n a le d  b y  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  y o u t h  o f  t h e  p r e s id e n t ia l  
c a n d i d a t e s  o f  t h e  t w o  m a j o r  p a r t ie s .  S e n a t o r  K e n n e d y  w a s  4 3 ,  w h i l e  R e p u b l i c a n  V i c e  
P r e s id e n t  N i x o n  w a s  4 7 .
T h e  e le c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  p o in t e d  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .  
D u r i n g  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  c a m p a i g n  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s  f e a t u r e d  
p r o m i n e n t l y ,  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  b e in g  m a d e  a  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  b y  K e n n e d y  ( S c h le s in g e r ,  1 9 6 5 ,  
p . 6 2 5 ) .  T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  p l a t f o r m  a r g u e d  f o r  t h e  n e e d  t o  a c h i e v e  a  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  f i v e  
p e r  c e n t  p e r  y e a r ,  a n d  b la m e d  s l o w  g r o w t h  e n t i r e l y  u p o n  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  a d m in is t r a t i o n  
( S c h l e s i n g e r  a n d  I s r a e l ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  3 4 8 2 ) .  T h e  D e m o c r a t s  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  s l o t h  a t h o m e  a n d  id le n e s s  a b r o a d . 48 K e n n e d y  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  in  1 9 5 9  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a d  t h e  lo w e s t  ra te  o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  o f  a n y  m a j o r  in d u s t r ia l i z e d  
s o c i e t y  i n  t h e  w o r l d . 49 T h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  e c o n o m y  w a s  n o t  g r o w i n g  f a s t  e n o u g h ,  h e  a r g u e d ,  
a s  1 7  m i l l i o n  A m e r i c a n ’ s  w e r e  g o i n g  to  b e d  h u n g r y  a t  n i g h t . 50 H e  p o in t e d  o u t  th a t  
A m e r i c a  f a c e d  s e r io u s  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  a n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e  s t a n d in g  a t  6  p e r  
c e n t . 51 K e n n e d y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s u m p t io n  o f  e c o n o m i c  p r o g r e s s  w a s  t h e  n u m b e r  o n e  
p r o b l e m  f a c i n g  t h e  n e x t  P r e s id e n t  ( S c h le s in g e r ,  1 9 6 5 ,  p .  6 2 5 ) .  H e  p r o m is e d  t o  g e t  th e  
n a t io n  m o v i n g  a g a in  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  2 1 9 ) ,  a n d  r e d u c e  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
t o  a  m i n i m u m  ( S c h l e s i n g e r  a n d  I s r a e l ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p p .  3 4 8 3 - 3 4 8 4 ) .  I n  r e s p o n s e  V i c e
52
P r e s i d e n t  N i x o n  a d m it t e d  t h a t  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  in  t h e  la t e  1 9 5 0 s  h a d  b e e n  t o o  s lo w .  
‘ Y o u  d o n ’ t  s e e  a  p i c t u r e  o f  a  b u r g e o n i n g  e c o n o m y  a t  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r i o d ’ s ta te d  
N i x o n . 53 T h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  s p e a k in g  a t  t h e  a n n u a l  m e e t in g  o f  th e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e t a r y  F u n d  ( I M F )  a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  e x p e r ie n c in g  a
48 ib id ., 8 A u g u s t  1960, V o l .  76 , N o .  6, p. 12.
49 ib id ., 19 S eptem ber 1960, V o l .  7 6 N o .  12, p. 19.
50 ib id ., 11 Ju ly  1960, V o l .  76, N o .  2, p. 18.
51 N e w sw e e k , 3 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l  56, N o .  14, p. 34.
52 T im e  International, 1 A u g u s t  1960, V o l .  76, N o . 5, p. 14.
53 ib id ., 22  A u g u st, 1960, V o l . ,  76, N o .  8., p. 13.
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s l ig h t  r e c e s s i o n . 54 D u r i n g  t h e  s e c o n d  o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s ’ f o u r  t e l e v i s e d  d e b a t e s  K e n n e d y ,  
a n d  N i x o n  t o  a  le s s e r  e x t e n t ,  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  e x t r i c a t in g  t h e  e c o n o m y  f r o m  
r e c e s s i o n . 55 H e r e  K e n n e d y  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  s l i p p i n g  in t o  it s  t h ir d  
r e c e s s i o n  a f t e r  e i g h t  y e a r s  o f  R e p u b l i c a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 56 B u t  K e n n e d y ’ s r e la t iv e  
in e x p e r ie n c e ,  a n d  h i s  r e l i g i o n ,  p l a c e d  h i m  a t  a  d i s a d v a n t a g e  in  t h e  c a m p a ig n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
in  t h e  S o u t h e r n  s ta te s .  H o w e v e r ,  N i x o n  u l t im a t e l y  f u m b l e d  h is  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  h is  g r e a t e s t  
m i s t a k e  p r o v i n g  t o  h a v e  b e e n  h is  a g r e e in g  t o  m e e t  K e n n e d y  in  t h e i r  t e l e v i s i o n  d e b a t e s  
( B o y e r  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p . 9 6 3 ) .  T h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e s e  d e b a t e s  p r o p e l l e d  K e n n e d y  u p  th e  
p o l l s . 57
K e n n e d y ’ s  m a r g i n  o f  v i c t o r y  in  t h e  p r e s id e n t ia l  e le c t io n  r e f le c t e d  a  d e s i r e  in  
c e r t a in  s e c t io n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  k e e p  t h in g s  a s  t h e y  w e r e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  h o s t i l i t y  t o  th e  id e a  
o f  a  C a t h o l i c  P r e s i d e n t . 58 K e n n e d y  w o n  b y  3 4 ,2 2 7 ,0 9 6  v o t e s  ( 4 9 .7  p e r  c e n t )  t o  N i x o n ’ s 
3 4 ,1 0 7 ,6 4 6  ( 4 9 .5  p e r  c e n t ) .  I n  e le c t o r a l  v o t e s  K e n n e d y ’ s  v i c t o r y  w a s  a  c o m f o r t a b le  
o n e :  3 0 3  t o  2 1 9  ( B o i l e r ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p . 3 0 0 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  w e r e  q u e s t io n s  o f  v o t i n g  
i r r e g u la r i t ie s  in  b o t h  I l l i n o i s  a n d  T e x a s ,  b u t  N i x o n  a r g u e d  a g a in s t  a  r e c o u n t  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d s  it  w o u l d  d a m a g e  A m e r i c a ’ s  im a g e  a b r o a d  ( M a z o  a n d  H e s s ,  1 9 6 8 ,  p . 2 4 9 ) .  T h e  
e l e c t i o n  a ls o  s a w  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  g a i n  t w o  s e a ts  in  t h e  S e n a t e ,  w h i l e  t h e y  g a in e d  2 0  in  
t h e  H o u s e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  m a in t a in e d  s t r o n g  m a j o r i t ie s  in  
b o t h  in s t i t u t i o n s .  K e n n e d y ,  a f t e r  s e t t in g  t h e  t o n e  f o r  a  n e w  e r a  w i t h  h is  in a u g u r a t io n  
s p e e c h ,  f i l l e d  h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t h  a  h o s t  o f  y o u n g  t e c h n o c r a t s  a n d  a c a d e m ic s .
54 T h e  E c o n o m is t ,  1 O c to b e r , 1960, V o l .  197, N o . 6110, p. 42.
55 T im e  International, 17 O c to b e r  1960, V o l .  76 N o . 16, p. 16.
56 ib id ., 31 O c to b e r, 1960, V o l .  76 , N o .  19, p. 15.
57 N e w sw e e k , 10 O c to b e r , 1960, V o l .  56, N o . 15, p. 15.
58 ib id ., 14 N o v e m b e r, 1960, V o l .  56, N o .  20, p. 17.
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T h e  A F L - C I O ' s  D i r e c t o r  o f  O r g a n i s a t i o n  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  in  1 9 6 0  1 .5  m i l l i o n  w o r k e r s  
h a d  b e e n  o r g a n i s e d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  A F L - C I O  m e r g e r  in  1 9 5 5 ,  b u t  t h a t  a n  e q u a l  n u m b e r  
h a d  le f t  t h e  o r g a n is a t io n .  A  d i f f i c u l t y  h e  c i t e d  w a s  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  w h i t e - c o l la r  
e m p l o y m e n t  ( G a l e n s o n ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  T h e  A F L - C I O ’ s  le a d e r s h i p  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  c h a n g in g  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  h a d  t o  b e  t a k e n  in t o  a c c o u n t  in  e f f o r t s  to  e x p a n d  
m e m b e r s h ip .  T h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s  s a w  a  la r g e  u p s u r g e  i n  t h e  u n io n is a t i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  
e m p l o y e e s .  T h i s  g r o w t h  r a n  c o u n t e r  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  t r e n d  o f  u n i o n  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  p r iv a t e  
s e c t o r  ( G o l d f i e l d ,  1 9 8 7 ,  p . 5 3 ) .  I n  1 9 5 9  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t r a d e  u n io n is t s  in  A m e r i c a  s t o o d  
a t  1 7 ,1 1 7 ,0 0 0 .  T h i s  w a s  a n  in c r e a s e  o f  8 8 ,0 0 0 ,  o r  0 .5 1  p e r  c e n t ,  o n  t h e  p r e v io u s  y e a r .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h is  f i g u r e  w a s  s t i l l  3 7 3 , 0 0 0  le s s  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s  t h a n  in  1 9 5 6 . B y  t h e  e n d  o f  
1 9 6 0 ,  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  s t o o d  a t  1 7 ,0 4 9 ,0 0 0 ,  a  f a l l  o f  0 .4  p e r  c e n t  o n  1 9 5 9 .  
U n i o n  d e n s i t y  d e c r e a s e d  b y  a l m o s t  3 p e r  c e n t  b e t w e e n  1 9 5 6  a n d  1 9 6 0  ( G a le n s o n ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  
H o w e v e r ,  1 9 6 1  s a w  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h ip  f a l l  b y  a  f u r t h e r  4 .3  p e r  c e n t ,  to  1 6 ,3 0 3 ,0 0 0  
( B a i n  a n d  P r i c e  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  8 9 ) .  T h i s  lo s s  o f  7 4 2 ,0 0 0  t r a d e  u n io n is t s  w a s  t h e  la r g e s t  
a n n u a l  d e c r e a s e  i n  u n io n  m e m b e r s h i p  r e c o r d e d  in  A m e r i c a  t o  t h a t  t im e .  T h i s  w a s  
s o m e w h a t  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  r e la t io n s  w i t h  t h e  u n io n s  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .  
A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  t h e  n a t io n a l  w o r k f o r c e  h a d  in c r e a s e d  t o  n e a r l y  6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  ( B o y e r  e t  
a l . ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p . 9 6 0 ) .  O r g a n i s e d  la b o u r  f o u n d  i t s e l f  in  t h e  i r o n i c  p o s i t i o n  o f  b e in g  c r i t i c i s e d  
a s  b i g  l a b o u r  a t  t h e  t i m e  w h e n  i t  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  s h r i n k i n g  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k f o r c e .
A l t h o u g h  it  w o u l d  b e  a n t ic ip a t e d  t h a t  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  w o u l d  in c r e a s e  
f o l l o w i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  p r o - l a b o u r  P r e s id e n t ,  i n i t i a l l y  t h e  o p p o s i t e  h a p p e n e d .  A s  
a u t o m a t io n  r e d u c e d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  w o r k e r s  in  c o a l m i n e s ,  a u t o  p la n t s ,  a n d  s t e e l m i l l s ,  
t h e  d e c r e a s e  i n  u n i o n  m e m b e r s  s a p p e d  c e r t a in  o f  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r ’ s  s t r e n g t h .  T h e  A F L -  
C I O ’ s  D i r e c t o r  o f  O r g a n i s a t i o n  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  a d v e r s e  p u b l i c i t y  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e
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M c C l e l l a n  h e a r in g s  in t o  u n i o n  c o r r u p t io n ,  e m p l o y e r  le t t e r s  t o  e m p l o y e e s  e m p h a s is in g  
u n i o n  r a c k e t e e r in g ,  a n d  t h e  p r o h i b i t i v e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  le g i s l a t i o n ,  d a m a g e d  th e  u n i o n s ’ 
p u b l i c  i m a g e  ( G a l e n s o n ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  A  G a l l u p  p o l l  t a k e n  a f t e r  t h e  h e a r in g s  f o u n d  t h a t  4 3  p e r  
c e n t  o f  A m e r i c a n ’ s  s a w  u n i o n  c o r r u p t i o n  a s  w id e s p r e a d ,  w i t h  a n  a d d i t io n a l  3 4  p e r  c e n t  
v i e w i n g  it  a s  l i m i t e d  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 2 0 7 ) .  T h e  la b o u r  m o v e m e n t  
a ls o  f a c e d  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  a d o p t in g  s t r a t e g ie s  u s e d  t o  o r g a n is e  b l u e - c o l l a r  w o r k e r s  in  th e  
d e p r e s s io n  y e a r s  t o  o r g a n i s i n g  w h i t e - c o l l a r  w o r k e r s  in  m o r e  p r o s p e r o u s  t im e s .  B u t ,  
w i t h i n  a  y e a r  o f  K e n n e d y ’ s in a u g u r a t io n  t h e  t r e n d  h a d  b e e n  r e v e r s e d .  I n  1 9 6 2 ,  u n io n  
m e m b e r s h i p  r o s e  a g a in ,  t h is  t im e  b y  2 8 3 ,0 0 0 .  B y  1 9 6 5  t h e  lo s s  o f  m e m b e r s h ip  in  1 9 6 0 -  
61  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  g o o d  b y  A m e r i c a ’ s  u n io n s .  I n  a l l ,  w i t h i n  e ig h t  y e a r s  o f  1 9 6 0  
A m e r i c a n  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  s t o o d  a t  2 0 ,7 2 1 ,0 0 0  ( A p p e n d i x  C ) .
D u r i n g  t h is  p e r i o d  t h e  n a t i o n ’ s  u n io n  le a d e r s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  f o r g e d  a  h ig h e r  d e g r e e  
o f  c e n t r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  r e s o u r c e s  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e i r  o r g a n iz a t io n s  
( K o c h a n  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 4 ,  p .  5 3 ) .  W i t h  b a r g a in in g  c a p a c i t y  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in  b o t h  
t h e  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m ,  t h e  s t a g e  w a s  s e t  f o r  a  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  p r o d u c t i v e  c o o p e r a t io n  b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t o p  u n io n  le a d e r s .  In  
n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  D a r k  ( 1 9 9 9 ,  p .  4 8 )  p o in t s  o u t ,  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  w a s  c o n f i n e d  t o  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  n u m b e r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h in  C o n g r e s s ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b r a n c h ,  a n d  th e  
m a j o r  in t e r e s t  g r o u p s .
T h e  1 9 6 0  e l e c t i o n  v i c t o r y  o f  J o h n  F .  K e n n e d y ,  w h o  h a d  r e c e iv e d  s t r o n g  A F L -  
C I O  s u p p o r t ,  p r e s a g e d  r e n e w e d  g r o w t h  ( a f t e r  d e c l in e )  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  f o r  t h e  la b o u r  
m o v e m e n t .  T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y ’ s  e le c t io n  p la t f o r m ,  g r a n d l y  e n t i t le d  “ T h e  R i g h t s  o f  
M a n , ”  h a d  d e c l a r e d  ‘ t h e  g o a l s  o f  t h e  la b o r  m o v e m e n t  a r e  t h e  g o a l s  f o r  a l l  A m e r i c a n s ,  
a n d  t h e i r  e n e m ie s  a r e  t h e  e n e m ie s  o f  p r o g r e s s . ’ 59 W h e n  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  t o o k  o f f i c e
59 Time International, 19  September 1960, Vol. 76 No, 12 ,  p. 19.
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h e  t h r e w  a l l  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  h i s  e x e c u t iv e  p o w e r  in t o  r e s o l v i n g  d i s p u t e s  o v e r  a u t o m a t io n .  
P r e s id e n t ia l  in t e r v e n t io n ,  v i a  t h e  T a f l t - H a r t l e y  in j u n c t i o n ,  f o r c e d  la b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t  
a g r e e m e n t  o n  j o b  p r o t e c t io n ,  s u p p le m e n t a r y  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b e n e f i t s ,  a n d  w o r k  r u le s  in  
t h e  s t e e l ,  a u t o m o b i l e ,  a i r l i n e ,  a n d  m a r i t i m e  in d u s t r ie s .
T h e r e  w a s  a  c h a n g e  in  m i n i s t e r i a l  a t t it u d e  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  th e  
t r a d e  u n io n s .  T h e  n e w  D e m o c r a t i c  a d m in is t r a t i o n  in  1 9 6 1  o f f e r e d  t h e  u n io n s  a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e v e r s e  t h e  d e c l i n e s  t h a t  h a d  c h a r a c t e r is e d  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  y e a r s .  A r t h u r  
G o l d b e r g ,  t h e  a r c h i t e c t  o f  t h e  A F L - C I O  m e r g e r ,  w a s  a p p o in t e d  S e c r e t a r y  o f  L a b o r . 60 
O n  c o m i n g  t o  o f f i c e  G o l d b e r g  a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  s i t u a t io n  in  th e  
e c o n o m y  w a s  g r a v e ,  a n d  it  w o u l d  r e c e i v e  p r i o r i t y  f r o m  t h e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  a n d  h is  
o f f i c e . 61 S o o n  a f t e r  h is  i n a u g u r a t io n  K e n n e d y  n a m e d  a  t r ip a r t i t e  la b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t  
p o l i c y  c o m m it t e e ,  c h a i r e d  b y  G o l d b e r g ,  t o  p r o v i d e  a d v i c e  o n  w a g e  a n d  p r i c e  p o l i c y .  
I n c lu d e d  a m o n g  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  m e m b e r s  w e r e  t h e  h e a d s  o f  s o m e  o f  th e  la r g e s t  
c o m p a n i e s  in  t h e  c o u n t r y .  Y e t ,  t h e r e  w a s  m o r e  s y m p a t h y  i n  W a s h i n g t o n  f o r  t h e  u n io n  
c a u s e  a n d  le s s  p r o - e m p l o y e r  b ia s .
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y 's  i n t e r v e n t io n  in  d is p u t e s  w a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  in c r e a s in g  
t r e n d  t o w a r d  g r e a t e r  g o v e r n m e n t  in f l u e n c e  in  la b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t  r e la t io n s .  It s e e m e d  
t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t - in s t ig a t e d  c o m p u l s o r y  a r b i t r a t io n  a n d  m e d ia t io n ,  p r o m o t e d  b y  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  L a b o r  G o l d b e r g ,  w a s  g r a d u a l l y  r e p l a c i n g  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a in in g  a s  th e  
m e a n s  o f  r e a c h i n g  a c c e p t a b le  c o n t r a c t u a l  a g r e e m e n t s  b e t w e e n  l a b o u r  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t .  
G e n e r a l l y ,  g o v e r n m e n t  in t e r v e n t io n  p r o v e d  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  l a b o u r  in  t h e  s h o r t  r u n ,  s e e in g  
t o  it  t h a t  w a g e  a n d  f r i n g e  b e n e f i t  d e m a n d s  w e r e  m e t .  I n  t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  h o w e v e r ,  th e  c lo s e  
a s s o c ia t io n  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  o n l y  w e a k e n  la b o u r 's  p o w e r  a n d  in d e p e n d e n c e .
60 ib id ., 19 D e ce m b e r, 1960. V o l .  76, N o .  25, p. 12/
61 ib id ., 6 January, 1961, V o l .  77 N o .  2, p. 46.
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I n  1 9 5 9  t h e r e  is  n o  r e c o r d  o f  P r e s id e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  m e e t i n g  w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  
o f  t h e  A F L - C I O .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r ,  h i s  f i n a l  y e a r  in  o f f i c e ,  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  d id  
m e e t  w i t h  t h e  A F L - C I O  le a d e r s h ip ,  b u t  o n l y  t w i c e . 62 A l l  in  a l l ,  P r e s id e n t  E i s e n h o w e r ’ s 
d e a l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  A F L - C I O  h a d  b e e n  in t e r m it t e n t  a t  b e s t .  P r e s id e n t  K e n n e d y  m e t  w it h  
t h e  A F L - C I O ’ s  t o p  o f f i c i a l s  t h r e e  t im e s  in  1 9 6 1  ( A p p e n d i x  A ) .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  
K e n n e d y  m e t  w i t h  t h e  A F L - C I O  le a d e r s h ip  o n  s e v e n  s e p a r a t e  o c c a s i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  in
1 9 6 3 ,  t h e  y e a r  o f  h is  a s s a s s in a t io n ,  P r e s id e n t  K e n n e d y  h e ld  e ig h t  m e e t in g  w it h  t h e  A F L -  
C I O . 63 A  w e e k  a f t e r  K e n n e d y ’ s  a s s a s s in a t i o n  P r e s id e n t  J o h n s o n  m e t  w i t h  t h e  le a d e r  o f  
t h e  A F L - C I O ,  G e o r g e  M e a n y ,  t o  a s s u r e  h im  t h a t  h e  w a s  a n x i o u s  t o  g o  a lo n g  w i t h  a  l i s t  
o f  t h in g s  t h a t  t h e  u n i o n s  w e r e  d e m a n d i n g  ( R o b i n s o n ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 2 3 4 ) .  T h e  y e a r s  
t h e r e a f t e r  w e r e  t o  s e e  m o r e  s u c h  m e e t in g s  b e t w e e n  P r e s id e n t  J o h n s o n  a n d  t h e  A F L - C I O  
o n  is s u e s  r a n g in g  f r o m  t h e  e c o n o m y  to  r a c i a l  in t e g r a t io n .
D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y ’ s r u le s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  C o n g r e s s  a n d  P r e s id e n t ia l  n o m i n a t in g  
p r o c e s s e s  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  b r o k e r s  w i t h  w h o m  it  in t e r a c t e d  r e g u la r ly ,  
w i t h  l i t t le  n e e d  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  a  m o r e  d i v e r s e  a n d  f l u i d  r a n g e  o f  in t e r e s t s  ( D a r k ,  1 9 9 9 ,  
p . 4 8 ) .  I n t e r e s t  g r o u p  le a d e r s ,  s u c h  a s  u n i o n  P r e s id e n t s  a n d  l o b b y i s t s ,  c o u l d  n e g o t ia t e  
d e a ls  w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  le a d e r s  a n d  k n o w  w i t h  s o m e  r e l i a b i l i t y  w h e n
-  o r  i f  -  t h e  g o o d s  w o u l d  b e  d e l iv e r e d .  T h i s  s y s t e m  o f  i n s id e r  b a r g a in in g  c o u ld  b e  
s u s t a in e d  in  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  in  w h i c h  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  in f l u e n t i a l  in t e r e s t  g r o u p s  w a s  
s m a l l ,  t h e  is s u e  a g e n d a  w a s  p r e d i c t a b l e  a n d  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  e l i t e  a c t o r s ,  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  
l i t t le  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a  q u i c k  a n d  s u s t a in e d  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  e x c lu d e d  o r  
u n r e p r e s e n t e d  g r o u p s .
62 T h e  A m e r ic a n  P re s id e n c y  P ro je ct, 2003. ‘ P u b lic  Papers o f  the P re s id e n ts .’ A c c e sse d  from  
http://w w w .presidency.ucsb .edu/site/docs/index_pppus.php.
63 ib id .
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G o v e r n m e n t  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  a n d  a c t io n s  o n  t h e  e c o n o m y  p o in t e d  to  th e  
e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t h e  t im e .  T h e  D e m o c r a t ’ s 1 9 6 0  p l a t f o r m  p o in t e d  t o  th e  n e e d  
f o r  a  b a la n c e d  b u d g e t  a n d  e x p a n d e d  w e l f a r e  s e r v i c e s . 64 H o w e v e r ,  P r e s id e n t  K e n n e d y ’ s 
f i r s t  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  A d d r e s s  w a s  f u l l  o f  g l o o m y  f o r e b o d i n g s  o n  t h e  s ta te  o f  th e  
e c o n o m y .  ‘ N o t  s i n c e  t h e  d a y s  b e f o r e  P e a r l  H a r b o r , ’ p o in t e d  o u t  Time , ‘ h a s  a  P r e s id e n t  
o f  t h e  U S  d e l i v e r e d  h i m s e l f  o f  s u c h  g l o o m y  f o r e b o d i n g s  o n  t h e  s ta te  o f  th e  U n i o n . ’ 65 
H e  a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  s e r io u s  t r o u b le .  U n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  in c r e a s in g ,  
h e  s a id ,  a n d  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  w o r s e n in g ,  t h e  ra te  o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  l a g g i n g ,  b a n k r u p t c ie s  
b o o m i n g ,  a n d  p r o f i t s  f a d i n g . U n e m p l o y m e n t  r e a c h e d  8 .1  p e r  c e n t  b y  F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 0  
( S c h l e s i n g e r ,  1 9 6 5 ,  p .  6 2 7 ) .  P o l i c y  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  c h a n g e  i f  t h e  s i t u a t io n  w a s  to  
i m p r o v e .  A  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  i n  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  w a s  s ig n a le d  w i t h  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t  
o f  W a l t e r  W o l f g a n g  H e l l e r ,  a s  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  in f l u e n t i a l  P C E A .  F o r  H e l l e r ,  th e  
f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r is e ,  s h o u l d  b e  c h a r g e d  w i t h  r e v i v i n g  th e  
e c o n o m y . 67 In  f a c t ,  a l l  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  t h a t  K e n n e d y  a p p o in t e d  t o  d e v e l o p  h is  
s t r a t e g y  f o r  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  c a m e  f r o m  t h e  r a n k s  o f  t h e  n e w  e c o n o m is t s ,  w h o  s o u g h t  
t o  m a n a g e  t h e  e c o n o m y  o n  K e y n e s i a n  p r i n c i p l e s  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 , p .  
2 1 9 ) .  T h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w a s  t o  s h i f t  t h e  f o c u s  o f  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  f r o m  m o d e r a t io n  o f  
t h e  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e  t o w a r d s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  p o t e n t ia l  o f  th e  
e c o n o m y  ( S p u l b e r ,  1 9 9 5 ,  p .  3 8 ) .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n c o m e s  p o l i c y  r e e m e r g e d  in  t h e  U S  
w it h  t h e  e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  w a g e  a n d  p r i c e  g u i d e p o s t s  ( S c h i l l e r ,  1 9 7 5 ,  p . 1 8 6 ) .
T h e  K e n n e d y  a d m in is t r a t i o n  w a s  t o  p u r s e  a  s t r a t e g y  o f  m o r e  p r o a c t iv e  
K e y n e s i a n  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ‘ N e w  E c o n o m i c s ’ ( M a r t i n ,  1 9 9 1 ,  p . 4 5 ) .  T h i s  p la c e d  
a n  e m p h a s i s  o n  m a x i m i z i n g  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  r a t h e r  t h a n  s m o o t h i n g  o u t  f lu c t u a t io n s .
64 T im e  International, 25 J u ly  1960, V o l .  76  N o . 4, p. 17.
65 ib id ., 10 F e b ru a ry  1961, V o l .  77 N o . 6, p. 11.
66 ib id ., 10 F e b ru a ry  1961, V o l .  77 N o . 6, p. 11.
67 ib id ., 2 Jan u ary  1961, V o l .  77, N o .  1, p. 8.
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F r e n c h  ( 1 9 9 7 ,  p . 3 1 )  a r g u e d  t h a t  its  o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  a c c e le r a t e  g r o w t h .  A s  a n  
a n t i r e c e s s io n  m e a s u r e  K e n n e d y  s o u g h t  t e m p o r a r y  t a x  c u t s  f r o m  C o n g r e s s  68 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e s e  t a x  c u t s  w a s  t o  in d u c e  h ig h e r  g r o w t h  a f t e r  t h e  la c k lu s t e r  r e c o r d  o f  
t h e  la t e  1 9 5 0 s ,  it s  p r o p o n e n t s  w e r e  n e v e r t h e le s s  q u i t e  a n x i o u s  a b o u t  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  
s t i m u l a t i n g  a  r i s e  i n  i n f la t io n .  K e n n e d y ’ s  a p p r o a c h  s p e c i f i e d  t a r g e t s  f o r  g r o w t h  a n d  
u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  p la c e d  f a r  g r e a t e r  f a i t h  in  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  c a p a c i t y  t o  id e n t i f y  a n d  
i m p le m e n t  p o l i c i e s  t o  f in e - t u n e  t h e  e c o n o m y .  K e n n e d y  a l s o  u r g e d  C o n g r e s s  t o  b o o s t  
t h e  m i n i m u m  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s ,  l i f t  m i n i m u m  w a g e s ,  e x t e n d  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
c o m p e n s a t io n ,  a n d  p a s s  a  d e p r e s s e d - a r e a s  b i l l .  T h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 6 1 ,  p p .  3 3 - 3 4 )  p o in t e d  
o u t  t h a t  ‘ t h e  m a j o r  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  
a r e  t o  r e m o v e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s l a c k  in  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  a c c e le r a t e  lo n g e r - t e r m  g r o w t h . ’ 
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  in c r e a s e d  b u d g e t  o u t la y s  s p a n n e d  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  f i e l d s  in c l u d i n g  
h o u s i n g  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a i d  t o  d e p r e s s e d  a r e a s ,  a n d  m e a s u r e s  t o  im p r o v e  
l a b o u r  m o b i l i t y  ( O E C D ,  1 9 6 1 ,  p . 3 4 - 3 5 ) .  B y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  t h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 6 2 ,  p . 
1 9 ) o b s e r v e d  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  h a d  m a d e  a n  im p o r t a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  th e  
a d v a n c i n g  o f  t o t a l  d e m a n d .
D u r i n g  h is  p r e s i d e n c y  K e n n e d y  t o o k  g o v e r n m e n t  in  a  n e w  d i r e c t io n ,  a w a y  f r o m  
t h e  e a s y g o i n g  E i s e n h o w e r  s t y le .  H i s  a d m in is t r a t i o n  w a s  h e a d e d  b y  s t r o n g ,  d e d ic a t e d  
p e r s o n a l i t ie s .  I ts  e n e r g y  a n d  c o m m i t m e n t  r e v i t a l i z e d  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  b u t  s t i l l  d o m e s t i c a l l y  
K e n n e d y ’ s r e c o r d  w a s  u n e x c e p t i o n a l .  H i s  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  o f t e n  b l o c k e d  in  C o n g r e s s  b y  
t h e  b a r r ie r s  t o  r e f o r m  e r e c t e d  b y  R e p u b l i c a n s  a n d  S o u t h e r n  D e m o c r a t s .  Y e t ,  P r e s id e n t  
K e n n e d y  m a d e  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  h is  d o m e s t ic  p r i o r i t y .  T o  s t im u la t e  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  h e  
c o m b i n e d  in c r e a s e d  s o c i a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  w i t h  in d u c e m e n t s  t o  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r is e  t o  in v e s t
68 ibid., 3 February, 1 9 6 1 ,  Vol.  77, No. 6, p. 8.
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in  c a p i t a l  g r o w t h .  K e n n e d y  a ls o  p e r s u a d e d  C o n g r e s s  t o  f in a n c e  a  c r a s h  e f f o r t  t o  p la c e  a  
m a n  o n  t h e  m o o n  t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  c o s t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e  m o r e  t h a n  $ 2 5  b i l l i o n .
W i t h i n  t w o  y e a r s  o f  h i s  e le c t io n ,  K e n n e d y  h a d  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  a  n u m b e r  o f  
m e a s u r e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  b e n e f i t  t h e  l a b o u r i n g  m a n .  H e  e x p a n d e d  p u b l i c  w o r k s  p r o je c t s  to  
c h e c k  u n e m p l o y m e n t ;  h e  p r o m o t e d  u r b a n  r e n e w a l  t o  a t t r a c t  in d u s t r y  t o  d e p r e s s e d  a re a s ;  
h e  o v e r s a w  t h e  e n a c t m e n t  o f  t h e  M a n p o w e r  D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  T r a i n i n g  A c t ,  w h ic h  
p r o v i d e d  n e w  s k i l l s  f o r  t h e  u n e m p l o y e d ;  a n d  h e  r e v a m p e d  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  a n d  
m i n i m u m - w a g e  la w s .  I n  la r g e  p a r t ,  s t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t s ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  F e d e r a l  
G o v e r n m e n t ' s  le a d ,  e n a c t e d  le g i s l a t i o n  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  t h e  w o r k i n g m a n ,  e f f e c t i n g  
m i n i m u m  w a g e  s t a n d a r d s ,  w o r k m e n 's  c o m p e n s a t io n ,  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b e n e f i t s ,  a n d  a n t i-  
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  p r a c t i c e s  in  h i r i n g .  T h i s  w a s  a  t r iu m p h  f o r  o r g a n i z e d  la b o u r .  T h e  A F L -  
C I O  c o n t i n u e d  t o  p u t  p r e s s u r e  o n  C o n g r e s s  t o  e x p a n d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  c o v e r a g e ,  
in t r o d u c e  a  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  h ig h e r  m i n i m u m  w a g e ,  a n d  h e a l t h - c a r e  p r o t e c t io n  f o r  a l l  
A m e r i c a n s  ( D a r k ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p . 5 7 ) .
P e r h a p s  m o r e  s o  t h a n  a n y  o t h e r  o r g a n iz e d  in t e r e s t ,  l a b o u r ’ s le a d e r s h ip  
t h o r o u g h l y  e m b r a c e d  t h e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  c a u s e .  T h e  A F L - C I O  c a m e  o u t  in  s u p p o r t  o f  r a c ia l  
e q u a l i t y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  l e g is la t io n  b e f o r e  C o n g r e s s  d id  n o t  c o n t a in  a  s e c t io n  o n  e q u a l  
e m p l o y m e n t  r ig h t s .  U n d e r  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  A F L - C I O  s u c h  a  s e c t io n  w a s  a d d e d ,  a n d  
a f t e r  m o n t h s  o f  d e l a y ,  e v e n t u a l l y  P r e s id e n t  J o h n s o n  s ig n e d  t h e  B i l l  in t o  la w  o n  4  J u l y
1 9 6 4 .  A F L - C I O  w a s  l a r g e l y  in s t r u m e n t a l  in  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t .  L a t e r  
i n  t h e  d e c a d e ,  u n i o n  le a d e r s  d e v o t e d  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o u n t  o f  t im e  a n d  r e s o u r c e s  
t o w a r d s  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  le g i s l a t i o n  d e s ig n e d  t o  r e d u c e  p o v e r t y  i n  A m e r i c a n  s o c ie t y .  T h i s  
m a r k e d  a n o t h e r  s h a r p  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  p r e - 1 9 6 0  la b o u r  m o v e m e n t ,  w h i c h  w a s  
p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t r a d e  u n i o n  is s u e s  a lo n e .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  o r g a n iz e d  la b o u r
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h a d  b e e n  t r a n s f o r m e d  f r o m  a  n a r r o w  t r a d e  u n i o n  m o v e m e n t  t o  o n e  w i t h  a  s o c ie t a l  
o r ie n t a t io n .
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Table 6.2: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1960
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  1 H i g h M e d i u m L o w N o n e
O l :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ a c c e s s  t o  th e  
P r e s id e n t
X
0 2 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  
o n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m m it t e e s
N / A
0 3 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  r e la t io n s h ip  in  th e  e c o n o m y  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  t h e  e m p l o y e r s ’ p e a k  
o r g a n is a t io n ,  a n d / o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
X
0 4 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ r e la t io n s h ip  
w i t h  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y
X
0 5 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  le v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  
m e m b e r s h i p  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y
X
0 6 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  
t o w a r d s  o r g a n is e d  l a b o u r
X
0 7 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  u n io n  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  w e r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r
X
0 8 :  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s
X
0 9 :  C h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a s  id e n t i f i e d  b y  n a t io n a l  
e c o n o m i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  a l i k e
X
0 1 0 :  C h a n g e  i n  m i n i s t e r i a l  a t t it u d e s  t o w a r d s  
t h e  r o le  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  p o l i t y
X
T h e  O b s e r v a b l e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  H y p o t h e s i s  2 H i g h M e d iu m L o w N o n e
O l :  A r e  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  m a i n  e c o n o m i c  
in d ic a t o r s  a t  d e c a d e - l o n g  lo w s ?
X
0 2 :  D o  o p i n i o n  p o l l s  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  
r e g a r d s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  
c r i s i s ?
N / A
0 3 :  D o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  m e d i a  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
s t a t e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  i n  c r i s i s ?
X
0 4 :  D o  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  r e g a r d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s ta te  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 5 :  D o e s  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  r e g a r d s  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  i n  c r i s i s ?
0 6 :  D o  d o m e s t ic  a n d  in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n isa tio n s  
re g a rd  th e  e c o n o m ic  state o f  the c o u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 7 :  D o  e le c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  r e g a r d  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  in  c r i s i s ?
X
0 8 :  A r e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o n o u n c e m e n t  o n  t h e  
s ta te  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  a r e  c o n s is t e n t  w i t h  a  
c r i s i s - m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o a c h ?
X
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In  T a b l e  6 .2  o n l y  2 2  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  
h y p o t h e s is  p o in t e d  t o  a  h i g h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  f it ,  w h i l e  n o n e  o f  t h e  o b s e r v a b le  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  h y p o t h e s is  in d ic a t e d  a  h i g h  f i t .  A s  t h e  f in d i n g s  f o r  b o t h  
h y p o t h e s e s  f a l l  b e l o w  t h e  m i n i m u m  6 0  p e r  c e n t  t h r e s h o ld  f o r  h i g h  e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l  
f i t ,  t h e  t a b le  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e  in  t h e  A F L - C I O ’ s i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in  1 9 6 0 .
I n  s u m m a t i o n ,  1 9 6 0 - 6 1  w a s  t o  w it n e s s  a  s w i f t ,  a n d  e n d u r i n g  c h a n g e  in  t h e  A F L -  
C I O ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h is  c h a n g e  w a s  n o t  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  a n d  it 
o c c u r r e d  a t  a  t im e  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s is .  
D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 5 0 s  A m e r i c a ’ s  e c o n o m i c  p r o w e s s  h a d  b e e n  u n r i v a l l e d  in t e r n a t io n a l ly ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t o w a r d s  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  p r e s i d e n c y  t h e  e c o n o m y  b e g a n  t o  s ta g n a te .  
T h e  n a t io n a l  m e d ia ,  c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  in t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n iz a t i o n s ,  a n d  e le c t e d  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a l l  v i e w e d  t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  in  d o w n t u r n  a t  t h e  t im e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  th e  
l e v e l  o f  i n f l u e n c e  o r g a n i z e d  la b o u r  p o s s e s s e d  o v e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  im p r o v e d  in  th a t  
w it h  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  D e m o c r a t i c  P r e s id e n t  in  1 9 6 0 ,  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  h a d  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
b o t h  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  a n d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  b r a n c h e s .  W i t h  it s  p o l i c i e s  a i m e d  a t  r ig h t i n g  th e  
e c o n o m y ,  a  u n i o n  f r i e n d l y  a d m in is t r a t i o n  h a d  b e e n  r e t u r n e d  t o  th e  W h i t e  H o u s e .  A s  
b a r g a in in g  c a p a c i t y  w a s  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in  b o t h  t h e  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t  a n d  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  t h e r e  d e v e l o p e d  p r o d u c t i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s id e n t  a n d  th e  
u n io n s .  T h e  A F L - C I O ’ s  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  P r e s id e n t  in c r e a s e d  in  1 9 6 1 , a n d  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  l e v e l  o f  u n i o n  p o l i c i e s  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  in t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s ,  c h a n g e d  t o  t h e  A F L - C I O ’ s  a d v a n t a g e .  In  
t h e  l o n g  r u n  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o u r ’ s  d e c l in e s  o f  t h e  la t e  1 9 5 0 s  w e r e  r e v e r s e d  a s  
W a s h i n g t o n ’ s  p r o - e m p l o y e r  b ia s  e n d e d  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p o l i c i e s  c a m e  t o  r e f le c t  
u n io n  v a lu e s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  ( g e n e r a t iv e  c le a v a g e ) ,
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a n d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  m e a n t  th a t  
w h a t  c h a n g e  t h e r e  w a s  in  th e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ’ i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  d i d  n o t  
c o n s t i t u t e  a  c r i t i c a l  j u n c t u r e .
f i g n r e  6 .2 :  T h e  C r i t i c a l  J u n c t u r e  G r i d ,  A m e r i c a ,  1 9 6 0
G e n e r a t i v e  C l e a v a g e  
( M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C r i s i s )
Y E S
N O
C h a n g e  ( S i g n i f i c a n t ,  S w i f t ,  a n d  E n d u r i n g )
Y E S  N O
X
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B y  t h e  t im e  o f  K e n n e d y ’ s a s s a s s in a t io n  in  N o v e m b e r  1 9 6 3  h is  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  th e  
e c o n o m y  h a d  a l r e a d y  d o u b le d  g r o w t h ,  d e c r e a s e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  h e ld  in f la t io n  t o  
j u s t  1 .3  p e r  c e n t  a  y e a r .  H e  in t r o d u c e d  t h e  lo n g e s t  u n in t e r r u p t e d  e r a  o f  e c o n o m i c  
e x p a n s io n  in  A m e r i c a n  h is t o r y  ( B o y e r  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p .  9 6 4 - 9 6 5 ) .  B y  t h e  m i d - 1 9 6 0 s  th e  
t h r e a t  o f  i n f l a t i o n  t o  t h e  J o h n s o n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s p o l i c i e s  d r o v e  it  t o  s e e k  A F L - C I O  
s u p p o r t  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  e c o n o m i c  c o n d i t i o n s  p e r m i t t e d  t h o s e  p o l i c i e s  c o n t in u a t io n .  
T h i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i o n s ’ im p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  e c o n o m y .  In  
W a s h i n g t o n  o r g a n i z e d  la b o u r  a n d  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  b e c a m e  h i g h l y  in t e g r a t e d  ( G r e e n s t o n e ,  
1 9 7 7 ,  c h a p  2 ) .
D u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s ,  P r e s id e n t  N i x o n ’ s  e f f o r t s  t o  c u r b  in f l a t i o n  a n d  c u r e  th e  
r e c e s s i o n  f a i l e d .  B u t ,  b y  im p l e m e n t i n g  w a g e  a n d  p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  t h e  P r e s id e n t  r e d u c e d  
o r g a n i z e d  l a b o u r ’ s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  P r o b l e m s  w i t h  in f la t io n  p e r s is t e d  
d u r i n g  F o r d ’ s  t e r m  a s  P r e s id e n t .  Y e t ,  d e s p i t e  a  c h a o t i c  e c o n o m y ,  a n d  a  s o m e w h a t  
h o s t i le  p o l i t i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t h e  A F L - C I O ,  d i d  w e l l  d u r i n g  t h e  N i x o n - F o r d  y e a r s .  A n  
o p i n i o n  p o l l  c o n d u c t e d  b y  US News and World Report in  1 9 7 6  r a n k e d  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r  
t h e  f o u r t h  m o s t  p o w e r f u l  in s t i t u t i o n  i n  A m e r i c a .  T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  e x e c u t i v e ’ s i n a b i l i t y  
t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m y  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  r e t a k in g  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  in  1 9 7 6 .
B y  t h e  la t e  1 9 7 0 s  e m p l o y m e n t  h a d  f a l l e n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  in  t h e  u n i o n i z e d  h e a v y  
in d u s t r ie s ,  b u t  g r o w n  in  t h e  n o n - u n i o n i z e d  s e r v i c e  in d u s t r ie s .  T h e  in d u s t r y  a n d  
p o p u l a t i o n  s h i f t  f r o m  N o r t h e a s t  t o  S o u t h w e s t  a l s o  m e a n t  e x p a n d i n g  e m p lo y m e n t  in  
p a r t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  l o n g  s e e n  a s  h o s t i le  t o  u n i o n  o r g a n iz e r s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  th e  
A F L - C I O ’ s r e l a t i v e  s i z e  in  t h e  e c o n o m y  s h r a n k .  B y  1 9 8 0  t h e  m e m b e r s h ip  in  u n io n s  
h a d  s l i p p e d  f r o m  o n e  i n  t h r e e  n o n a g r ic u l t u r a l  w o r k e r s  t o  o n e  in  f o u r  ( O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  
K e u c h e l ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  2 5 0 ) .  F o r  R o s e n b e r g  ( 2 0 0 3 ,  p . 2 6 6 )  ‘ d e c l i n i n g  u n i o n  d e n s i t y  w a s  a
Potential Critical Juncture 3: 1980 -  The Reagan Years
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f u r t h e r  s ig n  o f  t h e  w e a k e n i n g  b a r g a in in g  p o w e r  o f  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r . ’ T r a u m a t i c  c h a n g e s  
in  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y  d e s t r o y e d  t h e  p o s t - w a r  c o n s e n s u s  w i t h i n  w h i c h  la b o u r  h a d  
p r o s p e r e d .  T h e  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  i n f la t io n  a n d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  f o r c e d  P r e s id e n t  C a r t e r  to  
in i t ia t e  v a r y i n g  s t e p s  t o  f i n d  a  s o lu t io n .  T h e s e  m e a s u r e s  f i r s t  a l ie n a t e d  o r g a n is e d  la b o u r ,  
b e f o r e  a  N a t i o n a l  A c c o r d  i m p r o v e d  r e la t io n s .
T h e  E c o n o m y  a n d  R e a g a n ’ s  E l e c t i o n  V i c t o r y
L o n g  b e f o r e  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  c o n v e n t i o n  P r e s id e n t  C a r t e r  w a s  w o r r i e d  a b o u t  r e ­
n o m i n a t i o n .  B y  1 9 7 9  ‘ W a s h i n g t o n i a n s  j o k e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  P r e s id e n t  w it h  p o l l  
r a t in g s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  p r im e  in t e r e s t  r a t e ’ ( B o i l e r ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p .  3 5 5 ) .  A l t h o u g h  p r a is e d  f o r  
h is  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  w o r k ,  a n d  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p o l i c y  o f  e n e r g y  c o n s e r v a t i o n ,  h is  g e n e r a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  e v o k e d  l i t t le  c o n f i d e n c e .  T h i s  w a s ,  p a r t l y  d u e  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t io n ,  
a n d  h is  i n a b i l i t y  t o  w o r k  w i t h  C o n g r e s s ,  a b r u p t  c h a n g e s  o f  d i r e c t io n ,  a n d  p e r i o d i c  
c o n f e s s i o n s  o f  f a i l u r e .
B y  1 9 8 0  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  s e r io u s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  w i t h  t h e  m e d ia ,  n a t io n a l  
c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  d o m e s t i c  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  a n d  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ,  r e g a r d in g  
t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  in  c r i s i s .  C a p e l  ( 1 9 9 1 ,  p .  3 )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  in  r e c e s s io n  
a t  t h is  t im e .  T h i s  r e c e s s i o n  w a s  m a r k e d  b y  a  d e p r e s s in g  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  in f la t io n  a n d  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  ( O E C D ,  1 9 8 2 ,  p . 8 9 ) .  O ’ S u l l i v a n  a n d  K e u c h e l  ( 1 9 8 1 ,  p . 2 2 2 )  a r g u e  th a t  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  C a r t e r  p r e s i d e n c y  d e c l i n i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h ,  a  r e d u c e d  le v e l  o f  
s a v in g s ,  in a d e q u a t e  c a p i t a l  in v e s t m e n t ,  a n d  h i g h  i n f l a t i o n  a l l  h a m p e r e d  t h e  e c o n o m y .  
F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d  C h a i r m a n  P a u l  V o l c k e r  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  r e m e d y  f o r  th e  
s p i r a l l i n g  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  a  t ig h t e n i n g  o f  t h e  m o n e y  s u p p l y  ( K r u g m a n ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  
b y  M a r c h  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h is  p o l i c y  a p p e a r e d  l im i t e d .  T h a t  m o n t h  t h e  P r e s id e n t  in v o k e d  
t h e  C r e d i t  C o n t r o l  A c t ,  a s k i n g  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d  t o  i m p o s e  n e w  c o n t r o ls  o n
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c o n s u m e r  c r e d i t .  Time p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h is  r e s u l t e d  i n  a n  e x c e s s i v e l y  la r g e  r e d u c t io n  in  
c o n s u m e r  b o r r o w i n g ,  a n d  a  s t e e p  d e c l i n e  in  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h . 69 A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  th e  
F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  s o u g h t  t o  l o w e r  t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e .70 H o w e v e r ,  t h e  C a r t e r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s  m a s s i v e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t s  o n l y  s e r v e d  t o  d e e p e n  t h e  F e d ’ s d i l e m m a . 71 
T h e  d e f i c i t  in  t h e  f e d e r a l  b u d g e t  s t o o d  a t  $ 7 4  b i l l i o n  in  1 9 8 0  ( B r o g a n ,  1 9 9 9 , p .  6 8 3 ) .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  The Wall Street Journal:
A  g r o u p  o f  p r o m i n e n t  e c o n o m is t s  s h a r p ly  c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e ’ s 
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ,  s a y i n g  it s  a c t io n s  c a s t  s e r io u s  d o u b t  o n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  in t e n d e d  t o  m e e t  it s  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  s l o w  t h e  
g r o w t h  o f  t h e  m o n e y  s u p p l y  t o  c o m b a t  i n f l a t i o n . ’
T o  c o m p o u n d  m a t t e r s  a  J u n e  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  B u s i n e s s  C y c l e  D a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  o f  th e  
N a t i o n a l  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h  o f f i c i a l l y  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  U S  h a d  e n t e r e d  a  
r e c e s s i o n . 73 The Washington Post p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  in  t h e  s a m e  m o n t h  t h e  C o m m e r c e  
D e p a r t m e n t  ‘ r e p o r t e d  t h a t  l e a d in g  e c o n o m i c  in d ic a t o r s  h a d  p lu n g e d  4 . 8  p e r  c e n t  in  A p r i l
-  t h e  la r g e s t  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  3 2 - y e a r - o ld  i n d e x . 74 B y  A u g u s t  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d  
w a s  r e p o r t in g  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  f a c t o r ie s  h a d  o p e r a t e d  a t  o n l y  7 4 .2  p e r  c e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y  
in  J u l y ,  t h e i r  lo w e s t  l e v e l  i n  f i v e  y e a r s . 75
I n  e a r l y  S e p t e m b e r  F e d  C h a i r m a n  V o c k l e r ,  a p p e a r i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  H o u s e  B u d g e t  
C o m m i t t e e ,  w a r n e d  t h a t  h e  h a d  l i t t le  f a i t h  in  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y . 76 H o w e v e r ,
69 ib id ., 28 Ju ly , 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  4, p. 44
70 ib id ., 9 June, 1980, V o l .  115, N o .  23, p. 56.
71 N e w sw e e k , 2 2  D e c e m b e r, 1980, p. 65.
72 T h e  W a ll Street Jo u rn a l, 2  O c to b e r, 1980.
73 T im e  International, 16 June, 1980, V o l.  115, N o . 24, p. 48.
74 T h e  W a sh in g to n  P ost, 1 June 1980, p. A l .
75 ib id ., 19 A u g u st, p. D 6.
76 ib id ., 11 Septem ber, p. B 1.
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t w o  m o n t h s  la t e r  h e  w e n t  f u r t h e r ,  s t a t in g  u n a m b i g u o u s l y  t h a t  A m e r i c a  w a s  in  a
♦ * 77 • • •
r e c e s s i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  r e c o v e r y  w o u l d  b e  s lo w .  D e s p i t e  t h is  V o l c k e r  w a s  in t e n t  o n  
m a i n t a i n i n g  h i g h  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  k e e p  a  r e i n  o n  t h e  m o n e y  s u p p l y  in  o r d e r  t o  c u r b  th e  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s . 78 B y  s t e a d f a s t ly  h o l d i n g  d o w n  t h e  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  m o n e y  
s u p p l y  t h e  F e d  p u s h e d  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  t h e i r  h ig h e s t  l e v e l s  in  a  c e n t u r y ,  s lo w e d  
b o r r o w i n g  b y  b u s i n e s s  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l s  a l ik e ,  a n d  s e n t  t h e  h o u s i n g  a n d  a u t o m o b i le  
in d u s t r ie s  in t o  a  d e c l i n e . 79 D a r k  ( 1 9 9 9 ,  p .  1 2 0 )  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  ‘ t h r o u g h  t h e  j o i n t  
a c t io n s  o f  t h e  R e s e r v e  B o a r d  a n d  t h e  a d m in is t r a t i o n ,  t h e  e c o n o m y  h a d  b e e n  
in a d v e r t e n t l y  p l u n g e d  in t o  t h e  k i n d  o f  m a j o r  r e c e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  h a d  b e e n  
t r y i n g  t o  a v o i d . ’
W i t h  t h e  e c o n o m y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h e  ra te  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
r e a c h e d  7  p e r  c e n t ,  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  in c r e a s e  o v e r  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ’ s  5 .7  p e r  c e n t .  I n  e a r ly  
A u g u s t  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  L a b o r  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  j o b l e s s n e s s  h a d  in c r e a s e d  b y  a  s t a r t l in g  
1 .9  m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  s i x  m o n t h s  f r o m  F e b r u a r y  1 9  8 0 . 80 A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  A m e r i c a n  m a d e  
c a r  s a le s  d e c l i n e d ,  f a c t o r y  o r d e r s  f e l l ,  a n d  c o n s t r u c t io n  a c t i v i t y  s la c k e n e d .  I n  t h is
e n v i r o n m e n t  o v e r a l l  in d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  d e c r e a s e d  b y  m o r e  t h a n  8 p e r  c e n t  ( D a r k ,
• 81 
1 9 9 9 ,  p .  1 2 0 ) .  ‘ A  v i r u l e n t  s l u m p , ’ w a s  h o w  Time m a g a z i n e  s u m m e d  u p  t h e  f ig u r e s .
T h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  h a v i n g  r i s e n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  o i l  c r i s i s ,  a n d  f lu c t u a t e d  a t
r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  l e v e l s  t h e r e a f t e r ,  s t o o d  a t  1 3 .5  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 8 0 .  T h i s  w a s  A m e r i c a ’ s
h i g h e s t  l e v e l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  p o s t - w a r  h i g h  o f  1 9 4 6 .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  t h e  r a t io  o f
d e b t  t o  G N P ,  s t a n d in g  a t  3 3 .1  p e r  c e n t ,  h a d  b e g u n  i n c r e a s i n g  a g a in .  W h e r e a s  e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h  h a d  b e e n  s t a g n a n t  a t  2 .4  p e r  c e n t  in  1 9 7 9 ,  b y  1 9 8 0  t h e  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m y  w a s
77 ib id ., 20  N o v e m b e r  1980, p. B l .
78 ib id ., 23 Septem ber, p. D l .
79 T im e  International, 16 June, 1980, V o l.  115, N o . 24, p. 50.
80 ib id ., 11 A u g u s t , 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  6, p. 34.
81 ib id ., 16 June, 1980, V o l .  115, N o .  24, p. 48.
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c o n t r a c t in g .  T o  a d d  t o  t h is  c l i m a t e  o f  e c o n o m i c  w o e s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  d a y s  lo s t  to  
in d u s t r ia l  d i s p u t e s  s t o o d  a t  o v e r  2 0  m i l l i o n  ( A p p e n d i x  D ) .  H o w e v e r ,  a p a r t  f r o m  
i n f l a t i o n  a n d  in t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  i n d ic a t o r s  s e t  o u t  in  A p p e n d i x  D  
h a d  r e a c h e d  d e c a d e - l o n g  l o w s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  S p u l b e r  ( 1 9 9 5 , p .  4 1 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  th e  
E c o n o m i c  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  P r e s id e n t  1 9 8 1  s h o w s  a n  a d m in is t r a t i o n  r e a d y  t o  ‘ t h r o w  in  th e  
t o w e l ’ o n  t h e  e c o n o m y .
T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ p o s i t i o n  a s  t h e  w o r l d ’ s in d u s t r ia l  
p o w e r h o u s e  h a d  b e e n  d i m i n i s h i n g  o b s e r v e d  Time!'2 B y  m i d  J u n e  1 9 8 0 ,  w it h  th e  
e c o n o m y  l o c k e d  in  a  d o w n w a r d  s p i r a l ,  Time p o in t e d  w i t h  c o n c e r n  to  th e  L a b o u r  
D e p a r t m e n t ’ s  a n n o u n c e m e n t  t h a t  r e a l  h o u r l y  c o m p e n s a t io n  h a d  d r o p p e d  b y  5 .6  p e r  c e n t  
d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  y e a r .  ‘ K e y  s e g m e n t s  o f  U S  i n d u s t r y  a r e  s e r io u s ly  i l l ’ 
w a r n e d  t h e  New York Times.84 ‘ R e c e s s i o n  H i t s  H a r d ’ s c r e a m e d  a  h e a d l in e  in  The 
Washington Post.85 Time a l s o  s ta te d  t h a t  e v e r y  p e r c e n t a g e - p o in t  in c r e a s e  in  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  c o s t  t h e  f e d e r a l  b u d g e t  $ 2 5  b i l l i o n  in  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  lo s t  t a x e s  a n d  
a l lo t t e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b e n e f i t s . 86 B y  la t e  D e c e m b e r  t h e  New York Times w a s  
c o m m e n t i n g  t h a t  A m e r i c a  w a s  i n  t h e  d e p t h s  o f  a  r e c e s s i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  t h e r e  a p p e a r e d  
n o  e a r l y  e s c a p e . 87 T h e  s t e a d y  g r o w t h  in  r e a l  in c o m e s ,  a n d  s t a n d a r d s  o f  l i v i n g ,  t h a t  th e  
U S  o n c e  t o o k  f o r  g r a n t e d  h a s  b e c o m e  a  d i m  m e m o r y  o b s e r v e d  Time. I n s te a d ,  t h e  n a t io n
s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e c o m e  s t u c k  i n  a  c y c l e  o f  b o o m s  a n d  b u s t s ,  r i s i n g  a n d  f a l l i n g  in t e r e s t
88
r a t e s ,  a n d  a c c e l e r a t i n g  in f l a t i o n .
82 ib id ., 1 Septem ber, 1980, V o l .  116, N o . 9, p. 50.
83 ib id ., 9 June, 1980, V o l .  115, N o .  23, p. 56.
84 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 23 N o v e m b e r, 1980, p. 1.
85 T h e  W a sh in g to n  P ost, B u s in e ss  and F in a n ce , 31 A u g u st, p. L I .
86 T im e  International, 11 A u g u s t , 1980, V o l.  116, N o . 6, p. 35.
87 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 25 D e ce m b e r, 1980, p. 39.
88 T im e  International, 19 January , 1981, V o l .  117, N o . 3, p. 44.
307
B y  1 9 8 0  it  w a s  c le a r  t h a t  C a r t e r ’ s e f f o r t s  t o  m a n a g e  i n f l a t i o n  h a d  f a i le d .  T h e  o i l  
p r i c e  r is e s  e n g e n d e r e d  b y  t h e  I r a n ia n  r e v o l u t i o n  in  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 9  s e t  o f f  t h a t  d e c a d e ’ s 
s e c o n d  o i l  c r i s i s .  A s  i n f l a t i o n  c l i m b e d  C a r t e r ’ s  a p p r o v a l  r a t in g  f e l l  t o  o n l y  21  p e r  c e n t ,  
its  lo w e s t  l e v e l  s i n c e  r a t in g s  w e r e  b e g u n  in  1 9 5 2  ( W a y n e ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  2 6 0 ) .  T h e  n e e d  to  
r e d u c e  in f l a t i o n  w a s  a n  e x t e r n a l  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  c o n s t r ic t e d  t h e  l ib e r a l  
a g e n d a ,  a n d  i n d u c e d  p a i n f u l  f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  D e m o c r a t i c  p o l i c y m a k e r s  a n d  t h e ir  
in t e r e s t  g r o u p  a l l i e s .  I n f la t io n  d r o v e  t h e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  t o w a r d s  w a g e  a n d  p r ic e  
g u i d e l i n e s ,  a n d  t h e  t ig h t e r  f i s c a l  a n d  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s ,  w h i c h  u n i o n s  a b h o r r e d .  B u t  
la b o u r  h a d  n o  p l a u s i b l e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  o f  it s  o w n .  I f  it  h a d  c o n t r o l l e d  its  e c o n o m i c  
r e s o u r c e s  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  it  m i g h t  h a v e  d e l i v e r e d  s u c c e s s f u l  w a g e  r e s t r a in t  a n d  a v e r t e d  
t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  r e c e s s i o n a r y  d o w n t u r n .  A s  t h e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  t h e  C a l l a g h a n  g o v e r n m e n t  
in  B r i t a i n  s u g g e s t s ,  t h e  e x i g e n c i e s  o f  t h e  in t e r n a t io n a l  e c o n o m y  a t  t h is  t im e  i n v a r i a b l y  
p r o d u c e d  t e n s io n s ,  a n d  s o m e t i m e s  m a j o r  c o n f r o n t a t io n s ,  b e t w e e n  s o c ia l  d e m o c r a t i c  
g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  t h e i r  c o r e  c o n s t i t u e n c ie s  ( K r i e g e r ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p .  2 5 ) .
E c o n o m i c  c o m m e n t a t o r s  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c o l o u r s  e x p r e s s e d  e x t r e m e ly  n e g a t iv e  
o p i n i o n s  o n  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  e c o n o m y .  It  w o u l d  b e  1 9 8 1  a t  t h e  e a r l ie s t  b e f o r e  th e r e  
w o u l d  b e  s ig n s  o f  r e c o v e r y  w a r n e d  J o s e p h  P e c h m a n  o f  t h e  B r o o k i n g s  I n s t i t u t io n .89 T h e  
e c o n o m y  h a d  b e c o m e  d e e p l y  e n s n a r le d  in  w h a t  e c o n o m i s t  W a l t e r  O k u n  c a l l e d  ‘ t h e  g r e a t  
s t a g f la t io n  s w a m p . ’ 90 T h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  i n f l a t i o n  r e c o r d  is  n o t  g o o d  a d m it t e d  W a l t e r  
W o l f g a n g  H e l l e r .  I n  a l l o w i n g  t h e  e c o n o m y  t o  d e t e r io r a t e ,  n o t e d  A l a n  G r e e n s p a n ,  
C a r t e r  w a s  f o r c e d  in t o  a  c r a s h  p r o g r a m m e  o f  r e s t r a in t  t h a t  le d  t o  d e c l i n e  a n d  a  h u g e  r is e  
in  u n e m p l o y m e n t . 91 B y  M a y  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  a l r e a d y  in  r e c e s s i o n  o b s e r v e d  M i c h a e l  
S u m i c h r a s t  t h e  c h i e f  e c o n o m i s t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e  B u i l d e r s . 92
89 ib id ., 14 Ju ly , 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  2, p. 56.
90 ib id ., 29  Septem ber, 1980, V o l .  116, N o . 13, p. 17.
91 ib id ., 29  Septem ber, 1980, V o l .  116, N o . 13, p. 45.
92 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s ,  20  N o v e m b e r  1980, p. 1.
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E c o n o m i s t  I r w in  K e l l n e r  o f  M a n u f a c t u r e r s  H a n o v e r  T h r u s t  C o .  e m p h a s is e d  in  
Newsweek  t h a t  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  w a s  g o i n g  t o  b e  lo n g  a n d  u n p le a s a n t .93
B y  t h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  1 9 8 0  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  
s m a c k e d  o f  a  c r i s i s - m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o a c h .  P r e s id e n t  C a r t e r ’ s  $ 3 2 . 2  b i l l i o n  E c o n o m i c  
R e n e w a l  P r o g r a m m e  t o  s t im u la t e  t h e  e c o n o m y  w a s  u n v e i l e d  in  e a r l y  S e p t e m b e r .  
H o w e v e r ,  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  in  a n  e le c t io n  y e a r  t h is  p r o g r a m m e  c o n t a in e d  m o r e  
r e l i e f  f o r  b u s i n e s s  t h a n  t h e  v o t e r s ,  i t  w a s  c r i t i c i z e d  a s  ‘ a  w e a k  s m o r g a s b o r d  o f  m o r s e ls  
in s t e a d  o f  a  b o l d  s t r a t e g y . ’ 94 The New York Times p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s e d  t a x  
r e d u c t i o n s  w e r e  a n  a d m i s s i o n  t h a t  i n c o m e s  p o l i c y  h a d  p r o v e d  in a d e q u a t e  t o  c o p i n g  w it h  
t h e  p e r v a s i v e  i n f l a t i o n  r o l l i n g  t h r o u g h  t h e  e c o n o m y  95 ‘ T o o  l i t t le ,  t o o  la te ,  t o o  p o l i t i c a l , ’ 
c o m p l a i n e d  M u r r a y  W e i d e n b a u m  o f  W a s h i n g t o n  U n i v e r s i t y ’ s  C e n t r e  f o r  t h e  S t u d y  o f  
A m e r i c a n  B u s i n e s s .  H e  w e n t  o n  t o  c o m m e n t  th a t:  ‘ I t  p r o v i d e s  j u s t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  w h a t  
t h e  a i l i n g  e c o n o m y  n e e d s . ’ 96 T o  c o m p o u n d  m a t t e r s  t h e  t ig h t e r  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  p o l i c y ,  
a n d  h ig h e r  in t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  p r o v o k e d  P r e s id e n t  C a r t e r  t o  c o n d e m n  F e d  C h a i r m a n  V o l c k e r .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  h a d  e a r l i e r  s u p p o r t e d  V o l c k e r ’ s  s t r u g g le  w i t h  in f la t io n ,
97
C a r t e r  h a d  g r o w n  c o n c e r n e d  o v e r  t h e  im p a c t  o f  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  o n  h is  r e - e le c t io n  b id .  
Time a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d ’ s  s h i f t i n g  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  -  s l o w i n g  th e  
g r o w t h  o f  t h e  m o n e y  s u p p l y  t o  r e s t r a in  i n f la t io n ,  t h e n  p e r m i t t i n g  it  e x p a n d  t o  p r e v e n t  
t h e  r e c e s s i o n  g e t t in g  o u t  o f  h a n d ,  b e f o r e  t ig h t e n i n g  t h e  m o n e y  s u p p l y  a g a in  -  h a d
98
c o n t r ib u t e d  t o  t h e  g y r a t i o n s  in  t h e  e c o n o m y .
T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y ’ s  l e a d e r s h ip  y e a r n e d  f o r  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  c a n d i d a t e  to  C a r t e r  
i n  t h e  u p c o m i n g  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t io n .  I t  t h o u g h t  it s  p r a y e r s  h a d  b e e n  a n s w e r e d  w h e n ,
93 N e w sw e e k , 27 O c to b e r, 1980, p. 89.
94 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 2  Septem ber 1980, p. 12.
95 ib id ., 5 O cto b e r, 1980, p. 8.
96 T im e  International, 8 Septem ber, 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  10, p. 34.
97 T h e  W a sh in g to n  Post, 3 O c to b e r  1980, p. A l .
98 T im e  International, 19 January , 1981, V o l .  117, N o . 3, p. 44.
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o n  L a b o u r  D a y  1 9 7 9 ,  T e d  K e n n e d y  e n t e r e d  t h e  r a c e  ( S t a c k s ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 3 3 ) .  C a r t e r ’ s 
f r e n e t i c  e f f o r t s  t o  p r e v e n t  u n io n  d e f e c t i o n s  t o  K e n n e d y  r e v e a l e d  a  r e a lm  o f  u n io n  
b a r g a i n i n g  p o w e r  t h a t  r a d i c a l  c r i t i c s  u s u a l l y  i g n o r e d  ( D a r k ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p .  1 3 8 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  
w h e n  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  i n  I r a n  t o o k  A m e r i c a n  e m b a s s y  s t a f f  h o s t a g e  t h e  A m e r i c a n  p e o p le  
r a l l i e d  a r o u n d  C a r t e r  ( G e r m o n d  a n d  W i t c o v e r ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  5 6 - 5 7 ) .  T h e  D e m o c r a t s  g l u m l y  
r e n o m i n a t e d  J i m m y  C a r t e r  in  1 9 8 0 .
T h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  n o m i n a t e d  R o n a l d  R e a g a n  a s  t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  P r e s id e n t .  H e  
e m b r a c e d  t h e  i d e o l o g y  o f  t h e  N e w  R i g h t :  a  c u l t u r a l  c o n s e r v a t i s m  s t r e s s in g  s o c ia l  a n d  
m o r a l  i s s u e s .  H i s  m e s s a g e  w a s  s i m p l i s t i c :  lo w e r  t a x e s ,  r e d u c e d  f e d e r a l  s p e n d in g  o n  
s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  b a la n c e d  b u d g e t s ,  a n d  f e w e r  g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e g u la t io n s .  H e  a ls o  
f a v o u r e d  in c r e a s e d  d e f e n s e  s p e n d in g ,  a n d  e f f o r t s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  c o l la p s e  o f  
C o m m u n i s m .  W h e r e  B a r r y  G o l d w a t e r  h a d  f a i l e d  in  1 9 6 4  R e a g a n  w a s  c o n v i n c e d  h e  
c o u l d  t r iu m p h  in  1 9 8 0 .
I n  t h e i r  p a r t y  p l a t f o r m  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  p l e d g e d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  $ 1 2  b i l l i o n  a n t i­
r e c e s s i o n  p r o g r a m m e  a n d  t o  c r e a t e  a t  le a s t  8 0 0 ,0 0 0  j o b s .  T h e  p a r t y  a ls o  p le d g e d  n o t  t o  
f i g h t  in f l a t i o n  b y  a n y  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  w o u l d  le a d  t o  h ig h e r  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  o r  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  
in c r e a s e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t .  T h e  D e m o c r a t s  p l a c e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a h e a d  o f  i n f l a t i o n  a s  
t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  c h i e f  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  b la m e d  th e  
D e m o c r a t s ’ i n f l a t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  f o r  s t i f l i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  th e  
r e c e s s i o n .  T h e  G O P  u r g e d  a  b o ld  p r o g r a m m e  o f  t a x  r e d u c t io n s ,  s p e n d in g  r e s t r a in t s ,  a n d  
r e g u l a t o r y  r e f o r m s  t h a t  w o u l d  in j e c t  n e w  l i f e  in t o  t h e  e c o n o m y . "
I n  t h e  r u n  u p  t o  t h e  e l e c t i o n  The New York Times p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t :
99 ib id ., 25 A u g u st, 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  8, p. 50.
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T h e  p o l l s  h a v e  f o u n d  v o t e r s  p e r s i s t e n t l y  a n d  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  d i s s a t i s f ie d  
w i t h  P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r ’ s h a n d i n g  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  a  f a c t  t h a t  M r .  R e a g a n  
h o p e s  w i l l  p r o d u c e  a n  a v a la n c h e  o f  b l u e - c o l l a r  v o t e s  t o  a d d  t o  h is  b a s e  
a m o n g  t h e  m o r e  a f f l u e n t . 100
‘ P o l l s  s h o w e d  t h a t  M r .  C a r t e r  w a s  p e n a l i z e d  s u b s t a n t ia l l y  f o r  r i s i n g  u n e m p lo y m e n t .  I f  
w e  h a d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  in f l a t i o n  a t  3 p e r  c e n t ,  C a r t e r  w o u l d  b e  e a s i l y  r e - e le c t e d , ’ 
o b s e r v e d  R i c h a r d  S c a m m o n ,  d i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  E l e c t i o n  R e s e a r c h  C e n t r e . 101
A m e r i c a ’ s  e c o n o m i c  h e a lt h  w a s  a  c e n t r a l  is s u e  f o r  b o t h  p r e s id e n t ia l  c a n d id a t e s .  
I n  la t e  A u g u s t  R e a g a n  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s id e n t  h a d  ‘ c r e a t e d  a  s e v e r e  d e p r e s s io n  in  o u r  
n a t i o n . ’ 102 I n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e s e  e c o n o m i c  f a i l u r e s  h e  p r o m i s e d  n e w  p o l i c i e s  a n d  n e w  
l e a d e r s h ip  ( W a y n e ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  1 8 2 ) .  A l t h o u g h  C a r t e r  a d m it t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  w a s  in  a  
r e c e s s i o n  h e  s a id  t h a t  it  w a s  g o i n g  t o  b e  t h e  b r ie f e s t  s i n c e  t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r . 103 
C h a r l e s  E .  W a l k e r ,  D e p u t y  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  u n d e r  P r e s id e n t  N i x o n  w a r n e d  in  
m i d - O c t o b e r  1 9 8 0  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  ‘ n o  r e a l  in c r e a s e  in  e c o n o m i c  a c t i v i t y  f o r  t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  y e a r , ’ a n d  t h a t  a n y  r e c o v e r y  i n  1 9 8 1  w o u l d  b e  ‘ a n e m i c ’ a t  b e s t . 104 D u r i n g  th e  
f i n a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  c a m p a i g n  R e a g a n  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  in d e x  
in c r e a s e d  b y  1 2 .7  p e r  c e n t  in  S e p t e m b e r .  H e  d e c la r e d  t h a t  C a r t e r ’ s  r e c o r d  o n  in f la t io n  
a n d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  ‘ i s  a  f a i l u r e  o n  a  s c a le  s o  v a s t ,  in  d i m e n s i o n s  s o  b r o a d ,  w i t h  e f f e c t s  
s o  d e v a s t a t i n g ,  t h a t  i t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  w i t h o u t  p a r a l l e l  in  A m e r i c a n  H i s t o r y . ’ 105 R e a g a n  w e n t  
o n  t o  a t t a c k  C a r t e r  f o r  p e r m i t t in g  a  n e a r  d o u b l i n g  in  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  m i s e r y  in d e x  ( O k u n ’ s
T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 2 2  O c to b e r, 1980, p. 24.
101 ib id ., 30 O c to b e r, 1980, p. 1.
102 ib id ., 28 A u g u s t , 1980, p. 9.
103 ib id ., 29 O c to b e r, 1980, p. 26.
1M ib id ., 15 O c to b e r, 1980, p. 22.
105 T im e  International, 3 N o v e m b e r, 1980, V o l .  116, N o . 18, p. 17.
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d i s c o m f o r t  in d e x )  t h a t  C a r t e r  h a d  b a d g e r e d  G e r a l d  F o r d  w i t h  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 7 6
c a m p a i g n . 106
W h e n  it  w a s  c le a r  t h a t  R e a g a n  w o u l d  b e  t h e  G O P  n o m i n e e ,  t h e  u n io n s  u n it e d  
b e h i n d  C a r t e r . 107 I n  M i c h i g a n  a n d  O h i o  la b o u r  w a s  t h e  b a c k b o n e  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  
e f f o r t .  B u t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  i n f l a t i o n  w e r e  h ig h e r  t h a n  w h e n  C a r t e r  b e a t  F o r d  f o u r  
y e a r s  b e f o r e  ( D a r k ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p . 1 2 3 ) . M o r e o v e r ,  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  in f l a t i o n  t h e  F e d e r a l  
R e s e r v e  B o a r d  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r a is e  in t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  f u r t h e r  d a m a g i n g  t h e  P r e s id e n t ’ s re -  
e l e c t i o n  p r o s p e c t s  ( S c h n e id e r ,  1 9 8 5 ,  p .  2 3 3 ) .  O n  4  N o v e m b e r  R e a g a n  w a s  e le c t e d  
P r e s id e n t  w i t h  a  p l u r a l i t y  o f  8 .3  m i l l i o n  v o t e s ,  a n d  4 8 9  e l e c t o r a l  v o t e s  t o  C a r t e r ’ s 
m e a g r e  4 9  ( B o i l e r ,  1 9 9 6 ,  p .  3 6 2 ) .  T h e  A F L - C I O  l e a d e r s h i p ’ s  e f f o r t s  o n  b e h a l f  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r  w e r e  b u r ie d  b e n e a t h  a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  R e p u b l i c a n  a v a la n c h e  t h a t  c a r r ie d  
o f f  n e a r l y  4 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  u n i o n  v o t e . 108 I n  t h e  S e n a t e  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  g a in e d  12 
s e a t s ,  a n d  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  5 3  t o  4 7 ,  h o w e v e r ,  in  t h e  H o u s e  t h e  D e m o c r a t s  r e m a in e d  in  
c o n t r o l  b y  2 4 3  t o  1 9 2 .  C a r t e r ’ s  c r o w n i n g  f a i l u r e  w a s  h is  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y .  
H e  in h e r i t e d  a  b a d  s i t u a t io n ,  b u t  le f t  it  w o r s e .
P r e s id e n t  R e a g a n ,  h i s  P o l i c i e s  a n d  O r g a n i s e d  L a b o u r
T h e  f i n a l  y e a r  o f  t h e  C a r t e r  a d m in is t r a t i o n  w a s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  a  w e a k e n i n g  e c o n o m y ,  
f lu c t u a t i n g  -  b u t  g e n e r a l l y  h i g h  -  in t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a n d  r i s i n g  u n e m p l o y m e n t  ( O E C D ,  
1 9 8 2 ,  p .  9 ) .  T h e  O E C D  ( 1 9 8 3 ,  p . 7 )  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  w e a k  o u t p u t  t h r o u g h  1 9 8 0 -8 1  
p r o d u c e d  t h e  w o r s t  r e c e s s i o n  in  p o s t - w a r  h i s t o r y .  I n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  t h is  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  
t h e  n e w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o o k  o v e r  in  W a s h i n g t o n  D C  in  e a r l y  1 9 8 1 .  A m o n g  t h e  o t h e r  
p r o b l e m s  t h a t  c o n f r o n t e d  P r e s id e n t  R e a g a n  w a s  d e c l i n i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  o u t p u t ,  a n d
106 ib id ., 3 N o v e m b e r , 1980, V o l .  116, N o .  18, p. 45.
107 N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 29 O c to b e r  , 1980.
108 T h e  W a sh in g to n  P ost, 16 F e b ru a ry , 1981, p. A l .
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growing pressure on profitability and personal disposable incomes (OECD, 1982, p. 
17). In addition, the Bureau of Economic Analysis noted that inflation had wiped out 
any increases in incomes.109
There was a change in the government’s policies towards the trade unions, the 
level of trade union policies incorporated into the government’s policies, and the 
government’s economic policies. The Reagan administration asserted that its first and 
foremost objective was to improve the performance of the economy (Spulber, 1995, p. 
45). Despite its differences with Carter, the transfer of power to Reagan was an 
unwelcome outcome for labour. The unions soon found themselves in the White 
House’s crosshairs.
Sam Nagakama, chief economist of Kidder, Peabody & Co., warned that unless 
the incoming administration did something about the union contracts with auto, steel, 
and other major industries for basic increases in excess of productivity, the country 
could be facing its greatest economic disaster since the 1930s.110 In mid February 1981 
the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council held an emergency meeting ‘in an attempt to stave 
off a wholesale slaughter of some of organised labor’s sacred cows’ in the Reagan 
administration’s first budget.111 The council approved a resolution opposing budget 
cuts as a way to control inflation.112 The AFL-CIO called for credit controls aimed at 
lowering interest rates, the maintaining of natural gas and petrol price controls, a 
reindustrialsization programme to invest public and private funds in necessary projects, 
and expanded training programmes for workers.113 The AFL-CIO also proposed 
slashing social security taxes, and introducing tax cuts aimed at middle and low income
109 ibid., 9 November, 1980, p. 33.
110 The New York Times, 23 November 1980, p. 1.
111 The Washington Post, 16 February, 1981, p. Al.
112 ibid., 16 February, 1981, p. AB.
113 ibid., 17 February, 1981, p. AB
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families."4 However, the President’s budget contained none of the AFL-CIO’s 
proposals. In seeking to reduce the federal deficit the Reagan administration targeted 
for cutback $11 billion worth of public works and job training programmes, the 
extended unemployment benefits programme, and trade adjustment assistance-benefits 
paid to workers who had lost their jobs due to foreign invasion of a domestic industrial 
market.115
AFL-CIO President Kirkland attacked the government’s economic programme 
on Capitol Hill as the most costly roll of the dice ever proposed by policy makers. The 
programme favoured the rich over the poor Kirkland told the House Budget 
Committee.116 As the OECD (1982, p. 9) pointed out economic polices were redrawn 
along lines that differed from those of preceding governments in their political roots and 
their theoretical foundations.
With the change of government there was a change in the relationship in the 
economy between the trade unions and the government. The National Accord, reached 
between organized labour and the Carter administration in September 1979, was an 
outgrowth of the administration’s efforts to obtain labour’s co-operation with voluntary 
wage standards announced in October 1978 (Dark, 1999, p. 118). The unions touted the 
accord as the American version of Britain's social contact (Dark, 1999, p. 118). 
Discussions on the Accord often included Secretary of the Treasury William Miller and 
Labour Secretary Ray Marshall. A supplement to this agreement was the establishment 
of a 15 member tripartite Pay Advisory Board (Flanagan, 1980, p. 37). The National 
Accord to an extent improved relations between the AFL-CIO and the Carter
114 ibid, 18 February, 1981, p. AB
115 ibid., 16 February, 1981, p. Al.
116 ibid, 5 March 1981, p. A3.
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administration (Robinson, 1981, p. 385). However, Reagan terminated the National 
Accord, and the tripartite Pay Advisory Board scheme, soon after coming to office.
In 1979 President Jimmy Carter met with the leadership of the AFL-CIO on 12 
occasions (Appendix A). These encounters encompassed issues ranging from health 
care, to the economy, and national energy policy.117 The following year President 
Carter met 28 times with the leadership of the AFL-CIO. In the early months of 1980 
these meetings concerned industrial relations matters, however, as the presidential 
election drew nearer focus shifted to what support AFL-CIO could provide to Carter’s 
campaign.118 Many AFL-CIO regional heads accompanied Carter on his campaigning 
trips through their states. Despite its differences with Carter the transfer of power to 
Reagan, the first chief executive to have been a former union officer, was a disaster for 
American labour. Robert McGlotten, the AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist in Washington, 
went to the White House on only two occasions throughout the entire span of the 
Reagan-Bush years. Consequently, ‘in the 1980s the political standing of the AFL-CIO 
went into a tail spin’ (Brody, 1993, p. 248).
Between 1968 and 1978, public employee unionisation disguised the relative 
decline in private sector trade unionism.119 Ominously, organised labour had failed to 
unionise substantial numbers in non-manufacturing private employment (Dubofsky and 
Dulles, 1999, p. 385). In 1979 the level of trade union membership in the United States 
stood at just over 22 million, the highest level it ever reached. This was an increase of
268,000 members, or 1.23 per cent, over 1978 (Appendix C). Overall, union 
membership had been gradually increasing since the early 1960s. However, at the same 
time trade union density had been on a steady downward trajectory. In 1980 trade
117 Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, 2003. ‘President’s Daily Diary.’ Accessed from 
http://gil.usg.edu:8765/jclquery.html?qc=pdd&charset=iso-8859-l&ht=0&qp=&qt=AFL-CIO
118 ibid.
119 Time International, 15 September, 1980, Vol. 116, No. 11, p. 40.
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union membership fell to 20.96 million. This decrease constituted a loss of 1,057,000 
trade union members, or 4.8 per cent of overall membership. At the time this was the 
unions’ largest membership loss in the post World War II era. In light of the economic 
situation, and a hostile Republican administration, this was not a surprising 
development. However, the following year organised labour lost 321,000 more 
members. By 1982 overall union membership had slumped to 19.5 million. 
Consequently, between 1979 and 1982 total union membership fell by over 11 per cent. 
However, worse was to come.
Several economic, ideological, and social trends contributed to Reagan’s popular 
appeal. In 1981 the new administration embarked on a new economic programme 
(Rapping, 1988, p. 75). To the prospect of stagflation he promoted a seemingly painless 
panacea: tax cuts, wherein the resulting stimulus would boost federal revenues to 
balance the budget, consequently reducing inflationary pressure. Reagan’s 
uncomplicated patriotism acted as a balm to the wounded national psyche. However, 
the triumph of New Conservatism was also based on the challenge to America’s 
economic hegemony by West Germany and Japan, countries that relied less on defence 
spending as the engine of their economies. In contrast, argued Renshaw (1991, p. 140), 
the United States’ defence expenditure was crowding out more useful economic 
activities. Alfred Eichner stated that in the OECD area there was a strong inverse 
relationship between the proportion of GNP devoted to national defence and the growth 
rate.120
The 1970s had witnessed growing middle class opposition to the taxes necessary 
to sustain programmes such as social security. This burden became greater as the 
economic depression deepened, leading to a questioning of existing policies. The
120 The New York Times, 15 October, 1980, p. 2.
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OECD (1982, p. 10) pointed out that President Reagan’s election, and the 
accompanying Congressional elections, gave as clear a mandate for conservative 
policies as there had been in the post-war United States. Reagan initially fashioned his 
economic strategy around the controversial proposals of economist Arthur Laffer. 
Laffer proposed that steep tax cuts would stimulate growth, leading to even larger tax 
receipts, and thereby reduce the federal deficit.121 The new President’s programme, 
dubbed Reaganomics by the media, constituted the belief that American capitalism, if 
freed from the burden of taxes and government regulation, would surge ahead. 
Reagan’s first budget proposed a $750 billion tax cut, built around a 30 per cent 
reduction in federal income taxes over three years. In May 1981 Congress voted for a 
25 per cent income tax cut over three years. Middle and working class Americans, who 
had organised ‘tax revolts’ from Massachusetts to California, applauded (Jones, 1995, p. 
597). ‘A trend towards reduced economic regulation was carried further by the 
immediate application of the remaining stages of crude oil price decontrol, and the 
abolition of the Council on Wage and Price Stability’ (OECD, 1982, p. 24).122
Economic policies were redrawn along lines that differed from those of 
preceding governments in their political roots and theoretical foundations (OECD, 
1982, p. 9). In political terms President Reagan capitalised on anti-government 
sentiment, emphasised individualism, and a smaller Federal role. Tax reliefs were allied 
to a restructuring of federal expenditure, bringing sharp changes in the fiscal influence
on the economy. His programmes called for a shift in spending in favour of defence at
the expense of welfare, especially education, health, and housing (Tindall and Shi, 
1996, pp. 1434-1435). Inflation was to be tackled through monetary policies, and the 
anticipated deflationary effects of deregulation. Inflation declined, but only at the
121 Time International, 19 January, 1981, Vol. 117, No. 3, p. 46.
122 ibid, 19 January, 1981, Vol. 117, No. 3, p. 46.
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expense of millions of workers. By December 1981, unemployment reached 10.8 per 
cent nationally, and levels in excess of this in Michigan, and Alabama. Henry and 
Oliver (1987, p. 6) argued that Reagan’s legacy was to alter, rather than reduce, 
government expenditure. By the mid-1980s the real value of defence spending had 
exceeded its Vietnam War peak.
By 1981 the political strategy of the labour movement was a shambles. Union 
leaders became convinced that the Democratic Party’s structure was the main reason for 
the election defeat. For them the solution was an increase in union power; it would 
make the Democrats more favourably disposed towards labour’s interests, and see them 
nominate more electable candidates. The unionists’ aspiration for increased power was 
intensified by their profound dislike of the Reagan administration. However, on the 
admission of its officials, the AFL-CIO could achieve little on its own. Its greatest 
successes were as part of the coalition that campaigned for civil rights legislation. Its 
worst defeats came when it stood isolated on pure ‘labour’ issues. The paradox was that 
labour had better but less effective machinery than most other interest groups. Wilson 
(1979, p. 89) argues that the sophistication and level of political activity displayed by 
interest groups is correlated negatively with their strength in society.
Confrontation, Recession, and Recovery
With Reagan’s election the rich had an opportunity to strike back. They sought to undo 
a whole raft of social legislation spanning the Great Society, the Nixon and Carter years, 
and even the New Deal as well. But they had no structures to serve as replacements 
(Brogan, 1999, p. 685). They seemed to think they were unnecessary.
The first, and most famous, test of Reagan's intentions toward organised labour 
came with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organisation (PATCO) strike in
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August 1981. This erupted when controllers rejected an 11 per cent pay increase 
worked out between PATCO and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). A strike was 
called, to which 13,000 employees responded (Northrup, 1984). The administration 
declared the strike illegal, and defined the strikers as outlaws (Dubofsky and Dulles, 
1999, p.383). Reagan issued a back-to-work ultimatum. Employees not at work in 48 
hours were threatened with discharge; an action authorised under the Tafit-Hartley Act. 
Some 11,500 controllers were discharged when they refused to obey the order, and their 
union was decertified as their bargaining agent (Hurd and Krisky, 1986, p. 119). The 
affair exposed President Reagan’s anti-union animus.
The PATCO strike sent a message to both the private and public sectors that it 
was open season on labour (Bello et al., 1994, p. 92). A group of AFL-CIO Executive 
Council members met the President to urge that the controllers be reinstated. He 
refused, although he agreed they could apply for other federal employment. However, 
the government was not hiring at that time (Morgan, 1984). Time observed that 
Reagan’s tough reaction, a reaction more restrained than he had initially intended, was 
reminiscent of Roosevelt’s wartime order against striking coal miners in 1943.123
Under the Reagan administration the unions endured assaults from the executive 
branch of a magnitude not seen since before the New Deal (Dubofsky and Dulles, 1999, 
p. 378). The firing of the air traffic controllers, and the disbanding of their union, was 
part of a deliberate effort to legitimate a new level of anti-union hostility. Likewise, 
Reagan’s appointments of pro-business conservatives to the NLRB, and to key posts 
within the Department of Labor, were part of a scheme to undermine the unions. 
Funding for unemployment insurance, which strengthened the position of workers vis-à- 
vis employers was cut back, and worker safety and health standards were lowered.
123 ibid, 17 August, 1981, Vol. 117, No. 4, p. 21.
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Together, these changes constituted deterioration in the protective ramparts that labour 
had constructed with the help of the federal government in preceding decades.
Still, labour experienced some success in blocking the anti-union efforts of 
conservatives. Labour’s opponents scored no victories in altering the legal framework 
of industrial relations. Nor did they do any better in achieving other goals, such as 
curtailing wages on federal contracts. An analysis of the unions’ legislative record 
during Reagan's first term would conclude that they weathered the period without any 
substantial defeats (Dark, 1999, p. 142). They tended to do well in the House but lose 
in the Senate. The Republicans found that it was far easier to block legislation in 
Congress than to enact it during a period of divided government. Ironically, this feature 
of the political system, which had often prevented the passage of pro-union legislation, 
protected those statutory provisions already laid down (Masters and Delaney, 1987, p.
Reaganomics into the 1980s
D’Souza (1997, p. 85) argues that Reagan came to Washington with the most ambitious 
programme for America since the New Deal. But Reagan’s tax cuts reduced revenues 
without immediately bringing about the predicted business boom, while increases in 
military appropriations offset domestic spending cuts (Peterson and Rom, 1988). 
However, in the short term the administration’s plans were dwarfed by the dose of 
monetary policy applied by the Federal Reserve. This move had been intended to wring 
inflation out of the economy: through a major constriction in demand, and a 
corresponding downturn in production. A business slump and rising unemployment 
persisted through 1982. The federal deficit nearly doubled to $110.6 billion, and the 
national debt surpassed $1 trillion.
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Corporate America went on the warpath against organised labour, supporting 
decertification elections. Industry began moving to green field sites that tended to be 
non-union (Katz, 1985). The persistence of unemployment in the unionised sectors 
reduced the bargaining power of the unions. Not only did membership decline, but so 
also did the quality of the contracts negotiated in unionised industries. The adverse 
effects of Republican economic policy were compounded by budgets that reduced 
funding for social programmes. During this period labour’s influence in Washington hit 
a historic low (Edsall, 1984, p. 175).
For 12 years the Republicans would domination of the executive office. 
Reagan, and to a lesser extent his successor George H. W. Bush, displayed an anti­
union bias the like of which had not been seen since before the Great Depression. 
Under Reagan the unions experienced a reduction in their status in society and influence 
in politics. In this hostile environment organised labour dropped its commitment to 
broad social reform programmes, pursuing instead much narrower self-interested 
agendas (Moody, 1988, p. 161).
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Table 6.3: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1980
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High Medium Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
President
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
N/A
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07 : Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High Medium Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncement on the 




Table 6.3 shows that while 88 per cent of the observable implications of the first 
hypothesis pointed to a medium or high empirical-theoretical fit, 77 per cent pointed to 
a high fit exclusively, indicating a significant, swift, and enduring change in the trade 
unions’ influence over public policy. In the case of the second hypothesis, 87.5 per cent 
of the observable implications indicated a high or medium empirical-theoretical fit, with
62.5 per cent indicating a high fit exclusively, pointing to a macroeconomic crisis. The 
findings for both hypotheses surpassed the minimum 60 per cent threshold for high 
empirical-theoretical fit, confirming that there was a critical juncture in the AFL-CIO’s 
influence over public policy in 1980.
In summation, in 1981 there was a significant, swift, and enduring change in the 
AFL-CIO’s influence over public policy. With the economy in crisis at the time 
America elected a President who was to prove himself no friend of organized labour. 
This view concerning the economy was unanimously shared by the national media, 
political and economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and international 
organisations monitoring economic performance, and finally elected representatives. 
Organized labour’s gains from the 1960s onwards were threatened under the Reagan 
presidency. President Reagan’s policies were the antithesis of what AFL-CIO stood for, 
and interaction between the anti-union administration and organised labour diminished. 
Consequently, the AFL-CIO’s access to the President, its relationship with the 
government in the economy, the government’s economic and industrial relations 
policies, the trade unions’ influence over these policies, and ministerial attitudes, all 
changed to the trade unions’ disadvantage. Ultimately, the Republican’s recapturing of 
the White House was to result in the AFL-CIO’s loss of influence over the executive, 
and with the Senate in Republican hands up until 1988 the unions’ political allies only 
held sway in the House of Representatives. However, the Democrats there were able to
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block much o f the Republican’s anti-union legislation. Nevertheless, by 1988 there 
were 20 per cent fewer trade unionists in America than in 1980 (Appendix C). 
Organised labour was to remain in the political wilderness until 1992. It was at a lime 
o f macroeconomic crisis that the unions’ influence over public policy changed. 
According to the observable implications criteria set out in Chapter II this change in the 
trade unions’ influence over public policy was a critical juncture.
figure 6.3 : The Critical Juncture Grid, America, 1980






Potential Critical Juncture 4: 1992 -  The Clinton Years
‘The reelection of Ronald Reagan in 1984 was a green light for further anti-unionism’ 
(Goldfield, 1987, p. 6). According to AFL-CIO information director, Murray Seeger, 
the union busters were ‘now in hog heaven.’124 The economic recovery of 1984-1986 
failed to add members to union ranks as ordinarily happened in times of business 
expansion. Reagan solved the short-term problems of inflation and recession, but did so 
with borrowed money, and without touching the deeper sources of America’s economic 
decline (Dubofsky and Dulles, 1999, p. 383).
Scepticism among political elites concerning the feasibility of the large welfare 
state constituted another barrier to organised labour’s policies. These obstacles were 
reinforced by the intractability of federal budget deficits that rendered any expansion of 
state expenditure impossible. The federal debt that stood at $1816.9 million in 1985 
had increased to $4002.6 million by 1992 (Boyer et al., 1996, p. 1056). In this way the 
Reagan administration appeared to have come up with the perfect strategy: massive 
deficits that would prevent the future expansion of the welfare state (Rockman, 1991, p. 
11). This was according to Friedman (1988, p. 24) an intergenerational crime, with the 
government robbing future Americans to enrich those who merely happened to be 
around at the time.
By the mid-1980s the growing unity of House Democrats, brought about by the 
increased liberalisation of Southern Democrats, suggested at a stronger brand of party 
leadership as personified in Speaker Jim Wright. The AFL-CIO subsequently 
constructed a firmer alliance with House Democrats (Barry, 1989, p. 280). Labour 
would co-ordinate its agenda around a shared set of legislative priorities. In return 
labour’s favoured bills would be brought to the floor expeditiously, and with the full
124 The New York Times, 10 February, 1985.
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support of the Democratic leadership (Dark, 1999, p. 144). The AFL-CIO’s
relationship with the Congressional Democrats in the 1980s stood in stark contrast to 
the tensions that had existed during the Carter Administration.
The Economy and Clinton’s Election Victory
In 1990 the United States’ position in the world economy had clearly altered. It still 
possessed considerable strength as a major industrial producer, accounting for 23 per 
cent of world output, but its international standing had altered considerably since 1945. 
Its lead in total national income had narrowed, the balance of payments deficit had 
weakened it, and the rise of a rival Europe and Japan signalled a shift in economic 
power (French, 1997, pp. 205-206). National economic and political commentators, the 
media, as well as domestic and international organisations, regarded the economic state 
of the country as in crisis. According to Capel (1991, p. 3) the recession that began in 
the summer of 1990, prior to the Gulf War, had all the hallmarks of a very serious 
economic downturn. By December 1990 Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan called it a “meaningful downturn.”125 By that time the country was in a 
horrendous financial mess. Lyle Gramley, chief economist for the Mortgage Bankers 
Association of America and a former Federal Reserve Governor observed that ‘we are 
paying the price for what we did in the past with this enormous federal deficit.’126 The 
OECD (1993, p. 18) pointed out that the economy grew by only 0.8 per cent in 1990, 
and shrank by 1.2 per cent the following year. America seethed with economic 
discontent. The start of the 1990s saw Congress and President Bush agreed on a five- 
year deficit-reduction package (Divine et al., 1995, p. 993). The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act was intended to generate the largest deficit reduction in the country’s
125 Time International, 31 December, 1990, p. 50
126 ibid, 14 October, 1991, p. 42.
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history, however, it was soon clear that this was not being achieved. The OECD (1993, 
p. 29) pointed out that the federal deficit rose from $221 billion in 1990 to $290 billion 
in 1992, with federal debt surpassed $4 trillion. Instead of reducing the deficit, the 1990 
budget added more than $1 trillion to the national debt (Divine et al., 1995, p. 994). 
Federal debt stood at almost 65 per cent of GNP in 1992, up from 32 per cent in 1981 
(Appendix D). However, this was the only economic indicator in Appendix D that was 
at, or had surpassed, a decade-long low. By September 1992 The Wall Street Journal 
was warning that the budget deficit was out of control.127 The Gulf War, the Savings & 
Loan bailout (costed at $500 billion in 1992), the defence-industry contraction, the real 
estate depression, and soaring welfare and Medicare/Medicaid payments, wreaked 
havoc with the budget-balancing efforts.128 ‘These events,’ argued the OECD (1991, p. 
11), ‘turned sluggish growth into a recession.’
Retail sales slumped; housing starts declined, and unemployment rose. A weak 
recovery in 1991 faltered, and unemployment peaked at 7.8 per cent in mid-1992. Over 
2 million jobs had been lost to the economy in the space of a year. With a national debt 
of $4 trillion, and huge interest payments to keep up, the US had almost no room to 
stimulate the economy with a burst of spending.129 Time also warned that $2 trillion of 
corporate debt was preventing the sort of capital investment the economy needed to 
remain competitive in the 1990s. At the same time the borrowing binge of the 1980s 
left customers with little leverage for spending. Non-government debt had increased 
from $1.8 trillion in 1989 to $6 trillion in 1992.130 As the economic slowdown reduced 
tax revenues, states slashed social-welfare funding. The number of Americans below 
the poverty line rose to over 34 million. The economic downturn of the early 1990s
127 The Wall Street Journal. 18 September 1992, p. FI.
128 Time International, 28 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 39, p. 31.
129 ibid, 28 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 39, p. 32.
130 ibid, 28 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 39, p. 32.
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became the longest recession since the Great Depression.131 Galenson (1996) observed 
that the Reagan and Bush legacy was borne on the backs of the workers. The defeat of 
Bush in his bid for re-election in 1992 became essential to the unions. For the first time 
in years virtually all trade unions, including the Teamsters, would back the Democratic 
candidate.
As President Bush appeared invulnerable following the Gulf War,132 top 
Democrats opted to stay out of the presidential race. However, following a gruelling 
round of primaries Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas came to the fore as the 
Democrats’ nominee. In the primaries Clinton had increasingly benefited from labour 
support, which played a much larger part in his presidential bid than it did with Dukakis 
in 1988. At the party’s convention in July, Clinton pledged an activist government 
addressing the economy, jobs, and health care.
Time remarked that in June 1992 the American people were frightened about 
‘disappearing jobs, schools that don’t teach, unaffordable health care, and the spiraling 
numbers of homeless.’133 By late August polls found that only 22 per cent of the public 
regarded President Bush as performing a good job in relation to the economy.134 To 
compound matters, by early September 1992 the dollar had plunged to its lowest level 
since World War II.135 ‘The country’s 12 year vacation is over,’ declared Time, ‘its 
time to go back to work and pay the bills.’136 Overwhelmingly, the registered voters 
questioned by Newsweek disapproved of Bush's handling of the economy. Yet, less 
than half of them though that Clinton could do a better job. However, almost 60 per
131 ibid, 28 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 39, p. 31.
132 Gallup poll, 28 February -  3 March, 1991.
133 Time International, 15 June, 1992, Vol. 139, No. 24, p. 39.
134 ibid, 31 August, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 9, p. 29.
135 ibid, 7 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 36, p. 48.
136 ibid, 26 October, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 43, p. 40.
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cent of people felt that they were less well off in 1992 than they had been four years 
before.137 A worrisome prospect for any incumbent President facing into an election.
In August Time pointed out that the Reagan and Bush administrations were 
largely responsible for the enormous amount of red ink on the federal budget.138 ‘The 
American economy was comatose,’ observed Time late the following month. The New 
York Times argued that from the start of his term President Bush had mismanaged the 
economy, knowing secretly that it was in for tough times ahead, but refusing to admit
1 3 9that taxes would have to be raised. However, when taxes were raised this drew some 
vicious criticism from the public and the media. ‘Read My Lips: I Lied’ proclaimed the 
headline on the New York Post.'40 ‘Anxious about the economic future?’ asked 
Newsweek in late October 1992. ‘If you aren’t you should be,5 it went on to warn.141
The deficit crippled Bush's presidency. It stifled any thoughts he may have had 
for new federal initiatives, and it prevented him from proposing conventional pump- 
priming measures, such as tax cuts or public works spending, to stimulate the 
economy.142 However, the consequences of the deficit were not confined to the 
American economy.
International observers including the OECD have for a long time urged 
the United States to deal with its huge federal budget deficit, not only 
because it is unsustainable, but also because it is a major drag on US and 
global savings and a contributor to high interest rates world-wide 
(OECD, 1993, p. 9).
137 Newsweek, 21 September 1992, p. 40.
138 Time International, 31 August, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 9, p. 26.
139 The New York Times, 21 October, 1992, p. 2.
140 New York Post, 24 June, 1990, p. 1.
141 Newsweek, 26 October 1992, p. 44.
142 ibid, 7 September 1992, p. 32.
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If anything, the opinions of economic commentators were even more negative 
than those of the media. ‘This is a sick economy that won’t respond to traditional 
remedies,’ said Norman Robertson, chief economist at Pittsburgh’s Mellon Bank.143 
Alan Binder, Professor of economics at Princeton observed that no matter what policies 
the President implemented under the prevailing economic conditions the measures 
would increase GNP by 1 per cent at best.144 ‘The single most important lesson of 
elementary economics that America must learn,’ said World Bank chief executive 
Laurence H. Summers, ‘is this: deficit finance is not an alternate to cutting spending or 
raising taxes -  it is a way of postponing the need for these painful steps.’145 ‘This is not 
a normal recession,’ warned economist Paul Krugman, ‘in a normal recession monetary 
policy is cleaner and faster, but we have had the Federal Reserve trying for a long time 
and things are not happening.’146 To compound matters, Michael Boskin, Bush’s chief 
economic advisor, repeatedly clashed with White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, as 
the latter tried to keep the former away from the President. Boskin was eager to inform 
Bush as to the terrible state of the economy, and that things were far less rosy that the 
President kept proclaiming in public.147
By mid September 1992 the Federal Reserve Board continued to reduce interest 
rates in the hopes of stimulating borrowing and investment, and reviving the
148economy. Time observed that the Fed, under not-so-subtle pressure from the White 
House, had been pushing interest rates down for more than a year in hopes of
143 Time International, 28 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 39, p. 31.
144 Newsweek, 26 October, 1992, p. 46.
145 The Wall Street Journal, 27 September, p. Al.
146 The Washington Post, 17 October, 1992, p. Cl.
147 Time International, 26 October, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 43, p. 34.
148 The New York Times, 20 September, 1992, pi.
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stimulating the economy in order to help the President’s re-election campaign.'49 
However, the Federal Reserve stated that the economy in 1992 was about $210 billion 
smaller than it would have been if the federal budgets were in balance, and spending 
had not been siphoned off into current investments.150 In early October 1992 Lawrence 
E. Lindsey, a Federal Reserve governor, admitted that the country faced serious 
problems with its debt burden.151 M. A. Akhtar and Ethan Flarris, economists with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, pointed out that the legacy of the deficits of the 
1980s cost America about 7 per cent of its capital stock, and between 2.5 to 3.5 per cent 
of its potential output in the 1990s.152 The Economist observed that the Federal 
Reserve’s hands were tied by an administration that, in refusing to tackle the budget 
deficit, ‘has dumped upon it [the Fed] all responsibility for economic policy.’153
The pronouncements on the state of the economy were consistent with the 
suggestion of a crisis. For Time the fact that the top Clinton campaign strategist James 
Carville hung a sign on the wall of their campaign headquarters to explain what the 
election was about: ‘The Economy Stupid!’ sums up the Clinton campaign’s view on 
the economic state of the nation.’154 On this front Clinton was to attack relentlessly, 
focusing on the recession, and what solutions he would bring. However, the 
pronouncements on the economy coming from the White House by the end of October
1992 were confusing at best. President Bush sent out mixed messages, saying that the 
economy was in a not so bad state, only then to contradict himself by saying that his 
economic team was working hard to right the situation. President Bush then seemed to 
agree with Clinton’s argument that his administration had hopelessly botched the
149 Time International, 7 September, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 36, p. 49.
150 The Wall Street Journal, 27 September, p. Al.
151 The New York Times, 2 October, 1992, p. 6.
152 The Wall Street Journal, 27 September, p. Al.
153 The Economist, 5 September 1992, p. 52.
154 Time International, 2 November, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 44, p. 38.
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recession.155 If re-elected, he has promised to pack his ‘senior economic advisers onto 
the first Learjet leaving town.’156 However, this statement, made only weeks prior to 
the election, conveyed nothing but a sense of desperation from the White House.157 
Ultimately, the President’s denial that the country was in a recession convinced citizens 
that Bush was out of touch with reality (D’Souza, 1997, p. 258). ‘If we were Brazil, or 
some lesser-developed country, the IMF would have sent a mission to visit with this 
committee and would have read the riot act to you,’ said Robert Reischauer, director of 
the Congressional Budget Office, in testimony to the House Budget Committee.158
President Bush’s popularity plummeted as the economy worsened. One gauge 
of voter disaffection was the candidacy of billionaire businessman H. Ross Perot. His 
campaign focused on the burgeoning federal deficit, and the horrendous national debt. 
Meanwhile, union activists were prominent in many States, campaigning not only for 
Clinton-Gore, but also for local Democratic standard-bearers (Upham, 1993, p. G-110). 
On 3 November 43 per cent of voters chose Bill Clinton as their new President, Bush 
trailed with 38 per cent, and Perot amassed 19 per cent of the popular vote (Boiler, 
1996, p. 390). Of Clinton’s 44 million votes a quarter came from union households 
(Freedman, 2000). Most incumbents in Congress won re-election. In the House the 
Democrats lost nine seats, but maintained their majority over the Republicans by 258 to 
176. In the Senate the Democrats made a modest gain of one seat, giving them 57 
senators. There were hopes that the gridlock resulting from Republican Presidents 
confronting Democratic Congresses might at last be broken.
155 ibid, 26 October, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 43, p. 28.
156 The New York Times, 22 October, 1992, p. 2.
157 Time International, 26 October, 1992, Vol. 140, No. 43, p. 34.
158 The Wall Street Journal, 27 September, p. Al.
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January 1993 saw the inauguration of a new President determined to try to lift the 
economy’s performance over the medium term. Although Bill Clinton had fashioned 
himself as a new Democrat, he was first of all a Democrat. The Clinton administration 
acted to promote the interests of unions as organisations, and to advance legislation the 
unions supported. At the 1993 AFL-CIO convention President Clinton stated that he 
became President because he wanted a new partnership with the American labour 
movement (Glaenson, 1996, p. 74). However, there remained limits on what the 
administration could provide the unions, but these were not new. Nevertheless, the 
AFL-CIO, for the first time in 12 years, found itself with a friend in the White House. 
The importance of the union/Democratic relationship was confirmed by the access to 
top administration officials that union leaders enjoyed (Dark, 1999, p. 163). Labour 
leaders who had been to the White House rarely during the Reagan-Bush era became 
frequent invitees. Virtually all union leaders claimed to be deeply satisfied with the 
quality of their access to policymakers (Dark, 1999, p. 163). Robert McGlotten, the 
AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist, attended at the White House 40 times in the first nine months 
after Clinton came to office (Appendix A). AFL-CIO President Kirkland had regular 
meeting with Clinton adviser George Stephanopolous, and they were sometimes joined 
by Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin (Lewis, 1996, p. 70). ‘The Presidents of 
large national unions got their calls returned for the first time in twelve years, and found 
themselves socially and politically back as ‘players’ in Washington’ (Dark, 1999, p. 
163). The record of the Clinton administration in this regard was closer to the cordiality 
of the Johnson administration than the tension of the Carter administration.
The most important Clinton appointment from the union viewpoint was that of 
Robert Reich, a lecturer at Harvard, as Secretary of Labor. ‘His early pronouncements
President Clinton and Organised Labour
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anticipated a far more favourable climate for the unions than had existed under the 
Republican presidencies’ (Upham, 1993, p. 103). Reich opened his department’s lines 
of communication to the unions, and foresaw a new era of labour management co­
operation. Union leaders found Reich a reliable defender of labour’s position. He was 
also readily accessible to them. On numerous issues Reich was credited with promoting 
the unions’ viewpoint within the White House. He also appointed unionists to positions 
of influence within the Department of Labor.
There was a significant change in the government’s economic policies. 
Raosenberg (2003, p. 279) argues that rather than leading to strong economic growth 
benefiting the whole population, the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations 
contributed to rising inequality amidst economic stagnation. Clinton (1992, p. 46) 
stated that what was needed was a new economic programme which put people first, 
and put America back to work. Clinton was a moderate who sought to shed the 
Democratic Party’s reputation for ultra-liberalism, and wasteful spending on social 
programmes. Clinton also sought to court the middle class, and blue-collar voters who 
had once composed the party’s backbone. He also made long strides towards 
reclaiming the South for the Democratic Party. However, the recession shaped much of 
the Clinton agenda. The new administration’s economic strategy was built on the view 
that government could do much to improve on market outcomes (OECD, 1993, p. 14). 
The OECD (1993, p. 113) pointed out that the new administration recognised the need 
for action in order to confront the problem of the deficit. Rejecting the ‘trickle down’ 
approach of the Reagan-Bush years, Clinton proposed government action to revitalise 
the economy. This was to be done through investment in infrastructure and education 
(French, 1997, p. 52). In his State of the Union address of 17 February 1993, President 
Clinton gave the outlines of a package that would have cut the deficit substantially. His
334
1993 economic programme proposed spending cuts and tax increases aimed at a net 
deficit reduction of $325 billion over four years. One of the main components of this 
package was a so-called stimulus package that comprised $169 billion of additional 
budgetary outlays in the short term. In August Congress passed a five-year economic 
plan that incorporated Clinton’s spending cuts and tax increases, while gutting his 
stimulus package. This deficit-reduction plan went a long way to alleviating fiscal 
imbalances (OECD, 1993, p. 113).
While the administration was clearly committed to getting its own house in 
order by bringing down the budget deficit, so as to ease the drain on national savings, it 
had also shown a willingness to pursue actively such objectives as countering the trend 
rise in income inequality, securing faster job creation, and supporting higher rates of 
investment in all its forms, both tangible and intangible, physical and human, public and 
private. The OECD (1993, p. 115) pointed out that the new administration sought 
substantial reforms in a wide variety of areas on account of their intended impact on the 
nation’s productivity and competiviness. The new administration saw greater scope for 
government in correcting market failures than did the preceding administration. ‘The 
zeal for deregulation has clearly waned since the mid-1980s, and the government seems 
willing to turn to new regulation to achieve its social objectives in an environment of 
budgetary stringency’ (OECD, 1993, p. 117).
Clinton’s economic programme included the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Negotiated by the Bush administration, this pact admitted 
Mexico to the free-trade zone earlier created by the United States and Canada. After 
frenzied White House deal making, the House of Representatives passed NAFTA by a 
comfortable 234-200 margin in November 1993. NAFTA was approved over the 
objections of the AFL-CIO, the majority of Democrats in House of Representative, 165
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of whom voted against it, and 27 of the 55 Democratic Senators (Tindall and Shi, 1996, 
p. 1548). Consequently, even in years when the Democrats controlled both Congress 
and the White House, labour could not accomplish certain of its objectives (Boyer et al, 
1996, p. 1068). As predicted, trade with Mexico subsequently increased. Bello et al, 
(1994, p. 94) argued that NAFTA was corporate America’s effort to guarantee a source 
of cheap-labour reserves.
Economic globalisation enabled American companies to outsource their 
production to plants in other countries with lower labour costs. This led to corporate 
moves towards downsizing, which worked wonders with stock prices, and to declines in 
the labour movement in the United States. Blue-collar labour lost ground to 
“sweatshops” elsewhere in the world. Part-time labour became popular as employers 
could avoid paying for expensive benefits (Tilly, 1991, p. 14). The decline of jobs in 
the industrial sector, and their growth in the service sector, also continued. 
Manufacturing employed only 17 per cent of all non-agricultural workers by the mid- 
1990s. The hollowing out of manufacturing impacted on the white-collar work force. 
With smaller blue-collar contingents to manage, and managers, engineers, and designers 
available at lower cost in Third world countries, US corporations ‘downsized’ their 
middle and upper management ranks (Mishel and Bernstein, 1993).
As industrial employment declined, so did union membership. In 1945 some 35 
per cent of US workers belonged to unions; in 1992 the figure stood at 15.8 per cent. 
By 1991 the level of trade union membership in America stood at 16,568,433, a 
decrease of 171,379, or 1.02 per cent, on 1990 (Appendix C). By the end of the 1992, a 
year that saw the election of the first Democratic President since Jimmy Carter in 1976, 
trade union membership decreased by another 178,433, or 1.07 per cent. However, in
1993 the decline in union membership, which had gone on throughout the 1980s, was at
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last halted. That year saw an increase of 208,000 in trade union membership to reach a 
total of 16,598,000. The following year saw trade union membership increase again. 
This was partly due to the friendlier political environment engendered by Bill Clinton. 
Nevertheless, the remainder of the 1990s, a time of economic prosperity, saw the trade 
unions’ membership fluctuating above, or near to, the 16 million mark. By 2000 overall 
trade union membership stood at 16,258,000 (Appendix C). From this it can be seen 
that trade union membership appeared to stagnate slowly following Clinton’s election in 
1992. The increases in union membership in 1993 and 1994 did not endure.
The results of Clinton’s first year in office were impressive from the Democratic 
Party’s viewpoint. Economic improvements eased pressure on the Clinton 
administration to devise a revised economic stimulus programme. The rebound picked 
up steam in 1994 as retail sales, key indictors of consumer confidence, rose. The Big 
Three automakers and the steel industiy recovered strongly. Thanks to the addition of
3.5 million jobs in 1994, unemployment fell to 5.4 per cent, its lowest level in more 
than four years. Inflation remained under control, owing in part to a succession of 
interest-rate increases imposed by the Federal Reserve Board to cool the surging 
economy. A weakening of the OPEC oil cartel also helped to hold inflation in check. 
In constant dollars crude oil cost the same in 1993 as in 1973, before the cycle of price 
spurts began. The federal deficit dropped by $220 billion in 1994. Structural economic 
problems remained, but the short-term picture brightened in the mid-1990s.
A measure of the closeness between the administration and organised labour can 
be gauged from the fact that part of the President’s, ultimately unsuccessful, Health 
Care reform campaign burden was shouldered by the AFL-CIO at a cost of over $4 
million dollars. In March 1994 Clinton appointed a pro-union advocate, William 
Gould, as chair of the NLRB. The evolution of the NLRB under Gould’s leadership
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clearly demonstrated that the Clinton administration was interested in shifting public 
policy in a more pro-union direction. However, he could not insulate Gould against a 
crescendo of criticism from management spokespeople, Congressional Republicans, and 
federal judges, who together thwarted Gould’s efforts to secure a worker’s right to 
unionise.
As the mid-term elections loomed, frustrations with the administration, and with 
Washington politics generally, intensified. To his critics, Clinton’s failed health-care 
plan represented the dead end of a discredited New Deal/Great Society style of top 
down reform. At the same time, a movement to downsize government, reform the 
welfare system, slash taxes and spending, and shift power to the states, gained 
momentum among the middle class.
The Republicans’ ‘Contract with America’ nationalised the mid-term election of 
1994. The mid-term elections were normally dominated by local issues. The resulting 
Republican landslide saw them gain control of both Houses of Congress for the first 
time since 1952, and increased the number of Republican governors to 31. Overall, it 
was a thorough repudiation of the Democratic Party. Washington underwent a great 
shift to the right. However, Clinton shrewdly moved to the political centre, and by 1996 
his political fortunes were on the rise again.
Throughout the 1990s co-operation between the AFL-CIO and the Clinton 
White House ran very deep at times. Harold Ickes, former White House deputy chief of 
staff, gave Senate testimony to this effect in October 1997. Ickes told of a meeting in 
November 1995 between President Clinton, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, AFL- 
CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka, and Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (Dark, 
1999, p. 185). The subject of their meeting was twofold. To discuss plans for the
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Democrats retaking the House of Representatives, and stimulating the long-term 
revitalisation of the labour movement (Drew, 1997, p. 69).
By 1996 the unions had returned to their historic place atop the Republicans’ hit 
list (Meyerson, 1998, p. 1). ‘The Republicans were appalled at the labour movement’s 
intensified [political] involvement and its strategic co-ordination with Democratic 
operatives’ (Dark, 1999, p. 185). In four states initiative were placed on the ballot 
seeking to restrict unions’ abilities to devote resources to politics. In 30 other states, 
such measures were being introduced into legislatures. No such co-ordinated attack on 
union power had been seen since 1958. The AFL-CIO engaged in a $20 million radio 
and television effort aimed at unseating Republicans in Congress. Another $15 million 
supported the field organisations of 131 paid campaign co-ordinators (Meyerson, 1998, 
p. 19). Unions also made $49 million in PAC donations (McKeever et al., 1999, p. 
263). The main political goal of the AFL-CIO remained supporting the Democrats in 
their quest to control Congress and the executive branch. For their part, the 
congressional Democrats were becoming more dependent on organised labour, as the 
business support once guaranteed them by incumbency flowed to the new majority in 
Congress. As the congressional Democrats and organised labour were now sharing the 
experience of minority status, and a common enemy, their alliance grew closer. By 
1996 the new cycle of co-operation was evidenced in the co-ordinated push from a 
minimum wage increase.
Overall, the picture for the unions was mixed. The fruits of the Clinton victory 
in 1992 fell short of union expectations. Workplace fairness legislation, and a national 
health scheme, failed to be enacted. Organised labour did not forget Clinton’s creation 
of a congressional coalition to overcome their resistance to NAFTA. Hopes for labour 
law reform were dashed when the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994.
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Despite the wealth o f union PACs, it was not easy for labour to improve its image, its 
membership, and its influence in the Democratic Party. The Party remained somewhat 
tentative about union associations, as its leaders were fearful o f jeopardising middle- 
class support, and corporate acceptance, especially given that unions represented only 
14 per cent o f all workers. However, in contrast to the Reagan-Bush era labour had a 
friend in the White House (Galenson, 1996).
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Table 6.4: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1992
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High Medium Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
President
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
N/A
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High Medium Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
X
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncement on the 




In Table 6.4 it can clearly be seen that although 66 per cent of the first 
hypothesis’s observable implications pointed to a medium or high empirical-theoretical 
fit, only 55 per cent pointed to a high fit exclusively. In the case of the second 
hypothesis, 62.5 per cent of the observable implications indicated a high empirical- 
theoretical fit, pointing to a macroeconomic crisis. As the minimum 60 per cent 
threshold for high empirical-theoretical fit was not reached by the observables of the 
first hypothesis there was no critical juncture in the AFL-CIO’s influence over public 
policy in 1992.
In summation, 1992 was to see a swift, and enduring increase in the AFL-CIO’s 
influence over public policy, this at a time of macroeconomic crisis. However, this 
increase in influence lacked significance. The Bush years proved to be a depressing 
time for the American economy, and the trade unions. America was locked in its 
longest recession since the Great Depression. The federal deficit had skyrocketed, the 
economy contracted, while unemployment stood at its highest level in almost a decade. 
That the economy was in a recession was a view shared by the national media, political 
and economic commentators, the central bank, domestic and international organisations 
monitoring economic performance, and finally elected representatives. However, the 
extent to which this depression was considered a crisis varied between each of these 
commentators and observers. It was in response to the state of the economy that the 
American people elected a Democratic President to the White House for the first time 
since 1976. Suddenly, after more than a decade of alienation organised labour had an 
ally in the Executive, and union leaders had access to top administration officials (Dark, 
1999, p. 186). A new approach was adopted towards both the economy and the trade 
unions by the Clinton administration. As a consequence, the AFL-CIO’s access to the 
President, government economic and industrial relations policies, the trade unions’
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influence on government policies, and ministerial attitudes, all changed in the trade 
unions’ favour, with policies coming to reflect those advocated by the unions 
themselves. However, all did not go the unions’ way, despite the new administration 
promoting the unions’ interests and advancing legislation favourable to them. The 
unions’ influence over public policy underwent change at a time of macroeconomic 
crisis. However, this change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy was not 
dramatic enough to constitute a critical juncture.
Figure 6.4: The Critical Juncture Grid, America, 1992






This chapter has analyzed four instances of change in the AFL-CIO’s influence over 
public policy. In Chapter III each of these cases had been prima facie identified as 
constituting possible critical junctures. These possible critical junctures had been 
identified after an extensive examination of change in the AFL-CIO’s influence over 
public policy in America in the 55 years between 1945 and 2000. In this case only the 
proposed critical junctures in 1980 was in fact found to constitute an actual critical 
juncture according to the criteria set out in Chapter II. In that year the AFL-CIO’s 
influence over public policy underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring 
nature, this specifically at a time when the economy was in crisis. As a consequence of 
this the empirical-theoretical fit, as set out in Tables 6.3, was high.
However, a number of other implications can be ascertained from this chapter. 
The proposed critical junctures in 1946, 1960 and 1992, all turned out not to be critical 
junctures in the trade unions’ influence over public policy.
Although there were swift and enduring changes in the AFL and CIO’s 
influence over public policy in 1946, this change was not that significant, and it took 
place at a time of macroeconomic difficulties rather than macroeconomic crisis. As 
change of a significant nature, and a macroeconomic crisis, are central to the concept of 
a critical juncture, their absence in this case meant that the change that occurred was not 
a critical juncture. This means that neither of the two hypotheses was upheld by the 
data from 1946. In this case the empirical-theoretical fit, as set out in Table 6.1, was 
very low for both hypotheses. Despite this, there was a definite reduction in the AFL 
and CIO’s influence over public policy. This was at a time of economic difficulties that 
contributed to the Republicans’ retaking the Senate.
Conclusion
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In 1960 there was again swift and enduring change in the AFL-CIO’s influence 
over public policy. But this change was not that significant. At that time too the 
American economy was in difficulty, but it was not in crisis. Neither economic 
commentators, nor economic data, pointed towards a macroeconomic crisis. As a 
consequence, Table 6.2 points to a very low empirical-theoretical fit for both hypotheses 
in that year. Nevertheless, the election of a Democratic President, at a time of economic 
difficulties, saw an increase in the AFL-CIO’s influence over public policy with the 
appointment of pro-labour figures to key posts in the administration.
Although the economy was in crisis in 1992, and the trade unions’ influence 
underwent change of a swift and enduring nature, this change was not that significant. 
As can be seen from Table 6.4, just less than 60 per cent of the first hypothesis’s 
observable implications pointed to significant, swift, and enduring change in the AFL- 
CIO’s influence over public policy. As significant change is central to the whole idea 
of a critical juncture, its absence in this case means that the change that occurred was 
not a critical juncture. Despite this, President Clinton, was far more accommodating 
with organized labour than his Republican predecessors had been, and the AFL-CIO 
influence over public policy was greater in the 1990s than it had been in the preceding 
decade.
The issues of critical junctures with short legacies does not come up in the case 
of America. The argument here is that the unions’ influence over public policy did not 
undergo dramatic change from 1945 through until the end of 1980. It is only with the 
election of Ronal Reagan in that year, and his inauguration in January of 1981, that 
there occurred the first critical juncture in the AFL-CIO’s influence over American 
public policy in the second half of the twentieth century. This critical juncture’s legacy 
lasted until 1992, at which point the change in the AFL-CIO’s influence over public
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policy was borderline critical juncture. Consequently, the 1980 critical juncture’s 
legacy endured for at least as long as three presidential terms of office.
The fact that all four of the proposed critical junctures occurred in election years 
is a noteworthy issue. However, as the 1946, 1960, and 1992, proposed critical 
junctures were found not to constitute critical junctures, this only leaves us with the case 
of 1980 that was actually found to constitute a critical juncture. This critical juncture in 
the AFL-CIO’s influence over public policy occurred in a year in which a presidential 
election took place. The evidence set out shows that the economic difficulties in that 
year coincided with the coming to power of a President intent on altering the 
government’s approach towards the economy. The result saw the dramatic decrease in 
the unions’ influence over public policy throughout the decade of the 1980s. Despite 
the fact that the only critical juncture took place in a year that saw a different party’s 
candidate assuming the mantle of President, there was no critical juncture in the AFL- 
CIO’s influence over public policy in any of the other years where there was a change 
of party in the White House.
Figure 6.5: The Critical Juncture Grid for America, 1945-2000








C hapter V II
Sweden
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For most of the twentieth century the Swedish political landscape possessed all the 
characteristics of the five-party system found in other Nordic countries (Kuhnle, 1976, 
p. 25). This stable five-party system lasted for the best part of 70 years. The Swedish 
electoral system, based upon a proportional representation approach, was responsible 
for the stability of Swedish national governments, but forced the dominant political 
party, the Social Democrats, to rule in either in a minority capacity or as part of a 
coalition. Consequently, the government had to seek compromises and design policies 
acceptable to the majority. Yet, despite the institutional stability found in Sweden for 
most of the twentieth century, trade union influence on public policy was to undergo 
changes. The chapter examines these changes to see if they constituted critical 
junctures.
This chapter will examine variations in the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy in Sweden. Three specific instances will be concentrated upon: 1976, 1982, and 
1991. They were selected on the basis of prima facie evidence which suggested that in 
those particular years the LO’s influence over public policy changed significantly. The 
examination is searching for significant, swift, and enduring change in the LO’s 
influence over public policy, this at a time of macroeconomic crisis. This can be 
identified by testing the potential critical junctures in the LO’s influence over public 
policy against the hypotheses, and their observable implications, as set out in Chapter II. 
The chapter seeks to discover whether or not the hypotheses relating to change in the 
trade unions’ influence over public can survive the test of empirical evidence.
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During the twentieth century trade unions in Sweden went from small organisations 
engaged in bitter confrontations with employers and the political establishment, to 
virtually constituting part of that establishment. The Swedish trade union movement is 
divided into three main federations: The Swedish Trade Union Confederation, 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO); The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees, Tjanstemannens Centralorganisation (TCO); and, The Swedish 
Confederation of Professional Associations, Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation 
(SACO). This division is an anachronistic remnant of the class-oriented society of the 
early twentieth century.
The LO, the federation concentrated upon here, was founded in 1898 by the 
Social Democratic Workers’ Party, Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) (Fulcher, 
1988, p. 250). It is by far the oldest of the three Swedish employee federations, and 
served as a model for both the TCO and SACO. The LO has a close, if not institutional, 
relationship with the SAP (Heywood, 1997, p. 257). The combination of political 
affiliation, and huge membership, gave the LO a unique position in national life. ‘LO 
and the Social Democratic Party are two huge, complex, partly overlapping 
bureaucracies, in effect engaged in a never-ending conversation as to what it means to 
be a Social Democrat’ (Heclo and Madsen, 1987, p. 323).
Socialist policy initiatives typically began in LO study groups. The SAP would 
then propose a study in parliament, often in a commission including representatives 
from various sectors of the population (Hague et al., 1992, p. 212). The result was 
usually a unanimous report, followed by the implementation, in a modified form, of 
ideas that had been somewhat radical when proposed by the LO. It was the LO rather 
than the SAP that took the initiative in creating the welfare state (Lash, 1985, p. 231).
Development over the 20th Century
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The LO has been perhaps above all a political force, exerting direct pressure on 
government (cf. eg., Martin, 1979).
When the SAP achieved a level of 40 per cent support among the electorate it 
was in a position where it needed only to ensure the neutrality of one of the non­
socialist parties in order to take office (Castles, 1978, p. 23). For almost 70 years the 
SAP has occupied a pre-eminent position in Swedish politics. What became known as 
the Swedish Model evolved out of the co-operative spirit encapsulated within the 1938 
Saltsjobaden Agreement. In this agreement the LO acknowledged management’s right 
to manage, while the SAF recognised the principle of collective representation of 
workers through their unions. Free enterprise was to coexist with the expansive policies 
of a strong Social Democratic Government. There would be no state intervention in 
bargaining if the labour market parties behave responsibly.
The most important dynamic after Saltsjobaden was the solidarity wage policy 
from the 1950s. Known also as the Rehn-Meidner model, this combined two 
independent elements: egalitarian notions of a wages structure freed from the necessity 
of market forces, and the necessity to conduct a responsible wage policy adapted to the 
general policy of stabilisation. In 1952 the institutionalisation of peak-level wage 
bargaining was pressed upon the LO by the SAF (Fulcher, 1988, p. 251). This 
facilitated subsequent LO efforts to implement the kind of solidaristic wage policy Rehn 
and Meidner had advocated.
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Potential Critical Juncture 1: 1976 -  The SAP’s Fall from Power 
By the 1970s Sweden, although among the world’s richest countries, began to strain 
under the burden of supporting its expansive social welfare system.1 Although Swedish 
industry was healthy, the economy was no longer growing as fast as it had. The 
industrial sector -  which was the source of Sweden’s prosperity -  was becoming too 
small. This posed a danger that the country’s trade balance might deteriorate. The 
correlation between industrial expansion and domestic market growth became weaker.
From the mid-1960s onwards, the decline of the more backward industries had 
accelerated, while the growth of advanced sectors did not translated into employment 
growth. Full employment came to depend increasingly on the expansion of the public 
sector (OECD, 1992, p. 62). At the same time the rank and file of the labour movement 
was growing restive. The wave of wildcat strikes in 1969-1970 took the LO leadership 
by surprise. This was in part a reaction by high-wage workers to the solidaristic wage 
policy. In the previous decade solidarity wage policy was largely designed to reduce 
wage differences between workers with similar training and skills in different 
production sectors. During the 1970s this ambition changed to reducing wage 
differentials in all dimensions. The implicit slogan became equal pay for all work 
(Hibbs and Locking, 1995, p. 17).
‘During the 1950s and 1960s LO leadership had represented the moderate 
position within the SAP’ (Peterson, 1987, p. 41). However, by the 1970s these policy 
positions had reversed (Visser, 1996, p. 184). The LO, at the zenith of its powers, was 
able to utilise its extensive horizontal and vertical links with the socialists to play an 
active part in formulating government policies (Hancock, 1972, pp. 154-155). LO 
asked the government to limit the power of employers at workplaces. Consequently, the
1 Time International, 4 October, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 14, p. 8.
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role of the state, and public policy, in industrial relations became interventionist. This 
eroded support among employers for corporatism. The essence of the Swedish model 
had been the coexistence and co-operation of both sides of industry, with the state 
playing a neutral role.
Increased international competition, stagnating demand, and the recession 
following the oil crisis of 1973, led to a serious decline in the steel and shipbuilding 
industries (Lundberg, 1982, p. 199). Annual productivity growth, having increased at a 
rate of 4.1 per cent per year between 1950 and 1973, dropped to an annual rate of 1.4 
per cent thereafter (Forseback, 1976, p. 29). World demand for Swedish capital goods 
slumped after 1973 as Japanese competition hit home.2 ‘In the 1970s, wages exploded 
in a self-destructive series of agreements that placed Swedish firms in the un­
competitive position of having the highest paid labour force in the world’ (Ahlen, 1989, 
p. 333).
The unions, and to an extent the SAP, seemed to be moving away from an 
accommodation with capitalism and towards democratic socialism. The Swedish model 
of centralised, corporatist, collective bargaining was beginning to display evidence of 
strain. Not only was it becoming more difficult for the LO and SAF to agree, but 
factions within labour organisations were emerging (Fulcher, 1991, p. 267). There were 
signs of conflict between the growing army of public-sector employees and private 
sector counterparts. The fact that a growing number of white-collar and public sector 
employees favoured the TCO and SACO was eroding the privileged position of the LO- 
SAF axis in the system of centralised wage negotiations. LO-SAF wage negotiations 
consequently covered a shrinking proportion of the workforce (Calmfors and Forslund, 
1990, pp. 80-81).
2 The Economist, 4 April, 1981, p. 86.
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The issues of social welfare, employment, and taxation had dominated election 
campaigns in the decades after the war. The latter part of the 1970s saw them 
supplemented by two new issues: employee investment funds and nuclear power. As 
the 1976 election approached, the SAP noted declining support in public opinion polls 
(Hadenius, 1997, p. 121). During the previous three years of parliamentary deadlock, 
the outcome of a close 1973 election, the government had been incapable of controlling 
the political scene. It had been forced into compromises, or the outcomes of votes had 
been decided by the drawing of lots. Most significantly, the sharp rise in oil prices 
during the 1973-1975 oil crisis caused many countries to adopt restrictive economic 
policies. Time argued that the economic limits of the welfare state suddenly became 
plain in the midst of Europe’s worst post-war recession.3 The era of rapid growth was 
over, and Sweden’s attempts to bridge over the recession produced not tangible results 
for the voters (Lundberg, 1982, p. 197). However, this resulted in a wage-cost 
explosion (Lindbeck, 1997, p. 1302). The recession and stagflation dragged on, and 
Swedish industry lost competitiveness and market share.
By 1976 economic indicators pointed to an economy on a downward trajectory. 
The Swedish unemployment rate stood at 1.6 per cent. Although a decrease on the level 
of unemployment in 1975, and low compared to most other countries at the time, 
Sweden’s rate of unemployment had been averaging 2 per cent over the course of the 
1970s. This was double the average rate of unemployment that had been experienced in 
the 1960s. Nevertheless, the OECD (1977, p. 5) referred to this as an exceptional 
employment situation. ‘But the maintenance of high employment had been 
accompanied by less favourable performance in other areas, notably costs, prices and
The Economy, and the Election of 1976
3 Time International, 4 October, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 14, p. 8.
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the balance of payments’ (OECD, 1977, p. 42). Inflation had reached 10.3 per cent, its 
highest level since 1951. In the 1970s inflation had been running at over double that 
experienced in the previous decade. The oil crisis of 1973 added increasing impetus 
(3.2 per cent in 1974) to inflation’s upward trajectory. Consequently, inflation became 
a serious issue. The OECD (1976, p. 19) points out that the balance of payments 
deteriorated to $2.5 billion. In 1976 the debt to GNP ratio stood at 23.6 per cent, 
although lower than in any of the other countries under examination in this dissertation, 
Sweden’s national debt had been increasing throughout the early 1970s. In fact, 1976 
was to the mark the beginning of an explosion in Sweden’s debt to GNP ratio, which 
was to almost triple within a decade. At the same time, the economy’s growth rate had 
slowed to 1.2 per cent, from 4.3 per cent in 1974, and was to shrink the following year 
by 2 per cent. However, only 25,000 days were lost to industrial disputes in 1976, a 
fraction of the 366,000 lost the previous year, and economic openness was 17 per cent 
higher than at the start of the decade (Appendix D). According to Newsweek, the 
Swedish economy had escaped the worst of the worldwide recession. 4 The Economist 
pointed out that the Swedish stock market was near to an all-time high.5 Only one of 
the six economic indicators set out in Appendix D was at a decade-long low.
In 1976 the LO put forward its wage-earner funds proposal. Deriving their 
income from a levy on corporate profits, the proposed employee funds would allow for 
the gradual transfer of control to the labour unions of all enterprises with more than 50 
employees. But the SAP, ambiguous as to the desirability of the funds, retreated in the 
face of the employer-led opposition (Whyman and Burkitt, 1993, p. 612). Meanwhile, 
the non-socialist parties used the employee funds in their polemics against the Social 
Democrats. They argued that the fund proposals demonstrated that the ruling party
4 Newsweek, 4 October, 1976, p. 57.
5 The Economist, 25 September, 1976, p. 125.
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wanted socialism and state dominance in the business sector. Newsweek pointed out 
that many voters came to fear that the SAP ‘would replace Sweden’s mixed economy 
with a purely collectivist system.’6 During the 1970s the SAP was also criticised from 
the left by the more active Left Party Communists, Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna 
(VPK), due to the unrest in the labour market that had been without precedent in the 
post-war era. The years from the time that Olof Palme became chairman of the SAP in 
1969 were marked by confrontations. The deadlock in Parliament between 1973 and 
1976 created uncertainty while the three non-socialist parties became more skilled at 
presenting a united front in both election campaigns and Parliament.7
The 1976 election campaign was more emotional than was usual. The non­
socialist parties reached agreement on many issues. The leader of the Centre Party, 
Thorbjorn Falldin, was the man who brought these parties together.8 He, along with 
Olof Palme, was the central figure of the election. Falldin depicted the SAP as
advocates of an unwieldy, inhuman society that accorded higher priority to growth and
profitability than to other, more important values, such as the environment. The Times 
pointed out that the welfare system was not the non-socialists’ target, but the growing 
concentration of state power and the over bureaucratisation of society.9 This fear of 
even further concentration of power underlined the non-socialists’ opposition to the 
wage earner funds.10 Falldin also made nuclear power a major issue, and declared that 
no new reactors would be loaded with fuel if he became prime minister.11 At the time 
Sweden used more nuclear energy per capita than any other country.12 However the
6 Newsweek, 4 October, 1976, p. 57.
7 Time International, 20 September, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 12, p. 32.
8 The Guardian, 20 September, 1976, p. 2.
9 The Times, 16 September, 1976, p. 14.
10 Time International, 20 September, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 12, p. 32.
" The New York Times. 17 September, 1976, p. 7.
12 Business Week, 27 September, 1976, p. 43.
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business community was more concerned about the wage earner funds. “I’m much 
more worried about the Meidner Fund than about nuclear energy,’ said Hans Werther, 
chairman of Electrolux.’13 Palme’s position was doubly difficult, as he had to defend 
Sweden’s economic prosperity, which was threatened by the Centre Party’s proposal to 
rapidly dismantle the country’s nuclear power plants, and also had to explain the 
advantages of the proposed employee investment funds. Simultaneously, the SAP was 
experiencing internal discord over the nuclear power issue.
The election resulted in small shifts in the relative strength of the socialist and 
non-socialist blocs. However, the SAP was defeated after having ruled Sweden for 44 
years.14 The SAP’s share of the vote fell to 42.7 per cent, its lowest level since 1932, 
and its presence in the Riksdag was reduced from 156 to 152 seats. The combined 
support for the Centre Party, Liberals, and Moderate Party reached 50.8 per cent of the 
votes cast. They took 180 seats, five beyond an overall majority.15 ‘The Swedish 
model has gone in for repair,’ proclaimed the Financial Times upon the announcement 
of the result.16 Thorbjorn Falldin formed a centre-right coalition government consisting 
of the three non-socialist parties.17 However, the desire to form this non-socialist 
government was so strong that Falldin backed away from his election promise on 
nuclear power,18 as both the Liberals and Moderates supported the construction of more 
nuclear energy plants.19 This was to have severe consequences for his government’s 
lifespan.
13 ibid.
14 The Guardian, 20 September, 1976, p. 1.
15 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/.
16 Financial Times, 7 October, 1976, p. 12.
17 The Wall Street Journal, 21 September 1976, p. 21.
18 The New York Times, 24 October, 1976, p. 3.
19 Time International, 25 October, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 17, p. 9,
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The Non-Socialist Governments, their Policies, and the Trade Unions
The employers, encouraged by the Social Democrat’s loss of office, launched a strong 
ideological and political counter-offensive against the unions. SAF refused to conclude 
an agreement under the 1976 Co-determination Act, Medbestammandelagen (MLB), 
which in theory replaced management’s right to manage with joint negotiation 
(Whyman and Burkitt, 1993, p. 606). In contrast to the 1930s, the balance of power 
gradually shifted in the employers favour, and SAF later saw the dismantling of the 
corporatist system of representation as a way of further reducing union influence.
By 1976 the level of trade union membership in Sweden stood at 2,828,000, an 
increase of 62,000 over 1975 (Appendix C). This was a continuation of the 
uninterrupted growth in trade union membership since the end of the Second World 
War (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999, p. 350). In 1977 trade union membership increased 
by a further 104,000 members, or 3.6 per cent. Ironically, this increase was larger than 
in the year of the proposed critical juncture. In fact, union membership was to continue 
growing in Sweden for the following 12 years, albeit at a gradually slowing rate. 
Despite the SAP’s defeat, and an economy suffering the effects of stagflation, trade 
union expansion had continued. In fact, by the end of the 1970s trade union 
membership had surpassed the 3 million mark.
In 1975 the chairman of the LO, as a member of the Executive of the Social 
Democratic Party, met with the Prime Minister on 26 occasions within the Executive, or 
once every two weeks. It should be noted that the Executive is a party organ, and not a 
forum for meetings between the government and the LO. Outside the Executive the LO 
met with the Prime Minister once a month.20 Consequently, the LO leadership met with 
the Social Democratic Prime Minister on average 38 times in the years leading up to
20 Correspondence: Anders Kjellberg to the author, 2003.
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1976 (Appendix A). In that year, with the change of government taking place in early 
October, the LO met with the SAP Prime Minister Palme 27 times.21 Between 1976 and 
1980 the various non-socialist governments that held office continued to consult with 
the unions on economic policy, but to a lesser extent than previously. However, after 
1980 the non-socialist government further narrowed its scope of consultation with the 
unions. Exact figures for these years have proven impossible to acquire. Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that a non-socialist Prime Minister has never met with the LO 
leadership exclusively.22 This highlights, to an extent, the changed level of access that 
the LO had to the Prime Minister after 1976.
From the early 1900s onwards, organised interests had been given extensive 
opportunities to influence the public administration in Sweden (Rothstein, 1992, p. 46). 
Representatives of the major interest organisations were incorporated into the system to 
such a great extent that they were made full members of the executive boards of 
government agencies. Swedish ministries are rather small, and function not as 
implementation agencies but as policy organisations. Therefore, commissions 
appointed by the government, to a large extent, undertook the preparation of proposals. 
It was a tradition, an informal rule, that the most influential interest organisations were 
invited to commissions that prepare propositions within their area of interests. The task 
of implementing government policy was given to semi-independent directorates of 
which there were about 170 that had their own boards and directors-general (Rothstein, 
1988, p. 236). It was found that with the change of government in 1976 the LO’s 
representation on government committees and commissions was essentially unaffected. 




After its defeat in the election the SAP became more conservative. Its focus 
shifted to improving Swedish economic performance. Labour market legislation was 
given much less attention than in the past. Liberal members of the SAP argued for 
greater consideration of market forces, relief from government regulations, and a 
smaller public sector (Lundberg, 1985, p. 24). The SAP was intent on broadening its 
base of support by showing the voters that it could provide the solutions to the country’s 
economic problems. It also recognised that there had been a political shift to the right, 
so that traditional policies like taxing of ‘excess’ profits had less support. However, 
Newsweek pointed out that although the fear of higher taxation, and of too much 
bureaucracy, might have played a role in the 1976 election, it was not a decisive role.
The labour unions’ representatives within the Social Democratic Party were, on 
the whole, less moderate than they had been in earlier years. This was partially 
demonstrated by the trade unions’ wish to embarrass the ruling non-socialist parties 
(Olsen, 1984). The policies advocated by the LO, wage-earner funds and the Co­
determination Act, had moved it much further to the left of the SAP. This led to open 
disagreement between the LO and SAP, each publicly criticising the other through the 
medium of the newspapers (Peterson, 1987, p. 41).
There was a change in the trade unions’ relationship with the SAP. Since the 
mid-1940s the most influential source of ideas for the Swedish left had rested with LO’s 
research department, and its two leading theorists, Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. 
This department came to form a unique site for thinking about long-term strategy. 
However, after its electoral defeat in 1976 the SAP formed its own research unit. This 
was staffed by personnel who had previously worked in government ministries. These 
intellectuals typically came from an academic background in economics, and were
23 Newsweek, 18 October, 1976, p. 72.
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united by an aversion to the Meidner wage-eamer plan. Their patron was Kjell-Olof 
Feldt, the SAP’s economic spokesman while in opposition, who became finance 
minister in 1982.
Throughout the first half of the 1970s the LO had seen its campaign for 
industrial democracy succeeded in the face of SAF opposition. Although the expansion 
of public sector and white collar unions had resulted in the erosion of the privileged 
position of the LO-SAF axis in the system of centralised wage negotiations, with the 
SAP in power the LO’s requests went answered. However, it was the long-lasting 
implications of the oil crisis of 1973 that were to impact upon the LO. The era of rapid 
economic expansion was at an end, and many LO unions had suffered in the resulting 
stagflation. The building economic difficulties resulted in the SAP’s historic defeat, its 
reappraisal of its position within the Swedish political spectrum, and the subsequent 
diminished influence of the LO over it.
No change of system occurred after the election of 1976. ‘When the non­
socialists came to power they said they would run the social democracy better than the 
Social Democrats had,’ observed Sten Westerberg.24 Falldin assured Swedes that he 
had no intention of repealing any of their social benefits, and promised to even try and 
better them. Yet, he also interpreted the election as a mandate to break the 
concentration of power vested within the state, and to halt the experimentation with new 
social programmes that the socialists had found so tempting. His objective was to 
reduce the level of power possessed by the state’s heavy-handed bureaucracy.
The new administration, eager to prove that they would not wreck the welfare 
state, took measures to ease the structural problems that Swedish industry faced. 
However, in the period 1975-1978 profit rates declined and GDP contracted (O’Connor
24 Financial Times, 13 November, 1991, p. 2.
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et al., 1978, p. 3). The new government nationalised certain companies while pouring 
selective subsidies into other firms in difficulty. The support of employment especially 
in iron ore, steel, and shipbuilding meant preservation of inappropriate structures of 
production. Unemployment was concealed by means of expanding public works, 
training programmes, and an enlargement of the public sector (Statistisk Arsbok, 1982- 
83). ‘The results were predictable, the budget and external current account went deep 
into deficit, and inflation rose’ (Delsen and van Veen, 1992, p. 94).
Dagens Nyheter argues that until the massive expansion of the public sector, 
Sweden had experienced decades of consistent economic growth.25 The problem was 
that the public sector took up spare labour in times of recession, but did not shed it 
when the economy picked up. The result was a swollen public sector with an insatiable 
appetite for resources.26 Dagens Nyheter points out that as a consequence productivity 
in the private sector declined.27
After two years spent trying to find a solution to Sweden’s nuclear power issues 
the Falldin government resigned. It was replaced by a Liberal minority government, 
with its leader Ola Ullsten as prime minister. This government endured for just under a 
year. The 1979 general election saw the SAP win 154 seats. When added to those of
the VPK, the combined total for the left came to 174 seats. The non-socialist parties,
28taking 49 per cent of the vote, won the election by a majority of just one seat. A new 
tripartite non-socialist cabinet was formed, with Thorbjorn Falldin returning as prime 
minister.
Although the parties of the right had together formed governments it was clear 
that none of them was in a position to challenge the SAP as the single largest party in
25 Dagens Nyheter, 27 January, 1991, p. 7.
26 Dagens Nyheter, 28 January, 1991, p. 5.
27 Dagens Nyheter, 3 January, 1992, p. 4.
28 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolities/.
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the Riksdag. On many issues the non-socialist parties remained divided (Peterson, 
1987, p. 33). Consequently, the coalition could not agree on a set of policies to 
counteract the deteriorating economic situation (Olsen, 1984). Not only were they 
unable to make significant reductions in public expenditure, but also their rule coincided 
with a particularly difficult time for the economy. The irony was that the right wing 
administrations nationalised and subsidised weak industries, something that the SAP 
had resisted (OECD, 1978, p. 21). Their failure to improve the economy’s performance 
led to disenchantment amongst the electorate. There was a second oil shock in 1979, a 
record current account deficit, and increased international interest rates (Mjoset, 1992, 
p. 346).
‘As economic growth slowed down and an economic crisis hit all western 
capitalist countries in the 1970s it would seem that the Swedish electorate began to have 
cold feet about the increasingly socialist direction of state policies’ (Gould, 1988, p. 29). 
Whereas, initially, the Social Democratic governments had co-operated with capital, 
during the 1970s they seemed intent on milking it. At this time the trade unions’ 
influence over economic and political life grew to the point where it was regarded by 
many as too much (Shenfield, 1980, p. 53). The fundamental cause of the SAP’s defeat 
in 1976 had been the growing popular feeling that Sweden’s government was becoming 
a Leviathan. Fear of the further concentration of power underlay opposition to the 
wage-earner funds.29 However, by the end of the 1970s the SAP had lost two elections 
in a row, the Swedish economy was experiencing problems, and labour relations were 
no longer as stable as they had been.
29 Time International, 4 October, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 14, p. 10.
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Table 7.1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1976
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High Medium Low None
Ol: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister
X
02: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees
X
03: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government
X
04: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party
X
05: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy
X
06: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour
X
07: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour
X
08: Change in the government’s economic 
policies
X
09: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike
X
010: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High Medium Low None
Ol: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows?
X
02: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis?
N/A
03: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis?
X
04: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis?
X
05: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
06: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
07: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
08: Are government pronouncements on the 




It can be seen from Table 7.1 that only two of the observable implications from 
the first hypothesis, and none from the second hypothesis, indicated a high level of 
empirical-theoretical fit. In fact none of the first or second hypotheses’ observables 
indicated a medium level of empirical-theoretical fit. With the findings for both 
hypotheses falling far below the 60 per cent threshold for high empirical-theoretical fit, 
the table confirms that there was no critical juncture in the LO’s influence over public 
policy in 1976.
In summation, in 1976 there was no significant, swift, nor enduring change in 
the LO’s influence over public policy. With the economy in downturn, but certainly not 
in crisis, Sweden elected a non-socialist government. However, instead of bringing 
momentous changes in its wake, the election result left things very much as they were 
for both the economy and the trade unions. The view that the economy was in crisis 
was not shared by the national and international media, nor was it borne out by 
economic indicators. The non-socialists’ came to power promising to reduce the size of 
the government. Despite this the unions’ representation on government committees 
remained unaffected, as did their overall membership levels. Although, the unions’ 
level of interaction with the prime minister diminished somewhat after 1976, and their 
relationship with the right moving SAP changed to their disadvantage, the unions’ 
overall level of interaction with the government, and their presence in the economy, did 
not change all that much. No vast swaths of anti-union legislation were pushed through 
the Riksdag in 1976, nor were trade unionists unceremoniously removed from the 
corridors of power as was to happen in London three years later. According to the 
observable implications criteria set out in Chapter II what change there was in the trade 
unions’ influence over public policy in 1976 did not constitute a critical juncture.
364
Figure 7.1: The Critical Juncture Grid, Sweden, 1976






Potential Critical Juncture 2: 1982 -  The SAP’s Return to Power 
Successive periods in the life of the Swedish model had been characterised by 
somewhat different relationships between capital, labour, and the state. Nevertheless, 
industrial relations in Sweden to this point constituted a coherent and distinctive model. 
During the period from the 1950s to the 1980s the Swedish bargaining system was 
highly stable (Rehn and Viklund, 1990, p. 310). In principle, if not always in practice, 
the tradable, or export sector, had produced the norm for wage increases (Flanagan et 
al., 1983). By contrast, during the 1980s the conflicts and changes that characterised 
Swedish industrial and employment relations became more extensive and fundamental. 
This led to persistent discussion on the possible demise of the Swedish model.
Now the employers not only opposed the wage-earner funds, but also came to 
reject the solidaristic wage policy as larger pay differentials were demanded. These 
tensions led to the ‘great conflict’ of 1980. The employers locked out 770,000 workers 
on 2 May that year,30 after labour unions, who had demanded an 11 per cent wage 
increase, rejected a government proposal for a 2.3 per cent wage increase.31 The unions 
responded to the lockout by calling out on strike 100,000 additional workers. One 
quarter of Sweden's work forces was affected (Bernstein, 1983). The Swedish economy
on
was at, or near, standstill for almost two weeks. In the end the LO and the SAF 
accepted a final contract offer from a government-appointed mediator. Wages increased 
by 7.3 per cent for municipal, county, and state employees, and by 6.8 per cent for 
private sector workers.33 It was as a consequence of this dispute that real GDP rose by
only half the projected rate for 1980 (OECD, 1981, p. 6). ‘The great conflict of 1980
added to the mistrust which many large companies, especially in manufacturing, felt
30 The Economist, 10 May, 1980, p. 58.
31 Business Week, 26 May, 1980, p. 100.
32 Time International, 19 May, 1980, Vol. 115, No. 20, p. 22.
33 ibid, 26 May, 1980, Vol. 115, No. 21, p. 17.
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towards the negotiating system’ (Olsson, 1991, p. 52). Further strikes involving some
100,000 private-sector employees took place in 1981.
By this time it was quite obvious that the consensual elements of the Swedish 
Model had broken down (Mjoset, 1992, p. 347). The conflict of 1980 demonstrated the 
limitations of centralisation for the employers under the prevailing power relations in 
the Swedish labour market.34 After the dispute ended there was, not surprisingly, a shift 
in favour of decentralisation within the SAF (de Geer, 1992, pp. 142-142), which the 
employers believed would minimise the risks of large labour conflicts in future 
(Elvander, 1992, p. 13).
The Social Democrats and the Economy
The recession that began in the mid-1970s proved persistent. Central government’s 
expenditures were growing at a faster pace by the end of the 1970s than they had at the 
beginning of that decade, while revenues stagnated due to slow economic growth. The 
consequential budget deficits were largely financed through borrowing from abroad. 
However, there was no political mandate for either radical budget cuts or revenue 
enhancements. The non-socialists parties in government wanted neither to raise the 
level of taxes nor be accused of trying to dismantle the social welfare state.35 The 
coalition partners devised a complex mechanism for resolving disputes that arose 
among themselves. As a consequence, the compromise bills that the government 
submitted to parliament did not kindle the enthusiasm of any of the coalition parties.
By 1982 the Swedish economy was in difficulty, with the media, national 
commentators, domestic and international organisations, and the central bank, all 
pointing this out. With a sluggish national economy, stagnant revenues, and rapidly
34 The Economist, 17 May, p. 12.
35 Time International, 20 September, 1982, Vol. 120, No. 38, p. 32.
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rising expenditure, the government’s budget deficits had accelerated during the late 
1970s, so that by 1982 they had reached a substantial 13 per cent of GNP (Siven, 1984, 
p. 17). The Riksbank predicted that ‘the deficit on the national budget, which the non- 
Socialist Government had struggled to contain over the pervious two years, would grow 
from around SKr78 billion under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 billion in 1983- 
1984.’36 ‘In an international context, both the level of the budget deficit, and the swing 
in the budget balance since the mid-1970s has been more pronounced than in most other 
OECD countries’ (OECD, 1982, p. 16). By 1982 Sweden’s ratio of debt of GNP stood 
at 59.3 per cent. An indication of just how substantial the budget deficits were can be 
ascertained from the fact that the debt to GNP ratio had stood at 50.8 per cent just 12 
months before. In all, the Swedish debt to GNP ratio had grown by over 250 per cent in 
the space of just six years. The Economist observed that inflation was running at 8.6 per 
cent, although significantly down on 198l ’s inflation rate of 12.1 per cent, this figure 
was still very high for Sweden.37 Unemployment, having hovered at between 1.5 and 2 
per cent throughout the 1970s, had reach 3.1 per cent in 1982, its highest level since 
1945. Although this would have been a miniscule figure anywhere else, it was a 
political scandal in a country accustomed to full employment.38 For Swedes this was an 
unprecedented situation.
However, some economists believed that the [unemployment] figure 
would have been closer to 16 per cent if it included the jobless who are in 
training programmes and public work projects, workers who have been
36 Financial Times, 9 December 1982, p. 32.
37 The Economist, 28 August, 1982, p. 41.
38 The New York Times, 20 September, p. 3,
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forced into early retirement, and Swedes who have given up looking for 
work.39
Yet, apart from unemployment, and the debt to GNP ratio, none of the other indicators 
set out in Appendix D were at decade-long lows.
Economic growth, which had averaged 2.5 per cent throughout the fluctuation 
economic conditions of the 1970s, stood at a mere 1 per cent in 1982, after in fact 
contracting the previous year. Although only 2,000 days were lost to industrial disputes 
in 1982, 209,000 had been lost in 1981, while 4,478,000 days were lost in 1980 
(Appendix D). Nevertheless, in the context of the international recession of the early 
1980s, the large budget deficit prevented the government from pursuing a counter­
cyclical fiscal policy. Consequently, Sweden had to accept the impact of recession from 
abroad.
The Washington Post pointed out that at this time the Swedish economy faced 
serious economic challenges.40 ‘The country, like most in Europe, now suffers from 
low growth, falling industrial output and an unfavourable trade balance’ observed the 
New York Times ^ The paper went on to argue that the Swedish economy, once the 
envy of Europe, had been hobbled by its foreign debt, a low rate of investment, an 
adverse balance of payments, and its level of unemployment.42 The Financial Times 
pointed out that Swedes were nervous about the future, and reluctant to see their welfare 
state cut back and to accept the tough remedies proposed to deal with their growing 
economic problems.43 “The welfare state is in a major crisis of legitimacy,’ observed
39 Time International, 20 September, 1982, Vol. 120, No. 38, p. 32.
40 The Washington Post, 21 September, 1982, p. A15.
41 The New York Times, 19 September, p. 17.
42 ibid., 20 September, p. 3.
43 Financial Times, 18 September, 1982, p. 15.
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Hans Vetterberg, Sweden’s leading pollster and public opinion analyst. ‘We can no 
longer afford to keep expanding it the way we were.”44
The OECD (1982, p. 49) described the situation in the Swedish economy in the 
spring of 1982 as difficult. Economic performance in the two years to mid-1982 had 
been poor, this partly influenced by the weak international environment. Furthermore, 
in spite of the adjustment policies pursued by the authorities, correction of the large 
imbalances that had built up since the early 1970s was slow, and the economy remained 
in a situation of marked disequilibrium (OECD, 1984, p. 7). Apart from maintaining a 
relatively good level of employment the government’s economic policies were not 
successful. The government’s budgetary position weakened sharply, with the growth in 
public expenditures greatly outstripping that of the overall economy (OECD, 1984, p. 
9). The OECD (1984, p. 12) further pointed out that foreign competition had made 
substantial inroads on the Swedish domestic market, as suggested by the steady rise in 
the imported share of manufactured goods used domestically.
In the spring of 1981 the government and the opposition Social Democrats 
reached agreement on ways of reducing marginal taxation. However, this agreement led 
to a dispute within the coalition that saw the Moderates resign from the government. 
Thorbjom Falldin formed a new minority Government of the two middle parties (Centre 
and Liberal), his third Cabinet in five years. Both of these parties had suffered losses in 
the general election of 1979, and between them held a total of only 102 of the 350 seats 
in the Riksdag.45 This minority government hoped that its active program to combat 
Sweden’s economic problems would generate respect for non-socialist policies. 
However, declining popularity figures plagued the new administration.46 A mounting
44 The Washington Post, 21 September, 1982, p. A15.
45 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolities/.
46 The Economist, 28 August, 1982, p. 42.
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central government budget deficit, a negative balance of payments, and rising 
unemployment figures showed that the economic crisis was a reality (Mitchell, 1993, p. 
7). Swollen social welfare expenditures only added to the crisis. The welfare state was 
becoming dysfunctional for capital (Pontusson, 1984, p. 81). In the autumn of 1981 
Sweden carried out a 10 per cent devaluation of the krona, and in the spring of 1982 the 
non-socialist government introduced a far-reaching austerity program. However, the 
opposition parties gained ground while the two governing parties noted the steady 
erosion of their popularity in the opinion polls (Hadenius, 1997, pp. 129-130).
The public sector’s share of GNP had risen rapidly under the non-socialists, so 
that by 1982 public sector expenditure constituted some 67 per cent of GNP (OECD, 
1990, p. 59). That level of spending explained in part how the number of jobs in the 
public sector could rise by 43 per cent between 1972 and 1982, coming to outnumber 
jobs in private industry after 1978 (Gress, 1988, p. 123). Worryingly, Peterson (1987, 
p. 33) points out that Sweden’s share of the world economy dropped by some 40 per 
cent during the same ten-year period. Labours’ productivity growth from about 1970 
onwards was markedly less impressive than prior to then. The sluggish aggregate 
productivity growth in Sweden after 1970 was to some extent the result of the large size 
of the public sector, and labours’ slow productivity growth (Lindbeck, 1997, p. 1312).
The 1982 general election was seen a crucial for the future of Swedish politics. 
If the Social Democrats could not regain power it would demonstrate that a definitive 
shift in voter perceptions had occurred. Sweden would move in the same direction as 
neighbouring Norway and Denmark had done earlier, with the Social Democrats 
suffering sharp losses of support. As the 1982 election approached, Sweden’s economic 
problems, unemployment, and various Cabinet crises, depriving the non-socialist 
government of any credibility, undermined its prospects (Mjoset, 1992, p. 346). The
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government was, however, able to argue that the alarmist image of non-socialist rule 
that the Social Democrats had painted47 had not been correct. No dismantling of the 
social welfare system had occurred during the non-socialists six years in power, despite 
Social Democratic criticisms of their austerity measures.
The election campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis -  rising budget 
deficits, a S10 billion debt to foreign banks (300 times what it had been a decade 
before), inflation, declining export markets, and a disturbing trend towards 
unemployment, especially amongst the young.48 During the election campaign the 
Social Democrats attacked the viability of a new non-socialist government and their 
economic policy proposals. The party presented a program on how Sweden could save 
and work its way out of the economic crisis. However, the employee investments funds 
remained a weak point that could be used by the non-socialists against the SAP. The 
Economist argued that only 7 per cent of Swedes were in favour of the funds by late 
August 1982 49 The Times pointed out that industry was desperately worried by the 
threat to its independence posed by the funds.50 Unwilling to cooperate with the 
scheme51 Swedish corporations invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in a campaign 
against the plan.52 Their objective was ‘to persuade the public that the funds would 
mean the end of the mixed economy, and would be a decisive step towards a planned, 
socialist economy.’53 Pehr Gyllenhammar of Volvo and Hans Werthen, chairman of 
Electrolux and Ericsson insisted that they would not negotiate over a scheme that 
implied the takeover of their’ companies.54 ‘Our opposition to wage-earner funds is
47 Time International, 20 September, 1976, Vol. 108, No. 12, p. 32.
48 The Washington Post, 21 September, 1982, p. A15.
49 The Economist, 28 August, 1982, p. 41.
50 The Times, 17 September, 1982, p. 4.
51 The New York Times, 21 September, 1982, p. 3.
52 ibid., 19 September 1982, p. 17.
53 Financial Times, 18 September, 1982, p. 15.
54 Financial Times, 18 September, 1982, p. 15.
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definitive,’ remarked Curt Nicolin of Asea.55 Meanwhile, the LO was pushing for the 
implementation of wage-eamer fund system, while the SAP remained evasive and 
defensive on the issue.
In the 1982 election the SAP increased its number of seats in the Riksdag by 12 
to 166. However, this was not the major success the party had been hoping for. While 
the Centre Party suffered a loss of eight seats, and saw its share of the national ballot 
fall from 18.1 to 15.5 per cent, the Liberals had a disastrous election.56 Their presence 
in the Riksdag tumbled from 38 to 21 seats as their percentage of the national vote 
collapsed from 10.6 per cent to just 5.9 per cent.57 Of the three non-socialists parties 
only the Moderates, who had withdrawn from the administration in October 1981, made 
any gains. They upped their share of the national vote by 3.3 per cent to 23.6 per cent, 
and took 86 seats, 13 more than they had held after the 1979 general election. With the 
help of the VPK, which had maintained its tally at 20 seats, the SAP formed a new 
government with Olof Palme as prime minister.58
The SAP Government, its Policies, and the Trade Unions
The Social Democrats won the 1982 election despite the wage-earner funds issue 
(Lewin, 1985b). The non-socialist coalition had not been a success -  the Swedish 
economy was in its worst state since the 1930s (Martin, 2000, p. 234). This disaster 
was to precipitate a new approach to economic management. Many of the voters who 
opposed wage-eamer funds were more concerned with the government’s failure to keep 
unemployment in check.59 The SAP won the voters’ support by exploited their growing
55 The Economist, 25 September, 1982, p. 41.
56 The Times, 21 September, 1982, p. 5.
57 The Economist, 25 September, 1982, p. 41.
58 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/
59 The New York Times, 26 September, p. 3.
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fears over rising unemployment.60 Consequently, the economic crisis facing Sweden 
precipitated the return of the SAP.
By the early 1980s roughly one third of the labour force worked for the 
government. The public sector unions perceived their interests as different from those 
of their blue-collar counterparts (Henley and Tsakalotos, 1993, p. 161). This led to the 
fragmentation of political solidarity in the union movement (Teague and Grahl, 1992, p. 
68). With the rise to prominence of public sector and white-collar unions, the 
dominance of the LO-SAF axis came to an end (Delsen and van Veen, 1992, p. 84). 
LO’s share of total union membership dropped from 81 per cent in 1950 to 64 per cent 
in 1980. The LO and SAF were no longer hegemonic (Olsson, 1991, p. 41). The total 
level of trade union membership in Sweden stood at 3,184,300 in 1982 (Appendix C). 
Overall, since 1976, the rate of increase in union membership had been slowing. Yet, 
during the six years of non-socialist governments, rising unemployment, and economic 
difficulties, the trade unions’ membership had increased by 356,300. The slow-down in 
union growth in the late 1970s was to be expected, considering the huge percentage of 
the population already in trade unions. There simply were not that many people left to 
unionise in the country. Yet, 1982-1984 saw a brief increase in the rate of union 
growth. By 1983, a year after the SAP’s return to power, and despite the first cracks 
having appeared in the country’s centralised pay agreements, trade union membership 
reached 3,235,600, an increase of 51,300, or 1.6 per cent, on 1982. After 1984 the rate 
of growth in union membership began to slow again. However, it is clear that 1982 did 
not mark a significant turning point for trade union membership figures in Sweden.
There was a change in the government’s economic policies at this time. In 
1982, as the Social Democrats returned to power, Prime Minister Palme admitted that
60 Time International, 4 October, 1982, Vol. 120, No. 14, p.23.
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there  w e re  no  re ad y  so lu t io n s  to the c o u n try ’ s e co n o m ic  p ro b le m s.61 A g a in s t  th is  
b a ckg ro und  o f  e c o n o m ic  g lo o m  the gove rnm en t im p lem en te d  its re co ve ry  p rog ram m e -  
T h e  T h ird  R o ad . T h e  p rem ise  beh in d  th is  app roach  w as  tha t renew ed  g row th  requ ired  a 
re d is t r ib u t io n  o f  n a t io n a l in com e  from  la b o u r to  cap ita l. T h is  p o l ic y ,  a m a jo r sh ift  in  
S A P  e c o n o m ic  p la n n in g , w as to have  d ire  con sequen ce  fo r  the L O  b y  the e a r ly  1990s. 
B e h in d  th is  n ew  co u rse  o f  a c tion  la y  the in f lu e n ce  o f  the S A P ’ s o w n  research  unit. T h is  
a pp roach  am oun ted  to  an attem pt by  the S A P  to  m a in ta in  so c ia l d e m o c ra cy  in  Sw eden  
w hen  gove rnm en ts  in  m os t o ther w este rn  co u n tr ie s  w e re  r o ll in g  b a ck  w hat 
a p p ro x im a t io n s  to  so c ia l d e m o cra cy  they  possessed  (M a rt in , 2000 , p. 234). T h e  m a in  
a im  o f  the T h ir d  R o a d  w as  to  dev ise  a w id e -ra n g in g  and w e ll-b a la n c e d  s ta b ilisa t io n  
p rog ram m e en co m p a ss in g  dem and  m anagem en t m easures, as w e ll as in it ia t iv e s  
d e s ig ned  to  p rom o te  s tru c tu ra l change and  ensure  an eq u ita b le  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  the burden 
o f  ad ju stm en t (O E C D ,  1984, p. 21). T h e  S A P  w as de te rm ined  to  pou r gove rnm en t 
fund s in to  jo b  c re a t in g  indu str ie s , and  even  to  in crease  taxes fo r  that purpose. T h e  party  
p la nned  to spend  $1 00  m il l io n ,  and hoped  to  a ttract an a d d it io n  $350  m il l io n  in  p r iva te  
in ve stm en t, in  o rd e r to  create  30 ,000  new  jo b s.62
T h e  L O  c h a irm a n ’ s once  fo r tn ig h t ly  m ee tin g s  w ith  the leade r o f  the S A P ,  w ith in  
the  E x e c u t iv e  o f  the S A P ,  once  m ore  becam e encoun te rs w ith  the  P r im e  M in is te r  o f  
Sw eden . O u ts id e  the E x e c u t iv e  the L O  a lso  m e t w ith  the P r im e  M in is te r  once  eve ry  
m on th . C o n se q u e n t ly , in  1982 the L O  w o u ld  h ave  m et w ith  the P r im e  M in is t e r  15 
t im e s  (A p p e n d ix  A ).63 H o w e v e r, as in  the p e r io d  p r io r  to  1976, the rate o f  m eetings 
be tw een  the  le a d e rsh ip  o f  the L O  and S A P  re tu rned  to  ro u g h ly  38 per annum  in  the
61 The N ew  York Times, 20 September, 1982, p. 3.
62 ibid., 21 September, 1982, p. 3.
63 Correspondence: Anders Kjellbergto the author, 2003,
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years a fte r 1982 .64 T h e  L O ’ s access to  the P r im e  M in is t e r  had  undergone  s ig n if ican t, 
sw ift, and  e n d u r in g  change.
W ith  the change  o f  gove rnm en t in  1982 the L O ’ s rep resen ta tion  on governm ent 
co m m itte e s  and  c o m m is s io n s  rem a ined  e s se n t ia lly  una ffe c ted , as had  happened  s ix  
yea rs p re v io u s ly  w h en  the S A P  had lo s t  pow er. N o  d ram a tic  a lte ra tion s in  the L O ’ s 
rep resen ta tion  w e re  reco rded . H o w eve r, it is  n o tew o rth y  that at th is  t im e  the L O  had 
su ch  a  n u m b e r o f  o f f ic ia ls  engaged in  g o ve rnm en t com m ittees , boards, and co u n c ils , 
that it  p u b lis h e d  a b o o k  fo r  in te rna l use l is t in g  m em be rs  w h o  had  w h a t k in d  o f  
ass ignm en t, and  w h e re  th e y  w ere  ass igned . C o u n t in g  o n ly  the n a t io n a l and pe rm anent 
au tho rit ie s , in  1982  the L O  had  1,163 rep resen ta tive s on  663 p u b lic  boards , com m ittees, 
su b -com m ittee s , and  a d v iso ry  co u n c ils .
T h e  cen tre p ie ce  o f  f in a n ce  m in is te r  K j e l l - O lo f  F e ld t ’ s stra tegy to  boost 
co rpo ra te  p ro f it  m a rg in s  w as an im m ed ia te  d e va lu a t io n  o f  the k ro n a  b y  16 pe r cent on 
the S A P ’ s re tu rn  to  pow e r. T h is  d e va lu a t io n  w a s  im p lem en te d  in  co n ju n c t io n  w ith  a 
genera l p r ic e  fre e ze  and  in creases in  sa les and co rp o ra te  taxes in  a sw eep in g  “ c r is is  
p la n”65 a im ed  at s t im u la t in g  the e co n o m y  and co rre c t in g  the fu nd am en ta l im ba lan ces 
th e re in.66 T h e  m a in  o b je c t iv e  w as to  a ch ie ve  e xp o rt- le d  and  in ve s tm en t-fed  re co ve ry  
(O E C D ,  1984, p. 21). T h e  S A P  had  id e n t if ie d  la b o u r co sts  as the k e y  to  in te rna tion a l 
co m p e tit io n . T h e  L O  a ccom m oda ted  the d e va lu a t io n  b y  d em and ing  average w age 
in c reases o f  2 .5  pe r cen t in  the en su in g  w a g e -b a rg a in in g  round . H o w e v e r, the 
d e va lu a t io n  d rew  in te rn a t io n a l o pp rob rium . “ T h e  dange r o f  a ch a in  re a c tio n  o f  beggar- 
th y -n e ig h b o u r p o l ic ie s  w ith  p o te n t ia lly  d isa s trou s con sequen ce s is  n o w  greater that at 
any  t im e  s in ce  W o r ld  W a r  II,”  sa id  E m i l  V a n  Len n ep , se cre ta ry  genera l o f  the O E C D .67
6,1 ibid.
65 Financial Times, 12 October, 1976, p. 1.
66 The Washington Post, 8 October, 1982, p. A16.
67 The New York Times, 21 November, 1982, p. 3.
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N eve rth e le ss , the d e va lu a t io n , and the in te rn a tio n a l e c o n o m ic  re co ve ry  resu lted  in  h igh  
ea rn ings and  e x c e lle n t  scope  fo r  expo rte rs to e xp and  (A h le n , 1989, p. 333). T h is  w as 
the o n ly  su b stan tia l su cce ss  o f  the S A P ’ s in com es  p o l ic y  in  the 1980s (E lva n d e r, 1990, 
p. 16).
T h e re  w as a lso  a change  in  the exten t to  w h ic h  the trade u n io n s ’ p o lic ie s  w ere  
in co rp o ra ted  in to  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p o lic ie s , th is  b e in g  h ig h lig h te d  b y  the w age-ea rner 
fund  issue. O n ce  in  o f f ic e  the S A P  tr ie d  to  reach  a c o m p ro m ise  on w age-ea rner funds 
w ith  the C en tre  and L ib e ra l P a rt ie s  -  w ith o u t any  success. T h e  n o n -so c ia lis ts  
m a in ta in ed  that the fu nd s  threatened the m a rke t e co n o m y . ‘ L e a d in g  in du s tr ia lis ts  
rega rded  the fu nd s  as a d e v ic e  to  a ch ie ve  co m p le te  b u re au c ra t ic  c o n tro l o f  in du s try  and 
p la n n in g ’ (G re ss , 1988, p. 130). E m p lo y e r  and  bu s in e ss  o rg an isa t io n s  p e rce iv ed  the 
funds, and  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  on the S A P  gove rnm en t, as a threat to free en te rp r ise.68 
A s s a rd  L in d b e c k ,  D ire c to r  o f  the Institu te  fo r  In te rn a tion a l E c o n o m ic  S tud ie s  in 
S to c k h o lm  U n iv e rs it y ,  rega rded  the w age-ea rne r fund s as “ a te r r ib ly  dangerous p la n ” 
and w as “ v io le n t ly  a ga in s t th em .”69 H e  w en t on to  say  that: “ Sw ed en  has a lw a y s  been a 
E u ro pean  ca rica tu re . I t ’ s a p la ce  w e re  ty p ic a l W e s te rn  E u ro p ean  so c ia l trends w ere 
pushed  one step fu rth e r. B u t  th is  S A P  p la n ,”  he sa id , “ w as  b a s ic a l ly  c o lle c t iv is t  in 
d e s ig n.”70 T h e  b i l l  w a s  in te rp re ted  as a m eans b y  w h ic h  the S A P  co u ld  ensure L O  
suppo rt fo r  its  p o l ic y  o f  d e va lu a t io n  and p u b lic  se cto r a u s te r ity.71 D e sp ite  th is  
o p p o s it io n , P a r lia m e n t  app roved  the im p lem en ta t io n  o f  the em p lo yee  fu n d  system  on 21 
D e cem b e r 1983 b y  a m ere  s ix  v o te s.72 T h e  f in a l sy s tem  had, how eve r, been h e a v ily  
m o d if ie d  fro m  the  o r ig in a l p roposa l d e v ise d  in  the L O  in  1976 (G o u ld , 1993, p. 167). It
68 Financial Times, 16 September, 1983, p. 16.
69 The N ew  York Times, 12 October, 1982, p. 3.
70 ib id , 13 October, 1982, p. 3.
71 ib id , 25 January, 1984, p. v.
72 Financial Times, 22 December, 1983, p. 2.
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had  tran s fo rm ed  fro m  an o v e rt ly  s o c ia lis t  p ro po sa l to  a num ber o f  too th less 
sh a re h o ld in g  fund s o f  a ra the r co n ven t io n a l typ e  (M e id n e r , 1993, p. 223). N eve rthe le ss , 
the changed  v e rs io n  o f  M e id n e r ’ s p ro po sa l m et w ith  a h o s t ile  p u b lic  reception . A f te r  
the m o d if ic a t io n s  no t e ven  the L O  co u ld  m uste r a p ro - fu n d  m a jo r ity  (L e w in , 1985a, p. 
296).
T h e  g u lf  be tw een  la b o u r ’ s re fo rm is t a m b it io n s  in  1976 and the le g is la t iv e  
ou tcom e  o f  1983 w a s  y a w n in g . N o t  o n ly  w as  the s o c ia l change  in s ig n if ic a n t, but, it w as 
bough t at h ig h  cost. T h e  in a b il i t y  o f  the S A P  to de fend  the o r ig in a l p r in c ip le s  o f  the 
M e id n e r  P la n  m ade  the w age -ea rn e r fund s a p o l it ic a l l ia b i l i t y  fo r  the labou r m ovem ent. 
A f te r  1983, w h i le  the n o n -s o c ia lis t  pa rtie s launched  thunde rou s a ttacks on w ha t they 
a rgued  w as the su rre p t it io u s  c o lle c t iv is a t io n  o f  the w age -ea rne r funds, the S A P
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strugg led  to  get vo te rs  to  fo rg e t the issue.
T h e  fate o f  the w age -ea rne r funds w as a tu rn in g  p o in t  in  p o s t-w a r Sw ed ish  
p o lit ic s . T h e  su cce ss  o f  the R e h n -M e id n e r  m o d e l had p ro v id ed  the bas is  fo r  an 
im p re s s iv e  re co rd  o f  s o c ia l re fo rm s. W h en  the f irs t  s tra in s  on  th is  su rfaced  the labou r 
m o vem en t in tro d u ce d  a se rie s  o f  re fo rm s to in crease  in d u s tr ia l d e m o c ra cy  in  the 1970s. 
T h e  w age -ea rn e r fu n d s  w ere  in tended  to  g iv e  s o c ia l d e m o c ra cy  a se cond  e co n o m ic  
stra tegy c ap ab le  o f  ad d re ss in g  the d ilem m as  le ft  b y  the f irs t. H o w e v e r, th is  so c ia lis t  
o f fe n s iv e  fa ile d . A  co m m o n  e xp lan a tio n  w as that w age -ea rn e r fund s roused  lit t le  
en thus iasm , as th e y  p ro m ise d  no  d ire c t o r im m e d ia te  b ene fits  to  the w age  earners 
them se lves .
T h e  P a lm e  gove rnm en t, in a d d it io n  to g o in g  th rough  the m o t io n s  o f  crea ting  
w age -ea rn e r fund s, a lso  resto red  w e lfa re  en tit lem en ts  cu t by  the n o n -so c ia lis t  
g o ve rnm en t ( O E C D ,  1984, p. 23). A lth o u g h  the S A P  c o u ld  c la im  to  have  in co rpo ra ted
73 ibid , 25 May, 1984, p. 18.
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e lem en ts  o f  the L O ’ s p rog ram m e, the do m in an t th ru st o f  its  p o l ic ie s  n o w  po in ted  in  a 
v e ry  d if fe re n t d ire c t io n . F e ld t  w as  de te rm ined  to g iv e  p r io r ity  to  p r iv a te  secto r g row th , 
p ro f its , and  m arke t fo rce s . A  se ries o f  s tru c tu ra l re fo rm s  w ere  in trodu ced  that c o u ld  be 
seen as o v e rtu rn in g  o r  re d e fin in g  the tra d it io n a l p r io r it ie s  o f  the S A P . U n d e r  pressure 
fo r  m o re  in d iv id u a l freedom , and  the in te rn a t io n a lis a t io n  o f  the  e co n o m y , these re fo rm s 
saw  the S A P  m o v e  in  a  n e o - lib e ra l d ire c t io n  b y  the la te  1980s.74 F is c a l p o l ic y  w as he ld  
t igh t, and the s l im m in g  o f  the p u b lic  se cto r w o u ld , it  w as  a rgued, create c ro w d in g  in 
e ffe c ts  (M jo se t , 1992, p. 349). T h e  p u b lic  se cto r au s te r ity  stra tegy, w ith  a p ro f it  
e x p lo s io n  and  w ag e  restra in t, created severe ten s io n  be tw een  the S A P  and L O .
T h e re  w a s  a change  in  the re la t io n sh ip  in  the  e c o n o m y  be tw een  the trade un ion s 
and  the e m p lo y e rs ’ p e a k  o rgan isa t io n . A t  th is  t im e  in f la t io n a ry  pressures b rought about 
the  f irs t  c ra c k s  in  th e  c o u n try ’ s h ig h ly  cen tra lised  p a y  agreem ents. T h e  p r im a ry  cause 
o f  th is  in f la t io n a ry  p ressu re , the e xp an s ion  o f  w h ite - c o lla r  and p u b lic  secto rs un ions, 
re su lted  fro m  the  e c o n o m ic  d o w n tu rn  o f  the 1970s (M a rs h a ll,  1996, p. 5). T h e  resu ltan t 
fra gm en ta t io n  o f  s o lid a r ity  in  the trade  un io n  m o vem en t u nd e rm in ed  w age  restra in t, and 
the  do m in a n ce  o f  the L O - S A F  a x is . D u e  to  in f la t io n  the E n g in e e r in g  E m p lo y e r s ’ 
F e de ra tio n , Verkstadsforeningen (V F ) ,  w ith d re w  fro m  the cen tra l L O - S A F  agreem ents 
in  1983. T h is  w a s  the  f ir s t  con cre te  step tow a rd s  d e ce n tra lis a t io n  (W a lle rs te in , 1999, p. 
672). W ith  th is  d e ve lo p m en t there cam e the g ra d u a lly  c o lla p se  o f  the cen tra l w age  
agreem ents.
74 Financial Times, 17 September, 1991, p. 3.
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Table 7.2: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1982
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 H ig h Medium L o w N o n e
Ol: C h an g e  in  th e  trade  u n io n s ’ access to  the 
p r im e  m in is te r
X
0 2 :  C h an g e  in  the  trade  u n io n  rep resen ta tion  
on g o ve rnm en t co m m itte e s
X
0 3 :  C h an g e  in  the re la t io n sh ip  in  the e co n o m y  
be tw een  the trade  un ion s , the e m p lo y e rs ’ peak 
o rg an isa t io n , and /o r the gove rnm en t
X
0 4 :  C h an g e  in  th e  trade  u n io n s ’ re la t io n sh ip  
w ith  a p o l it ic a l p a rty
X
0 5 :  C h an g e  in  the le v e l o f  trade  u n io n  
m e m be rsh ip  in  the e co n o m y
X
0 6 :  C h an g e  in  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s po lic ie s  
tow ards o rg an ised  la b o u r
X
0 7 :  C h a n g e  in  the le v e l o f  trade u n io n  p o lic ie s  
tha t w e re  in co rp o ra te d  in to  the go ve rn m e n t ’ s 
p o l ic ie s  tow a rd s  o rg an ised  la bo u r
X
0 8 :  C h an g e  in  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s e co n o m ic  
p o l ic ie s
X
0 9 :  C h an g e  in  the  trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  ove r 
p u b lic  p o l ic y  as id e n t if ie d  by  n a tio n a l 
e co n o m ic , p o l it ic a l,  and  in d u s tr ia l re la t ion s  
com m en ta to rs  a lik e
X
0 1 0 :  C h a n g e  in  m in is te r ia l a ttitudes tow ards 
the ro le  o f  trade  u n io n s  in  the p o l it y
X
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 H ig h Medium L o w N o n e
Ol: A r e  the c o u n t ry ’ s m a in  e co n o m ic  
in d ic a to rs  at d e cad e - lo n g  low s?
X
0 2 :  D o  o p in io n  p o l ls  f in d  that the p u b lic  regard  
the e c o n o m ic  state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
N / A
0 3 :  D o  the  n a t io n a l m e d ia  regard  the e co n o m ic  
state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 4 :  D o  n a t io n a l e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ic a l 
c om m en ta to rs  rega rd  the  e co n o m ic  state o f  the 
c o u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 5 :  D o e s  the  c e n tra l b a n k  regards the 
e c o n o m ic  state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 6 :  Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
0 7 :  D o  e le c ted  rep resen ta tive s  regard  the 
e c o n o m ic  state o f  th e  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 8 :  A r e  g o ve rn m e n t p ronoun cem en ts  on the 
state o f  the e c o n o m y  co n s is ten t w ith  a c r is is -  
m anagem en t app roach ?
X
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In  T a b le  7.2 o n ly  30 pe r cen t o f  the o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  o f  the firs t  
h yp o th e s is  in d ica ted  a h ig h  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l fit, w h i le  none o f  the obse rvab le  
im p lic a t io n s  o f  the se cond  h ypo th e s is  in d ica ted  a h ig h  f it . In fact, o n ly  one o f  the 
se cond  h y p o th e s is ’ s o b se rvab le s  in d ica ted  even  a m e d iu m  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l fit. A s  
the f in d in g s  fo r  bo th  h ypo theses are now he re  near the m in im u m  60  per cen t th re sho ld  
fo r  h ig h  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f it , the tab le  sh ow s c le a r ly  that the f in d in g s  ind ica te  there 
w as no  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  in  the L O ’ s in f lu en ce  ove r p u b lic  p o lic y .
In su m m a tion , in  1982 there  w as a sw ift, and e n d u r in g  change  in  the L O ’ s 
in f lu e n ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y .  W ith  the e co n o m y  in  d if f ic u lt y ,  and  d iv is io n s  w ith in  the 
n o n -s o c ia lis t  a d m in is tra t io n  p re v en t in g  the im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  coheren t co rre c t iv e  
p o lic ie s , Sw ed en  re tu rned  the S o c ia l D em o cra ts  to  p o w e r.75 A lth o u g h  the L O ’ s 
in te ra c t io n  w ith  the g o ve rn m e n t had  changed lit t le  in  c e r ta in  respects s in ce  1976, from
1982 o n w a rd s  the s o c ia lis t  g o ve rn m e n t ’ s n e o - lib e ra l ( T h ird  R o ad ) e co n o m ic  p o lic ie s , 
apart fro m  the w age -ea rn e r fund s ( in  a h ig h ly  m o d if ie d  fo rm ), em anated from  the r ig h t 
o f  the party  that w as  n o w  f in n ly  in  the ascendancy , w ith  its  o w n  research  u n it  h av in g  
been e s tab lish ed  in  the la te  1970s. A t  th is  t im e  the n a t io n a l m ed ia , com m enta to rs, 
in te rn a t io n a l o rg a n iza t io n s , and  e le c ted  rep resen ta tives a l l  v ie w e d  the e co no m y  as in  
d if f ic u lt y ,  bu t no t in  c r is is . F o r  a ll o f  them  in f la t io n  w a s  a p ro b lem  that had to  be 
con ta ined . In  th is  case, a lth oug h  the  L O ’ s le v e l o f  in te ra c t io n  w ith  the governm en t d id  
not d im in is h , the g o v e rn m e n t ’ s p o lic ie s , d ic ta ted  b y  the e co n o m y , to  an extent ceased to 
re f le c t  the u n io n s ’ va lu e s . S im u lta n eo u s ly , c ra ck s  had begun  to sh ow  in  the c o u n try ’ s 
ce n tra lise d  pay  agreem ents. T h e  changes that cam e  to  be v is ite d  upon  the Sw ed ish  
m o d e l w e re  o f  su ch  m ag n itu d e  that som e w ere  led  to  speak  its  e ffe c t iv e  dem ise  
{ K je llb e rg , 1992, p. 88). A lth o u g h  the L O ’ s access to  the  p r im e  m in is te r  increased  in
75 The New York Times, 19 September, 1982, p. 17.
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1982, the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p o lic ie s  tow a rd s  the trade un ions , a lo n g  w ith  the leve l o f  un ion  
p o l ic ie s ’ in co rp o ra ted  in to  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p o lic ie s , d id  no t change  to the L O s  
advantage . A t  a t im e  o f  m a c ro e co n o m ic  d if f ic u lt ie s ,  bu t no t c r is is , the u n io n s ’ 
in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  changed , but not s ig n if ic a n t ly .  A c c o rd in g  to the 
ob se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  in  C h a p te r  II, th is  change  in  the trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu en ce  over 
p u b lic  p o l ic y  d id  no t con st itu te  a c r it ic a l ju n ctu re .
Figure 7.2: The Critical Juncture Grid, Sweden, 1982
G e n e ra t iv e  C le a v a g e C h a n g e  (S ig n if ic a n t, S w if t ,  and E n d u rin g )





Potential Critical Juncture 3: 1991 -  The SA P’s Second Fall
T h e  S w e d is h  e c o n o m ic  re c o ve ry  o f  1985 w as to  som e  exten t caused by  fa ll in g  o il 
p r ice s , and  robu s t in te rn a t io n a l e co n o m ic  co n d it io n s . In that y e a r ’ s genera l e le c tio n  the 
S A P ,  tog e th e r w ith  the V P K ,  re ta in ed  a sm a ll m a jo r ity  in  p a r lia m e n t.76 D e sp ite  its 
v ic to r y  the S A P  re co g n ise d  there  had  been  a sh if t  to  the r ig h t  in  so c ie ty . T h is  had been 
in f lu e n ce d  b y  d e ve lo pm en ts  in  E n g lis h -s p e a k in g  co u n tr ie s  -  d e regu la tio n , tax  cuts, a 
s h r in k in g  p u b lic  secto r, and p r iv a t isa t io n . A s  a consequence , the S o c ia l D em ocra ts  
sou gh t to  b roaden  th e ir  support base. T h e  r ig h t  w in g  o f  the party , headquartered in  the 
F in a n c e  M in is t r y  unde r K j e l l - O lo f  F e ld t, a rgued fo r  g rea ter a tten tion  to  m arke t forces, 
and  a sm a lle r  p u b lic  se cto r (L u n d b e rg , 1985, p. 24). T h e  m a in  ba s tio n  o f  resistance to 
change  w as the L O .
T h e  S A P ’ s tu rn  to  the r ig h t  m ean t that the L O  w ith d re w  to  a na rrow er 
c o n ce p t io n  o f  u n io n  com pe ten ce , as w a s  happen ing  in  A m e r ic a , Ire land  and the U K  at 
the sam e tim e . U n d e r  the c ircum stan ce s , m any  un io n  leaders con s ide red  the retreat 
d e s ira b le , because  it freed  the un ion s  fro m  re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  go ve rnm en t p o lic y , and 
enab le d  them  to  concen tra te  on d e fend in g  the in te rests o f  th e ir  m em bers.
T h e  g o v e rn m e n t ’ s s tra tegy  o f  p ro f it - le d  re co ve ry  m ade it m o re  d if f ic u lt  fo r  the 
L O  and  the w h ite -c o lla r  fed e ra t ion s to e xe rc ise  w age  restra in t, e f fe c t iv e ly  p la y in g  in to 
the hands o f  e m p lo y e rs  w h o  w an ted  to  d e cen tra lise  w age  b a rg a in in g  (Pon tusson , 1994, 
p. 37). T h e  c e n tr ifu g a l fo rce s  o f  d e ce n tra lis a tio n  and w age  d r if t  in te racted  w ith  w hat 
appeared  to be ir re c o n c ila b le  u n io n  r iv a lr ie s . B y  the m id -1 9 8 0 s  s o lid a r ity  has g iven  
w a y  to  co m p e tit io n , p it t in g  p u b lic  se cto r un ion s  aga in s t p r iv a te  se cto r un ion s (m o stly  
tradab le ), b lu e  c o lla r  aga in s t w h ite  c o lla r , h ig h ly  s k i l le d  aga in s t lo w e r  s k ille d , and w e ll 
p a id  aga in s t lo w  p a id  (Sw en son , 1991, pp. 382 -383). T h is  co n tr ib u ted  to  the e ro s io n  o f
76 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/
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the  n o rm a t iv e  con sen su s that had und e rp in n ed  cen tra lise d  w age  b a rg a in in g  (Pontusson, 
1994, p. 37).
In c re a s in g ly , the s ize  o f  the p u b lic  se cto r cam e  to  be seen as a p r in c ip a l fa c to r in  
the c o u n t ry ’ s e c o n o m ic  stagnation . P u b lic  se cto r em p lo ym en t, w h ic h  had accoun ted  fo r 
abou t one f if th  o f  to ta l e m p lo ym en t in  the 1960s cam e  to  co n st itu te  o ve r 35 per cent o f  
a l l  e m p lo y m e n t in  Sw ed en  b y  the end o f  the 1980s (O ls so n , 1990, p. 124). P u b lic  
e xp en d itu re  ro se  fro m  30 pe r cen t o f  G D P  in  1960 to  o v e r  60 pe r cen t b y  the late 1980s, 
m a k in g  it the la rg e s t p u b lic  se cto r in  the w o r ld .77 T h e  a ttem pt to  s ta b ilise  these f igu res 
w a s  a fea tu re  o f  g o ve rnm en t p o l ic y  th roug hou t the 1980s (G o u ld , 1993, p. 169).
T h e  an sw e r to  w h y  the S A P  fo rg o t the le sson s o f  the R e h n -M e id n e r  m o d e l lie s  
in  the  change  in  the ba lan ce  o f  fo rce s  w ith in  the la b o u r m ovem en t. T h e  L O  w as in  a 
m u ch  w ea ke r  p o s it io n  in  re la t io n  to  the S A P  than  in  the past. In te lle c tu a l au tho rity  had 
passed  fro m  its  researchers to  the p a r ty ’ s p o l ic y  un it. T h e  de fea t o f  the w age-ea rne r 
fu n d  p la n  in  its  in it ia l  fo rm  m ean t a sharp  fa l l  in  the L O ’ s p u b lic  p restige . B e y o n d  these 
in te lle c tu a l and  p o l it ic a l se tbacks, m o reove r, the L O  w a s  lo s in g  co n tro l o ve r its ow n  
in d u s tr ia l te rr ito ry . T h e  g row th  o f  w h ite -c o lla r  un ion s , the d is in te g ra t io n  o f  cen tra l 
ag reem ents, and  the o u tb reak  o f  d is t r ib u t iv e  c o n f lic ts  be tw een  b lu e -c o lla r  un ion s  eroded 
its  a b i l it y  to  c o -o rd in a te  the w age  b a rg a in in g  p ra c tice s  o f  its  a ff il ia te s , and to  d e liv e r  
v o lu n ta ry  w ag e  restra in t.
U n d e r  these  co n d it io n s , a d e c lin e  in  L O  in f lu e n ce  o ve r  S A P  p o l ic y  cho ice s  w as 
to  be  expected . A f t e r  fa il in g  to  m o b il is e  support fo r  w age -ea rn e r funds, the L O  had no 
cohe ren t a lte rn a t iv e  to  the T h ird  R oad . T h e  L O  w en t a lo n g  w ith  it  because  one o f  its 
o b je c t iv e s  w a s  to  m a in ta in  f u l l  em p loym en t. T h e  T h ird  R o a d , in  a sense, exp ressed  the 
sta lem ate  w ith in  the  S w e d ish  la b o u r m ovem en t in  the 1980s. T h e  L O  rem a ined  ab le  to
77 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
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in s is t  on  fu l l  em p lo y m e n t as an o v e rr id in g  go a l o f  g o ve rnm en t p o lic y ,  bu t it  lost its 
a b i l it y  to  in fo rm  the  S A P ’ s app roach  to  in f la t io n , p ro d u c t iv ity , and com pe tit iveness .
T h e  E c o n o m y
She lte red  b y  the in te rn a t io n a l b o o m  that fo llo w e d  the S A P ’ s re tu rn  to  p o w e r in  1982, 
and its  d e va lu a t io n  o f  the k rona , the T h ird  R o a d  appeared  a s tu n n in g  success. F rom
1983 to  1988 the S w e d ish  e co n o m y  g re w  at an annua l rate o f  2 .7  pe r cent, the ba lance  
o f  trade d e f ic it  tu rn ed  in to  a su b stan tia l su rp lu s , and the rate o f  u n e m p lo ym en t fe ll from  
3.5 pe r cen t to  less than  2 pe r cent. B y  1988, the S o c ia l D e m o c ra ts  had e lim in a te d  the 
huge  bu dge t d e f ic it  o f  13 pe r cen t o f  G D P  they  had in h e r ite d  fro m  the n o n -so c ia lis t  
go ve rnm en t, w ith o u t cu tt in g  w e lfa re  en t it lem en ts.78 F lo u r is h in g  th is  reco rd  be fo re  the 
e le c to ra te  the S A P  w o n  easy  re -e le c t io n  in  1988.79
H o w e v e r , the L O  and  V P K ’ s v o t in g  d o w n  o f  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s c a ll fo r a 2  per 
cen t V A T  su rcha rge  to  pay  fo r  h ig h e r  hea lth  sp end in g  in  A p r i l  1989 w as an exam p le  o f  
the f a i l in g  S w e d is h  m o d e l.80 B y  the 1990s an e co n o m ic  c r is is , its  o r ig in s  in  the p o lic ie s  
o f  the T h ir d  R o ad , w a s  a f f l ic t in g  Sw eden . T h e  c o u n try ’ s a ttem pt to  m a in ta in  in du s tr ia l 
c o m p e tit iv e n e ss , f in a n ce  an  eno rm ous p u b lic  sector, and  e n jo y  f u l l  em p loym en t, a l l at 
the  sam e t im e , re su lted  in  s p ir a l l in g  in f la t io n  b y  1989. T h e  e co n o m y  had begun to 
o ve rh ea t.81 In tha t y e a r  p r ice s  rose b y  6.6 pe r cent, as aga in s t 4.5 pe r cen t in  the O E C D  
as a w h o le  (O E C D ,  1992, p. 12). F a ilu re  to  su sta in  n o n - in f la t io n a ry  g row th  resu lted  
fro m  a s lu g g ish  p ro d u c t iv ity  g row th . S uppo rt fo r  the S A P  started to  c rum b le .
T o  co pe  w ith  the e c o n o m ic  s itu a tion  the g ove rnm en t in tro du ced  a le g is la t iv e  
‘ c r is is  p a ck a g e ’ in  F e b ru a ry  1990 c a ll in g  fo r  a re tu rn  to  ce n tra lise d  ba rg a in ing , and a
78 The Washington Post, 18 September, 1988, p. A32.
79 The Times, 20 September, 1988, p. 7.
80 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
81 The Economist, 21 September, 1991, p. 33.
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d ra co n ia n  w ag e  free ze  and s tr ik e  ban o f  tw o  yea rs d u ra t io n.82 C o n s t itu t in g  the m ost far 
re a ch in g  g o ve rn m e n ta l in te rven tio n  in  the h is to ry  o f  S w e d ish  in d u s tr ia l re la tion s, and in 
d ire c t  con tra st w ith  the  b a s ic  p h ilo s o p h y  u n d e r ly in g  the S w e d ish  m o d e l, it  b rough t forth 
a w ave  o f  p ro te sts fro m  trade u n io n is ts . T h e  V P K  w ith d re w  its suppo rt and brought 
d o w n  the S A P  gove rnm en t. T h e  re su lt w a s  a m a jo r p o l it ic a l c r is is  in  the sp r in g  o f  1990. 
H o w e v e r, a fte r M o d e ra te  P a r ty  C h a irm a n  C a r l B i ld t  p ro v ed  u nab le  to  fo rm  a non ­
s o c ia lis t  go ve rnm en t, and the S A P ’ s In g va r C a r ls so n  w as re -app o in ted  p r im e  m in is te r.
T h e  e c o n o m ic  pa rtne rsh ip  be tw een  the e m p lo ye rs  and the trade un ions 
unde rw en t change. ‘ T h e  sh ift  in  the p o l it ic a l c lim a te  to  one m o re  f r ie n d ly  to the 
em p lo y e rs  en cou raged  S A F  to  w o rk  fo r  a p ro fo u n d  change  o f  s y s te m ’ (K je llb e rg , 1998, 
p. 93). F ro m  the m id -1 9 8 0 s  o nw a rd s the S A F  had  in c re a s in g ly  c a lle d  in to  question  the 
co rp o ra t is t  sys tem  (de G ee r, 1992, p. 155-157). It m oun ted  in tense  p u b lic ity  cam pa igns 
to  im p ro v e  the e le c to ra l p ro spec ts  o f  L ib e ra l and  C o n se rv a t iv e  parties. T h e  S A F ’ s ideas 
on  p r iv a t is a t io n  and  d e re gu la tio n  a lso  in f lu e n ce d  the S A P  gove rnm en t. Sw enson  and 
P o n tu sso n  (2000 , p. 83) p o in t  ou t tha t w age  b a rg a in in g  d u r in g  the 1980s, p ro ced u ra lly  
and su b s ta n t iv e ly  d if fe re n t fro m  the 1956-1983  pe rio d , had  sea -saw ed  betw een peak- 
le v e l and  in d u s try - le v e l n ego tia tion s . T h is  w as o rchestra ted  by  the governm ent; and 
there w a s  no  b a rg a in in g  be tw een  the L O  and S A F  le a d in g  up  to  the se ttlem en t proposed 
by  a g o ve rn m e n t app o in ted  c o m m iss io n . F o r  V is s e r  (1996 , p. 180) th is  ‘ w as [an] 
in d ic a t io n  that the S w ed ish  M o d e l had reached  its  e n d .’ H o w e v e r, an apparen tly  
d e c is iv e  s h if t  o c cu rre d  in  1990 w hen  the S A F  shu t d o w n  its  b a rg a in in g  and sta tistics 
un it, fo rm a lly  d e c la r in g  that it  w o u ld  n o  lo n ge r nego tia te  o v e r  w ages o r genera l w o rk in g  
c o n d it io n s  w ith  the L O  (M a rt in , 2000 , p. 258). T h e  d r iv in g  fo rc e  beh in d  th is  V F  
in sp ire d  m o v e  to  redu ced  the  in f lu e n ce  o f  hom e  m a rke t e m p lo ye rs  o ve r w age
82 ibid.
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se tt lem en ts in  the expo sed  secto rs w as the  im pac t o f  in f la t io n a ry  p ressu re  (Sw en son  and 
Pon tu sson , 2000 , p. 97). C o n seq u e n tly , the em p lo ye rs , freed  fro m  p re v io u s  constra in ts, 
cho se  to  abandon  co n sen sua l a rrangem ents v ie w e d  as d e tr im en ta l to  th e ir  needs 
(M a rs h a ll,  1996, p. 9). T h e  e ro s io n  o f  ce n tra lise d  b a rg a in in g  w as fo llo w e d  by a 
su b s tan t ia l s h if t  fro m  in f la t io n  caused b y  w age  co m p re ss io n  to  m a rke t-d r iv en  w age 
in f la t io n  (H ib b s  and L o c k in g ,  1996, pp. 134-135).
T h e  au tum n  o f  1990 saw  the b e g in n in g  o f  an unp receden ted  b an k in g  c r is is.03 
T h e  u n d e r ly in g  cause s o f  th is  w ere  fa ll in g  p r ice s  in  the rea l estate m arket, unsound 
le n d in g  p ra c tice s , and  r is k y  sp e cu la tio n  in  the w a ke  o f  f in a n c ia l m a rke t de regu la tion  
( O E C D ,  1992, p. 13). T h e  re su lt in g  c ra sh  in  v a lu e s  p la ced  the w h o le  b an k in g  system  in 
je o p a rd y  and  th rea tened  the coun try 's  f in a n c ia l in fra s tru c tu re  (M a rt in , 2000, p. 246). 
S ta te -ow ned  N o rd b a n k , the c o u n try ’ s se co n d -la rg e s t bank, sh o cked  ana lysts  w hen  it 
po s ted  a p re -ta x  lo s s  o f  S K r6.6 b i l l io n  fo r  1991, the  la rgest eve r reco rd ed  b y  a Sw ed ish  
b a n k.84
B y  1991 the S w e d ish  e co n o m y  w as  in  d if f ic u lt y ,  w ith  the m ed ia , na tiona l 
com m en ta to rs , d o m e s t ic  and  in te rn a t io n a l o rg an isa t io n s , and  the cen tra l bank, a ll 
p o in t in g  th is  out. T h e  in te rn a t io n a lisa t io n  o f  f in a n c ia l m a rke ts  u nd e rm in ed  the in te rna l 
co he ren ce  o f  the S w e d is h  e conom y , and  restric ted  the a b i l it y  o f  the gove rnm en t to 
pu rsue  e c o n o m ic  p o l ic ie s  tha t d iv e rg ed  fro m  tho se  o f  o the r c a p ita lis t  states. P o lic ie s  
that in d u s tr ia lis ts  (and  fo re ig n  cu rre n cy  dea le rs) d isa p p ro ve d  o f  w e re  in c re a s in g ly  
d i f f ic u l t  to  im p le m e n t (M a rs h a ll,  1996, p. 9). T h e  S A P ’ s ab rup t d e c is io n  to  a p p ly  fo r 
m e m b e rsh ip  o f  the  E C  (E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity )  in  1990, announced  as part o f  its 
a u s te r ity  package , w a s  a d ire c t response  to  the p ro b lem  o f  ca p ita l o u t f lo w .85 T h is  m ove,
83 Financial Times, 23 October, 1991, p. v.
84 ib id , 15 October, 1991, p. 21.
85 Christian Science Monitor, 25 October, 1991, p. 1.
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addressed p r im a r i ly  to  f in a n c ia l m arkets, w as  taken  w ith o u t  p r io r  p u b lic  debate. The  
ep isode  m a rked  a lo w  p o in t  in  the L O - S A P  re la t io n sh ip .
A b a n d o n in g  the w age  freeze  the S A P  s tru c k  a dea l w ith  the L ib e ra ls  to cut 
p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re.86 T h e  S A P  g ove rnm en t in  its  Janua ry  1991 budget p roposa l 
o f f ic ia l ly  annou n ced  a m a c ro e co n o m ic  p o l ic y  that em phas ised  p r ice  s ta b ility , as a 
re a c tio n  aga in s t the rap id  in f la t io n  o f  the 1980s. It is  co n se qu en tly  no t su rp ris in g  that 
fro m  the b e g in n in g  o f  the 1990s au s te r ity  p o l ic y  w a s  g iv e n  a h ig h e r  p r io r ity  than 
e m p lo y m e n t (A b e rg , 1994, pp. 87-88). In o rd e r to  in crease  the  c re d ib i li t y  o f  the new  
p o l ic y  stance  In g va r C a r ls so n , in  M a y  1991, announced  that the S w e d ish  k ro n a  w o u ld  
be  pegged to  the E C U  (O E C D ,  1992, p. 39). T h is  w a s  the f irs t  step in  a cam pa ign  to 
c o n tro l in f la t io n  as a p re lu d e  to  E C  m em be rsh ip . A  p o l ic y  o f  f ix e d  exchan ge  rates and 
budge t cu ts b y  the S A P  and  the subsequen t n o n -s o c ia lis t  g o ve rnm en t w as to  tran s fo rm  a 
s itu a t io n  o f  e xce ss  dem and , h ig h  in f la t io n , and an e x trem e ly  t ig h t  la b o u r  m arket, into 
the oppos ite . “ W e  h ave  m o ved  to the r ig h t  in  S w e d e n , ’ o b se rved  B jo rn  v o n  S ydo w  
fro m  the P r im e  M in is t e r ’ s o ff ic e , ‘ fo r  the s im p le  reason  that the S o c ia l D em ocra ts  co u ld  
no  lo n ge r m a tch  h ig h e r sp end in g  w ith  h ig h e r ta xe s.”87
U n e m p lo y m e n t  in c rea sed  unde r the im p a c t o f  the au s te rity  m easures, a lm ost 
d o u b lin g  fro m  1.7 pe r cen t in  1990 to 3.1 pe r cen t in  1991.88 “ O b v io u s ly  that is s t il l a 
lon g  w a y  sho rt o f  the le ve ls  y o u  h ave  on the co n tin en t o r  in  E n g la n d , bu t here in 
Sw ed en  a n y th in g  ab o ve  3 per cen t is  regarded as s k y -h ig h ,”  o bse rved  R o l f  A ls in g  
e d ito r  o f  the  n ew spape r Aftonbladet,89 T h e  fo llo w in g  ye a r  saw  an u nem p lo ym en t rate 
o f  5.3 per cent, a h is to r ic  post S econd  W o r ld  W a r  h igh . T h e re  w as  genera l f is ca l 
in s ta b ility , and  the cu rren t budget d e fic it , p u b lic  se cto r b o r ro w in g  requ irem en t, and
86 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
87 ibid.
88 Time International, 30 September 1991, Vol. 138, No. 14, p. 21.
89 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
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n a t io n a l debt, w e re  a l l r is in g  ra p id ly . S w e d e n ’ s ra tio  o f  deb t to  G N P ,  w h ic h  had fa lle n  
from  68 .7  pe r cen t in  1985 to 45 .5  pe r cen t by  1990, started to  r ise  aga in . T h e  debt to 
G N P  ra tio  w as to  a lm o s t d ou b le  to 80.6 pe r cen t b y  1994. In f la t io n  w a s  runn in g  at a 
rate o f  9 .7  pe r cent. T h e  B a n k  o f  In te rn a tion a l S e tt lem en t (B IS )  obse rved  that ‘ a lthough  
in f la t io n  had  been r is in g  s in ce  1986 in  the ten  le a d in g  in d u s tr ia lis e d  co un tr ie s  Sw eden  
had  d isp la y e d  the w o rs t  p e rfo rm ance  o f  a l l.’90 A t  the sam e t im e  e co n o m ic  g row th , 
w h ic h  from  1985 onw a rd s  had been a ve rag in g  o n ly  2.3 pe r cen t pe r annum , w e ll b e low  
the O E C D  ave rage  o f  3.5 pe r cen t (D e lse n  and van  V e en , 1992, p. 94), cam e near to a 
co m p le te  s ta n d s t il l in  1990, be fore  g o in g  in to  reve rse  in  1991, w ith  the econom y  
co n tra c t in g  b y  1.1 p e r  c e n t.91 The New York Times stated that the e co n o m y  w as 
stagnant th rough  1 9 9 1.92 T h e  Washington Post argued that the peop le  o f  Sw eden  w ere 
b e co m in g  in c re a s in g ly  tro u b le d  b y  the c o u n try ’ s s lo w  e co n o m ic  g row th , and doubts 
abou t th e ir  a b i l it y  to  m a in ta in  the e x tra o rd in a ry  standard  o f  l iv in g  to w h ic h  they  had 
be com e  a ccu s to m e d.93 The Guardian p o in ted  ou t that ‘ th is  w a s  the f irs t  t im e  the 
e co n o m y  has con tra c ted  s in ce  1942 .’ 94 T h e  Financial Times p o in te d  ou t that in  1991, 
unde r the c o m b in e d  im p a c t  o f  w ea k  fo re ig n  dem and , and  lo sses in  co s t com pe tit iveness , 
S w e d ish  e xp o rte rs  lo s t g round  in  a l l  g e o g raph ic  m a rk e ts.95 T h e  c o u n try ’ s e co no m ic  
openness d e c lin e d  fro m  68 .9  in  1983 to  54 .4 b y  1991 (A p p e n d ix  D ). P re v io u s ly , w hen  
the c o m p e tit iv e n e s s  o f  S w e d e n ’ s m an u fa c tu r in g  se cto r de terio ra ted , the k ro n a  had been 
deva lued . H o w e v e r , th is  w a s  n o w  ru le d  out. T h e  b a n k in g  c r is is , the c o u n try ’ s deepest 
re ce ss io n  s in ce  the 1930s, and  S w e d e n ’ s d e c lin in g  co m p e tit iv e n e s s  in  fo re ig n  m arkets, 
c rea ted  e n t ire ly  n ew  p ro b lem s  fo r  the governm en t. A lth o u g h  the m ac ro e co n o m ic
90 The Times, 11 June, 1991, p. 4.
91 The Economist, 7 September, 1991, p. 38.
92 The N ew  York Times, 16 September, 1991, p. 1.
93 Washington Post, 18 September, 1991, p. A 18.
94 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
95 Financial Times, 23 October, 1991, p. v.
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s itu a tio n  in  1982 had  no t been good , b y  1991 S w e d e n ’ s e c o n o m y  w as in  a fa r w o rse  
state.
Business Week p o in ted  ou t tha t b y  the au tum n  o f  1991 the S o c ia l D em ocra ts  
w e re  a lre a d y  s ta g in g  a ta c t ic a l re treat fro m  the w e lfa re  sta te.96 B y  th is  t im e , a c co rd in g  
to  The Economist, S w e d e n ’ s in d u s tr ia l ou tpu t w a s  in  f r e e fa l l.97 F o r  the Investors 
Chronicle re ce ss io n , r is in g  unem p lo ym en t, and  a so a r in g  budget d e f ic it  in d ica te  the 
em ba ttled  state o f  the e c o n o m y.98 The Herald Sun p o in te d  ou t that w h ile  Sw ed ish  
co m p an ie s  in ve s te d  o n ly  10 pe r cen t o f  th e ir  re sou rce s ab road  in  the e a r ly  1980s, th is  
f ig u re  expanded  to  75 pe r cent b y  the 1 9 9 0 s ."  T h e  reason  fo r  th is , a c co rd in g  to U l f  
Ja kob sson , c h ie f  e co n o m is t  at S ven ska  H and sbanken , w a s  that en trepreneurs faced  so 
m an y  taxes it w a s  d i f f ic u lt  to  a ch ie ve  a p o s it iv e  rate o f  re tu rn.100 S om e o f  the h ighest 
taxes in  the  w o r ld , p ro h ib it iv e  in te rest rates, and  h ig h  in f la t io n  sm othe red  the once- 
robu s t p r iv a te  secto r. C o n seq u e n tly , a c co rd in g  to  the Christian Science Monitor, 
‘ S w e d ish  in d u s try , w ith  no  in ce n t iv e  to  stay, is  n o w  s c ra m b lin g  to  set up ope ra tion s 
abroad, w he re  the  re tu rn s are h ig h e r.’101 T h e  Financial Times p o in te d  ou t that in du s tr ia l 
p ro d u c t io n  w a s  ano th e r d ism a l in d ic a to r  o f  S w e d e n ’ s e c o n o m ic  hea lth . In  1990, ou tput 
d ropped  b y  2.8 pe r cent, and it  fe l l  b y  a fu rth e r 6 p e r cen t in  1 9 9 1.102
B y  1991 m o s t e co no m is ts  w e re  agreed that S w e d e n ’ s e co n o m y  w as in  d if f ic u lty .  
“ Sw ed en  is  in  a v e ry  seve re  recess ion . T h e re  is  a c r is is  in  e ve ry  m a jo r  part o f  the p u b lic  
secto r -  hea lth , ed u ca tio n , ch ild ca re , and aged ca re ,”  sa id  A n d e rs  A s lu n d , the co u n try ’ s
96 Business Week, 20 September, 1991, p. 41.
97 The Economist, 31 August, 1991, p. 83.
98 Investors Chronicle, 11 October, 1991, p. 68.
99 Herald Sun, 14 October, 1991. p. 42.
100 The Gazette, 21 September, 1991, p. B l.
101 Christian Science Monitor, 22 October, 1991, p. 3.
102 Financial Times, 23 October, 1991, p. v.
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le a d in g  e c o n o m is t.103 C r it ic s  argue that the em pha s is  on  tra in in g  am oun ted  to  a g ian t 
s ta tis t ic s  gam e. T h e  O E C D  (1992 , p. 29 ) p o in te d  ou t that those  in  t ra in in g  p rog ram m es 
w e re  no t co un ted  as u n e m p lo yed  even  though  th e y  had  no  jo b s . “ S om e tim es  these 
p ro g ram m es ju s t  t ie  p e o p le  up  and have  the e f fe c t  o f  k e e p in g  them  aw ay  from  rea l 
jo b s ,”  o bse rved  e co n o m is t  G u n n a r  E lia s s o n .104 H o w e v e r , b y  m id  O c to b e r  1991, R ob e rt 
T a y lo r  a rgued  tha t the  e co n o m y  appeared to  h ave  reached  the bo ttom  o f  its  re ce ss io n.105
T h e  O E C D  (1990 , p. 11) p o in ted  ou t tha t d u r in g  the la te  1980s S w ed en ’ s 
e co n o m y  had  been  ove rh ea ting . E c o n o m ic  p o lic ie s  w e re  pu rsued  in  a c lim a te  o f  
m o u n tin g  in f la t io n a ry  p ressure . H o w e v e r, because  o f  the s to c k  m a rke t c rash  o f  1987 
and  the 1988 e le c t io n , m easu res to  get to  g r ip s  w ith  in f la t io n a ry  de ve lopm en ts  w e re  not 
ta ken  be fo re  1989 ( O E C D ,  1990, p. 27). S w e d is h  e xp o rt p e rfo rm an ce  w as  a lso  w eak  
( O E C D ,  1990, p. 18). Sw eden  had  the la rg e st budge t su rp lu s  in  the O E C D  area in  1989, 
bu t the la rg e st d e f ic it  b y  1993 (O E C D ,  1994, p. 9). T h e  O E C D  (1994 , p. 11) observed  
tha t ‘ the cu rre n t re ce ss io n  is u n iq u e  in  depth  w hen  m easu red  b y  trend  d e v ia t io n s  o f  
e ith e r o u tpu t o r e m p lo y m e n t. ’ T h e  O E C D  (1992 , p. 99) w a s  con ce rned  that Sw ed ish  
e c o n o m ic  d y n a m ism  h ad  su ffe red  due to  a la c k  o f  co m p e t it io n  in  the p u b lic  secto r and 
in  parts o f  the  p r iv a te  sector. T h is  had  redu ced  the  in ce n t iv e s  to  im p ro ve  business 
e f f ic ie n c y .
T h e  E le c t io n  o f  1991
P r io r  to  the  gene ra l e le c t io n  o f  1991, o p in io n  p o lls  sh o w ed  suppo rt fo r  the S A P  
d e c lin in g  to  less than  30  pe r cent, o n ly  a few  p o in ts  ahead o f  the M o d e ra te  Pa rty . A  
new  e lem e n t in  th is  ch an g in g  p o lit ic a l scene w a s  that a fte r h a v in g  con tested  n ine
103 Christian Science Monitor, 22 October, 1991, p. 3.
104 N ewsw eek, 2 December 1991, p. 64.
105 The Financial Times, 23 October, 1991, p. v.
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genera l e le c t io n s  the C h r is t ia n  D em ocra ts , Kristdemokraterna ( K D S ) ,  w ere  at last 
e l ic it in g  a fa r  be tte r response  in  the p o lls  than e ve r be fo re . A  new  p o lit ic a l party  o f  the 
r ig h t  w as a lso  s h o w in g  s trong ly . N e w  D e m o c ra c y , Ny Demokrati ( N Y D ) ,  h a v in g  
em erged  d u r in g  the au tum n  o f  1990, w as  m o re  co m m itte d  to  cu ts in  p u b lic  expend itu re , 
and  im m ig ra t io n  co n tro ls , than  any  o f  the o the r p a r t ie s.106 T h e  New York Times po in ted 
ou t that a fte r y ea rs  o f  h ig h  in f la t io n , an aem ic  e c o n o m ic  g row th , and d e c lin in g  p u b lic  
so c ia l se rv ice s , the S w e d ish  vo te rs  appeared ready  to  th ro w  ou t P r im e  M in is te r  Ingva r 
C a r ls s o n .107 A s  the  1991 e le c t io n  app roached  the fo u r  e s tab lish ed  n o n -s o c ia lis t  parties 
-  the M o d e ra te s , L ib e ra ls ,  C en tre  and the C h r is t ia n  D e m o c ra ts  -  p repared  to govern  the 
co u n try  together.
T h e  v o te r  s h if ts  in  the 1991 p a r lia m en ta ry  e le c t io n  w e re  grea ter than at any t im e  
s in ce  the e s ta b lish m en t o f  d e m o c ra cy  in  1921. B e tw e e n  them  K D S  and  N Y D  w o n  51
_ 1 OS
seats in  the Riksdag. T h e  M o d e ra te  Pa rty , in ten t on  m o d ify in g  the w e lfa re  state, 
in creased  its  rep re sen ta tion  from  66 to  80 deputies, w h ile  the o the r tw o  lon g  estab lished  
n o n -s o c ia lis t  pa rtie s , the  L ib e ra ls  and the C en tre  Pa rty , b o th  lo s t 11 seats e a ch.109 The 
S A P ,  r e c e iv in g  o n ly  38  pe r cent o f  the vo te,110 and se e in g  its  rep resen ta tion  in  the 
Riksdag f a l l  b y  22  seats to  138, had  its poo rest e le c t io n  p e rfo rm an ce  s in ce  1928 .111 T h is  
e le c t io n  w a s  v ie w e d  as a re fe rendum  on the S w ed ish  m o d e l and the go ve rn m e n t ’ s T h ird  
W a y  p o l ic ie s.112 F o l lo w in g  the announcem en t o f  the re su lt  the Financial Times
113
o bse rved  tha t ‘ S w e d is h  p o l it ic s  have  reached  the  end  o f  the S o c ia l D e m o c ra t ic  e ra .’ 
The Guardian sta ted b lu n t ly  tha t the S A P  w as de fea ted  because  ‘ th ey  have  m essed up
106 Time International, 30 September 1991, Vol. 138, No. 14, p. 21.
107 The N ew  York Times, 15 September, 1991, p. 1.
108 ibid.
109 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/
110 Time International, 30 September 1991, Vol. 138, No. 14, p. 21.
111 The Gazette, 21 September, 1991, p. B l.
112 Time International, 30 September 1991, Vol. 138, No. 14, p. 21.
113 Financial Times, 17 September, 1991, p. 3.
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the e c o n o m y.’114 A c c o rd in g  to  the Journal of Commerce the ‘ vo te rs  w e re  exp ress ing  
d is sa t is fa c t io n  w ith  the c o u n try ’ s p o o r e co n o m ic  p e rfo rm a n ce.’115 C a r l B i ld t  sum m ed 
up the re su lt as “ a m a ss ive  m andate  fo r  change  and the  w o rs t  de fea t fo r  the le ft w e have 
eve r seen in  th is  c o u n try  s in ce  u n iv e rsa l su ffra g e.”116
H o w e v e r, in  its  o v e ra ll con te x t the three m a in  n o n -s o c ia lis t  parties had a 
d is a p p o in t in g  e le c t io n . C o m b in e d , they  p o lle d  o n ly  39 .5  p e r cen t o f  the n a tio n a l vote, 
and to o k  144 seats, ju s t  s ix  m o re  than the S A P ,  bu t e ig h t le ss than  th ey  had  taken in  the 
1988 e le c t io n.117 H o w e v e r, B i ld t  w as ab le  to  fo rm  a fo u r-p a rty  c o a lit io n  governm ent 
w ith  the in c lu s io n  o f  the  K D S .  Y e t ,  th is  g o ve rnm en t d id  n o  possess a m a jo r ity  in  the 
Riksdag. B u t, n e ith e r the  L ib e ra l no r C en tre  Pa rtie s  w an ted  to co -opera te  w ith  the N Y D  
(G o u ld , 1993, p. 173).
T h e  B i ld t  A d m in is t ra t io n , its P o lic ie s ,  and  the T rad e  U n io n s
T h e  e le c t io n  o u tco m e  d id  no t a lte r the s tru c tu ra l changes o u t lin e d  in  the C o n se rv a t iv e  
and L ib e ra l P a r ty ’ s j o in t  p rog ram m e, en tit led  “ A  N e w  S ta rt fo r  S w ed en.”118 P r im e  
M in is t e r  B i ld t  sa id  tha t the Riksdag b ro a d ly  supported  the a p p lic a t io n  o f  r ig o rou s  
m easu res to  re stru c tu re  the e c o n o m y.119 “ T o  add ress the e c o n o m ic  p rob lem s the 
“ g o ve rnm en t is  d ed ica ted  to  s la sh in g  the ro le  o f  the sta te ,’ sa id  Pe te r T ron , Sw ed ish  
a n a ly s t at H o a re  G o ve tt , ‘ and w i l l  in trodu ce  toughe r la b o u r law s  to  reduce  the expense 
o f  w ha t is  c u r re n t ly  the  w o r ld ’ s h igh e s t-pa id  w o rk fo rc e.”120 A f te r  ta k in g  pow e r the 
M o d e ra te  P a r ty  d o m in a te d  c o a lit io n  p roposed  the a b o lit io n  o f  w e a lth  tax, and cu t taxes
1,4 The Guardian, 13 September, 1991, p. 5.
115 Journal o f  Commerce, 24 September, 1991, p. 1A.
116 Financial Times. 17 September, 1991, p. 3.
117 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/
118 European Report, 23 October 1991, p. 1.
119 Agence France Presse, 6 December, 1991.
120 Investors Chronicle, 11 October, 1991, p. 68.
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on in co m e  from  cap ita l. It a lso  asked  p a r lia m en t to ap p ro ve  s e ll in g  the sta te ’ s share in 
34 com pan ie s , su ch  as the T e le c o m m u n ic a t io n s  A d m in is t ra t io n  and  the State P o w e r 
B o a rd .121 A lth o u g h  the S A P  had  n eve r engaged in  w h o le sa le  n a t io n a liz a t io n , the state 
o w ned  co m p an ie s  w ith  som e 300 ,000  em p lo yee s  and  a m a rke t v a lu e  o f  a round  S K r2 5 0  
b i l l io n .122 T h is  la w ’ s p re am b le  stated that p r iva te  o w n e rsh ip  and free  co m p e tit io n  w ere 
the best fo u n d a tio n  fo r  a strong  e co n o m y  (H ad en iu s , 1997, p. 151). C a r l B i ld t ’ s 
m essage  w as that the state sh o u ld  not s tr iv e  a fte r d o in g  w ha t a free so c ie ty  can  better 
m anage. B y  la y in g  d o w n  c le a r l im ita t io n s  on h o w  fa r the re sp o n s ib ility  o f  the state 
sh o u ld  extend , he w a s  c h a lle n g in g  w ha t had  been re ce iv e d  w is d o m  s in ce  the 1930s.123 
T h e  g o ve rn m e n t ’ s o b je c t iv e  w as to  reduce  the o v e ra ll ta x  burden, and p u b lic  
e xpend itu re . In a d d it io n , events, and the governm en t, s lo w ly  un d e rm in ed  the co m p le x  
n e tw o rk  o f  S o c ia l D e m o c ra t ic  in s t itu t io n s . T h e  n ew  a d m in is tra t io n  sough t to  reduce  the 
g e n e ro s ity  o f  v a r io u s  b e n e fit  system s, and began  the ta sk  o f  a b o lis h in g  the em p loyee  
in ve s tm en t fu n d s.124 D u r in g  the sp r in g  o f  1992 p a r lia m e n t passed a law  sp e c ify in g  that 
the fund  assets w o u ld  be used to  p rom ote  research, and to  suppo rt the deve lopm en t o f  
s m a ll and m e d iu m -s iz e d  co m p a n ie s  (H aden iu s , 1997, p. 153).
O n  an in te rn a t io n a l sca le  the Sw ed ish  C o n se rv a t iv e s  are v e ry  m ild  
com p a red  w ith  R eagan  o r Tha tche r, m ore  l ik e  E n g lis h  L ib e ra ls . T h e y  
w an t som e  p r iv a t iz a t io n , and  som e ta x  cuts, bu t i t ’ s o n ly  o n  the m a rg in s  
that th e y  w i l l  ch ange  the m od e l, sa id  P ro fe s so r  S t ig  H a d e n iu s  o f
S to c k h o lm  U n iv e r s it y .125
121 European Report, 23 October 1991, p. 1.
122 The Economist, 16 November, 1991, p. 62.
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B y  1990 the  num be r o f  trade u n io n is ts  in Sw eden  stood  at 3 ,387 ,700  (A p p e n d ix  
C ). T h is  f ig u re  w as  a decrease  o f  27 ,400  fro m  1989, w hen  o v e ra ll trade un ion  
m e m b e rsh ip  had s tood  at 3 ,415 ,100 . In  fact, th is  w a s  the  f ir s t  substan tia l fa ll in 
S w ed ish  trade  u n io n  m e m b e rsh ip  s in ce  W o r ld  W a r  II. H o w e v e r , in  1991, desp ite  a ll 
that had happened in  the e co n o m y  and p o lit ic s , trade  u n io n  m em be rsh ip  a c tu a lly  
in creased  b y  37 ,200 , o r  1.1 pe r cent, on  1990. T h e  fo l lo w in g  yea r saw  Sw ed ish  trade 
u n io n s ’ m e m b e rsh ip  edge up w a rd s  b y  a fu rth e r 6 ,500 , to  peak  at an a ll t im e  h igh  o f  
3 ,431 ,400 . H o w e v e r , the ra te  o f  annua l in c rease  in  u n io n  m em be rsh ip  had fa lle n  to 
o n ly  0.2 pe r cen t b y  th is  stage. F ro m  1993 onw a rd s  o v e ra ll trade  un io n  m em be rsh ip  
began to  stagnate in  Sw eden , and w ith in  f iv e  yea rs  stood  at 3 ,293 ,300 , a d e c lin e  o f  
138 ,100  on 1992.
It is sa fe  to  assum e that d u r in g  the f irs t  e ig h t m on th s o f  1991 the rate o f  
m ee ting s be tw een  the  L O  and  the S A P  P r im e  M in is t e r  to o k  p la ce  at a com pa rab le  le ve l 
to  that p r io r  to  1976  o r a fte r 1982. T h is  be in g  the case, the L O  w o u ld  h ave  m et w ith  the 
P r im e  M in is t e r  24  t im e s  in  the p e r io d  to the end o f  A u g u s t  1991 (A p p e n d ix  A ).126 
H o w e v e r , a fte r C a r l B i ld t  cam e  to  p o w e r in  S ep tem be r th is  changed . A lth o u g h  L O  
leaders d id  m eet w ith  m in is te rs  o c c a s io n a lly  d u r in g  1992 and  1993 to  d iscu ss  e co no m ic  
p o l ic y ,  su ch  m ee ting s w e re  rare. T h e  d ia r ie s  o f  the P r im e  M in is t e r ’ s O f f ic e  re co rd  o n ly  
th ree  encoun te rs  w ith  the L O  in  the p e r io d  fro m  1991 to  1994 .127 H o w eve r, none o f  
these m ee tin g s  w o u ld  h ave  in v o lv e d  the P r im e  M in is t e r  and the le ade rsh ip  o f  the L O  
e x c lu s iv e ly .  It can  c le a r ly  be seen that a fte r 1991 the u n io n s ’ access to, and 
c o n su lta t io n  w ith , the  p r im e  m in is te r  w as fa r less frequen t and ex ten s ive  than 
here to fo re .
126 ibid.
127 Correspondance: Jenny Bjornsdotter-Alge, SAP Political Advisor, Riksdag, to the author, 2003.
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T h e re  w as  a change  in the trade u n io n s ’ rep re sen ta tion  on governm ent 
com m ittee s . R o th s te in  (1992 , p. 43) p o in te d  ou t tha t S w e d is h  in te rest o rgan isa tion s 
p a rt ic ip a te d  in  m o s t p o l it ic a l issues hand led  b y  p a r liam en t. H o w e v e r , w ha t R o th ste in  
(1988 , p. 237) c a lls  a d m in is tra t iv e  co rp o ra t ism  becam e c o n tro v e rs ia l a fter the B i ld t  
g o v e rn m e n t ’ s a c ce ss io n  to pow er. T h e  S A F  w ith d re w  fro m  m o s t co rp o ra t is t bod ie s  at 
cen tra l as w e ll as re g io n a l and  lo c a l le v e l in  1991 (P e s to ff, 1995, p. 166). T h is  gave  the 
S A F  ‘ m o re  freedom  to  pu rsue  its  a im s, p a r t ic u la r ly  s in ce  one  o f  its ta rgets w as the state 
apparatus i t s e l f  (K je llb e rg , 1998, p. 93). W ith  the departu re  o f  w ha t Ingham  (1974 , p. 
43 ) c a lls  the d r iv in g  fo rc e  beh ind  the cen tra lisa tio n  o f  in d u s tr ia l re la tion s , the Sw ed ish  
m o d e l co lla p sed . ‘ In  its p la ce  has em erged  a ch ao tic  system , som e tim es e ch o in g  the 
past m od e l, bu t o ften  m o c k in g  i t ’ (A h le n , 1989, p. 330). A s  a re su lt o f  the S A F ’ s 
in it ia t iv e , p a r liam en t adop ted  a p ro po sa l from  the n o n -s o c ia lis t  gove rnm en t to end 
co rp o ra t is t  rep resen ta tion . In  1992 un io n  rep resen ta tive s  w e re  e xp e lle d  fro m  m ost 
c o m m iss io n s , com m ittee s , and  agenc ies. C o n seq u e n tly , t r ip a r t ite  bod ie s  no longe r e x is t 
at cen tra l, re g io na l, o r  lo c a l le ve l, apart fro m  the L a b o u r  C o u r t  and the Pen s ion  
In su ran ce  F u n d s  (K je llb e rg , 1998, p. 93). T h e  fo rm a l rep re sen ta tion  o f  em p loye rs  and 
u n io n s  on  these co m m itte e s  w as  rep la ced  b y  m em be rs  o f  p a r liam en t, and in d iv id u a ls  
fro m  d if fe re n t se c t io n s  o f  so c ie ty . A lth o u g h  these in d iv id u a ls  in c lu d e  both business 
p e o p le  and un io n is ts , none w ere  nom ina ted  b y  th e ir  e m p lo y e rs ’ a sso c ia t io n s  o r trade 
u n ion s . A s  ‘ the  g ro w th  o f  co rp o ra t is t  rep resen ta tion  o c cu rre d  in  p a ra lle l w ith  the 
e xp an s io n  o f  the  w e lfa re  sta te ’ (H a g g lu n d  and D e g e rb la d , 1994, p. 235), ‘ it w as lo g ica l 
that as the f is su re s  in  the S w ed ish  m o d e l becam e m o re  appa ren t co rp o ra t ism  shou ld  go 
in to  d e c l in e ’ (K je llb e rg , 1998, p. 93).
T h e re  w a s  a  change  in  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p o l ic ie s  to w a rd s  o rg an ised  labour. The 
n o n -s o c ia lis t  g o ve rn m e n t im p le m e n t p o lic ie s  that re s tric ted  the le g a l p ro te c tion  o f
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un io n s  d u r in g  u n o f f ic ia l s tr ik e s  ( O E C D ,  1992, p. 52). W ith  a v ie w  to  streng then ing  the 
aw areness o f  the e x is ten ce  o f  w a g e -em p lo ym en t l in k s , and  the s o lid a r ity  be tw een the 
em p lo y e d  and  u n e m p lo yed , the gove rnm en t announced  tha t it  w o u ld  increase 
em p lo y e e s ’ c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  u n e m p lo ym en t in su rance , and  m ake  such  insurance 
co m p u ls o ry  ( O E C D ,  1992, p. 52). T h e  change  in  o r ie n ta t io n  re f le c te d  conce rn s that 
past p o lic ie s , e s p e c ia lly  the m a ss iv e  e xp an s io n  o f  the p u b lic  secto r, had in v o lv e d  h igh  
co sts  in  te rm s o f  lo sse s  in  e f f ic ie n c y  and  e co n o m ic  d yn am ism . Pa s t p o lic ie s  were 
th o ugh t to  ha ve  u n d e rm in ed  S w e d e n ’ s fu tu re  g row th  p ro sp e c ts  e ven  i f  they  had he lped 
d u r in g  m os t o f  the 1970s and 1980s to  h o ld  u n e m p lo y m e n t d o w n  to  lo w  le ve ls  by  
in te rn a tio n a l standards.
In the  y e a r le a d in g  up to  the 1991 genera l e le c t io n , change  to o k  p la ce  in  
e c o n o m ic  p o l ic y .  T e n s io n s  b u ild in g  in  the latter part o f  the  1980s cam e to a head in  
O c to b e r  1990  w h en  la rg e  cu rre n cy  o u t f lo w s  p rom p ted  the  Riksbank to  in crease  in terest 
rates sh a rp ly  to  de fend  the k ro n a.128 T o  resto re  co n fid en ce , and  co m b a t in f la t io n , f isca l 
p o l ic y  w a s  t ig h tened  (O E C D ,  1992, p. 11). T h is  m a rk ed  an im po rtan t change in  
m a c ro e co n o m ic  p o l ic y  fo r  a g o ve rnm en t that had p re v io u s ly  a ttached  top  p r io r ity  to the 
m a in tenance  o f  c o n tin u o u s  h ig h  e m p lo ym e n t le ve ls . A s  the e c o n o m y ’ s fu tu re  prospects 
depended  on  m a in ta in in g  a t ig h t  f is c a l and m one ta ry  p o l ic y  th is  m eant g iv in g  the 
h ig h e s t p r io r ity  to  k e e p in g  in f la t io n  at the average E u ro p e a n  le ve l, even  at the cost o f  a 
h ig h e r le v e l o f  reg is te red  open  unem p lo ym en t, so m e th in g  tha t w o u ld  not have  been 
a ccep tab le  in  the pa s t.129 T h e  g o ve rn m e n t ’ s re so lv e  w a s  em phas ised  in  the budget 
sta tem ent o f  Janua ry  1991, w h ic h  m ade  lo w  in f la t io n  the p r im e  a im  o f  e co n o m ic  p o lic y  
( O E C D ,  1992, p. 39).
128 Agence France Presse, 6 December, 1991.
129 Financial Times, 23 October, 1991, p. v.
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T h e  c o a lit io n  g ove rnm en t that to o k  o f f ic e  in  la te 1991 sough t to im p lem en t 
fu nd am en ta l change  in  the structu re  o f  the e conom y . C o n se q u e n tly , p o l ic y  becam e 
m o re  s tr in g en t u nd e r C a r l B i ld t .  A  cen tra l e lem en t o f  the n ew  e co n o m ic  p rog ram m e 
w a s  to  redu ce  taxes in  o rde r to  en cou rage  e f f ic ie n c y . T o  p re ven t ta x  redu ct io n s from  
d e s ta b ilis in g  the e co no m y , th ey  w ere  to  be m a tched  b y  redu ced  sp end in g  (O E C D , 1992, 
p. 44). In  genera l, the fo rce s  o f  co m p e tit io n  w e re  g iv en  a g rea ter ro le  in  a llo c a t in g  
re sou rce s  in  the e co n o m y  ( O E C D ,  1992, p. 40). T h e  E c o n o m is t  obse rved  that ‘ the 
g o v e rn m e n t ’ s e c o n o m ic  p o l ic y  w a s  tough , and m ade no  co n ce ss io n  fo r  the fa c t that the
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co u n try  w a s  in  a re ce s s io n .’ T h e  cen tre -r ig h t go ve rnm en t w an ted  to change Sw eden 
fro m  a so c ia l d e m o c ra cy  to  a m o re  free  m a rke t e co n o m y , and  in  th is  o b je c t ive  it 
a ch ie v e d  m o re  in  its  f ir s t  s ix  w ee k s  in  o f f ic e  than  the  p e rv io u s  n o n -so c ia lis t  
a d m in is tra t io n s  had be tw een  1976 and 1982 argued S ten  W e s te rb e rg  c h ie f  e conom is t at 
the  E n s k i ld a  F o n d k o m m is s io n  in ve s tm en t f i rm .131
P a ra d o x ic a lly ,  at th is  sam e t im e  S A F  a sso c ia t io n s  w e re  en te r in g  in to  the m ost 
c o rp o ra t is t  w age  n eg o tia t io n s  in  S w e d ish  h is to ry , le a d in g  to  the tr ip a rt ite  R ehnbe rg  
agreem ent. H o w e v e r , ‘ in  p ra c tice , the R eh n b e rg  ag reem en t c o u ld  be seen as 
e n co u ra g in g  a fo rm  o f  ‘ su p e r-d e ce n tra liz a t io n ’ s in ce  b y  a v o id in g  lo c a l nego tia tions, 
lo c a l p ay  d e te rm in a t io n  w o u ld  be a m atte r fo r  in d iv id u a l e m p lo y e r  p re ro g a t iv e ’ 
( K je llb e rg ,  1998, p. 90). In  con tra st to  the 1970s, the em p lo y e rs  se ize d  the in it ia t iv e  fo r 
change  in  the 1990s. In  con tra st to  the 1930s w h en  the  pa rt ie s  reached  the Sa lts jobaden  
A g re e m e n t in  o rd e r to  fo re s ta ll state in te rven tio n , S A F  n o w  appeared  to  p re fe r state 
re g u la t io n  (S w en so n  and  Pon tu sson , 2000 , p. 83).
130 The Economist, 16 November, 1991, p. 62.
131 Financial Times, 13 November, 1991, p. 2.
132 Investors Chronicle, 14 February, 1992, p. 3
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F ro m  the t im e  that the cen tre -r ig h t m in o r ity  g o ve rnm en t cam e to  o f f ic e  in  1991, 
it  had  p re s id ed  o ve r  a s te ad ily  w o rs e n in g  e co no m y . C o n se q u e n tly , it w as  fo rced  to 
in tro d u ce  u n p o p u la r  au s te r ity  m easures. H o w e v e r, d e va lu a t io n  w as  regarded as 
u na ccep tab le  due to  its in f la t io n a ry  consequences. N e ve rth e le s s , the k ro na  cam e under 
a tta ck  d u r in g  the E u ro p ean  m one ta ry  c r is is  o f  1992 (H ad en iu s , 1997, p. 152). T o  a vo id  
d e va lu a t io n , and resto re  bu s in e ss  co n fid en ce , the gove rnm en t reached  a dea l w ith  the 
S A P  on an e c o n o m ic  aus te rity  package . In re tu rn  fo r  th is  the S A P  re ce iv ed  guarantees 
that secu red  the o rg a n isa t io n a l strength  o f  the un ions . H o w e v e r, d u r in g  the Eu ropean  
c u rre n cy  c r is is  in  the au tum n  o f  1992 the k ro n a  cam e  under seve re  p ressure on the 
in te rn a t io n a l m o n e y  m arke ts  (O E C D ,  1994, p. 9). O n  19 N o v e m b e r  1992 the Riksbank 
announced  it  c o u ld  no  lo n ge r de fend  the f ix e d  exchan ge  rate (Pe tersson , 1994, p. 7). 
T h e  co s t to  the Riksbank had  been $28 b i l l io n .133 T h e  k ro n a  w a s  a llo w e d  floa t, and 
p ro m p t ly  san k  in  v a lu e.134 T h e  B i ld t  reg im e  tr ie d  to  p in  the b lam e  fo r  its d if f ic u lt ie s  on 
the s tew a rd sh ip  o f  the S A P .  Y e t , desp ite  the apparen t p la u s ib il it y  o f  the argum ent, it 
d id  no t c o n v in c e  the voters.
In  the 1994 e le c t io n  the S A P  w o n  161 seats and  fo rm ed  a m in o r ity  
a d m in is t ra t io n.135 It co -ope ra ted  w ith  the V P K  in it ia l ly ,  and  then  w ith  the C en tre  Party. 
T h e  a rrangem en t te m p o ra r ily  o b lite ra te d  the d iv id in g  l in e  be tw een  n o n -so c ia lis t  and 
so c ia lis ts . T h e  S A P  w as  o b lig e d  to  co n tin u e  w ith  the f is c a l au s te rity  in trodu ced  by  the 
co n se rv a t iv e  a d m in is tra t io n , a ban don in g  its  g o a l o f  fu l l  em p lo ym en t. T h is  w as to 
d iv id e  the S A P  and L O .  D u r in g  1996 the S A P  a cco rd ed  top  p r io r ity  to im p ro v in g  
cen tra l g o ve rnm en t f in an ce s , le a d in g  to  cu tb a ck s  in  so c ia l w e lfa re  and  the reby  added to 
the a lre a d y  w id e sp re ad  jo b le s sn e ss . A lth o u g h  the tw o  b ranches o f  the la bou r m ovem en t
133 The Irish Times, 23 November, 1992, p. 16.
134 Facts on File World N ew s Digest, 26 November, 1992, p. 898A1.
135 httpi/Avwyv.const,s.ns,se/swe4is.hpoXj.tics/.
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had w o rk e d  tog e th e r c lo s e ly  fo r  n e a r ly  a cen tu ry , the 1996  L O  co ng re ss  tu rned  in to  a 
d em o ns tra tio n  aga in s t the S A P ’ s p o lic ie s .  A c c o rd in g  to  L O ,  the gove rnm en t was 
b a la n c in g  its bu dg e t on  the b a ck s  o f  u n io n  m em be rs  (H ad en iu s , 1997, p. 168-169).
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Table 7.3: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1991
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 H ig h Medium L o w N o n e
Ol: C h a n g e  in  the trade  u n io n s ’ a ccess to  the 
p r im e  m in is te r
X
0 2 :  C h a n g e  in  the trade u n io n  rep resen ta tion  
on go ve rn m e n t co m m itte e s
X
0 3 :  C h a n g e  in  the re la t io n sh ip  in  the e co n o m y  
be tw een  the trade un ion s , the e m p lo y e rs ’ peak 
o rg an isa t io n , and /o r the gove rnm en t
X
0 4 :  C h a n g e  in  the  trade  u n io n s ’ re la t io n sh ip  
w ith  a p o l it ic a l p a rty
X
0 5 :  C h a n g e  in  the  le v e l o f  trade  u n io n  
m e m b e rsh ip  in  the e co n o m y
X
0 6 :  C h a n g e  in  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p o lic ie s  
tow ards o rg a n ise d  la b o u r
X
0 7  : C h a n g e  in  the le v e l o f  trade  u n io n  p o lic ie s  
tha t w e re  in co rp o ra te d  in to  the go ve rn m e n t ’ s 
p o lic ie s  tow a rd s  o rg an ised  labou r
X
0 8 :  C h a n g e  in  the g o ve rn m e n t ’ s e co n o m ic  
p o lic ie s
X
0 9 :  C h a n g e  in  the trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r 
p u b lic  p o l ic y  as id e n t if ie d  b y  n a t io n a l 
e co n o m ic , p o l it ic a l,  and  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  
com m en ta to rs  a lik e
X
0 1 0 :  C h a n g e  in  m in is te r ia l a ttitudes tow a rd s  
the ro le  o f  trade  u n io n s  in  the p o lit y
N/A
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 H ig h Medium L o w N o n e
Ol: A r e  the  c o u n t ry ’ s m a in  e co n o m ic  
in d ic a to rs  at d e ca d e - lo n g  low s?
X
0 2 :  D o  o p in io n  p o l ls  f in d  that the p u b lic  
rega rds the e c o n o m ic  state o f  the co u n try  as in  
c r is is ?
N/A
0 3 :  D o  the n a t io n a l m e d ia  rega rd  the e co n o m ic  
state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 4 :  D o  n a t io n a l e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ic a l 
com m en ta to rs  rega rd  the  e co n o m ic  state o f  the 
co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 5 :  D o e s  the  c e n tra l b a n k  regards the 
e c o n o m ic  state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
N/A
0 6 :  Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?
X
0 7 :  D o  e le c te d  rep resen ta tive s  regard  the 
e c o n o m ic  state o f  the  co u n try  as in  c r is is ?
X
0 8 :  A r e  g o ve rn m e n t p ronoun cem en ts  on  the 
state o f  the e c o n o m y  co n s is ten t w ith  a c r is is -  
m anagem en t app roa ch ?
X
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T a b le  7.3 sh ow s that 66 per cen t o f  the f irs t  h y p o th e s is ’ s o b se rvab le  im p lica t io n s  
po in te d  to  a h ig h  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l fit. H o w e v e r, in  the case o f  the second 
h ypo th es is , o n ly  50 pe r cen t o f  its id e n t if ia b le  ob se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  in d ica ted  a h igh  
le v e l o f  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l fit. A s  the m in im u m  th re sh o ld  o f  60 pe r cen t fo r  h ig h  
e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f i t  w as no t reached  b y  the o b se rvab le s  o f  the se cond  hypo thes is  
there w as no  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  1991.
In su m m a tio n , 1991 saw  a s ig n if ic a n t, sw if t  and e n d u r in g  change  in  the L O ’ s 
in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o lic y .  T h e  n a t io n a l m ed ia , com m en ta to rs , in te rna tiona l 
o rg an iza t io n s , and  e le c ted  represen ta tives, a ll v ie w e d  the e co n o m y  as in  serious 
d if f ic u lt y ,  i f  no t in  c r is is , at the t im e . T h e  le v e l o f  u n e m p lo ym en t w as h ig h  (fo r 
Sw eden), in f la t io n  w a s  v e ry  h ig h , g o ve rnm en t deb t w as  r is in g , and the e co n o m y  w as 
co n tra c tin g . T h e  S A P  g o ve rn m e n t ’ s s o lu t io n  to  these p ro b lem s, an unp receden ted 
go ve rn m e n ta l in te rv en t io n  in to  in d u s tr ia l re la t ion s , led  to  f r ic t io n  w ith  the L O .  The 
e co n o m ic  p ro b le m s  p re c ip ita te d  the u n e q u iv o ca l e n d in g  o f  n a t io n a l pay  b a rg a in in g  as it 
had  e x is ted  s in ce  the  1950s, the de feat o f  the S A P  and the e le c t io n  o f  a n o n -so c ia lis t  
go ve rnm en t, and  a n ew  app roach  to  e c o n o m ic  m anagem ent. T h e  n o n -so c ia lis t  
a d m in is tra t io n , fo cu sed  on  r ig h t in g  the e co n o m y  th rough  au s te r ity  m easures, attacked 
the  w e lfa re  state. T h e  B i ld t  a dm in is tra t io n , in  a d d it io n  to  se tt ing  abou t d ism a n t lin g  the 
w e lfa re  state, e je cted  the trade  u n io n s  fro m  the c o rr id o rs  o f  pow er. T h e  L O ’ s 
in te ra c t io n  w ith  the p r im e  m in is te r  d im in ish e d , its rep resen ta tion  on  governm ent 
com m itte e s  ceased, u n io n  g row th  s lo w e d  and  then  reversed , and  the gove rnm en t’ s 
in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  and e co n o m ic  p o lic e s  changed  to  the L O ’ s d isadvan tage . H o w eve r, 
the S A P  a d m in is tra t io n  that fo llo w e d  in  1994 con tin ued  the au s te rity  p o lic ie s  o f  the 
B i ld t  go ve rnm en t. A t  a t im e  o f  m a c ro e co n o m ic  d if f ic u lt ie s ,  bu t not c r is is , the L O ’ s 
in f lu e n ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  unde rw en t change  o f  a s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and  endu rin g
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nature. A c c o rd in g  lo  the ob se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  c r ite r ia  set ou t in  C h a p te r 11 the 
change  in the trade u n io n s ’ in f lu en ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  w a s  not a c r it ic a l jun ctu re .
figure 7.3: T he C ritical Ju n c tu re  G rid , Sweden, 1991
G e n e ra t iv e  C le a v a g e C h a n g e  (S ig n if ic a n t ,  S w ift , and E n d u r in g )
(M a c ro e c o n o m ic  C r is is )




T h is  chap te r has e xa m in e d  three in stances o f  change in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  
p o lic y .  T h e  p r im a  fa c ie  e v id en ce  fo r  each  o f  these cases co n s t itu t in g  p o s s ib le  c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  w a s  pu t fo rw a rd  in  C h ap te r III. T h ese  p o s s ib le  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  w ere 
id e n t if ie d  fo l lo w in g  an e xa m in a t io n  o f  change  in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o lic y  
in  Sw ed en  in  the  yea rs  be tw een  1945 and  2000 . In th is  in s tance  none o f  the proposed  
c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  w e re  fo u n d  to  constitu te  a c tu a l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s .
In  the  ca se  o f  1976 there w as no  s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift , n o r e n d u r in g  change in  the 
L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o lic y .  A s  a l l  th ree c r ite r ia  are cen tra l to  the con cep t o f  a 
c r it ic a l ju n c tu re , th e ir  absence in  1976 s im p ly  m ean t tha t no  change  o f  any  rea l im port 
in  the trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  o c cu rre d  in  Sw eden  in  that year. A t  the 
t im e  the e co n o m y  w a s  in  d o w n  tu rn , bu t no t an yw he re  near to  be in g  in  a c r is is  o f  any 
k in d . A s  a con sequen ce  o f  th is , the e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f it, as set ou t in  T a b le  7.1, w as 
a lm o s t ze ro  fo r  b o th  o f  the hypo theses in  1976.
S ix  y ea rs  la ter, in  1982, there a change  in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  
that w a s  bo th  s w if t  and  endu rin g . B u t  th is  change  in  in f lu e n ce  w as  not that s ig n if ican t. 
A t  tha t t im e  the  c o u n t ry ’ s e co n o m y  w as  in  d if f ic u lt y ,  bu t it w as  not in  c r is is . A s  
e c o n o m ic  c r is is  (g ene ra t ive  c le avage ), and the co n cep t o f  s ig n if ic a n t  change, are cen tra l 
to  o u r n o t io n  o f  a  c r it ic a l ju n ctu re , th e ir  absence  in  th is  case m eans that w hateve r 
change  in  fa c t o c cu rre d  w as no t a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re . A s  can  be c le a r ly  seen from  T a b le  
7 .2  there  w a s  a  v e ry  lo w  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f it  fo r  bo th  o f  the hypo theses in  1982. 
T h e  S A P ’ s re tu rn  to  p o w e r  m ean t that the L O ’ s le v e l o f  in te ra c t io n  w ith  the governm ent 
d id  no t d im in is h . H o w e v e r , w ith  th is  g o ve rn m e n t ’ s p r io r it ie s  b e in g  d ic ta ted  by  the 
e co n o m y , and  w ith  the S A P ’ s se tt ing  up o f  its  o w n  resea rch  departm en t in  the late
Conclusion
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1970s, p u b lic  p o l ic ie s  c o u ld  no  lon ge r c lo s e ly  re f le c te d  those  o f  the L O .  A t  th is  t im e  
the c o u n try ’ s ce n tra lise d  p ay  agreem ents a lso  began  to  d is in teg ra te .
O n ly  the change  in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  1991 w as in  fact 
fo und  to  co m e  c lo s e  to  c o n s t itu t in g  an ac tu a l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  a c co rd in g  to  the c r ite r ia  as 
set ou t in  C h a p te r  II. In that yea r the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  underw en t 
change  o f  a s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and e nd u r in g  nature, th is  at a t im e  w hen  the e co n o m ic  
state o f  the c o u n try  w a s  bo rd e r in g  upon  c r is is . A s  can  be seen fro m  tab le  7.3 the 
e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f it  w as h ig h  fo r  the f ir s t  h yp o th e s is  in  that year, and bo rde rlin e  
h ig h  fo r  the se co n d  hypo thes is . T h is  is  no t to  say  that the re  w a s  no t a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  in 
Sw eden  in  1991. It is  ju s t  the case that the s p e c if ic  o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  em p loyed  
here  do  not p o in t  to  it. W ith  a d iffe re n t set o f  o b se rvab le s , and access to  m ore  Sw ed ish  
s p e c if ic  in fo rm a t io n  tha t the  ba rr ie r o f  language  has to  an ex ten t preven ted , the resu lts 
in  the case  o f  1991 m ig h t  be d iffe ren t.
A s  w a s  the  case  in  the p re v io u s  chap te r that fo cu sed  upon  the U n ite d  States o f  
A m e r ic a , the issu e  o f  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  w ith  a sho rt d u ra t io n  d id  not com e  up w hen  
d e a lin g  w ith  Sw eden . T h e  cen tra l fea tu re  here  w a s  that the u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  ove r 
p u b lic  p o l ic y  d id  no t u nde rgo  any  d ram a tic  changes fro m  1945 r ig h t  th rough  u n t il 1991.
A l l  th ree  o f  the  p roposed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  e xa m in ed  here o ccu rred  in  years in 
w h ic h  gene ra l e le c t io n s  w e re  he ld . H o w eve r, none o f  the p roposed  c r it ic a l jun ctu re s  
w e re  fo und  to  be a c tu a l c r it ic a l ju n ctu re s . B u t  de sp ite  th is , it  is  the case, from  the 
e v id en ce  set ou t here, that the e co n o m ic  p ro b lem s  in  1982 and 1991 in du ced  the 
p o l it ic a l p a rt ie s  tha t cam e  to  p o w e r in  those  yea rs  to  a lte r th e ir  p o lic ie s  tow a rd s  the 
trade  un ion s . T h is  w a s  to  re su lt in  the L O ’ s s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and  end u rin g  loss o f  
in f lu e n ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  1991. H o w e v e r, it  is  n o tew o rth y  that there w ere  no 
o the r p ro po sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , no r o ther substan tia l changes in  the L O ’ s in f lu en ce
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o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y ,  in  any  o f  the o th e r yea rs  that w itn e ssed  genera l e le c t io n s  between 
1945 and 2000 , in c lu d in g  1976 w h ich  saw  the S A P  lo se  p o w e r to  the n o n -so c ia lis ts  fo r 
the f irs t  t im e  s in ce  1932.
figure 7.4: The Critical Juncture Grid for Sweden, 1945-2000






C o n c l u s i o n
T h e  quest to  im p ro v e  o u r und e rs tand in g  o f  change bo th  w ith in  and acro ss coun trie s ove r 
t im e  is the  b a ck g ro u n d  aga in st w h ic h  th is  thes is  is  set. T h e  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  app roach  
p ro v id e s  a m eans o f  lo o k in g  at the p ro cess  o f  change. W ith o u t  d is c a rd in g  the centra l 
p recep ts o f  the app roa ch  as it has de ve loped  to  th is  p o in t  the thes is  sets ou t to  im p ro ve  
upon  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  the  concept. T h e  a rgum en t here is  that the approach, as it 
had d e ve lo ped  up u n t i l now , has la cked  a ce rta in  r ig o u r. Im p ro v in g  upon  the approach 
in v o lv e d  re m o u ld in g  the  con cep t in  a w a y  that endow ed  it w ith  sp e c if ic s . C le a r ly  
de fin e d  standards w e re  deve loped  that enab led  the id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  le ve ls  o f  change, in 
o rde r to  see i f  s p e c if ic  in c id en ts  constitu ted  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , o r  not, as the case m ay 
have been. W ith  the  sy s tem isa tio n  o f  the standards it  w as easy  to see w ha t w as, and 
w ha t w as not, a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re , redu c in g  u n ce rta in ty  su rro u n d in g  the w h o le  concept. 
T h e  app roach  d e ve lo p e d  here is  a p p lic a b le  to any  research  p ro je c t that fo cuses upon  the 
issu e  o f  change. T h e  co n cep t is  o p e ra t io n a liz e d  and  m ade  fa ls if ia b le  a l l at the sam e 
t im e . T h is  had  im p ro v e d  its  u se fu ln e ss  as an in s tru m en t in  id e n t ify in g  change.
T h e  re m o u ld e d  app roach  s im p ly  stated that a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  o ccu rs  w hen  there 
is  a gene ra tive  c le a vag e , and a p e r io d  o f  change that is  s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and endu r in g  in  
nature. T h e  co n cep ts  o f  s ig n if ic a n ce , sw iftne ss, and du ra t io n  have  been endow ed  w ith  
c le a r ly  d e fin e d  va lu e s , m a k in g  the fram ew o rk  re a d ily  a p p lic a b le  to in d iv id u a l coun trie s , 
bu t a lso  acro ss  co un tr ie s , and ove r t im e . T h e  rem o u ld e d  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  app roach  w as 
tested aga in s t v a r ia t io n s  in  the  trade u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o lic y .  T h is  w as to 
see i f  the app roach  c o u ld  id e n t ify  the nature o f  the changes uncovered .
A  m o s t s im i la r  and m o s t d iffe ren t ba s is  w a s  em p lo yed  in  the state se le c tion  
p rocess . T h is  en su red  that l ik e  w as com pared  w ith  lik e , and that the co n te x t o f  ana lys is
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w ere , to  a degree  at least, a n a ly t ic a lly  equ iva len t. T h is  w as necessa ry  co n s id e r in g  that 
co u n tr ie s  w ith  d if fe re n t  p o lit ic a l,  e co n o m ic , and trade  u n io n  structu res w ere  under 
e xa m in a tio n . T h e  trade  u n io n  peak  o rg an isa t io n s  in  Ire land , B r ita in ,  the U n ite d  States 
o f  A m e r ic a , and Sw eden , in  the p e r io d  be tw een 1945 and  2000 , con st itu ted  the fo cu s  o f  
the case stud ies.
T h e  m e th o d o lo g y  w as  d raw n  up  to  be as b road  and e n co m pass in g  as p o ss ib le . A  
d is t in c t iv e  fea tu re  here  w as the em p lo ym en t o f  the a n a ly t ic  n a rra tiv e  m e thodo logy . T h is  
w as used to  b le n d  the hypo theses and ob se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  c r ite r ia  and na rra tion  in to  
the s tud y  change  in  the  trade u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o lic y .  In th is  case 
d e s c r ip t iv e  in fe ren ce  w a s  used to  understand  i f  changes in  the trade  u n io n s ’ in flu en ce  
o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  c o u ld  be c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s . T h e  s p e c if ic  to o ls  used to  go from  
ob se rved  ph enom ena  to  unob se rved  phenom ena  w ere  the  p a ir  o f  hypo theses and the ir 
e igh teen  o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s .
F ir s t ly ,  a  p re lim in a ry  and  w id e -ra n g in g  a n a ly s is  w as  condu cted  on the fou r 
co u n tr ie s  cho sen  fo r  e xam in a tio n . T h is  a n a ly s is  co ve red  the 55 years from  1945 
th roug h  to 2000 . T h is  e xa m in a t io n  sough t s ign s  o f  s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and endu rin g  
change  in  the trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  ove r p u b lic  p o lic y .  T h e  id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  the 
p o ten tia l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  in  the trade u n io n  peak  o rg a n is a t io n s ’ in f lu en ce  ove r p u b lic  
p o l ic y  in  each  o f  the  co un tr ie s  w as based upon  c irc u m s ta n t ia l ev id en ce . T h e  pu rpose  
here  w a s  to  id e n t ify  th e  p o te n t ia l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  tha t w o u ld  go  fo rw a rd  fo r  fu rther 
e xa m in a tio n  in  the  m a in  b o d y  o f  the d isse rta tion . In a ll,  fo u r  p roposed  c r it ic a l jun ctu re s  
pe r c o u n try  w e re  id e n t if ie d  in  Ire land , the U n ite d  K in g d o m , and  the U n ite d  States o f  
A m e r ic a , w h ile  th ree  p ro po sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  w e re  d is co v e re d  in  Sw eden . T h e y  w ere 
then  tested aga in s t th e  hypo theses, and th e ir  o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s , in  o rde r to
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d is c o v e r  i f  those  h ypo theses re la t in g  to  change in  the trade  un io n  peak o rg an isa t io n s ’ 
in f lu en ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  c o u ld  id e n t ify  a c tua l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s .
C h ap te r  I V  th rough  V I I  concen tra ted  in  d e ta il upon  the p roposed  c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  in  each  o f  the coun tr ie s  in  tu rn . O f  the 15 in stan ce s w he re  the trade u n io n s ’ 
in f lu en ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  w as p r im a  fa c ie  id e n t if ie d  as h a v in g  changed  to  the extent 
o f  c o n s t itu t in g  p o s s ib le  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , o n ly  seven  cases w e re  fo und  to  constitu te  
a c tua l c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  a c co rd in g  to  the c r ite r ia  la id  ou t in  C h ap te r  II. In each o f  these 
cases the trade u n io n  peak o rg a n isa t io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o v e r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  w as found  to have 
unde rgone  change  o f  a s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and en d u r in g  nature, at t im e s  w hen  the 
e co n o m ie s  in  the v a r io u s  states w e re  in  c r is is . In each o f  these  cases the e m p ir ic a l-  
th eo re tica l f it  had  to  be v e ry  h ig h  fo r  bo th  hypo theses, as a m in im u m  o f  60 per cent o f  
th e ir  o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  had to  in d ica ted  a h ig h  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f it  fo r  there to 
have  been a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re . C o n sequen tly , th is  sa t is f ie d  the hypotheses, and the ir 
o b se rvab le  im p lic a t io n s  c r ite r ia , as set ou t in  C h ap te r II.
A  num be r o f  o the r im p lic a t io n s  can be d raw n  fro m  the chapters. O f  the 15 
p roposed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  ju s t  o ve r h a l f  w e re  found  no t to  constitu te  actua l c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  at a ll.  T h e  reasons fo r  th is  v a r ie d  across the co u n tr ie s  to  an extent. In 1970, in  
Ire land , the change  in  the I C T U ’ s in f lu en ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  w a s  no t s ig n if ic a n t. In 
B r ita in ,  that sam e year, the change in  the T U C ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  w as not 
endu rin g . In the U n ite d  S tates o f  A m e r ic a  in  1960 the change  in  the A F L - C I O ’ s 
in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b l ic  p o l ic y  w as no t s ig n if ic a n t. A n d  in  Sw eden , in  1976, w ha t change 
o ccu rred  in  the  L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  w as n e ith e r s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, nor 
endu rin g . H o w e v e r, c o m m o n  to  seven o f  the e igh t “ n o n -c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s ”  w as the fact 
that the e co n o m y  w a s  fo und  no t to  be in  c r is is  at those  tim es. T h e re  w as no  generative 
c le avag e  to b e g in  w ith . N eve rth e le s s , there w as change  to  som e  exten t in  the trade
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u n io n  peak  o rg a n isa t io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  each  o f  those  years, th is  
c o in c id in g  w ith  e c o n o m ic  d if f ic u lt ie s .  In  m ost o f  these cases the em p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l 
f it , as set ou t in  the  v a r io u s  T ab le s , and  illu s tra te d  in  f ig u re  8.1, w o u ld  have  been low  
fo r  bo th  o f  the  hypo theses.
A n  e x ce p tio n  to  th is  w as  the case o f  A m e r ic a n  in  1992. In  that in stance  the 
e c o n o m y  w a s  d is co v e re d  to  be  in  c r is is , w h ile  the change  in  the A F L - C I O ’ s in f lu en ce  
o ve r  p u b lic  p o lic y ,  a lth o u g h  sw ift, and  endu rin g , w as  fo u n d  n o t to  be that s ig n if ic an t. 
A lth o u g h  a  n ew  app roach  w a s  adop ted  tow a rd s bo th  the e c o n o m y  and  o rgan ised  labou r 
b y  the  D e m o c ra t ic  a d m in is tra t io n  w hen  it cam e to  p o w e r in  1992 n o t e ve ry th ing  w en t in  
the  u n io n s ’ fa vou r. T h is  case sh ow s tha t it  is  p o s s ib le  to  have  one h a l f  o f  the rem ou lded  
v e rs io n  o f  the c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  app roach  (genera tive  c le avag e ) sa t is f ie d  w ith o u t the 
o ther. Sw ed en  in  1991 illu s tra te d  the sam e po in t, to  an extent. In that case the change 
in  the L O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  w as s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift , and  endu ring , bu t the 
e co n o m y  w as  fo u n d  n o t to  be in  c r is is  at the t im e .
Figure 8.1: The Critical Juncture Grid for Ireland, Britain, America, and Sweden, 
1945-2000
G e n e ra t iv e  C le a v a g e C h a n g e  (S ig n if ic a n t , S w if t ,  and E n d u r in g )
(M a c ro e c o n o m ic  C r is is )
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T h is  th e s is  id e n t if ie d  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  w ith  le g a c ie s  tha t lasted  a m in im u m  o f  
ju s t  f iv e  years as in  the case o f  B r ita in  in  the p e r io d  1974 -1979 , w h ile  in  the case o f  
A m e r ic a , the A F L - C I O ’ s in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  d id  no t undergo  any d ram atic  
changes in  the 35 yea rs from  the start o f  o u r e x am in a tio n  in  1945 r ig h t th rough  to 1980. 
T h e  sho rte r the  d u ra t io n  o f  a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  the grea ter is  the  l ik e lih o o d  that the 
e co n o m y  o f  the  co u n try  w as in  tu rm o il.  T h is  can  a lso  been  seen in  the case o f  Ire land, 
in  the e c o n o m ic  c r is is  r id d en  1980s, w h en  its  shortest c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  lasted  fo r  o n ly  s ix  
years fro m  1981 to  1987. T h e  fa c t that no  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re  o ccu rred  in  Sw eden  after 
1945 (a lth ou gh  there  w as  s ig n if ic a n t, sw ift, and e n d u r in g  change  in  the trade u n io n s ’ 
in f lu e n ce  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  1991), and to o k  decades to  o c cu r  in  U n ite d  States o f  
A m e r ic a  (1980 ), as opposed  to  Ire land  and B r ita in ,  and tha t the legac ie s  o f  the c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  w e re  o f  lo n g e r  d u ra t io n  in  Sw eden  and  A m e r ic a , than  in  bo th  Ire land and 
B r ita in ,  suggest at a  grea ter e co n o m ic  s ta b ility  in  the fo rm e r coun trie s .
O f  the 15 p ro po sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , and the seven  tha t w e re  a c tu a lly  fo und  to 
con s t itu te  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , s ix  o ccu rred  in  years in  w h ic h  genera l e le c tio n s  w ere  held. 
T h e  e co n o m ic  d i f f ic u lt ie s  in  those  years c o in c id e d  w ith  the p o l it ic a l pa rt ie s that cam e to 
pow er, o r  w e re  in  p ow e r, d ra s t ic a lly  a lte r in g  th e ir  p o lic e s  tow a rd s  the trade un ions. O f  
the e ig h t p ropo sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  that tu rned  ou t no t to  be c r it ic a l ju n ctu res , s ix  w ere 
in  genera l e le c t io n s  years. In a ll, o f  the 15 p roposed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  in it ia l ly  set out, 
o n ly  th ree  w e re  in  yea rs w ith o u t genera l e le c tio n s , Ire land  in  1959, and 1970, and the 
U n ite d  States o f  A m e r ic a  in  1946. O f  these, o n ly  1959 con s t itu ted  a c r it ic a l jun ctu re . 
H o w e v e r, there  w e re  n o  o the r p ropo sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  in  the trade un io n  peak 
o rg a n isa t io n s ’ in f lu e n c e  o ve r p u b lic  p o l ic y  in  an y  o f  the o the r years that w itnessed  
genera l e le c t io n s  be tw een  1945 and 2000  in  the co un tr ie s  e xam ined .
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T h is  leave s u s w ith  the c o n c lu s io n  that ju s t  under h a l f  o f  the p roposed  c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  in  the  trade un io n  peak  o rg a n isa t io n s ’ in f lu e n ce  o ve r  p u b lic  p o lic y , in  the 
co u n tr ie s  e xam in ed , w e re  id e n t if ie d  as co n s t itu t in g  ac tu a l c r it ic a l jun ctu re s . In the case 
o f  ju s t  o v e r  h a l f  o f  the  p ropo sed  c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , th e  trade  u n io n s ’ in f lu en ce  o ve r 
p u b lic  p o l ic y  w a s  id e n t if ie d  as h a v in g  changed  in  a less d ram a tic  fa sh io n  than w o u ld  
con s t itu te  a c r it ic a l ju n c tu re . H o w e v e r, these f in d in g s  are no t irre fu tab le , and it is 
p o s s ib le  tha t b y  e m p lo y in g  a d if fe re n t n um be r o f  o b se rvab le s  w ith  d if fe re n t independent 
v a r ia b le s , and  d if fe re n t hypo theses, and b y  u t il is in g  a d if fe re n t p ro x y  fo r  the generative 
c le avage , and an a lte red  th re sho ld  le ve l, one co u ld  d e r iv e  d iffe re n t resu lts. H o w  
d ra m a t ic a lly  d if fe re n t tho se  re su lt m ig h t be is  a m atte r fo r  fu rth e r research.
T h is  thes is , in  se ek in g  to  im p ro v e  upon  o u r u nd e rstand ing  o f  the con cep t o f  
c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s , has b u ilt  on  the fra m e w o rk  la id  ou t b y  C o l l ie r  and  C o l l ie r  (1991). 
T h is  rem o u ld e d  fra m e w o rk  sets ou t c le a r ly  d e fin ed  standards that enab led  the 
id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  le v e ls  o f  change, in  o rde r to  see i f  s p e c if ic  in c id en ts  constitu ted  c r it ic a l 
ju n c tu re s  o r  not. T h e  sy s tem isa tio n  o f  the standards reduced  u n ce rta in ty  su rround ing  
the w h o le  con cep t. T h e  rem o u ld ed  app roach  possesses a c la r ity  and r igou r. T h e  
app roach  d e ve lo p e d  here can  be a p p lie d  to  any  p ro je c t c o n ce rn in g  i t s e lf  w ith  the issue  o f  
change. In th is  rega rd  the rem ou lded  app roach  is  re p lic a b le , transfe rab le , and 
fa ls if ia b le .  T h e  th e s is  takes the v ie w  that the c r it ic a l ju n c tu re s  app roach , as set out here, 
p ro v id e s  a better m eans o f  lo o k in g  at the p rocess o f  change  than  d id  the ea r lie r  ve rs ion s 
o f  the app roach .
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M e e t i n g s  w i t h  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r s  a n d  P r e s i d e n t s
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IRELAND
Number of Meetings with the Taoiscacli










1959 1 3 3
1970 0 3 2
1981 5 7 2
1987 0 4 4
Sources: Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions: A nnua l Reports. Dublin: ICTU.
BRITAIN
N um ber o f M eetings w ith the P rim e M inister










1945 1 1 7
1970 25 8L ; 3C* 3
1974 11 4C ; 25L 27
1979 17 17L ; 2C 2
Source: Trades Union Congress: A nnua! Reports. London: TUC.
Source for 1979: Mitcneii, N ., 1987. '"Changing Pressure Group Politics: The Case o f  the TUC, 1976- 
1984,’ British Journal o f  P olitical Science , Vol. 17, pp. 509-517.
L = Labour 
C= Conservative
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Number of Meetings with the President










1946* 18 19 11
I960** 2 3 7
1980*** 12 28 0
1992**** 3 40 40
Source:
*Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 2003. ‘The Presidents D ay.’ A ccessed from 
http ://vv vv w . tr uman I i brarv. or g/calendar/
**The American Presidency Project, 2003. ‘Public Papers o f  the Presidents.’ A ccessed from 
http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/site/docs/index pppus.php.
***Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, 2003. ‘President’s Daily Diary.’ A ccessed from 
http://gil.usg.edu:8765/jclquery.html?qc=pdd&charset=iso-8859-l&ht=0&qp=&qt=AFL-CIO  
****D ark, Taylor E., 1999. The Unions and  the Democrats: An Enduring A lliance. London: Ithaca.
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S W E D E N
Number of Meetings with the Prime Minister










1976 38 12 12
1982 12 15 38
1991 38 24 3*
Source: Correspondence o f  Anders Kjellberg to the author, 2003.
♦ Correspondance: Jenny Bjornsdotter-Alge, SAP Political Advisor, Riksdag, to the author, 2003.
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I C T U  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o n  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  
a n d  E c o n o m i c  a n d  S o c i a l  C o m m i t t e e s
___________________________ A p p e n d i x  B ___________________________
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1. ICTU Representation on Industrial Relations and Economic and Social 




F a c to r ie s  A d v is o r y  C o u n c i l
S a fe ty  C o m m itte e s
N a t io n a l J o in t  C o m m itte e  on  the
H u m a n  S c ien ce s
H u m a n  P ro b le m s  in  Indu stry
H o u rs  o f  W o rk
T ra n sp o rt  C o m m itte e
E m p lo y e r  L a b o u r  C on fe rn ece  
F a c to r ie s  A d v is o r y  C o u n c i l 
S a fe ty  C o m m itte e s  
N a t io n a l Jo in t  C o m m itte e  on the 
H u m a n  S c ie n ce s  
H u m a n  P ro b le m s  in  Industry  
H o u rs  o f  W o r k  
T ra n sp o rt C o m m itte e  
A p p re n t ic e sh ip s  C o m m itte e  
H a rb o u r  B o a rd s
Economic 
and Social
P r ic e  A d v is o r y  C o m m itte e  
C o m m is s io n  on  In com e  T a x  
C o m p a n y  L a w  R e fo rm  C o m m itte e
N I E C
P r ic e  A d v is o r y  C o m m itte e  
C o m m is s io n  on  In com e  T a x  
C o m p a n y  L a w  R e fo rm  C om m itte e  
P r ic e  A d v is o r y  C o m m itte e  
I r ish  N a t io n a l P ro d ic t iv ity  C om m itte e  
E c o n o m ic  C o m m itte e  
C o m m itte e  on  In du s tr ia l O rg an isa t ion
Source: Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions: Annual Reports. Dublin: ICTU.
2. ICTU Representation on Industrial Relations and Economic and Social 




R e d u n d a n c y  Paym en ts  A c t  A p p e a ls  
B o a rd
C o m m it te e  o f  E n q u ir y  in to  In du str ia l 
R e la t io n s  in  E S B  
L a b o u r  P a r ty  J o in t  C o m m itte e  
F a c to r ie s  A d v is o r y  C o u n c i l  
R e d u n d a n c y  Paym en ts  A c t  B o a rd
Employer-Labour Conference 
E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe ren ce  W o rk in g  
C o m m itte e
E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe ren ce  S tee ring  
C o m m itte e
C o d e s  o f  F a ir  E m p lo y m e n t  and 
D is m is s a l P ro cedu re s  
In d u s tr ia l T ra in in g  A u th o r ity  
L a b o u r  P a r ty  Jo in t  C om m itte e  
F a c to r ie s  A d v is o r y  C o u n c i l 
R e d u n d a n cy  A p p e a ls  T r ib u n a l
Economic 
and Social
I N P C
I N S O
N I E C
M a n p o w e r  A d v is o r y  C o m m ittte e  
D e c im a l C u r re n c y  B o a rd  
N a t io n a l D e ve lo p m e n t A s s o c ia t io n  
P r ic e  A d v is o r y  B o d y  P ane l
I N P C
N IS O
IIR S
M a n p o w e r  A d v is o r y  C o m m itte e  
I D A  G ra n ts  C o m m itte e  
N a t io n a l D e ve lo p m e n t A s so c ia t io n  
N a t io n a l P r ic e s  C o m m is s io n  
Foras Forbartha
Source: Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions: Annual Reports. Dublin: ICTU,
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3. ICTU Representation on Industrial Relations and Economic and Social 




E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe re n ce  
L a b o u r  C o u r t
E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe re n ce  S tee r in g  
C o m m itte e
E m p lo y m e n t  A p p e a ls  T r ib u n a l 
E m p lo y m e n t  E q u a lity  A g e n c y
E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe ren ce  
L a b o u r  C o u r t
E m p lo y m e n t  A p p e a ls  T r ib u n a l 
E m p lo y m e n t  E q u a lity  A g e n c y
Economic 
and Social
N a t io n a l E c o n o m ic  and  S o c ia l C o u n c i l  
I r is h  P ro d u c t iv ity  C en te r 
N a t io n a l P r ic e s  C o m m is s io n  
M a n p o w e r  C o n su lta t iv e  C o m m itte e  
N a t io n a l S a v in g s  C o m m itte e  
W o r k in g  P a rty  on  T a x a tio n  
N a t io n a l U n d e rs ta n d in g  S tee r in g  
C o m m itte e
T r ip a r t ite  S tand in g  C o m m itte e  on  
E m p lo y m e n t
N a t io n a l E c o n o m ic  and S o c ia l C o u n c i l 
I r ish  P ro d u c t iv ity  Cen tre  
N a t io n a l P r ic e s  C o m m is s io n  
M a n p o w e r  C o n su lta t iv e  C om m itte e  
N a t io n a l S a v in g s  C o m m itte e  
G o v e rn m e n t- IC T U  W o rk in g  Pa rty  on 
T a x a t io n
Y o u th  E m p lo y m e n t  A g e n c y  
S e c to ra l D e ve lo p m e n t C om m itte e  
S e c to ra l C o n su lta t iv e  Com m itte e s 
R e g io n a l M a n p o w e r  C o m m itte e s  
C o m m is s io n  on T a x a t io n
Source: Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions: Annual Reports. Dublin: ICTU.
4. ICTU Representation on Industrial Relations and Economic and Social 




E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe re n ce  
L a b o u r  C o u r t
E m p lo y m e n t  E q u a lity  A g e n c y  
E m p lo y m e n t  A p p e a ls  T r ib u n a l 
A d v is o r y  C o m m itte e  on  W o rk e r  
P a r t ic ip a t io n
E m p lo y e r -L a b o u r  C o n fe ren ce  
L a b o u r  C o u r t
E m p lo y m e n t  E q u a lity  A g e n c y  
E m p lo y m e n t  A p p e a ls  T r ib u n a l
Economic and 
Social
N a tio n a l E co n o m ic  and S o c ia l C o u n c il 
I r ish  P ro d u c t iv ity  Cen tre  
Secto ra l D eve lopm en t Com m ittee  
Secto ra l C on su lta tive  Com m ittees 
S o c ia l Guarantee A d v is o ry  B o a rd  
M o n ito r in g  Com m ittee  fo r S o c ia l 
E m p lo y m e n t Schem e 
N a t io n a l Sav ings Com m ittee  
Y o u th  E m p lo ym en t A g e n cy  
N a t io n a l P r ice s  C o m m iss io n  
M a n p o w e r Consu lta tive  C om m ittee  
N a t io n a l En te rp rise  A gen cy  
G o ve rn m e n t-IC T U  W o rk in g  Party  on 
T a x a tio n
N a tio n a l E co n o m ic  and Soc ia l C o un c il 
Ir ish  P ro d u c t iv ity  Cen tre  
Secto ra l D eve lopm en t Com m ittee 
Secto ra l C on su lta tive  Com m ittees 
So c ia l Guarantee A d v iso ry  Board  
M o n ito r in g  Com m ittee  fo r Soc ia l 
E m p lo ym en t Schem e 
N a tio n a l Sav ings Com m ittee  
P rog ram m e fo r N a tio n a l R ecove ry- 
C en tra l R e v ie w  Com m ittee
Source: Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions: Annual Reports. Dublin: ICTU.
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419
Level of Trade Unions’ Membership in Ireland, 1955 -  1995
M e m b e rsh ip A n n u a l R a te  o f  
C h an g e  %
E m p lo y m e n t  
D e n s ity  %
W o rk fo rc e  
D e n s ity  %
1955 316 ,400 +1.7 45 .6 42 .7
1956 316 ,500 0.0 46 .2 43.1
1957 308 ,200 -2.5 46 .5 42.3
1958 306 ,800 -0 .4 46 .9 42 .4
1959 Critical Juncture 313,700 +2.2 47.9 43.7
1960 325 ,500 3.8 50 .2 45 .8
1961 335 ,600 +3.1 52 .4 48 .2
1962 348 ,500 +3.8 53.5 49 .4
1963 351 ,000 +0.7 53 .0 48 .9
1964 362 ,300 +3.2 53 .8 49 .9
1965 371 ,900 +2.6 54 .4 50 .7
1966 372 ,500 +0.2 53 .7 49 .9
1967 377 ,700 +1.4 54 .2 50.2
1968 389 ,800 +3.2 55.1 50.8
1969 409 ,200 +5.0 57 .0 52.9
1970 Critical Juncture 424,100 +3.6 59.1 54.2
1971 427 ,100 +0.7 59 .2 54.5
1972 433 ,900 +1.6 59.5 54.4
1973 442 ,000 +1.9 59 .2 54.5
1974 458 ,500 +3.7 59 .8 55.4
1975 466 ,700 +1.8 61.5 55.4
1976 471 ,100 +0.9 62 .6 54.9
1977 489 ,900 +4.0 63.3 55.7
1978 512 ,900 +4.7 64 .0 57.0
1979 534 ,200 +4.2 63 .9 57.8
1980 545 ,200 +2.1 63.5 57 .4
1981Critical Juncture 542,200 -0.4 62.9 54.9
1982 536 ,900 -0 .9 62 .4 53.2
1983 530 ,400 - 1.1 63.5 52.1
1984 518 ,200 -2.2 63.3 50 .7
1985 501 ,500 -3.1 62.5 48.8
1986 482 ,700 -3 .7 59 .0 46.1
1987 Critical Juncture 468,600 -2.8 57.5 44.8
1988 4 70 ,500 +0.40 57 .7 45 .4
1989 476 ,800 +1.3 58.8 47.1
1990 490 ,6 00 +2.9 58.5 48 .2
1991 500 ,000 +1.9 58 .6 47.1
1992 501 ,000 +0.2 57.3 46 .2
1993 499 ,2 00 -0.2 55.8 44 .8
1994 506 ,200 +1.4 54.3 44 .2
1995 517 ,900 +2.3 52.3 44 .4
Source: DUES Data Series on Trade Unions in Ireland (Department o f  Industrial Relations, University 
College, Dublin and University o f  Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, Germany.
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Bean, R., 1989. International Labour Statistics: A Handbook, Guide, and Recent Trends. London: 
Routledge.
Ebbinghaus, Bernard, and Jelle Visser, 1999. Development o f  Trade Unions in Western Europe, 1945- 
1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Level of Trade Unions’ Membership in Britain, 1944 -  1987
M e m b e rs h ip A n n u a l R a te  o f  
C h an g e  %
E m p lo y m e n t  
D e n s ity  %
W o rk fo rc e  
D e n s ity  %
1944 7 ,890 ,737 -1 .06
1945 Critical Juncture 7,875,000 -0.2 38.6
1946 8 ,803 ,000 +11.8 43.0
1947 9 ,145 ,000 3.9 44.5
1948 9 ,363 ,000 2.4 45 .2
1949 9 ,318 ,000 -0 .4 44.8
1950 9 ,289 ,000 -0.2 44 .8 44.1
1951 9 ,530 ,000 2.6 45 .4 45 .0
1952 9 ,588 ,000 0.6 45 .8 45.1
1953 9 ,527 ,000 -0.5 45.3 44 .6
1966 10 ,259 ,000 -0.5 44.1 43 .6
1967 10 ,194 ,000 -0.5 44 .7 43 .7
1968 10,200,000 +0.1 45 .0 44 .0
1969 10 ,479 ,100 +2.7 46.3 45.3
1970 Critical Juncture 11,187,000 +6.8 49.8 48.6
1971 11 ,135 ,000 -0 .4 50.3 48 .8
1972 11 ,359 ,000 +2.0 51.3 49 .6
1973 11 ,455 ,200 +0.8 50.5 49.3
1974 Critical Juncture 11,764,000 +2.7 51.6 50.4
1975 12 ,184 ,000 +3.6 53 .6 51.7
1976 12 ,386 ,000 +1.7 54 .9 52.0
1977 12 ,846 ,000 +3.7 56 .8 53.5
1978 13 ,112 ,000 +2.1 57.5 54.3
1979 Critical Juncture 13,289,000 +1.4 57.3 54.4
1980 12 ,947 ,000 -2.5 56.3 52.8
1981 12 ,106 ,000 -6 .4 55.3 49.8
1982 11 ,593 ,000 -4.1 54.1 47 .9
1983 11 ,236 ,000 -3 .0 53.3 46 .7
1984 10 ,994 ,000 -2.1 52 .0 45.5
1985 10 ,821 ,000 -1.5 50 .4 43 .9
1986 10 ,539 ,000 -2.5 48 .8 42.5
1987 10 ,462 ,900 -0.6 48 .2 42.5
Source: Bain, George Sayers, and Robert Price, 1980. Profiles o f  Union Growth: A Comparative 
Statistical Portrait o f  Eight Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bain, George Sayers, 1983. Industrial Relations in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marsh, Arthur, 1984. Trade Union Handbook. Aldershot: Gower.
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Ebbinghaus, Bernard, and Jelle Visser, 1999. Development o f  Trade Unions in Western Europe, 1945- 
1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Level Trade Unions’ Membership in America, 1942 -  2000
M e m b e rs h ip A n n u a l R a te  o f  
C h an g e  %
E m p lo y m e n t  
D e n s ity  %
W o rk fo rc e  
D e n s ity  %
1942 10 ,380 ,000 +1.7 23.5
1943 13 ,213 ,000 +27 30.3
1944 14 ,146 ,000 +7.06 33.2
1945 14 ,322 ,000 +1.2 34.3
1946 Critical Juncture 14,395,000 +0.5 32.1
1947 14 ,787 ,000 +2.7 31.4
1948 14 ,319 ,000 -3.1 29 .7
1949 14 ,282 ,000 -0 .25 29.3
1950 14 ,267 ,000 -0.10 28 .4
1951 15 ,946 ,000 + 11.76 31.5
1952 15 ,892 ,000 -0.33 31.1
1953 16 ,948 ,000 +6.6 32 .6
1954 17 ,022 ,000 +0.43 32 .4
1956 17 ,490 ,000 +4.09 31 .6
1957 17 ,369 ,000 -0 .69 31 .0
1958 17 ,029 ,000 -1.95 29 .9
1959 17 ,117 ,000 +0.51 29 .7
1960 Critical Juncture 17,049,000 -0.4 28.9
1961 16 ,303 ,000 -4.3 27.2
1962 16 ,586 ,000 +1.73 27 .4
1963 16 ,524 ,000 -0 .37 26 .6
1964 16 ,841 ,000 +1.9 26 .6
1965 17 ,299 ,000 +2.71 26 .7
1966 17 ,940 ,000 +3.7 27 .0
1967 18 ,367 ,000 +2.38 26 .6
1968 20 ,721 ,000 +12.81 29.3
1976 22 ,153 ,000 -0 .24 24 .7
1977 21 ,632 ,000 +2.35 23.5
1978 21 ,75 7 ,000 +0.57 22 .7
1979 22 ,02 5 ,000 +1.23 22.3
1980 Critical Juncture 20,968,000 -4.8 20.8
1981 20 ,64 7 ,000 -1.5 20.2
1982 19 ,571 ,000 -5 .2 19.0
1983 18 ,643 ,000 -4 .7 18.0
1984 18 ,306 ,000 - 1.8 17.3
1985 16,996,101 -7.1 18.0
1986 16 ,975 ,180 -0.12 17.5
1987 16 ,913 ,064 -0 .36 17.0
422
1988 17,001,665 +0.52 16.8
1989 16 ,960 ,452 -0 .24 16.4
1990 16 ,739 ,812 -1.3 16.1
1991 16,568,433 - 1.02 16.1
1992 Critical Juncture 16,390,000 -1.07 15.8
1993 16 ,598 ,000 +1.26 15.8
1994 16 ,748 ,000 +0.90 15.5
1995 16 ,360 ,000 -2.3 14.9
1996 16 ,269 ,000 -0.55 14.5
1997 16 ,110 ,000 -0 .97 14.1
1998 16 ,211 ,000 +0.62 13.9
1999 16 ,477 ,000 +1.64 13.92000 16 ,258 ,000 -1.33 13.5
Source: Bain, George Sayers, and Robert Price, 1980. Profiles o f  Union Growth: A Comparative 
Statistical Portrait o f  Eight Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bean, R., 1989. International Labour Statistics: A Handbook, Guide, and Recent Trends. London: 
Routledge.
Ebbinghaus, Bernard, and Jelle Visser, 1999. Development o f  Trade Unions in Western Europe, 1945- 
1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Level of Trade Unions’ Membership in Sweden, 1972 -  1999
M e m b e rs h ip A n n u a l R a te  o f  
C h an g e  %
E m p lo y m e n t  
D e n s ity  %
W o rk fo rc e  
D e n s ity  %
1972 2 ,492 ,400 +2.6 69.2
1973 2 ,551 ,100 +2.4 70.5
1974 2 ,653 ,900 +4.0 71.9
1975 2 ,766 ,000 +4.2 73.2
1976 Critical Juncture 2,828,000 +2.2 74.1
1977 2 ,932 ,000 +3.6 76.3
1978 2 ,996 ,800 +2.2 77.3
1979 3 ,048 ,800 +1.7 77.6
1980 3 ,114 ,300 +2.1 78.2
1981 3 ,144 ,000 +1.0 78.6
1982 Critical Juncture 3,184,300 +1.3 79.3
1983 3 ,235 ,600 +1.6 80.0
1984 3 ,298 ,300 +1.9 81.1
1985 3 ,349 ,800 +1.6 81.5
1986 3 ,393 ,100 +1.3 82.6
1987 3 ,413 ,400 +0.6 84.8
1988 3 ,416 ,100 +0.1 83.8
1989 3 ,415 ,100 0.0 82.9
1990 3 ,387 ,700 -0 .7 82.4
1991 Critical Juncture 3,424,900 +1.1 83.5
1992 3 ,431 ,400 +0.2 85.5
1993 3 ,411 ,900 -0.5 87.7
1994 3 ,392 ,700 -0.5 88.6
423
1995 3 ,390 ,200 0.0 87.5
1996 3 ,355 ,200 -0 .9 86.6
1997 3 ,317 ,000 - 1.0 86.4
1998 3 ,293 ,300 -0.6
*
Source: Bain, George Sayers, and Robert Price, 1980. Profiles o f  Union Growth: A Comparative 
Statistical Portrait o f  Bight Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bean, R.. 1989. International Labour Statistics: A Handbook, Guide, and Recent Trends. London: 
Rouiledge.
Ebbinghaus, Bernard, and Jelle Visser, 1999. Development o f  Trade Unions in Western Europe. 1945- 
1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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Ireland’s Main Economic Indicators, 1945 -  2000
Y e a r Unemployment Inflation Government Debt 
to GNP ratio








1945 10.6 -1.2 244
1946 10.6 -1.19 150
1947 9.3 10.2 33.8 449
1948 9.4 -1.09 4.75 258
1949 9.0 1.2 4.1 273
1950 7.5 0.0 1.9 217 70 .93345
1951 7.3 11.25 49.9 1.9 545 82 .55222
1952 9.1 10.1 2.26 529 69 .63176
1953 9.6 2.04 2.5 82 66 .85665
1954 8.1 2.0 0.9 67 65 .45109
1955 6.8 1.9 1.9 236 67 .17816
1956 7.7 4.4 -1.45 48 60 .98576
1957 9.2 2.57 0.98 92 62 .7357
1958 8.6 2 . 6 -2.2 126 62 .86433
1959 8.0 -0.85 55.5 4.1 124 62 .73207
1960 6.7 0 . 8 6 57.5 5.0 80 64 .68637
1961 5.0 2.8 57.8 3.2 377 69 .80739
1962 4.8 4.3 58.3 3.1 104 66 .89395
1963 5.0 2.5 58.93 4.7 234 69 .97402
1964 4.7 6.7 55.2 3.8 545 70 .08703
1965 4.6 5.0 58.7 1.9 556 74 .32474
1966 4.7 3.0 59.7 0.7 784 75 .72556
1967 5.0 4.8 58.3 4.8 183 74 .11819
1968 5.0 5.0 59.2 8.1 406 79 .36693
1969 5.0 7.4 55.9 4.7 936 79 .29319
1970 5.8 8.2 54.5 3.3 1008 77 .47553
1971 5.5 9.0 53.8 4.3 274 75 .15673
1972 6.2 8 . 6 50.0 6.4 207 70.39311
1973 5.7 11.4 47.97 4.4 207 78 .31638
1974 5.4 17.0 55.39 4.2 552 94 .37706
1975 7.3 20.9 58.05 2.0 296 86 .44022
1976 9.0 18.0 62.5 2.1 777 94.96721
1977 8.8 13.6 61.4 6.9 442 102.0045
1978 8.1 7.6 63.5 6.7 613 103.7894
1979 7.1 13.2 70.65 2.4 1465 109.601
1980 7.3 18.2 71.91 1.9 412 106.4831
1981 9.9 20.4 77.45 1.1 434 105.0999
1982 11.4 17.1 86.53 -0.7 434 97 .81183
1983 13.6 10.5 97.60 - 1 . 6 319 101.7349
1984 15.4 8 . 6 106.28 2.3 386 112.7388
1985 16.7 5.4 108.60 0 . 8 418 112.172
1986 17.1 3.8 123.26 -1.1 309 101.1026
1987 17.7 3.1 124.07 4.6 264 104.8707
426
1988 16.4 2 . 1 117.35 4.4 143 109.5299
1989 15.1 4.1 106.84 7.0 26 117.0717
1990 13.0 3.3 99.98 8.4 208 109.3312
1991 14.7 3.2 94.5 2 . 6 17 110.7998
1992 15.3 3.1 95.37 4.6 1 1 114.0337
1993 15.8 1.4 95.40 3.7 61 121.382
1994 14.7 2.4 90.98 7.3 25 131.6719
1995 12.2 2.5 83.38 10.7 130 141.2347
1996 11.9 1.7 74.01 7.4 114 143.4561
1997 10.3 1.5 65.73 9.8 74 146.9532
1998 5.8 3.75 53.19 8.61 37 161.8042
1999 4.7 1.5 42.46 10.85 215 163.56742000 3.7 34.36 11.46 97 175.5566
Sources: Leddin, Anthony J., and Brendan M. Walsh, 1998. The Macroeconomy of Ireland. (4th ed.) 
Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
Mitchell, B. R., 1993. International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-1988. (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: 
Stockton Press.
Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
Britain’s Main Economic Indicators, 1935 -  2000
Y e a r Unemployment Inflation Government Debt 
to GNP ratio








1935 11.0 1.16 168 3.7 1,955
1936 9.4 3.4 162 3.04 1,829
1937 7.8 4.4 150 4.33 3,413
1938 9.3 1.06 147 3.12 1,334
1939 5.8 1.05 141 4.11 1,356
1940 3.3 16.6 121 16.3 940
1941 1.2 8.03 131 6.26 1,079
1942 0.5 0.80 149 1.13 1.527
1943 0.5 -0.81 168 1.92 1,810
1944 0.4 1.65 194 -4.96 3,710
1945 0.5 0.8 232 -7.0 2,835
1946 1.9 0 . 0 252 -0.89 2,158
1947 1.4 0 . 0 245 -2.58 2,433
1948 1.3 8.06 217 2 . 8 1,944
1949 1.2 2.49 2 0 1 3.2 1,807
1950 1.6 0.83 197 3.8 1,389 43.81316
1951 1.3 8.76 178 1.9 1,694 51.93016
1952 2.2 7.11 164 1.5 1,792 46.87596
1953 1.8 3.15 154 4.4 2,184 42.53413
1954 1.5 1.43 149 3.8 2,457 41.60354
1955 1.2 3.98 141 3.3 3,781 42.54314
1956 1.3 6 . 1 1 134 2.7 2,083 41.72839
1957 1.6 3.65 126 1.9 8,412 41.49407
427
1958 2.2 3.89 1 2 1 -0.34 3,462 38.39157
1959 2.3 1.34 117 3.4 5,270 38.22627
1960 1.7 1.27 1 1 0 4.5 3,024 41.30951
1961 1.6 3.25 106 3.5 3,046 39.79346
1962 2.1 3.63 103 1 . 0 5,798 38.7525
1963 2.6 2 . 1 2 1 0 1 3.9 1,755 38.7822
1964 1.7 3.61 93 5.2 2,277 38.80818
1965 1.5 4.95 87 2.3 2,925 37.67207
1966 1.5 4.40 84 2 . 0 2,398 37.54288
1967 2.4 2 . 8 8 81 2 . 6 2,787 38.0489
1968 2.4 4.13 81 4.1 4,690 42.21695
1969 2.3 5.32 74 1.5 6,846 42.50344
1970 2.5 7.06 67 2.2 10,980 43.82084
1971 3.4 8.94 60 2.7 13,551 43.5476
1972 3.7 7.84 58 2 . 2 23,909 42.3862
1973 2.2 6.84 52 7.5 7,197 48.48464
1974 2.1 13.89 50 -1.0 14,750 59.62696
1975 3.2 24.06 46 -0.7 6 , 0 1 2 52.59175
1976 4.8 14.13 47 3.6 3,284 57.26631
1977 5.2 13.03 48 1.3 10,142 58.77758
1978 5.1 10.75 49 3.7 9,405 55.20993
1979 4.6 13.44 46 1.6 29,474 55.21527
1980 5.6 17.81 43 -2 . 0 11,964 52.04547
1981 9.0 10.81 46 -2 . 0 4,266 50.38433
1982 10.4 7.33 44 1 . 8 5,312 50.64292
1983 11.2 5.13 43 3.7 3,754 51.9722
1984 11.1 4.52 45 2.4 27,135 56.81158
1985 11.5 5.54 46 3.8 6,402 56.49634
1986 11.6 3.40 44 4.2 1,920 52.06778
1987 10.4 4.86 46 4.4 3,546 51.9535
1988 8.3 6.39 44 5.2 3,702 49.57684
1989 6.1 6.83 39 2 . 1 4,128 51.40334
1990 5.5 6.05 35 0 . 6 1,903 50.62695
1991 7.9 6.36 35 -1.5 761 47.42838
1992 9.4 4.37 36 0 . 1 528 48.41582
1993 10.2 1.6 40 2.3 649 51.96185
1994 9.4 2.4 46 4.4 278 53.68399
1995 8.5 3.5 50 2 . 8 415 57.08764
1996 8.0 2.4 52 2 . 6 1,303 59.07874
1997 6.9 3.1 52 3.5 235 57.09245
1998 6.2 3.4 49 2 . 6 282 54.28551
1999 5.9 1.5 46 2 . 1 242 54.29056
2000 5.4 3.0 42 3.1 499 57.90991
Sources: OECD, 1995. Labour Force Statistics. OECD: Paris.
Mitchell, B. R., 1993. International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-1988. (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: 
Stockton Press.
Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2003.
Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (C1CUP), October 2002.
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America’s Main Economic Indicators, 1935 -  2000
Y e a r Unemployment Inflation Government Debt 
to GNP ratio








1935 20.1 2 . 2 39 9.9 15,500
1936 16.9 1.5 43 13.8 13,900
1937 14.3 3.5 41 5.18 28,425
1938 19.0 -2 . 1 44 -5.10 9,148
1939 17.2 - 1 . 0 42 8.55 17,812
1940 14.6 1 . 0 43 8.50 6,701
1941 9.9 5.0 40 16.0 23,048
1942 4.7 10.4 46 13.0 4,183
1943 1.9 6 . 0 71 13.1 13,501
1944 1.2 1 . 6 96 7.17 8,721
1945 1.9 2.24 117.5 1 . 0 38,025
1946 3.9 18.13 121.7 -19.0 116,000
1947 3.9 8 . 8 109.6 -2 . 8 34,600
1948 3.8 2.7 98.3 4.8 34,100
1949 5.9 - 1 . 8 93.0 -0.5786 50,500
1950 5.3 5.8 93.9 8.7 38,800 8.181615
1951 3.3 5.9 79.5 7.6 22,900 9.423225
1952 3.0 -.9 74.3 3.9 59,100 8.89649
1953 2.9 -.59 71.2 4.5 28,300 8.374369
1954 5.5 -0.3 71.6 -0.67 22,600 8.466593
1955 4.4 0.3 69.4 7.09 28,200 8.66339
1956 4.1 2 . 8 63.8 1.9 33,100 9.409499
1957 4.3 3.0 60.4 1.9 16,500 9.792786
1958 6.8 1.7 60.7 -0.9 23,900 8.843573
1959 5.5 1.5 58.4 7.2 69,000 8.735885
1960 5.5 1.3 56.0 2.4 19,100 9.445088
1961 6.7 0 . 6 55.0 2.3 16,300 9.258961
1962 5.5 1 . 2 53.3 5.5 18,600 9.267821
1963 5.7 1 . 6 51.7 4.0 16,100 9.298134
1964 5.2 1.19 49.3 5.3 22,900 9.618976
1965 4.5 1.7 46.9 6 . 1 23,300 9.590608
1966 3.6 2.9 43.6 5.8 25,400 9.944596
1967 3.7 2 . 8 41.8 2 . 8 42,100 10.10676
1968 3.4 4.2 42.5 4.0 49,018 10.44892
1969 3.4 5.4 38.5 2 . 8 42,869 10.4746
1970 4.8 5.9 37.6 -0.3 66,414 11.2628
1971 5.8 4.3 37.7 3.1 47,589 11.23777
1972 5.5 3.3 36.9 5.4 27,066 11.83244
1973 4.8 6 . 2 35.6 5.5 27,948 13.56898
1974 5.5 11.0 33.6 -0.7 47,991 17.08434
1975 8.3 9.1 34.7 -0.7 31,237 16.14538
1976 7.5 5.8 36.2 4.9 23,962 16.63435
1977 6.9 6.5 35.8 5.2 21,258 16.97072
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1978 5.9 7.7 35.0 4.7 23,774 17.52088
1979 5.7 11.3 33.1 2.4 20,409 18.93889
1980 7.0 13.5 33.3 -0.3 20,844 20.69277
1981 7.5 10.4 32.5 2.3 16,908 20.01288
1982 9.7 3.8 35.2 -2 . 1 9,061 18.16323
1983 9.6 3.7 39.9 4.0 17,461 17.29869
1984 7.5 4.0 40.7 7.0 8,499 18.17739
1985 7.2 3.79 43.9 3.6 7,079 17.25269
1986 6.9 1 . 1 48.2 3.1 11,861 17.51173
1987 6.2 4.3 50.4 2.9 4,469 18.59198
1988 5.5 4.4 51.9 3.8 4,381 19.75899
1989 5.3 4.6 53.0 3.4 16,529 20.19781
1990 5.6 6 . 2 55.9 1 . 2 5,925 20.61974
1991 6.8 2.98 60.7 -0.9 4,584 20.64378
1992 7.5 2.9 64.4 2.7 3,989 20.7988
1993 6.9 2 . 8 66.3 2.3 3,981 20.92695
1994 6.1 2.59 66.9 3.5 5,021 21.98644
1995 5.6 2.53 67.2 2.3 5,771 23.46015
1996 5.4 3.3 67.3 3.4 4,889 23.71018
1997 4 .9 1 . 6 65.6 3.9 4,497 24.49585
1998 4.7 1 . 2 63.2 4.4 5,116 23.87445
1999 4 .4 1.4 61.4 4.2 1,996 24.2283
2000 4 .0 1.9 59.4 5.2 20,149 26.19722
Sources: OECD, 1995. Labour Force Statistics. OECD: Paris.
Department of Labor, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Mitchell, R. B., 1998. International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993. (4th ed) 
Macmillan: Basingstoke.
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
Sweden’s Main Economic Indicators, 1945 -  2000
Y e a r Unemployment Inflation Government Debt 
to GNP ratio








1945 4.5 -0.4 7.1 11,321
1946 3.2 0.4 4.9 27
1947 2.8 2 . 6 3.5 125
1948 2.8 5.0 4.5 151
1949 2.7 1 . 6 5.4 2 1
1950 2.2 1 . 2 38.8 5.1 41
1951 1.8 15.8 32.4 2 . 8 531 54.01877
1952 2.3 8.0 29.5 1 . 6 79 45.99083
1953 2.8 1 . 2 31.1 3.5 582 41.96784
1954 2.6 0 . 6 31.9 5.7 24 44.02913
1955 2.5 2.7 31.7 3.0 159 45.02526
1956 1.7 5.2 30.8 3.3 4 46.67535
1957 1.9 3.8 32.4 2.4 53 47.98466
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1958 2.5 4.0 31.9 2.4 15 44.38861
1959 2.0 0 . 8 32.8 5.4 24 42.69992
1960 1.4 4.2 31.6 3.7 18 45.60977
1961 1.2 2 . 1 28.6 5.7 2 43.25785
1962 1.3 4.7 25.1 4.3 5 42.5172
1963 1.4 2 . 8 23.4 5.2 25 42.67662
1964 1.1 3.0 2 1 . 2 6 . 8 34 43.3241
1965 1.1 5.0 19.0 3.8 4 43.47562
1966 1.4 6.4 18.9 2 . 1 352 42.47558
1967 1.7 4.3 19.3 3.4 0.4 41.26103
1968 2.0 1.9 2 0 . 8 3.6 1 42.29757
1969 1.7 2.7 26.0 5.0 1 1 2 44.95344
1970 1.4 7.0 2 1 . 0 6.5 156 47.68532
1971 2.0 7.4 2 0 . 8 0 . 8 839 46.47
1972 2.0 6 . 0 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 1 1 45.83361
1973 2.5 6.7 2 2 . 6 3.9 1 2 50.90327
1974 2.0 9.9 24.2 4.3 58 63.73183
1975 1.6 9.8 24.4 2 . 2 366 55.24588
1976 1.6 10.3 23.6 1.2 25 55.70874
1977 1.8 11.4 26.5 -2 . 0 87 55.18196
1978 2.2 1 0 . 0 31.8 1.3 37 54.19376
1979 2.1 7.2 37.9 4.3 29 60.43795
1980 2.0 13.7 43.2 1.9 4,478 60.14818
1981 2.5 1 2 . 1 50.8 -0 . 6 209 59.64625
1982 3.1 8.6 59.3 1.1 2 64.93382
1983 3.5 9.0 64.6 1 . 8 37 68.92182
1984 3.1 8 . 0 67.1 4.0 31 68.82427
1985 2.8 7.4 68.7 1.9 504 68.49155
1986 2.7 4.2 6 6 . 6 2.3 696 62.17399
1987 1.9 4.2 60.8 3.1 15 62.70506
1988 1.6 5.8 54.7 2.3 797 62.30348
1989 1.3 6.4 48.7 2.4 410 62.80757
1990 1.7 10.5 45.5 1.4 770 59.2418
1991 2.9 9.7 47.9 -1.1 22 54.44349
1992 5.3 2.5 61.1 -1.4 28 54.42113
1993 8.2 4.7 75.6 -2 . 2 190 61.99749
1994 9.4 2.3 80.6 3.3 52 68.36518
1995 8.8 2 . 8 80.9 3.9 627 74.12771
1996 9.6 0 . 8 80.3 1.3 61 71.43361
1997 9.9 0.9 78.5 1 . 8 23 78.02905
1998 8.2 0.4 73.4 2 . 8 1 . 6 81.14629
1999 6.7 0.3 6 6 . 1 0 5.0 78 81.07326
2000 5.6 1.3 58.20 1 . 0 272 89.02305
Sources: OECD, 1995. Labour Force Statistics. OECD: Paris.
Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2003.
Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Mitchell, B. R., 1993. International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-1988. (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: 
Stockton Press.
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
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